F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
JAN 29 2001
PUBLISH
PATRICK FISHER
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
DAVID E. HOLLINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-4072
DELTA AIRLINES,
Defendant-Appellee,
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Utah
(D.C. No. 97-CV-788-S)
Larry G. Reed, of Anderson & Karrenberg, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-
Appellant.
Janet Hugie Smith, of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, Salt Lake City, Utah (Frederick
R. Thaler, of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, Salt Lake City, Utah, and Andrew J.
Fisher, Delta Airlines, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia, with her on the brief), for
Defendant-Appellee.
Before SEYMOUR, MURPHY, Circuit Judges, and KANE, * District Judge.
SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.
*
Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior District Judge, United States District
Court for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation.
David E. Hollins appeals from the order of the district court granting
summary judgment to his former employer, Delta Airlines, on his racial
harassment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. For
the reasons stated below, we affirm.
I
David E. Hollins began his employment as an associate customer service
agent with Delta Airlines in December 1995. On February 4, 1996, a white co-
worker, Rex Fidler told Mr. Hollins the following joke: “How can you tell when a
person is well-hung?” Answer: “When you can’t get two fingers between his
neck and the rope.” App., vol. I at 47, 124. Mr. Hollins immediately reported the
joke to two Delta supervisors, Dennis Jacobson and Carla Sutera. Mr. Jacobson
and Ms. Sutera spoke with Mr. Fidler about the inappropriateness of the joke and
requested written statements from Mr. Fidler, Mr. Hollins, and another Delta
employee who had witnessed the incident. Delta thereafter gave Mr. Fidler a
warning letter and placed it in his employment file.
At some point prior to his telling of the “well-hung” joke, Mr. Fidler had
told a group of employees, including Mr. Hollins, the following joke: “If you
have a Black, a Mexican, and a Tongan in a car, who is the driver?” Answer:
“The Sheriff.” App., vol. I at 50; vol. II at 170. No employee ever reported this
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joke to a Delta supervisor.
Sometime after the “well-hung” joke incident, Mr. Hollins noticed several
hangman’s nooses dangling from the ceiling above his work area. He also noticed
nooses hanging in two other areas. One was hung in such a way that it swung
down when a door was opened. The other was hung in an area where an African-
American employee worked. Mr. Hollins did not complain about these nooses to
anyone. However, Charles Wilson, an African-American co-worker of Mr.
Hollins, complained about the nooses to Tom Brothers, the immediate supervisor
of both Mr. Hollins and Mr. Wilson. Mr. Brothers immediately removed all the
ropes and then held a meeting with the employees in which he indicated the ropes
were offensive and would not be tolerated. Shortly thereafter, an employee named
Stan White told Mr. Brothers that it was he who had tied the ropes. He stated he
tied ropes to pass the time and had not intended to offend anyone. Mr. White was
given a warning letter and a copy was placed in his employment file.
According to Mr. Hollins, Mr. Brothers’ treatment of him dramatically
changed after he complained about the “well-hung” joke. Mr. Brothers began to
follow him during his meal breaks, warning him and other African-American
employees that “You’d better be back to work before I’m through eating.” App.,
vol. II at 172. He followed and “intently” watched African-American employees
while they ate. Id. Mr. Brothers also began to stand near Mr. Hollins while he
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was at work and to scrutinize his work closely. He followed Mr. Hollins and used
the restroom at the same time. Mr. Hollins also contends Mr. Brothers began to
write him up for minor infractions in the workplace that, while violations of Delta
policy, were often ignored by supervisors. However, Mr. Hollins never
complained of Mr. Brother’s conduct to a supervisor or to Delta’s Equal
Employment Opportunity (EEO) officer.
In granting summary judgment for Delta, the district court focused on
whether the treatment Mr. Hollins received from his co-workers and supervisors
amounted to a racially hostile work environment, relying on this Court’s analysis
in Bolden v. PRC, Inc., 43 F.3d 545 (10th Cir. 1994). The district court held that
Mr. Hollins failed to meet the Bolden requirement that the harassment be
“pervasive or severe enough to alter the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment” and that it be “racial or stem[] from racial animus.” Id. at 551. The
court concluded “there is no viable evidence that either the hanging joke or rope
incidents were racial or stemmed from racial animus,” and that while the
“‘sheriff’ joke appears to have racial overtones . . . it clearly was an isolated
incident.” App., vol. II at 253. The district court held it “uncontroverted that one
of Delta’s employees had a habit of tying knots of various kinds in ropes found in
the area and that he sometimes would throw the ropes over pipes near the ceiling.
The employee did not view the ropes as racial symbols.” Id. Alternatively, the
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court held that Delta was entitled to summary judgment in any event because it
took prompt remedial action whenever it learned about the offensive conduct.
II
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
the same legal standard used by the district court. Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Dep’t of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs. , 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir.
1999). That legal standard is whether “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). If there is no
genuine issue of material fact in dispute, we determine whether the district court
correctly applied the substantive law. Simms , 165 F.3d at 1326.
The issue presented for our resolution is whether the district court erred in
concluding that Mr. Hollins was not subjected to a racially hostile work
environment and that even if he were, Delta was not liable for the harassment.
For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment. In so doing, we reject the district court’s conclusion that the “well-
hung” joke and the presence of hangmen’s nooses were uncontrovertedly
innocuous. The joke appears to be a facially racist remark, and the nooses may
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also have been racially motivated, regardless of the rope-tying employee’s
representations to Delta. These are genuine issues of material fact that preclude
summary judgment on the hostile work environment issue. However, we agree
with the district court that Delta can not be held liable for the asserted harassment
on this record.
