F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
SEP 11 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
REBECCA CISNEROS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HEATHER WILSON, Cabinet Secretary;
CHRISTINE ROMERO, in her individual
capacity,
Defendants,
and No. 98-2215
CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES
DEPARTMENT, as a branch of the State
of New Mexico,
Defendant-Appellee.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. No. CIV-96-1493 LH/DJS)
Donna L. Dagnall, Dagnall, Rames & Thomas, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-
Appellant.
Paula I. Forney, State of New Mexico, Legal Bureau/RMD, Santa Fe, New Mexico, for
Defendant-Appellee.
Jessica Dunsay Silver, Seth M. Galanter, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C., filed a brief for the Intervenor.
Before EBEL, HOLLOWAY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Rebecca Cisneros (Plaintiff) brought this action against the New Mexico
Department of Children, Youth, and Families (Defendant Department).1 Plaintiff alleged
that Defendant Department (1) terminated her because of her disability (severe depression
and acute anxiety) in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and (2) retaliated against her in violation of Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15, because
she had filed charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on both claims, holding that Plaintiff could not prove: (1) that she was a
“qualified individual with a disability” as required by the ADA, or (2) that she was
retaliated against because she had filed charges with the EEOC as required by Title VII.
The Plaintiff appealed. Following argument there was an intervening Supreme
1
Plaintiff also brought claims against various employees of Defendant
Department. The district court dismissed those claims. See I App. at 31. Plaintiff has
not appealed that ruling.
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Court opinion that was handed down in January 2000, Kimel v. Florida Bd of Regents,
120 S. Ct. 631 (2000). We requested supplemental memoranda from the parties and from
the Government as an intervenor. These have been considered and we have determined
that the Eleventh Amendment, which was raised at oral argument, does not bar this suit
and that we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For reasons that follow, we
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I
A
Because the district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See McGarry v. Bd of County
Comm’rs, 175 F.3d 1193, 1198 (10th Cir. 1999) (“We view the evidence, and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.”).
From 1984 until 1995, Plaintiff worked for the Defendant Department (and various
other state agencies). In May 1995, Plaintiff was ordered to investigate another employee
for possible wrongdoing. During the four days of the investigation, Plaintiff was placed
under “extraordinary” emotional strain which caused Plaintiff to suffer a mental
breakdown on May 19, 1995. Before her breakdown, Plaintiff had no mental disability.
Instead, she was a “fully competent” employee who was “performing the duties of her
position.” After her breakdown, Plaintiff was unable to work. She sought treatment from
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a psychiatrist, Dr. Ray, who diagnosed her as suffering from severe depression and acute
anxiety.
To allow her sufficient time to recover, on June 21, 1995 Plaintiff filed a request
for leave pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Defendant
Department granted that request and provided Plaintiff leave from June 26, 1995 until
September 15, 1995 (the maximum amount of leave authorized under that Act). See 29
U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (providing twelve weeks of leave under FMLA).
In early August 1995, Plaintiff requested forms so that she could participate in
Defendant Department’s voluntary annual leave transfer program. That program would
have allowed Plaintiff to remain on paid leave by obtaining donated leave from other
employees. Defendant Department refused to provide the forms directly to Plaintiff
because she had obtained counsel; Defendant Department, instead, told Plaintiff to have
her attorney contact it.2
Around September 12, 1995, Plaintiff wrote Defendant Department requesting that
it extend her leave until January 15, 1996. On September 29, 1995, Defendant
Department wrote back, informing Plaintiff that department policy allowed extended
leave without pay, but only under two circumstances: (1) if the department could assure
her a position of like status and pay at the same geographic location upon return, or (2) if
the department could not make such assurances, but the employee waived his or her right
2
Plaintiff did not receive the forms until September 30, 1995.
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to return to such a position. Defendant Department told Plaintiff that it could not assure
her return to an equivalent position and, thus, it could grant her request for leave only if
she waived her right to return to such a position. Defendant Department placed Plaintiff
on leave without pay until she submitted a completed request for extended leave.
On the same day that Defendant Department wrote back to Plaintiff, September 29,
1995, Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC alleging age and disability discrimination.3
Thereafter, on October 16, 1995, Plaintiff submitted a request for extended leave without
pay, as well as a request to participate in Defendant Department’s voluntary annual leave
transfer program. With the requests, Plaintiff included letters from Dr. Ray and another
of Plaintiff’s doctors, Dr. Maestas, stating that Plaintiff was unable to work. In the
requests Plaintiff refused to waive her right to return to an equivalent position. II App. at
182 (“I am unable to comply with your request to waive my rights to my position, pay and
location upon return to work.”).
On November 6, 1995, Defendant Department informed Plaintiff that it could not
grant her request for extended leave without pay because she had not waived her right to
return to an equivalent position. Defendant Department therefore placed Plaintiff on
“absent without leave” status. See id. at 188; I App. at 117 (employment policy)
(“Failure by the employee to report to work upon the expiration of approved
Family/Medical Leave will result in Absent Without Leave status, and may result in
3
Plaintiff is not pursuing a claim of age discrimination in this action.
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disciplinary action.”) (emphasis in original). Defendant Department, however, gave
Plaintiff five working days from receipt of the letter to reconsider her decision not to
waive that right. Because Plaintiff was absent without leave, Defendant Department
refused to consider her request to participate in the voluntary annual leave transfer
program.
On November 7, 1995, Plaintiff filed another charge with the EEOC, this time
alleging that Defendant Department had retaliated against her for filing the first charge.
Two days later, Plaintiff again informed Defendant Department that she would not waive
her right to return to an equivalent position. In response, Defendant Department told
Plaintiff that it was considering dismissing her from her position for being absent without
leave. After repeated exchanges of correspondence between Plaintiff and Defendant
Department, Defendant Department dismissed Plaintiff on December 23, 1995. On that
same day, Plaintiff filed another charge with the EEOC alleging that she had been
terminated in retaliation for filing her previous charges with the EEOC.
B
On October 29, 1996, Plaintiff filed this action alleging that Defendants (1)
terminated her because of her disability in violation of the ADA, and (2) retaliated against
her because she had filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC in violation of Title
VII. See I App. at 1-5. Thereafter, Defendants moved for summary judgment. See I
App. at 33. On July 22, 1998, the district court granted Defendants’ motion, holding that
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Plaintiff could not prove: (1) that she was a “qualified individual with a disability” as
required by the ADA, or (2) that she was retaliated against because she had filed charges
with the EEOC as required by Title VII. See II App. at 342-44. This timely appeal
ensued.
II
A
At oral argument, Defendants for the first time argued that the ADA does not
validly abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. Ordinarily the failure to
raise an issue in the district court and in the opening brief to this court would waive the
argument. See Smith v. Rogers Galvanizing Co., 128 F.3d 1380, 1385-86 (10th Cir.
1997) (“Generally, we will not consider an issue that was not raised and resolved in the
trial court.”), on rehearing, 148 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 1998). Claims of sovereign
immunity, however, present an exception to that general rule. See In re Talbot, 124 F.3d
1201, 1205 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Although the general rule in the Tenth Circuit is that the
court will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal, the United States' claim
of sovereign immunity presents an exception to the general rule.”); see also Mascheroni v.
Board of Regents of University of California, 28 F.3d 1554, 1559 (10th Cir. 1994) (“We
need not decide whether we are required or merely authorized to consider sua sponte the
Eleventh Amendment's applicability because, in either event, the law is clear that we may
consider whether the Eleventh Amendment bars Dr. Mascheroni's state law claims against
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the Board of Regents.”).
Supreme Court precedent and decisions of this court establish that deciding the
Eleventh Amendment issue is not beyond our jurisdictional grasp and that the issue
should be decided. In Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 466 (1945),
the Supreme Court considered the “conduct” of the Indiana Attorney General in
determining whether the state had waived its sovereign immunity from suit. The Attorney
General had appeared in both the federal district court and the court of appeals where he
defended the suit on the merits and without raising sovereign immunity as a defense.
Only upon reaching the Supreme Court did the state first advance the Eleventh
Amendment as a bar to federal court jurisdiction. Despite the fact that the Attorney
General had waited until this ultimate stage in the proceedings before raising sovereign
immunity as a defense, the Court nonetheless declared that “[t]his was in time.” Id. at
467. The Eleventh Amendment, the Court concluded, “declares a policy and sets forth an
explicit limitation on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will
consider the issue arising under this Amendment in this case even though urged for the
first time in this Court.” Id. (emphasis added).
