Rodriguez v. IBP, Inc.

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
MAR 14 2001
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT

PASCUAL R. RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-
No. 99-3287
Appellant,
No. 99-3288
No. 99-3325
v.

IBP, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant and
Cross-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
(D.C. No. 94-CV-1168-JTM)

Kathy Perkins Brooks, of Stinson, Mag, & Fizzell, P.C., Kansas City, Missouri
(Brian R. Markley of Stinson, Mag, & Fizzell, P.C., with her on the brief) for
Appellant and Cross-Appellee.

David O. Alegria, of McCullough, Wareheim & Labunker, P.A., Topeka, Kansas,
for Appellee and Cross-Appellant.

Before HENRY, MURPHY, Circuit Judges, and MILLS, District Judge. *

*
Honorable Richard Mills, District Judge, United States District Court for
the Central District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Pascual R. Rodriguez sued his employer, IBP, Inc., for retaliatory

discharge. Rodriguez prevailed on his retaliation claim at trial. Following entry

of judgment, IBP filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law and,

alternatively, a new trial. The district court denied IBP’s post-trial motions,

simultaneously ordering Rodriguez to provide a signed release of his Social

Security records. Rodriguez failed to comply with the district court order and was

subsequently found in contempt and sanctioned for his noncompliance. The case

comes before this court on IBP’s appeal of the district court’s denial of its

motions for judgment as a matter of law and new trial, and Rodriguez’s cross-

appeal of the district court’s order requiring him to provide a signed release of his

Social Security records and the contempt order for his failure to provide the

release. This court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and

affirms both the portion of the district court’s July 6, 1999, order requiring

Rodriguez to provide the signed release and its subsequent contempt order. IBP’s

appeal is dismissed as moot.

II. BACKGROUND

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 Rodriguez began working for IBP at its Finney County, Kansas plant in

1985. On April 6, 1990, he was injured at work when a co-worker struck his

elbow with a heavy bucket. Unable to perform his usual job as a whizard knife

operator, Rodriguez worked in a series of light-duty jobs for nearly two years. In

January 1991, he initiated his worker’s compensation claim. In January 1992,

Rodriguez claimed he could not perform light-duty work. IBP allowed Rodriguez

to call in daily to inform the company whether he was going to work on each

particular day. In May 1992, Rodriguez stopped calling and IBP terminated his

employment.

In May 1994, Rodriguez filed a complaint against IBP, alleging the

company terminated him in retaliation for exercising his rights under the Kansas

Workers’ Compensation Act. IBP claimed Rodriguez was terminated for

violating its no call/no show policy. IBP also argued that Rodriguez was

physically unable to perform his regular-duty position on the day of his

termination, thereby barring a worker’s compensation retaliatory discharge claim

under Kansas law.

IBP filed a motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the

district court. Rodriguez appealed, and this court reversed the district court’s

grant of summary judgment. See Rodriguez v. IBP, No. 96-3159, 1998 WL

426797, at *4 (10th Cir. July 20, 1998) (unpublished disposition). The case was

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remanded and set for trial. Three weeks before trial, the parties participated in

court-ordered mediation. During the mediation, IBP learned for the first time that

Rodriguez was receiving Social Security disability benefits. IBP requested the

immediate production of materials related to Rodriguez’s disability benefits. The

only material Rodriguez ever turned over to IBP was a record of payment.

IBP subsequently filed a motion in limine, seeking to exclude from trial

evidence of Rodriguez’s alleged economic loss and to bar submission of economic

damages to the jury. At the in limine conference, counsel for Rodriguez indicated

that he would produce the information regarding his client’s Social Security

benefits as soon as he obtained it. On the third day of trial, IBP renewed its

motion in limine because Rodriguez failed to give it information regarding the

basis for his disability determination by the Social Security Administration.

Rodriguez’s counsel indicated that his client’s Social Security benefits

entitlement date was November 1992. The district court granted IBP’s motion in

limine, in part, limiting pecuniary damage evidence to the period between

Rodriguez’s termination date and the date he became totally disabled.