An employer may be liable for the racially harassing conduct of its
employee under three theories, all of which are derived from the common law of
agency: the negligence theory, under which the employer fails to remedy a hostile
work environment it “knew or should have known about;” the actual authority
theory, under which an employee harasses another employee within the scope of
his employment; or the apparent authority theory, under which the harassing
employee acts with apparent authority from the employer. Griffith v. State of
Colorado, Div. of Youth Serv., 17 F.3d 1323, 1330 (10th Cir. 1994); see also
Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 158 F.3d 1371, 1374-75 (10th Cir. 1998).
Mr. Hollins contends the situation here implicates all three theories of
liability. Pursuant to the negligence theory, he argues that Delta knew or should
have known about the hostile work environment he suffered because Delta was
notified about the “well-hung” joke and the nooses. Alternatively, he asserts that
Delta is vicariously liable for the acts of Mr. Brothers because, as a supervisor,
Mr. Brothers acted with either actual or apparent authority. We examine each of
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these contentions.
A. Negligence Theory
Employers are not automatically liable for harassment perpetrated by their
employees. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). In order to
prevail on a negligence-based hostile work environment claim, Mr. Hollins “bears
the burden of establishing that the employer’s conduct was unreasonable.”
Wilson v. Tulsa Junior College, 164 F.3d 534, 541 n.4 (10th Cir. 1998). He must
prove that Delta was itself negligent because “it knew or should have known
about the conduct and failed to stop it.” Burlington Indust., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742, 759 (1998). Thus, the focus is not on whether the employer is liable for
the bad acts of others, but whether the employer itself is responsible for failing to
intervene.
At the outset, we note that Delta has a written harassment policy. Although
this fact is more directly relevant to evaluating Mr. Hollins’ vicarious liability
claims, it is also relevant to his actual liability argument. Delta’s harassment
policy encourages employees to go to their supervisors or, if they “cannot resolve
the matter” within their own department, to go directly to Delta’s EEO director.
App., vol. I at 155. This policy satisfies the requirements placed on harassment
policies by the Supreme Court in its recent hostile work environment decisions.
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See Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
807-09 (1998).
The “sheriff” joke which Rex Fidler told Mr. Hollins was never reported by
Mr. Hollins or any other Delta employee to any Delta supervisor, as Mr. Hollins
concedes. Delta cannot be held liable for this incident because there is no
evidence it could have reasonably known of it. The “well-hung” joke was timely
reported by Mr. Hollins to two supervisors, who acted immediately by taking
written statements, reprimanding Mr. Fidler, and sending Mr. Fidler a warning
letter which went on his employment record at Delta. Mr. Hollins does not claim
Mr. Fidler told him any other racially offensive jokes after this intervention by
Delta. Finally, as soon as the nooses were brought to the attention of Mr.
Brothers, he immediately removed the ropes, warned his employees against such
offensive and intolerable conduct, and reprimanded the employee involved. Mr.
Hollins does not contend that any other ropes were found in the workplace after
this action was taken by Delta.
Although Mr. Hollins asserts that Mr. Brothers’ conduct was racially
harassing, 1 Mr. Hollins never complained about Mr. Brothers to a supervisor or to
1
There appears to be a conflict between Mr. Hollins’ deposition testimony
and a subsequent affidavit he filed with the court. “[A]n affidavit submitted on a
summary judgment motion which conflicts with the affiant’s earlier sworn
testimony is not automatically disregarded.” Durtsche v. American Colloid Co.,
958 F.2d 1007, 1010 n.2 (10th Cir. 1992). Before disregarding an affiant’s
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Delta’s EEO officer. Consequently, Delta did not have actual knowledge of the
situation. Moreover, knowledge cannot reasonably be imputed to Delta given that
it had no prior notice of any kind that Mr. Hollins believed he was being harassed
by a supervisor.
In each of the above incidents, when Delta was presented with a potentially
harassing situation, it immediately investigated, took corrective action, and
disciplined any offending employees. Delta conducted itself as a reasonable
employer. Wilson, 164 F.3d at 541 n.4.
B. Vicarious Liability
Mr. Hollins’ alternative theory of liability is that Mr. Brothers acted with
either the actual or apparent authority of Delta, making Delta vicariously liable
for his acts. We cannot properly evaluate this argument because Mr. Hollins
offered no evidence whatsoever that would show Mr. Brothers was acting at the
behest of Delta, with actual authority. He also offered no evidence that Mr.
Brothers was a “management level employee” who could be said to be acting
under the apparent authority of his employer. See Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162
conflicting affidavit, a district court judge must determine whether, as an
evidentiary matter, the affidavit was submitted in order to create a “sham fact
issue.” Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1237 (10th Cir. 1986). The district
court here did not reach this issue and we need not decide it in order to determine
the outcome of this case.
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F.3d 1062, 1074 (10th Cir. 1998); Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664,
674 (10th Cir. 1998). Delta, conversely, provided evidence on the two issues it
must prove in order to mount an affirmative defense to vicarious liability: “(a)
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any .
. . harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to
take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer . . .” Harrison, 158 F.3d at 1375 (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 2293).
Under these circumstances, Delta’s responses were reasonable, and it may not be
held liable for any racial harassment that may have occurred in the workplace.
We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
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