Ford Motor Co. remains binding. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman, 456 U.S. 89, 99 n.8 (1984) (“The limitation deprives federal courts of any
jurisdiction to entertain such claims, and thus may be raised at any point in a
proceeding.”); Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of the State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 515 n.19
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(1982) (noting that on remand the state may raise the Eleventh Amendment as a defense
even though in earlier proceedings it had relied solely on alternative grounds and had
“expressly requested that we . . . not pass on its potential Eleventh Amendment
immunity”); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974).
The decisions of this court and others are squarely in accord with Ford Motor Co.
In Richins v. Industrial Construction, Inc., 502 F.2d 1051, 1056 (10th Cir. 1974), we
answered the question “[c]an the Eleventh Amendment be waived by the attorney general
of the state entering an appearance and litigating in the case . . .?” by concluding that “it
cannot be so waived . . . absent some extraordinarily effective waiver.” Id.(emphasis
added); see also De Leon Lopez v. Corporacion Insular de Seguros, 931 F.2d 116, 121
(1st Cir. 1991) (“[T]he salience of the provision overrides ordinary notions of procedural
default; an eleventh amendment defense may be raised for the first time even on appeal
to the Supreme Court.”); Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 453 F.2d 819, 827-28 (5th Cir.
1971) (following Ford Motor Co. to hold that “defendants did not waive the right to claim
immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution by defending on
the merits in the district court” where the court of appeals on its own motion raised the
sovereign immunity issue for the first time at oral argument).
Here, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss that did not include the defense of
Eleventh Amendment immunity. We cannot conclude that in so doing the state’s conduct
was sufficiently extraordinary as to warrant a finding that the state effected a waiver of its
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sovereign immunity. See Garcia v. Bd. of Education of the Socorro Consolidated School
District, 777 F.2d 1403, 1405-06 (10th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (holding that the state may
raise the Eleventh Amendment as a defense at oral argument on appeal although it had
raised sovereign immunity in its original answer but then later abandoned that defense);
see also MacDonald v. Bd. of Regents of the University of Michigan, 371 F.2d 818, 819
(6th Cir. 1967) (per curiam) (applying Ford Motor Co. to reject Appellant’s contention
that the state’s filing of an answer waives subsequent right to assert Eleventh Amendment
immunity).
Accordingly, we conclude that we should consider Defendants’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity argument.
B
As Defendants concede, this court’s recent decision in Martin v. Kansas, 190 F.3d
1120 (10th Cir. 1999), held that the ADA validly abrogated the states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity. After Martin, and after the briefing and oral argument of this
appeal, the Supreme Court decided Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631
(2000), on January 11, 2000. There the Court held that the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S. §§ 621-634, did not validly abrogate the States’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity. As noted we then requested further briefing to determine the
status of Martin in light of Kimel. We have considered those further briefs and turn now
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to our resolution of the Eleventh Amendment question.4
“In order to determine whether Congress has abrogated the States' sovereign
immunity, we ask two questions: first, whether Congress has unequivocally expressed its
intent to abrogate the immunity, and second, whether Congress has acted pursuant to a
valid exercise of power." Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996)
(citation, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). As Martin noted, there is no
doubt that Congress passed the first hurdle when it enacted the ADA which provided: “A
State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the
United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a
violation of this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12202; Martin, 190 F.3d at 1126-27; see also H.
Rep. No. 101-485(IV), at 70, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 512, 559 (“Consistent with
the requirements set forth in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.234 (1985),
this section specifies that a State shall not be immune under the 11th Amendment. . . .”).
The dispositive issue here is whether Congress “acted pursuant to a valid exercise
of power” when it enacted the ADA. Congress purported to pass the ADA pursuant to
two Constitutional provisions: Article I, Section 8 (the Commerce Clause) and Section 5
4
We note that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case involving whether the
ADA validly abrogates the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. See University of Alabama
at Birmingham Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 120 S. Ct. 1669 (2000). Plaintiff and the United States
urge us to stay this case pending the Court’s decision in Garrett.
The Court granted certiorari on two earlier occasions to resolve the same question, only to
have the cases settle. We previously stayed this case pending the decisions in those cases. Given
the uncertainty whether the Court will actually decide the question this time in a manner
dispositive here, we decline to stay this case again.
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of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (“It is the purpose of this
[Act] . . . to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce
the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce . . . .”). In Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S.
at 72, the Supreme Court held that Congress cannot validly abrogate the state’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity under its Article I powers. Therefore, Congress could validly
abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity, if at all, only pursuant to Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
C
The Supreme Court’s current test for congressional abrogation of the States’
immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment originated in City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). There, a municipality challenged the constitutionality of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Congress had passed RFRA in response to
the Court’s decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990), which had held that a neutral, generally applicable law ordinarily
would not violate the Free Exercise Clause. By enacting RFRA, Congress sought “to
restore the compelling interest test . . . and to guarantee its application in all cases where
free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b).
In City of Boerne, the Court held that Congress in RFRA had exceeded its power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment:5
5
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[t]he Congress shall have the
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”
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Congress’ power under § 5 . . . extends only to “enforc[ing]” the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has described this
power as “remedial.” The design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are
inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the
substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States. . . .
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 (alterations in original). To protect against impermissible
attempts by Congress to determine the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
adopted a congruence and proportionality test: “There must be a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to
that end.” Id. at 520.
Under this congruence and proportionality test, “[t]he appropriateness of the
remedial measure must be considered in light of the evil presented.” Id. at 530. “Strong
measures appropriate to one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser
one.” Id. The Court therefore looked first to the legislative history of RFRA to determine
the extent of the “evil.” According to the Court, “RFRA’s legislative record lacks
examples of modern instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious
bigotry.” Id. at 530. Thus, the legislative history did not demonstrate a pattern or practice
of unconstitutional action and therefore it did not demonstrate a particularly pernicious
“evil.” See, e.g., id.
“Regardless of the state of the legislative record,” the Court held that “RFRA
cannot be considered remedial, preventive legislation, if those terms are to have any
meaning”:
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Remedial legislation under § 5 should be adapted to the mischief and
wrong which the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect against.
RFRA is not so confined. Sweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at
every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions
of almost every description and regardless of subject matter.
Id. at 532. RFRA failed the “congruence and proportionality” test:
The stringent test RFRA demands of state laws reflects a lack of
proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the
legitimate end to be achieved. If an objector can show a substantial burden
on his free exercise, the State must demonstrate a compelling governmental
interest and show that the law is the least restrictive means of furthering its
interest.
Id. at 533-35. Accordingly, the Court held that RFRA was not a valid exercise of
Congress’s power under Section 5. See id. at 535.
The Court applied the congruence and proportionality test again two terms later in
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 119 S.
Ct. 2199 (1999). There the Court addressed whether the Patent Remedy Act validly
abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. Following City of Boerne, the
Court held that it “must first identify the Fourteenth Amendment ‘evil’ or ‘wrong’ that
Congress intended to remedy. . . .” Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2207. With the Patent
Remedy Act Congress sought to remedy the States’ infringement of patents and their use
of sovereign immunity to deny the patent holders compensation for the infringement. See
id. “In enacting the Patent Remedy Act, however, Congress identified no pattern of
patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations.” Id. The
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Court said:
The legislative record . . . suggests that the Patent Remedy Act does
not respond to a history of “widespread and persisting deprivation of
constitutional rights” of the sort Congress has faced in enacting proper
prophylactic § 5 legislation. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526. Instead,
Congress appears to have enacted this legislation in response to a handful of
instances of state patent infringement that do not necessarily violate the
Constitution. Though the lack of support in the legislative record is not
determinative, see id. at 531, identifying the targeted constitutional wrong
or evil is still a critical part of our § 5 calculus because “[s]trong measures
appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to
another, lesser one.” id. at 530. Here, the record at best offers scant
support for Congress’ conclusion that States were depriving patent owners
of property without due process of law by pleading sovereign immunity in
federal-court patent actions.
Id. at 2210 (alteration in original). Because there was little evidence of constitutional
violations by the states, the Court held that the provisions of the Patent Remedy Act were
“out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventative object.” Florida Prepaid, 119
S. Ct. at 2210.
After City of Boerne,6 a number of circuits, including our circuit, applied the
congruence and proportionality test to the ADA.7 See Garrett v. University of Alabama at
6
Before Boerne, the Seventh Circuit had held that Congress validly abrogated the states’
Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted the ADA. See Crawford v. Indiana Dep’t of
Corrections, 115 F.3d 481, 487 (7th Cir. 1997).