At the close of Rodriguez’s case-in-chief, IBP moved for judgment as a

matter of law. It argued there was insufficient evidence to prove Rodriguez was

able to return to the whizard-knife position on the date of his discharge or

anytime after. The district court denied the motion. The jury subsequently

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returned a verdict for Rodriguez, awarding him $411,000. The district court

entered judgment on April 26, 1999.

Although IBP had not yet filed its renewed motion for judgment as a matter

of law and its alternative motion for a new trial, IBP filed a memorandum on May

10 in support of its motions. IBP also requested an order requiring Rodriguez to

provide a release for his Social Security records in the event it denied IBP’s post-

trial motions so that IBP could file a motion for relief from the judgment under

Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On May 11, IBP filed a

motion seeking leave to file its motion for judgment as a matter of law one day

late. On May 14, the district court entered orders deeming IBP’s memorandum to

be its motion and denying its motion to file out of time as moot. On July 6, the

district court denied IBP’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law and

new trial, but ordered Rodriguez to provide IBP with a signed release for all of

his Social Security records within ten days. IBP subsequently filed a notice of

appeal from the district court’s final judgment and its denial of IBP’s post-trial

motions.

On July 16, 1999, Rodriguez filed a motion to amend the judgment solely

with respect to the portion of the court order requiring a signed release for the

Social Security records. On August 24, the district court denied Rodriguez’s

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motion, giving him ten days to comply with the court order. On September 7,

Rodriguez filed a notice of cross-appeal from the district court’s July 6 order.

Rodriguez failed to provide the release by the deadline specified in the

district court’s August 24 order. On September 30, the district court ordered

Rodriguez to appear and show cause why he should not be held in contempt.

Rodriguez responded to the order with a written explanation. On October 13, the

district court found Rodriguez in contempt, “having willfully refused to comply

with a lawful court order to provide the Social Security records or a release to

obtain the records to defendant.” To ensure compliance with the court’s previous

orders, the district court ordered a reduction in the amount of the original

judgment by ten percent in the event Rodriguez failed to submit three signed,

unconditional releases to the court prior to October 28. The court ruled that for

each subsequent business day in which the releases were not submitted it would

remit the remainder of the judgment by five percent of the original judgment. In

addition, the district court denied Rodriguez’s request for a stay of the July 6

order.

On October 14, Rodriguez filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s

October 13 order. On October 26, Rodriguez filed a motion to stay the contempt

order in the district court pending his appeal to this court. That motion was

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denied. Rodriguez filed a motion to stay in this court on December 1, which was

denied because the $411,000 judgment had been reduced to zero.

Both IBP and Rodriguez filed motions to dismiss each other’s appeals.

This decision disposes of Rodriguez’s motion to dismiss IBP’s appeal, IBP’s

motion to dismiss Rodriguez’s cross-appeal, and the following consolidated

appeals: IBP’s appeal of the district court’s denial of its motions for judgment as

a matter of law and new trial; and Rodriguez’s cross-appeals of the district court’s

order requiring him to sign a release for his Social Security records and its

October 13, 1999, contempt order. 1 In its appellate brief, IBP indicates that this

court need not consider its appeal if we affirm the district court’s contempt order.

Because we affirm both the district court’s order requiring Rodriguez to provide a

signed release and its contempt order, we dismiss IBP’s appeal as moot.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdictional Issues

Both IBP and Rodriguez filed motions to dismiss the other party’s appeal

on jurisdictional grounds. Rodriguez claims this court does not have jurisdiction

1
We also dispose of two other motions. IBP filed a motion pursuant to 10th
Circuit Rule 30.1, seeking to include certain items in its appendix. Rodriguez
filed a motion to supplement his appendix. Both motions are granted. Notably,
the Social Security Benefit Statements included in Rodriguez’s supplemental
appendix do not provide this court with any conclusive evidence as to when he
first began receiving disability benefits.

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over IBP’s appeal because it failed to timely file its post-trial motions, which in

turn rendered its notice of appeal untimely. IBP argues this court does not have

jurisdiction over Rodriguez’s appeal of the court order requiring Rodriguez to

provide a release for his Social Security records because discovery orders are not

final, appealable orders within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This court

denies both motions.