7
We note that the Supreme Court applied the ADA to the states in Pennsylvania Dept. of
Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998). The Court, however, reserved the question whether
the ADA exceeded Congress’ power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at
212 (“We do not address another issue presented by petitioners: whether application of the ADA
to state prisons is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power under . . . § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
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Birmingham Bd. of Trustees, 193 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S.
Ct. 1669 (2000); Dare v. California, 191 F.3d 1167, 1174 (9th Cir. 1999), petition for
cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3566 (U.S. 2000); Martin, 190 F.3d at 1127-28; Mueller v.
Costello, 187 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1999); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426,
1433 (11th Cir. 1998), aff’d on other grounds, 120 S. Ct. 631 (Jan. 11, 2000);8 Coolbaugh
v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430, 438 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 58 (1998); Clark v.
California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub. nom. Wilson v.
Armstrong, 118 S. Ct. 2340 (1998). Most circuits, including ours, held that the ADA
validly abrogated the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.9 The circuits essentially
followed the same approach that this court used in Martin.
In Martin we relied on three principle reasons to distinguish the ADA from RFRA.
8
The Eleventh Circuit in Kimel held that Congress had validly abrogated the States’
Eleventh Amendment immunity when it passed the ADA, but not when it passed the ADEA.
The parties filed separate petitions for certiorari involving the statutes. The Supreme Court
granted the petition for certiorari on the ADEA claim, see 525 U.S. 1121 (1999), and affirmed
the Eleventh Circuit, albeit on a different basis, see 120 S. Ct. at 631, 640. The Supreme Court
also granted certiorari to resolve the ADA question, see Florida Dept of Corrections v. Dickson,
120 S. Ct. 976 (2000), but dismissed the writ after the parties settled that case, 120 S. Ct. 1236.
9
The Eighth Circuit held that the ADA did not validly abrogate the states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1010 (8th Cir. 1999)
(en banc), cert. granted in part, 120 S. Ct. 1265, cert. dismissed, 120 S. Ct. 1265 (2000); Debose
v. Nebraska, 186 F.3d 1087, 1088 (8th Cir.), republished at 207 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3391 (Dec. 1, 1999). Panels of the Fourth Circuit have split on the
question. Compare Amos v. Maryland Dep’t of Public Safety and Correction Services, 178 F.3d
212, 220 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that the ADA validly abrogated the States’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity), vacated on other grounds, 205 F.3d 687 (4th Cir. 2000), with Brown v.
North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698, 707-08 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that
the ADA did not validly abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity).
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We first held the ADA was designed to remedy a strong “evil” or “wrong.” See Martin,
190 F.3d at 1127-28. The Supreme Court in City of Clebourne v. Clebourne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), had held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited
arbitrary discrimination against the disabled. Martin, 190 F.3d at 1128. “Thus, under
Clebourne, the disabled are protected by Fourteenth Amendment, and Congress is entitled
to enforce this protection against the states.” Id. Moreover, “Congress, when it enacted
the ADA, made numerous findings of fact regarding the pervasiveness of discrimination
against disabled persons.” Id. at 1127.
In light of this strong “evil,” the ADA was “congruent and proportional.” See id.
at 1128. We held that, “[t]he Act only prohibits discrimination against ‘qualified
individuals,’ and it requires only ‘reasonable accommodations’ that do not impose an
‘undue burden’ on the employer.” Id. at 1128. Martin therefore concluded that:
The ADA, unlike RFRA, is not attempting to impose a strict
scrutiny standard on all state laws or actions in the absence of evidence of
discrimination.... Rather, the ADA seeks to impose a scheme that will
adequately prevent or remedy a well-documented problem of discrimination
without unduly burdening the state prison system. It subjects some laws
and official actions to a "reasonable accommodation" requirement only to
the point that the accommodation is not unduly burdensome. Such a
scheme, unlike RFRA, does not redefine or expand [disabled persons']
constitutional protections, but simply proportionally acts to remedy and
prevent documented constitutional wrongs.
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
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D
After our decision in Martin, the Supreme Court in January 2000 analyzed whether
the ADEA validly abrogated the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in Kimel, 120 S.
Ct. 631, 645-50 (2000). As in City of Boerne and Florida Prepaid, the Court again
applied the congruence and proportionality test. Unlike City of Boerne and Florida
Prepaid, however, in Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 645, the Court focused its attention on the Equal
Protection Clause. The Court first noted that it had, on three previous occasions, held that
age discrimination claims did not establish violations of the Equal Protection Clause.
See id. (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93
(1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam)).
More importantly, the Court noted that age discrimination victims were not a discrete
class and therefore claims of such discrimination were subject only to rational basis
review. Kimel, 120 S. Ct at 645-46. The Court highlighted the importance of the nature
of scrutiny to be applied by the courts:
States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the
Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally
related to a legitimate state interest. The rationality commanded by the
Equal Protection Clause does not require States to match age distinctions
and the legitimate interests they serve with razorlike precision. . . .In
contrast, when a State discriminates on the basis of race or gender, we
require a tighter fit between the discriminatory means and the legitimate
ends they serve. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, a State may rely on
age as a proxy for other qualities, abilities, or characteristics that are
relevant to the State's legitimate interests. The Constitution does not
preclude reliance on such generalizations.
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Id. at 646 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
The Court then considered the ADEA “against this backdrop” of the Equal
Protection Clause and held that the Act was “so out of proportion to a supposed remedial
or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior.” Id. at 647 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532).
Specifically, the ADEA “makes unlawful, in the employment context, all discriminat[ion]
against any individual . . . because of such individual’s age.” See id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. §
623 (a)(1)) (alterations in original). Accordingly, “[t]he Act, through its broad restriction
on the use of age as a discriminating factor, prohibits substantially more state employment
decisions and practices than would likely be held unconstitutional under the applicable
equal protection, rational basis standard.” Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 647.
The Court said the ADEA’s exceptions did not solve this problem. Section 623
(f)(1) does allow employers to rely on age when it “is a bona fide occupational
qualification [BFOQ] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular
business.” Kime1, 120 S. Ct. at 647. This defense, however, was “a far cry from the
rational basis standard we apply to age discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.”
Id. Moreover, “[u]nder the ADEA, even with its BFOQ defense, the State’s use of age is
prima facie unlawful.” Id. Application of the ADEA thus starts with a presumption in
favor of requiring the employer to make an individualized determination.
The Court next noted that the ADEA (§ 623 (f)(1)) allows employers to engage in
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behavior otherwise prohibited by the Act “where the differentiation is based on
reasonable factors other than age.” Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 648. “Under the Constitution, in
contrast, States may rely on age as a proxy for other characteristics.” Id. This defense
therefore “merely confirms that Congress, through the ADEA, has effectively elevated the
standard for analyzing age discrimination to heightened scrutiny.” Id.
The Court concluded that “the ADEA prohibits very little conduct likely to be held
unconstitutional.” Id. The Court said that this fact,
while significant, does not alone provide the answer to our § 5 inquiry.
Difficult and intractable problems often require powerful remedies, and we
have never held that § 5 precludes Congress from enacting reasonably
prophylactic legislation. Our task is to determine whether the ADEA is in
fact just such an appropriate remedy or, instead, merely an attempt to
substantively redefine the State’s legal obligations with respect to age
discrimination. One means by which we have made such a determination in
the past is by examining the legislative record containing the reasons for
Congress’ action. . . “The appropriateness of remedial measures must be
considered in light of the evil presented.” “Strong measures appropriate to
one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one.”
Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 649 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530).
The Court examined the legislative record and concluded that “Congress never
identified any pattern of age discrimination by the States, much less any discrimination
whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional violations.” Id. at 648-49. At best, the
evidence of discrimination by the States consisted of “isolated sentences clipped from
floor debates and legislative reports,” which was plainly insufficient. See id. at 649.
Finally, although the Court accepted the fact that Congress “found substantial age
- 20 -
discrimination in the private sector, the Court held that this evidence was “beside the
point,” since “Congress made no such findings with respect to the States.” Kimel, 120 S.
Ct. at 649. “A review of the ADEA’s legislative record as a whole, then, reveals that
Congress had virtually no reason to believe that state and local governments were
unconstitutionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of age. . . .
Congress’ failure to uncover any significant pattern of unconstitutional discrimination
here confirms that Congress had no reason to believe that broad prophylactic legislation
was necessary in this field.” Id. at 649-50.
Accordingly the Court in Kimel held that the ADEA did not validly abrogate the
States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.
E
The Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits have now analyzed whether Kimel
required them to revise their previous rulings concerning the ADA and the Eleventh
Amendment. These courts have reached contrary conclusions. Compare Lavia v.
Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections, 2000 WL 1121553 (3d Cir. 2000); Erickson v. Bd. of
Governors of State Colleges and Universities for Northeastern Illinois Univ., 207 F.3d
945, 948 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The Supreme Court’s opinion in Kimel calls all of these
decisions into question, and we think it best to analyze the subject afresh rather than to
rehash pre-Kimel conclusions in and out of this circuit.”), and Cooley v. Mississippi Dept.
of Transp., 96 F. Supp.2d 565, 568 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (“Despite its contrary holding prior
- 21 -
to Kimel, this Court predicts that, if faced with this issue again, the Fifth Circuit would
follow reasoning similar to that of the Seventh Circuit and hold that states are immune
from damages suits under the ADA.”), with Kilcullen v. New York State Dep’t of Labor,
205 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[T]his court has already determined that [the ADA is
legitimate remedial legislation]. New York’s protestations notwithstanding, that decision
is controlling here.”) (citation omitted). Judge Kimball, one of our Tenth Circuit District
Judges has recently made a scholarly survey of this law and has held the ADA’s
abrogation of state Eleventh Amendment immunity valid, following our Martin holding.
See Davis v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 96 F. Supp.2d 1271, 1279 (D. Utah 2000) (“The
Kimel Court merely applied the previous tests that it had announced in Seminole Tribe
and refined in City of Boerne. Because the Tenth Circuit applied the very test that Kimel
requires, Martin is still good law that must be followed by this court.”).
For reasons we will explain, we are persuaded by the views in Kilcullen, in the
dissent of Judge Wood in Erickson, and in Judge Kimball’s Davis opinion. We feel that
Martin’s conclusion on the validity of the ADA’s abrogation of Eleventh Amendment
immunity remains sound and need not be altered because of the analysis in Kimel. Our
reasons follow.
The Second Circuit’s opinion concerned an epilepsy victim with a learning
disability. Kilcullen, 205 F.3d at 77. His suits under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act and
New York law challenged his discharge from the New York Department of
- 22 -
Transportation under both the federal and state laws and alleged that application forms of
the Department violated the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and New York
law also by posing questions about his disability. His suit was dismissed on the ground
that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from considering claims against the
States under the provisions in question. The Kilcullen opinion dealt with an appeal of
one of Kilcullen’s suits.
The Second Circuit rejected the State’s analysis and held that state agencies are not
immune from suit in federal court to enforce the rights guaranteed in Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the 1992 ADA, while not
absolutely congruent in their other requirements, do impose identical obligations on
employers. Kilcullen, 205 F.3d at 79, n.1. Kilcullen noted the two part test set forth in
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996), for determining whether an
act of Congress validly abrogates States’ sovereign immunity: (1) Congress must
unequivocally express its intent to abrogate the immunity; and (2) Congress must act
pursuant to a constitutional provision granting it the power to abrogate. Kilcullen, 205
F.3d at 79.
As to the second prong set out above, Kilcullen said that recent Supreme Court
precedent has clarified that Congress may not abrogate State sovereign immunity
pursuant to its Article I powers, but it may do so pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and its enforcement power there granted. New York conceded the
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unequivocal expression of Congress’ intent to abrogate State sovereign immunity, but
argued that the second Seminole Tribe requirement was not met since Congresss was not
acting pursuant to a valid exercise of its Section 5 enforcement powers when it adopted
the Rehabilitation Act.
More specifically New York later argued that Congress’ abrogation was invalid
because it had not yet developed a sufficient legislative record demonstrating the
Rehabilitation Act was appropriate to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Kilcullen, 205
F.3d at 80. The Second Circuit rejected New York’s objection to consideration of the
subsequently accumulated legislative record when it assessed whether the Rehabilitation
Act constituted remedial legislation. Id. Courts “have always been free to consider
evidence beyond that which is contained in the legislative record.” Id. See Turner
Broadcasting Systems v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 200 (1997). And the Second Circuit, noting
the statement in Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2210, that “lack of support in the legislative
record is not determinative,” concluded that the Supreme Court “has never established a
procedural requirement that Congress document in detail its reasons for adopting the
statute.” Kilcullen, 205 F.3d at 80.
“The ultimate question remains not whether Congress created a sufficient
legislative record, but rather whether, given all of the information before the Court, it
appears that the statute in question can appropriately be characterized as legitimate
remedial legislation.” Id. Kilcullen concluded that examining “the legislative record
- 24 -
Congress compiled in its hearings on the ADA, this court has already determined that the
substance of these twin statutes [the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act] can be so
characterized.” (citing Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 308-11 (2d Cir. 1999)). Kilcullen
concluded that in light of identical provisions in the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, a
single question was presented for review and held that Congress “validly abrogated the
States’ immunity from suit under both the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act.” Kilcullen, 205 F.3d at 82.
In Erickson v. Bd. of Governors, 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2000), the Seventh Circuit
held, inter alia, that Title I of the ADA does not “enforce” the Fourteenth Amendment and
therefore the Eleventh Amendment bars suit in the federal courts against the States and
arms of the States. The majority opinion in Erickson noted that the legislative findings
concerning the ADA “contain not one word about state governments,” id. at 951, and that
legislative statements, as in Kimel, consist “almost entirely of isolated sentences clipped
from floor debates and legislative reports.” (quoting Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 649). The
Seventh Circuit majority therefore concluded that the ADA does not enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment and that private litigation against the States is blocked in the federal courts.
Erickson, 207 F.3d at 952. Judge Wood dissented, finding critical distinctions between the
ADEA and the ADA. For cogent reasons which she articulates, Judge Wood concludes
that the ADA was a permissible exercise of Congress’s Section 5 power with ample support
in the legislative record. It is convenient to detail the reasoning of Judge Wood later after
- 25 -
we discuss the Third Circuit’s Lavia opinion.
In Lavia, a Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Corrections Department employee sued
alleging harassment and termination of his employment. Lavia had suffered from a seizure
and had been diagnosed with CNS Vasculitis of the brain and Lavia alleged his condition
rendered him “disabled.” He sought reinstatement, damages and other relief under the
ADA, the Vocational Rehabilitation Act and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The
latter claim was dismissed by the District Court under the Eleventh Amendment but not the
federal claims. The Commonwealth appealed, challenging Lavia’s claim under the ADA.
The Third Circuit focused on the validity of Congressional abrogation of the
Eleventh Amendment immunity of the Commonwealth. The court held the first
requirement for abrogation was met by the express statement of the ADA on abrogation. It
was held, however, that the Congress did not act in doing so within the proper exercise of
its power. Article I powers, including those under the Commerce Clause, do not support
abrogation. Section 5 power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment was held unavailing
also. The Lavia opinion said that since Congress is only authorized to exercise its Section 5
power to remedy constitutional violations by the States, and not by private members of
society and the community, and because there is no evidence of State violations, Congress
did not validly abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. 2000 WL 1121553,
*9.
Lavia dismisses Judge Wood’s views as merely “forceful and interesting” but says
- 26 -
they do not call for a different result than Lavia’s invalidation of the ADA abrogation
provision. 2000 WL 1121553, *10. We disagree.
We are persuaded by the dissent of Judge Wood in Erickson, id. at 952-61, and not
by the Erickson majority opinion or by Lavia. Judge Wood considered and discussed
Kimel at length, 207 F.3d at 954 et seq., concluding that “Congress legitimately used its
power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it made the ADA applicable to
the states.” Id. at 954. She noted the requirement from Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2205,
that there “must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end.” (quoting from City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at
519-20). Judge Wood pointed out that the Erickson majority opinion “ignores the express
holding of Kimel that ‘we have never held that section 5 precludes Congress from enacting
reasonably prophylactic legislation.’ 120 S. Ct. at 648.” 207 F.3d at 955.
Judge Wood’s dissent found critical distinctions between the ADEA (which Kimel
held to have invalidly attempted to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity) and the
ADA, which Judge Wood found valid in its abrogation of the immunity. She said Kimel
observed that older persons have not been subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment. Id. at 956. Judge Wood pointed out that, in contrast, Congress found in the
ADA that disabled persons have been subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment in critical areas such as employment, transportation, communication, recreation,
institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services. Id. at 956. Thus
- 27 -
in the ADA’s statement of “Findings,” Congress provided a litany of areas in which it
found that the disabled suffer discrimination.10 For purposes of deciding whether Congress
validly abrogated state sovereign immunity in enacting the ADA, Congress’s “Findings”
are especially significant for the extent to which several of its enumerated areas are largely,
or even entirely, the domain of the states. For instance, Congress found that discrimination
exists in “education.” As Judge Wood noted in her dissent in Erickson, “Education in this
country is overwhelmingly an enterprise of state and local government,” and that a full
ninety percent of elementary and secondary school students attend public schools.