1. Rodriguez’s Motion

Rodriguez argues the memorandum IBP filed on May 10, 1999, did not

constitute a Rule 4(a)(4) motion and, accordingly, did not toll the time to appeal.

See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) (providing that time to file appeal runs from entry of

order disposing of motion under Rules 50 and 59 of Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure). He argues the district court treated IBP’s memorandum as a post-trial

motion in order to circumvent the clear language of Rule 6(b) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b) (prohibiting an extension of

time for taking action under Rules 50(b) and 59(b)).

This court has the authority to construe a motion for extension of time

within which to file a notice of appeal as the functional equivalent of a notice of

appeal. See United States v. Smith, 182 F.3d 733, 736 (1999). In determining

whether to treat the motion as a notice of appeal, we examine whether the moving

party intended to seek appellate review and whether it provided sufficient notice

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to the parties and courts. See id. at 735. It follows, by analogy, that the district

court may treat IBP’s Memorandum in Support of Its Renewed Motion for

Judgment as a Matter of Law and Its Alternative Motion for a New Trial as

motions under Rules 50(b) and 59(b) if each accomplishes the same end as would

a motion itself.

IBP’s memorandum plainly indicates IBP’s intent to file post-trial motions.

Further, the memorandum complies with the requirements regarding the proper

form of a motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b). The memorandum renewed IBP’s

request for judgment as a matter of law and, alternatively, a new trial. See id.

50(b), 59(b). It specifies the judgment sought and articulates the law and facts on

which IBP seeks relief. See id. 50(a)(2). It states with particularity the ground

for IBP’s motion and sets forth its requested relief. See id. 7(b). This court

concludes the district court’s treatment of IBP’s memorandum of support as a

timely filed motion for post-trial relief was proper.

Rodriguez further challenges this court’s jurisdiction over IBP’s appeal by

claiming IBP failed to comply with the required contents of a memorandum under

the local rules. See D. Kan. R. 7.6(a). He claims IBP’s post-trial memorandum

did not contain a statement of the nature of the matter before the court, a

statement of the facts supported by references to the record, or a statement of the

questions presented. Rodriguez does not indicate, however, how the district court

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abused its discretion in accepting IBP’s memorandum despite its deficiencies

under the local rules, nor does he indicate how a district court’s misapplication of

local rules deprives this court of appellate jurisdiction. This court will not make

arguments for Rodriguez that he did not make himself. Cf. Phillips v. Calhoun,

956 F.2d 949, 953-54 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding this court need not consider a

party’s claim that is unsupported by legal argument and authority). Thus,

Rodriguez’s argument fails.

Because IBP’s memorandum was filed within the time set forth in Rules 50

and 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the time to file a notice of appeal

was tolled. IBP’s subsequent motion in the district court to extend the time to file

an appeal and its subsequent appeal to this court were timely. Accordingly,

Rodriguez’s jurisdictional challenge is without merit.

2. IBP’s motion

IBP challenges this court’s jurisdiction over Rodriguez’s appeal from the

July 6 order requiring him to release his Social Security records. IBP asserts the

order is not final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it is a discovery

order. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court has jurisdiction over all final orders of

the district court. A final order “ends litigation on the merits and leaves nothing

for the district court to do but execute the judgment.” Hooker v. Cont’l Life Ins.

Co., 965 F.2d 903, 904 (10th Cir. 1992). Discovery orders generally are

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interlocutory and not immediately appealable. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Alaska

Land Leasing, Inc., 778 F.2d 577, 578 (10th Cir. 1985). This case, however,

involves a post-trial discovery order. If we accept IBP’s argument, a post-trial

discovery order would never be appealable until a party complies. Because such

an event may never occur, this cannot be the rule. The order became final and

non-interlocutory at the very latest when Rodriguez was sanctioned for not

complying with the post-trial discovery order.