Erickson, 207 F.3d at 957 & n.3 (Wood, J., dissenting). Given the clear public nature of
education, we agree with Judge Wood that the inclusion of “education” among the areas in
which Congress found discrimination against the disabled demonstrates a congressional
finding of state discrimination.
The inclusion of “education” is not unique in this regard. As Judge Wood’s dissent
demonstrates, Congress’s enumeration of “transportation” and “health services,” both of
which entail heavy state and local government involvement, likewise represents a
congressional finding that the states themselves engage in discrimination against the
disabled. Id. at 957-58 & nn. 4-5 (Wood, J., dissenting).
Congress’s list of areas of discrimination is not limited to those largely or
10
42 U.S.C. § 12101 states in pertinent part: “The Congress finds . . discrimination against
individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment, housing, public
accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization,
health services, voting, and access to public services. . .”
- 28 -
predominantly controlled by the states. The litany of areas also includes those that
unambiguously are under the exclusive domain of the states. In this regard we note
Congress’s finding that the disabled are subject to discrimination in “voting.” As the
conduct of elections is within the exclusive purview of the states, Congress’s decision to
include “voting” again demonstrates a congressional finding of discrimination by the
States.
We conclude that contrary to Lavia’s holding that the statute lacks a legislative
history or congressional findings of discrimination against the disabled by the states,
Congress did in fact make findings of state discrimination. Having delineated areas
infected by state discrimination against the disabled, Congress properly sought to remedy
and prevent the recurrence of such discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (4) (“[U]nlike
individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national
origin, religion, or age, individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of
disability often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination. . .”). To do so,
Congress validly abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity by invoking its power under
Section 5 in a manner proportionate and congruent to the violations Congress had
identified. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
The dissent of Judge Wood concludes that these and other reasons demonstrate that
the ADA is a permissible exercise of Congress’s section 5 power, and that the ADA and the
ADEA “fare quite differently under the proportionality analysis required by Boerne and
- 29 -
Kimel.” Erickson, 207 F.3d at 956 (Wood, J., dissenting). The dissent reasons that it was
the broad sweep of the ADEA that caused the Supreme Court to find it was not a
proportional response to the problem of age discrimination (the ADEA prohibiting all
employment discrimination on the basis of age against persons over 40, the protected class,
with only limited tempering of the restriction where an employer shows a substantial basis
for believing all or nearly all employees over a given age lack qualifications or because
individual testing is highly impractical). Id. at 957. In contrast, Judge Wood’s dissent
points to the ADA’s “more nuanced approach to the problem of disability discrimination.”
Id. An employer making distinctions on the basis of disability need only show that
reasonable steps of accommodation will not work. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111, 12113. This
leads to the dissent’s conclusion that the ADA meets the first part of Kimel’s analysis --
proportionality. 207 F.3d 955-57.
The dissent then considers the second Kimel question -- whether the legislative
record reveals either a pattern of age discrimination committed by the states or “any
discrimination whatsoever that [rises] to the level of constitutional violation. ” Id. at 957.
The legislative record is found to be admittedly sparse on findings pertaining specifically to
state behavior. The dissent focuses, however, on the fact that
. . .the House Report notes that “inconsistent treatment of people with
disabilities by different state or local government agencies is both inequitable
and illogical.” H. R. Rep. No. 101-485 (II), U. S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News at 319. More importantly, the express congressional findings with
respect to pervasive discrimination address many areas that are controlled to a
significant degree by state and local governments. For example, Congress
- 30 -
identified discrimination in education as a particular problem.
Education in this country is overwhelmingly an enterprise of state and
local government. Another sector singled out in the statute was health
services, in which state and local governments also play a powerful role. The
story is similar for transportation, which is also mentioned in § 12101(3).
Congress’s specific attention to sectors with such a substantial state and local
governmental presence indicates that it knew that government action at the
state level was an important part of the problem it was addressing.
Id. at 957-58 (emphasis added). Moreover the dissent points out that other evidence the
Kimel Court found lacking for the ADEA -- “a record of discrimination that reveals
constitutional violations -- is present in abundance for the ADA.” Id. at 958. The findings
cited by the dissent are reproduced in the Appendix to this opinion.
As noted, in Davis v. Utah State Tax Commission, 96 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D. Utah
2000), Judge Kimball thoroughly analyzed the Eleventh Amendment issue. He agreed, as
we do, with the dissent of Judge Wood in Erickson and restated her analysis at length. We
need not repeat his recitation of her views, and merely note our agreement with the analysis
laid out in the Davis opinion on the Eleventh Amendment issue. We express no view on
other issues which the Davis opinion deals with.
In sum, from our consideration of Kimel and the subsequent opinions we have
analyzed above, Kilcullen, Judge Wood’s dissent in Erickson, and Davis, we are convinced
that this court’s opinion in Martin remains sound and that no subsequent Supreme Court or
other precedent calls for us to revise the conclusions expressed therein. Accordingly, we
hold that the ADA validly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity so that Plaintiff’s
- 31 -
ADA claims against the defendants are not barred by the immunity.
III
We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment to determine
whether it correctly applied the law and whether, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact. See United
States ex rel. Hafter v. Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc., 190 F.3d 1156, 1160 (10th Cir.
1999).
Plaintiff argues vigorously that Defendants caused her disability and otherwise
discriminated against her because of her disability.11 See Appellant’s Brief In Chief at 12-
16. The ADA, however, does not prohibit all disability discrimination. Instead, the Act
bars discrimination only against a “qualified individual with a disability”: “No covered
entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the
disability of such individual in regard to . . . [the] terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (emphasis added). Therefore, even if Defendants
discriminated against Plaintiff, if Plaintiff was not a “qualified individual with a disability,”
then the ADA provides no redress for that wrong. See, e.g., Smith v. Blue Cross Blue
Shield, 102 F.3d 1075, 1077-78 (10th Cir. 1996).
For the purposes of this appeal, Defendants concede that Plaintiff, in fact, is
11
disabled. We therefore do not address that part of the prima facie case.
- 32 -
The term “qualified individual with a disability” means “an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires. . . .” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(8). This court has adopted a two-part test for determining whether a disabled
person meets that requirement:
First, we must determine whether the individual could perform the
essential functions of the job, i.e., functions that bear more than a marginal
relationship to the job at issue. Second, if (but only if) we conclude that the
individual is not able to perform the essential functions of the job, we must
determine whether any reasonable accommodation by the employer would
enable him to perform those functions.
Hudson v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 87 F.3d 1167, 1168 (10th Cir. 1996) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted); see also White v. York Int’l Corp., 45 F.3d 357,
361-62 (10th Cir. 1995) (same). “The determination as to whether an individual is a
‘qualified individual with a disability’ must be made as of the time of the employment
decision.” Nowak v. St. Rita High Sch., 142 F.3d 999, 1003 (7th Cir. 1998); see also
Smith, 102 F.3d at 1077 (stating a similar proposition).12
As demonstrated above, Plaintiff’s disability prevented her from attending work.
Attendance is generally an “essential” function of any job. See Nowak, 142 F.3d at 1003
(“Obviously, an employee who does not come to work cannot perform the essential
12
Thus, Defendant’s evidence that Plaintiff is still unable to work is not relevant
to the question whether she was a “qualified individual with a disability” at the time of
the challenged discrimination.
- 33 -
functions of his job.”); Rogers v. Int’l Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 759 (5th Cir.
1996) (“[A]n essential element of any job is an ability to appear for work. . . .”) (citation,
alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Plaintiff concedes that
attendance is ordinarily an essential function of her job. See Appellant’s Brief In Chief at
11.
Because Plaintiff cannot perform an essential function of her position, we must
“determine whether any reasonable accommodation by the employer would enable [her] to
perform those functions.” Hudson, 87 F.3d at 1168. It is well-settled that a request for
leave may lead to a “reasonable” accommodation – such a request may allow an employee
sufficient time to recover from an injury or illness such that the employee can perform the
essential functions of the job (i.e., attend work) in the future. See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630,
Appendix to Part 1630 – Interpretative Guidance to Title I of the ADA, § 1630.2(o)
(Examples of possible accommodations include “permitting the use of accrued paid leave
or providing additional unpaid leave for necessary treatment.”); see also Taylor v. Pepsi-
Cola Co., 196 F.3d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1999) (“An allowance of time for medical care or
treatment may constitute a reasonable accommodation.”) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); Rascon v. U.S. West Communications, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324, 1334 (10th
Cir. 1998) (stating the same rule); Hudson, 87 F.3d at 1168 (stating a similar proposition).
However, “[t]he term ‘reasonable accommodation’ refers to those accommodations
which presently, or in the near future, enable the employee to perform the essential
- 34 -
functions of his job.” Hudson, 87 F.3d at 1169 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis added); see also Meyers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995)
(stating the same proposition). Accordingly, a request for indefinite leave cannot constitute
“reasonable” accommodation – such a leave request does not allow the employee to
perform the essential functions of the job in the near future.13 Plaintiff suggests, however,
that she did not request indefinite leave. See Appellant’s Brief In Chief at 16. Instead, she
requested leave for a finite period of time: from November 1995 to January 1996. See id.
According to Plaintiff, she therefore requested a “reasonable” accommodation pursuant to
this court’s precedent. See, e.g., id.
Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, this court has required an employee to provide an
expected duration of the impairment (not the duration of the leave request). See Hudson,
87 F.3d at 1169 (“This court agrees with plaintiff that a reasonable allowance of time for
medical care and treatment may, in appropriate circumstances, constitute a reasonable
accommodation. In this case, however, plaintiff has failed to present any evidence of the
expected duration of her impairment as of the date of her termination.”); see also Taylor,
196 F.3d at 1110 (stating a similar proposition); Rascon, 143 F.3d at 1334 (stating a similar
13
Other circuits have adopted similar requirements. See Nowak, 142 F.3d at 1004
(7th Cir.) (“The ADA does not require an employer to accommodate an employee who
suffers a prolonged illness by allowing him an indefinite leave of absence.”); see also
Mitchell v. Washington Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 9 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating a similar
proposition); Watkins v. J & S Oil Co., Inc., 164 F.3d 55, 62 (1st Cir. 1998) (similar);
Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 120 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 1997).
- 35 -
proposition); Smith, 102 F.3d at 1077 (stating a similar proposition). Without an expected
duration of an impairment, an employer cannot determine whether an employee will be able
to perform the essential functions of the job in the near future and therefore whether the
leave request is a “reasonable” accommodation. See, e.g., Hudson, 87 F.3d at 1169. For
example, in Rascon an employee submitted evidence from his doctor that the expected
duration of his treatment was four months and his prognosis for recovery was “good.” See
143 F.3d at 1334. In the circumstances, the court held that the employee’s request for leave
to seek treatment for his illness constituted “reasonable” accommodation. See id.
In Hudson, 87 F.3d at 1169, on the other hand, the employee submitted some
evidence that she was not permanently disabled. The employee, however, failed to
provide any evidence of the expected duration of the impairment. See id. In such
circumstances the court held that the employee failed to create a triable issue of fact
regarding the “reasonableness” of her requested leave. See id.; see also Taylor, 196 F.3d at
1110 (“As in Hudson, Plaintiff failed to present evidence of the expected duration of his
impairment.”); Smith, 102 F.3d at 1077 (rejecting the plaintiff’s ADA claim, because “[a]s
of the date of her replacement or termination, Smith had presented no evidence of the
expected duration of her complete disability”).
The district court correctly concluded that, as in Hudson, Taylor, and Smith, Plaintiff
failed to prove the expected duration of her illness and thereby the “reasonableness” of her
request for leave. See II App. at 342 (“Because she has not established if and when she
- 36 -
could return to work, she has not established that she is a qualified individual.”). As noted
above, Plaintiff submitted letters from her doctors when she requested extended leave. The
first letter, from Dr. Ray, stated that Plaintiff “remains unable to return to work. It is
uncertain when she may be capable of returning to work.” Id. at 184 (emphasis added).
The second letter, from Dr. Maestas, states that “[m]edically, [Plaintiff] is to be considered
unable to maintain any type of job duties and should be considered temporarily disabled.
The duration of the above illnesses are unknown, however, she will be followed very
closely in this office and should be excused from any and all work until January of 1996.”
Id. at 185 (emphasis added).
Thus the letters state that the duration of the illness is both “uncertain” and
“unknown.” Indeed, Plaintiff conceded below that the record contains “no firm date of
return to work. . . .” II App. at 324 (summary judgment hearing) (Plaintiff’s attorney); see
also id. at 325 (Plaintiff’s attorney) (“[T]here is nothing in this record at this time that
establishes she would be back at work at a certain date in 1996.”). In these circumstances
the letters from Plaintiff’s doctors do not establish that Plaintiff’s leave request was a
“reasonable” accommodation.
Plaintiff, however, cites her own affidavit here in which she states that she expected
to recover by January 1996. See II App. at 203 (“I believe I would have returned to work in
January 1996 if the Department employees had not begun to harass me.”). As the district
court correctly held, Plaintiff’s own belief is not sufficient to create a triable issue of fact,
- 37 -
especially where, as here, her belief is inconsistent with the evidence from her own doctors.
See II App. at 341-42 (district judge’s oral ruling) (“The only evidence in the record that I
can find with respect to this issue, is her affidavit, Exhibit 20, in which she states that she
believes she could have returned to work in January of 1996, if Department employees had
not harassed her. There is no other evidence. That is not the evidence necessary to
establish that she was capable of performing the essential functions of her position. She
has not established if or when she could return to work.”); see also Martin v. Nannie and
the Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410, 1418 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Martin is unable to provide
anything but her own unsupported assertion that the reasons given for her termination are a
pretext for sexual discrimination. Conclusory statements are insufficient to defeat a motion
for summary judgment.”); McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 149 F.3d 1125, 1130 (10th
Cir. 1998) (holding that the plaintiff’s own opinion was insufficient to establish a triable
issue of fact).
Plaintiff next argues that her request was “reasonable” because it complied with
Defendants’ leave polices. She argues that the court announced such a rule in Rascon. See
Appellant’s Brief In Chief at 17-18. We are not persuaded. As noted above, in Rascon this
court held that a leave request is not reasonable if the “plaintiff failed to present evidence
of the expected duration of her impairment.” In Rascon, 143 F.3d at 1334, the plaintiff
provided such evidence: the plaintiff’s doctor told the defendants that a four month in-
patient program was likely to effectively treat the plaintiff. See id. The court thus held that
- 38 -
the plaintiff had established that the leave request was a “reasonable” accommodation. See
id.
The ADA, however, does not require an employer to provide all reasonable
accommodations. Instead, an employer need not provide an accommodation that requires
“undue hardship.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (“[T]he term discriminate includes . . .
not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with disability . . . unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of
the business of such covered entity.”). In Rascon, 143 F.3d at 1334, the defendants
claimed that providing the plaintiff with his requested leave would result in such a
hardship. The court held that the plaintiff’s leave request could not constitute undue
hardship because it was less onerous than the leave offered by the employer’s leave
policies. See id. at 1334-35.
Contrary to Plaintiff’s reading of Rascon, that case does not establish that a
requested leave is a “reasonable” accommodation if such leave is authorized by the
employer’s leave policies. Instead, Rascon holds that if leave requested is otherwise
“reasonable” – because it provides an expected duration of the impairment – then the leave
cannot constitute undue hardship if the requested leave is authorized by the employer’s
leave policies. Here Plaintiff never established that her request for leave was “reasonable.”
Therefore, pursuant to Rascon the court need not address whether her request would
- 39 -
constitute undue hardship. In the circumstances, the nature of Defendants’ leave policies is
simply not relevant.
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to establish that she was a “qualified individual with a
disability” because she failed to show that her requested leave was a “reasonable”
accommodation. Therefore, she cannot prevail on her claim under the ADA regardless of
whether Defendants caused her condition or subjected her to disability discrimination. In
these circumstances the district court correctly granted Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA claim.
IV
Plaintiff further asserts a retaliation claim. She argues that Defendants subjected her
to adverse employment actions because she had filed charges of discrimination with the
EEOC.14 Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because [the employee] has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §
14
In her opening brief, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants retaliated against her for
taking FMLA leave. See Appellant’s Brief In Chief at 25. FMLA does prohibit such
retaliation. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (making it unlawful for an employer "to interfere
with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under"
the Act). However, Plaintiff neither alleged a violation of the FMLA in her complaint,
nor did she otherwise raise such a claim below. In the circumstances, we will not
consider Plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation argument. See Rademacher v. Colorado Ass'n of
Soil Conservation Dists. Med. Benefit Plan, 11 F.3d 1567, 1572 (10th Cir. 1993) (“The
general rule, however, is that the failure to raise the issue with the trial court precludes
review except for the most manifest error.”) (citation, alteration, and internal quotation
marks omitted).