B. Court Order to Provide Release of Social Security Records

After the district court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict, IBP sought

post-trial relief in which it renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law

and, alternatively, sought a new trial. IBP asked the court to order Rodriguez to

provide a release for his Social Security records if the court denied IBP’s post-

trial motions. In its July 6, 1999, order, the district court denied IBP’s motions

but ordered Rodriguez to “deliver to [IBP] a signed release for all Social Security

records within ten days.” Rodriguez argues the district court did not have the

authority to issue this order. This court reviews the order to release the Social

Security records for an abuse of discretion. See GWN Petroleum Corp. v. Ok-Tex

Oil & Gas, Inc., 998 F.2d 853, 858 (10th Cir. 1993).

Rodriguez indicated during pre-trial mediation that he was receiving Social

Security disability benefits. Based on this disclosure, IBP filed a motion in limine

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to limit Rodriguez’s claim for economic damages. At the in limine hearing,

Rodriguez’s counsel indicated that his client was in the process of gathering the

information regarding his determination of disability. The district court reminded

Rodriguez that the information was “at least constructively within his care,

custody and control.” Rodriguez’s counsel represented to the district court that

“as far as the information is concerned, as soon as I get my hands on that

information, which I have been trying to obtain, I will get it and put it in [IBP]

counsel’s hands and find out anything that I need to find out.” Rodriguez’s

counsel also specifically indicated he would obtain the information regarding

Rodriguez’s disability status. The district court postponed its ruling, awaiting the

provision of the information to IBP.

On the first day of trial, Rodriguez provided IBP with documents showing

he began drawing disability benefits sometime in 1992. Because he did not

provide records indicating the basis of his disability determination or the exact

date when he began drawing benefits, IBP renewed its motion in limine on the

third day of trial. IBP asked the court to limit economic damages to a specific

time frame, from Rodriguez’s termination date up to the date on which Rodriguez

was declared disabled for Social Security purposes. Rodriguez’s counsel only

indicated his client began receiving benefits in November 1992. The district

court granted IBP’s motion, limiting economic damages to the period of time

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from Rodriguez’s termination until around November 1992. Later that day,

however, Rodriguez testified that he may have begun receiving Social Security

disability benefits in September 1992.

IBP argues Rodriguez’s Social Security records touch on the central issue

of whether Rodriguez was in fact physically unable to perform the whizard knife

job on his May 14, 1992, termination date, and therefore correspondingly unable

to claim retaliatory discharge for invoking worker’s compensation rights. 2 IBP

contends that because Rodriguez testified he began receiving benefits in

September 1992, he must have represented himself as, and been determined to be,

unable to perform the whizard knife job even before his May 1992 termination.

See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(D), (c)(2) (providing that a disabled individual is not

entitled to disability insurance benefits until the first month after a five-month

period during which he has been under a disability).

Although it may appear that the release of Rodriguez’s Social Security

records would have no impact in light of the district court’s denial of IBP’s post-

trial motions, the district court obviously found the records significant for the

purpose of Rule 60(b) relief. IBP specifically requested the release for this

2
Rodriguez claims the district court failed to require IBP to show how the
Social Security records would entitle it to relief from judgment. This was already
quite clear to IBP and the district court, however, and should have been clear to
Rodriguez. Whether Rodriguez was permanently disabled at the time of his
termination is highly relevant to his retaliation claim.

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reason. The district court granted IBP’s request, even though it denied its

motions for judgment as a matter of law and, alternatively, a new trial.

Nonetheless, Rodriguez makes several arguments to support his claim that

the district court had no authority to issue the order to sign a release. He first

argues the court order “violates all discovery rules.” It was Rodriguez, however,

who violated the discovery rules by not making mandatory pre-trial disclosures

under Rule 33(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. IBP’s first set of

interrogatories included a request for Rodriguez to disclose “each and every

lawsuit, claim, or administrative proceeding to which plaintiff has ever been a

party, including the court or agency where filed, the adverse party or parties, the

date filed, the date dismissed or closed, and the nature of the claim(s) asserted.”

In his response, Rodriguez failed to disclose information about the proceeding

before the Social Security Administration which resulted in his receipt of

disability benefits.