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2000e-3(a). Title VII, therefore, prohibits an employer from retaliating against an
employee who has filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, see McGarry, 175 F.3d
at 1201, but only when the charge alleges discrimination on the basis of “race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Plaintiff’s charges alleged age
and disability discrimination. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot state a claim of retaliation
under Title VII.
Like Title VII, the ADEA makes it
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or
applicants for employment, for an employment agency to discriminate against
any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member
thereof or applicant for membership, because such individual, member or
applicant for membership has opposed any practice made unlawful by this
section. . . .
29 U.S.C. § 623(d). Therefore, the ADEA prohibits an employer from retaliating against
an employee who has filed a charge of age discrimination with the EEOC. As indicated
above, however, the ADEA does not validly abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 650. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot pursue a claim of
retaliation against Defendants, a state agency, under the ADEA.
Finally, the ADA, like Title VII and the ADEA, also provides that “[n]o person shall
discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice
made unlawful by this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12203. Therefore, the ADA prohibits an
employer from retaliating against an employee who has filed a charge of disability
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discrimination with the EEOC. As stated above, the ADA (unlike the ADEA) validly
abrogates the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. Accordingly, we consider whether
Plaintiff adequately states a claim for retaliation under the ADA.
Retaliation claims generally proceed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
analysis. Gonzagowski v. Widnall, 115 F.3d 744, 749 (10th Cir. 1997).15 Under that
analysis, the employee must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation by
demonstrating that: “(1) she engaged in protected opposition to [ADA] discrimination or
participated in a[n] [ADA] proceeding; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action
contemporaneous with or subsequent to such opposition or participation; and (3) there is a
causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.”
Penry v. Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 155 F.3d 1257, 1263-64 (10th Cir. 1998)
(quoting Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Schs., 43 F.3d 1373, 1381 (10th Cir. 1994)); see also
Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1324 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating the same requirement).
If the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer
15
A plaintiff “may also establish discrimination directly, in which case the
McDonnell Douglas framework is inapplicable.” Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164
F.3d 545, 550 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 120 S. Ct. 48 (1999). “To prevail via this direct
method, a plaintiff must introduce direct or circumstantial evidence that the alleged
retaliatory motive actually relates to the question of discrimination in the particular
employment decision, not to the mere existence of other, potentially unrelated, forms of
discrimination in the workplace.” Id.; see also Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d
1204, 1207 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[S]tatements of personal bias or prejudice[] do not
constitute direct evidence of discrimination.”). Plaintiff has not argued (and cannot
successfully argue) that she satisfies that requirement.
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to articulate legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for the adverse action. See Medlock v.
Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 550 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 120 S. Ct. 48 (1999). If the
employer meets its burden, the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the
proffered reasons are pretextual. See id. The employee can prove pretext by “showing
either that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or that the
employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc.,
188 F.3d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 1999) (citation, alteration, and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Rea v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1450, 1455 (10th Cir. 1994)
(stating the same requirement).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant took several separate employment actions in
retaliation for her filing charges with the EEOC. We examine each claim in turn.
A
Plaintiff first alleges that Defendants refused to provide her with the donated leave
application because she had filed a charge with the EEOC. See Appellant’s Brief In Chief
at 24-26. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, however, Plaintiff must prove,
among other requirements, that “she suffered an adverse employment action
contemporaneous with or subsequent to” the filing of her charge with the EEOC. Penry,
155 F.3d at 1263-64. Plaintiff concedes that Defendants refused to provide her with the
annual donated leave forms in early August. See II App. at 199 (Plaintiff’s affidavit) (“In
early August 1995, I went to the Human Resources Office of the Department. I requested
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from Carla Armijo the appropriate forms to complete to request Annual Donated Leave
pursuant to the Department’s Catastrophic Leave Policy. . . . Ms. Armijo told me that since
I had an attorney representing me on my grievance against the Department, she could not
give me any forms and refused to do so.”).
Plaintiff did not file her first charge with the EEOC until September 29, 1995, over a
month after the challenged employment action in early August. That being so, Plaintiff
cannot prove that the employment action occurred “contemporaneous with or subsequent
to” her filing a charge with the EEOC. Therefore, Plaintiff’s first claim of retaliation
fails.
B
Plaintiff further argues, however, that Defendants’ refusal to consider her request to
participate in the donated annual leave program constitutes unlawful retaliation. We are
persuaded that plaintiff established a prima facie case of retaliation: (1) Plaintiff filed a
charge of discrimination with the EEOC, which constituted protected opposition to ADA
discrimination; (2) Defendants denied plaintiff’s request to participate in the annual
donated leave program on November 6, 1995, a date subsequent to her filing of her first
EEOC charge on September 29, 1995; and (3) the temporal proximity between the
protected filing of the EEOC charge and the adverse employment action of refusing
Plaintiff’s request is sufficient to demonstrate a causal connection. See McGarry, 175 F.3d
at 1201.
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The burden then shifted to Defendants to offer a legitimate, non-retaliatory rationale
for those decisions. Defendants met that burden by stating that it refused to consider
Plaintiff’s request because she was AWOL. See II App. at 189. The burden thus shifted
back to Plaintiff to prove that this proffered rationale was pretextual.
To demonstrate such pretext, Plaintiff points to the combination of circumstances of
the manner and timing of Defendants’ refusal to consider her application to participate in
the annual leave donation program, and Defendants’ designating her AWOL retroactively
to October 18, 1995. See Appellant’s Brief In Chief at 24-25. We agree that such
circumstances are sufficient for the trier of fact to find pretext.
Plaintiff requested that Defendants allow her to participate in the annual donated
leave program on October 16, 1995. See II App. at 182-83. At that time, Plaintiff was not
AWOL; she had been placed on leave without pay by her supervisor, pending completion
of a request for extended leave without pay (which Plaintiff also submitted on October 16,
1995). See id. at 170. Defendants received Plaintiff’s requests for extended leave without
pay and for participation in the annual donated leave program on October 18, 1995. See id.
at 182, 183, 187. On November 6, Defendants denied Plaintiff’s request for extended leave
without pay because Plaintiff refused to waive her right to return to an equivalent position.
See id. at 187-88. In that same November 6, 1995 letter, Defendants also placed Plaintiff
on AWOL status, retroactively to October 18, 1995, the date on which defendant received
Plaintiff’s requests. Defendants then refused to consider Plaintiff’s request to participate in
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the annual donated leave program because she was AWOL. See id. at 189.
A rational trier of fact could infer pretext from the timing and manner of
Defendants’ action. Specifically, Plaintiff was not AWOL when she submitted her request
to participate in the annual donated leave program and Defendants refused to consider her
request because it retroactively deemed her AWOL. Although Defendants may have
retroactively declared Plaintiff AWOL for a legitimate reason, a rational trier of fact could
also infer that Defendants took the action for an illegitimate reason. In the circumstances,
the district court erred by granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See
Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1240 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Although Kimura's actions may
have an innocent explanation, on summary judgment the only question is whether a rational
juror could infer a noninnocent explanation. A rational juror could infer that Kimura's acts
showed affirmative agreement with Iopa's actions. In the circumstances, the district court
erred by granting summary judgment to Defendants on Anderson's claim. . . .”), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 324 (1999); see also Marx v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., 76 F.3d 324, 329
(10th Cir. 1996) (“Granting plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, the pattern of
actions taken by defendants precludes summary judgment concerning defendants’
motivation in demoting plaintiff and terminating his employment.”); Corneveaux v. CUNA
Mut. Ins. Group, 76 F.3d 1498, 1504 (10th Cir. 1996) (“This case presented material
factual disputes which should have been resolved by the trier of fact. If the jury had found
CUNA's reasons to be pretexts for age discrimination then it could have inferred intentional
- 46 -
discrimination and found in favor of Ms. Corneveaux.”).
In sum, we hold that the summary judgment rejecting the retaliation claim was error
for reasons stated above in this Part IV-B of this opinion. With respect to this claim of
retaliation based on the manner and timing of Defendants’ refusal to consider Plaintiff’s
application for participation in the annual donated leave program and Defendants’ related
actions, we reverse the grant of summary judgment.
V
Plaintiff has challenged the district court’s decision to award costs to Defendants.
Because we have reversed the district court’s decision in part, we remand for
reconsideration of the cost question in light of our decision.
VI
Accordingly we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part the district court’s grant of
summary judgment for Defendants. We REMAND for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
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APPENDIX
In full, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 states:
The Congress finds that--
(1) some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental
disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a whole is
growing older;
(2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with
disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive
social problem;
(3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical
areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education,
transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health
services, voting, and access to public services;
(4) unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of
race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals who have
experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have often had no legal
recourse to redress such discrimination;
(5) individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of
discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory
effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers,
overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications to existing
facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards and criteria,
segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits,
jobs, or other opportunities;
(6) census data, national polls, and other studies have documented that people
with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and are
severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and
educationally;
(7) individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have
been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of
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purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political
powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the
control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not
truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in,
and contribute to, society;
(8) the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to
assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and
economic self-sufficiency for such individuals; and
(9) the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and
prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an
equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is
justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars in
unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity.
(b) Purpose
It is the purpose of this chapter--
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the
standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities;
and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to
enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to
address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with
disabilities.
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No. 98-2215, Rebecca Cisneros v. Heather Wilson et al.
KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I.
At oral argument, Defendants raised the Eleventh Amendment, which had not
been presented to the district court or in their appellate briefs. The Eleventh
Amendment may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, and sua sponte. See
Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 745 n.2 (1998); Higgins v. Mississippi, 217 F.3d
951, 953-54 (7th Cir. 2000); United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Business & Technical
Institute, Inc., 173 F.3d 890, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Our cases have considered
Eleventh Amendment immunity sua sponte, and in similar circumstances. See, e.g.,
Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf and Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir.
1999); V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 131 F.3d 1415, 1419-20 (10th
Cir. 1997); Mascheroni v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 28 F.3d 1554, 1559
(10th Cir. 1994).
In view of the Supreme Court’s holding in Wisconsin Dep’t of Corrections v.
Schacht, 524 U.S. 381 (1998), however, it seems appropriate to consider whether the
Defendants have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity argument.
According to the Court,
The Eleventh Amendment . . . does not automatically
destroy original jurisdiction. Rather, the Eleventh
Amendment grants the State a legal power to assert a
sovereign immunity defense should it choose to do so. The
State can waive the defense. Nor need a court raise the
defect on its own. Unless the State raises the matter, a court
can ignore it.
Schacht, 524 U.S. at 389. To be sure, past Supreme Court cases have implied that
Eleventh Amendment immunity is in the nature of a subject matter jurisdiction
defense. See id., 524 U.S. at 393 (Kennedy, J., concurring). While the Eleventh
Amendment may be a limitation on a federal court’s judicial power, “it is not
coextensive with the limitations on judicial power in Article III.” Calderon, 523 U.S.
at 745 n.2. Were the Eleventh Amendment truly jurisdictional, a court would not be
free to ignore it. See Parella v. Retirement Bd. of the R.I. Employees Retirement Sys.,
173 F.3d 46, 55-56 (1st Cir. 1999). Even the Supreme Court has addressed merits
questions before Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources v. United States ex rel. Stephens, 120 S. Ct. 1858, 1865-66 (2000).
Here, Defendants were represented by the able Legal Bureau of the New Mexico
State Risk Management Division, and did not raise Eleventh Amendment immunity as
an affirmative defense in their answer. They moved to dismiss only the individual
Defendants named in their individual capacities. In replying to Plaintiff’s argument
against the motion, Defendants relied upon abrogation of Eleventh Amendment
immunity and stated:
The waiver of the state’s immunity has been validated, at least for Title
VII and whether the waiver is valid for the ADA has not been
conclusively determined in light of Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida ,
[517 U.S. 44] (1996), but that issue is not asserted in the pending motion.
-2-
Aplt. App. 26. The district court agreed that Eleventh Amendment immunity had been
abrogated pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 29. After failing
to make an argument that the ADA’s abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity
was invalid, Defendants participated in discovery and then moved for summary
judgment on the merits.
Although a state’s waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity must be clear and
unequivocal, waiver is possible where the state voluntarily invokes federal jurisdiction
or clearly declares its intent to submit to federal jurisdiction. See College Sav. Bank
v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. , 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2226 (1999).
We have found waiver where a state removes a case to federal court, asserts immunity
and then defends on the merits. See McLaughlin v. Board of Trustees of State
Colleges of Colo. , 215 F.3d 1168, 1170-71 (10th Cir. 2000) (adopting Justice
Kennedy’s approach in his concurring opinion in Schacht ); see also Sutton , 173 F.3d
at 1234-36 (state removed to federal court and litigated on the merits). Of course,
merely defending a suit in federal court does not amount to a waiver. But where a
state is aware of the Eleventh Amendment argument but withholds it in favor of
defending on the merits, its conduct may amount to a waiver. See Neinast v. Texas ,
217 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he state cannot simultaneously proceed past the
motion and answer stage to the merits and hold back an immunity defense”); Hill v.
Blind Indus. & Servs. of Maryland , 179 F.3d 754, 762-63 (9th Cir. 1999). In deciding
-3-
this issue, we may look to the conduct of the state claiming Eleventh Amendment
immunity. See Innes v. Kansas State Univ. (In re Innes) , 184 F.3d 1275, 1280 (10th
Cir. 1999), cert. denied , 120 S. Ct. 1530 (2000). Defendants never presented their
current argument to the district court, preferring to hedge the bet at the court of
appeals during oral argument. Because the case is easily resolved on grounds narrower
than the Eleventh Amendment, I would not reach the Eleventh Amendment issue. See
Parella , 173 F.3d at 56-57; see generally Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, P.C. ,
467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth. , 297 U.S. 288, 347
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
II.
I concur in the court’s opinion on the merits (parts III & IV), with the exception
of part IV(B), which reverses summary judgment on the ADA retaliation claim. While
it is true that Plaintiff was on leave without pay status at the time she made her request
to participate in the leave donation program, that leave without pay status was only
until Defendants received a completed request for extended leave without pay. Aplt.
App. 170 (Defendants’ letter to Plaintiff dated 9/29/95) (“On Friday, September 15,
Christine B. Romero, Director of the Human Resources Division, verbally approved
leave without pay (as opposed to ‘extended leave without pay’) until such time as the
Department receives your completed Request for Extended Leave Without Pay form
-4-
so we can make a formal decision based on applicable rules.”). Plaintiff’s request was
received on October 18, 1995. Aplt. App. 187. On November 6, 1995, the Defendant
denied the request for extended leave without pay because Plaintiff would not waive
the “like status and pay, at the same geographic location” condition. Id. at 188.
Plaintiff was placed in AWOL status as of October 18, 1995, which was the date that
the leave without pay status ran out. See id. She was also given additional time to
waive the condition. See id.
Though the Court states that placement in AWOL status was retroactive, Prop.
Op. at 46, it must be remembered that Plaintiff’s status after October 18, 1995, was
a fait accompli if she would not waive the condition. None of the summary judgment
material suggests that Defendants were under any obligation to grant her extended
leave without pay when she would not waive the condition, and then allow her to
participate in the leave program.
In seeking summary judgment, Defendants articulated a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for placing the Plaintiff in AWOL status as of October 18,
1995–specifically, Plaintiff refused to waive the pertinent condition. See Aplt. App.
41; Aplee. Supp. App. 32-33. Defendant then refused to consider the leave donation
request as Plaintiff was AWOL and not in good standing. See Aplt. App. 115, 271.
Plaintiff was warned repeatedly about this and the evidence indicates that a failure to
report for work when FMLA leave expired might be considered a voluntary
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resignation. See Aplee. Supp. App. 26.
In my view, Plaintiff completely failed to demonstrate pretext. See Anderson
v. Coors Brewing Co. , 181 F.3d 1171, 1180 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing pretext). For
example, Plaintiff’s response to the summary judgment motion states:
25. Other employees of the Defendant have been granted donated annual
leave despite the sworn affidavit of Christine Romero, which contradicts
her deposition testimony. 16 Her affidavit indicates no other coworkers of
Plaintiff had been granted said leave.
26. Defendant Christine Romero has indicated an animosity towards the
Plaintiff over a number of years.
Aplt. App. 144 (citations omitted). Plaintiff then points to a coworker (Don Lawson)
who requested donated annual leave because of a medical condition that required a six-
month absence. Id. at 174, 202. Plaintiff, however, has no evidence that the coworker
was similarly situated to her–that the coworker was at a point where he needed
indefinite extended leave without pay and refused to waive the pertinent condition
simultaneously with requesting leave donations. Cf. Krouse v. American Sterilizer
Co. , 126 F.3d 494, 504 (3rd Cir. 1997) (analyzing “similarly situated” in ADA
retaliation context). Nothing indicates that the Defendant’s reasons are unworthy of
belief, thus, I respectfully dissent from part IV(B).
16
The contradiction is hardly apparent. In opposing summary judgment, Plaintiff
has the burden to explain. See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671-72
(10th Cir.1998)
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