At oral argument, Rodriguez’s counsel claimed he was unaware his client

was receiving Social Security benefits until the pre-trial mediation three weeks

before trial, the same time IBP learned of the benefits. This does not excuse

Rodriguez’s failure to disclose the information. Even if the ignorance of

Rodriguez’s counsel was an excuse, which it is not, Rodriguez fails to recognize

that he had a continuing duty to supplement his disclosures upon learning that the

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information he disclosed in the interrogatories was incomplete. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 26(e)(2). Although the district court found that Rodriguez did not intentionally

withhold information about his disability benefits, this finding does not excuse

him from his continuing duty to disclose.

After Rodriguez’s testimony, IBP could have asked the district court for a

continuance of the trial. It did not. IBP’s failings, however, do not excuse

Rodriguez’s continuing violation of his duty to disclose the information regarding

his Social Security benefits. 3 Rodriguez repeatedly failed to follow the district

court’s instructions to provide information regarding his disability determination.

Rodriguez claims that because IBP strategically decided to pursue a motion

in limine, rather than some other course, it cannot now claim it was prejudiced by

that choice. IBP’s motion in limine, however, was based on the available

information it had at the time, which did not establish Rodriguez’s disability date

prior to his termination. It was not until trial when Rodriguez testified that he

began receiving disability benefits in September 1992 that IBP had reason to

believe Rodriguez had been determined to be disabled before his termination date.

Rodriguez specifically claims IBP is prohibited from seeking post-trial

discovery by its failure to seek a continuance of the trial or to file a motion to

3
IBP’s failings, however, did hurt it during the district court’s review of
IBP’s post-trial motions. The district court indicated that IBP’s lack of diligence
contributed to its decision to deny IBP’s motion for a new trial.

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compel. IBP pursued discovery by seeking the relevant information in its

interrogatories. While IBP could have been more aggressive, we find no authority

in this circuit to support Rodriguez’s claim and do not view these facts as

compelling the creation of such authority.

Rodriguez also contends the district court did not have jurisdiction to issue

the order to release the Social Security records because final judgment had been

entered. 4 Control of discovery, however, lies in the sound discretion of the

district court. See Martinez v. Schock Transfer & Warehouse Co., 789 F.2d 848,

850 (10th Cir. 1986). Despite Rodriguez’s suggestions otherwise, we find

nothing in this court’s authority indicating that this discretion ends upon the

completion of the trial and before a notice of appeal has been filed. Rodriguez

had a duty to disclose information regarding his Social Security benefits during

4
In connection with this argument, Rodriguez claims the discovery rules
are not applicable to post-trial procedures and that post-trial discovery is
prohibited. Rodriguez relies on the First Circuit’s decision in Public Citizen v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1988), to support this proposition.
Public Citizen involved an attempt by a non-party to intervene and force the
actual parties to file all discovery materials in court following dismissal of the
case. See id. at 778-80. The district court’s order in Public Citizen was not
related to a party’s continuing duty to disclose information to another party, as is
the case here. See id. at 781. Rodriguez also incorrectly relies on this court’s
decision in United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Insurance Co. to support his
argument. United Nuclear Corp., however, involved a collateral litigant’s attempt
to intervene in order to gain access to discovery subject to a protective order. See
905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990). Rodriguez has pointed to no authority to
support his claim. Accordingly, his argument fails.

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the original discovery process. Rodriguez’s attempt to characterize the district

court’s order as a reopening of discovery belies the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Rodriguez had a continuing duty to disclose information regarding his

Social Security benefits even after discovery closed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2).

Moreover, the district court’s order to sign the release coincided with its final

judgment on the merits, and was entered before the district court lost jurisdiction

over the case.

Rodriguez further claims the district court did not have jurisdiction to order

the release because 42 U.S.C. § 1306(a) prohibits the disclosure of information

about an applicant for Social Security benefits. Rodriguez misconstrues this

statute. This provision of the Social Security Act prohibits disclosure by

employees of the Department of Health and Human Services. See 42 U.S.C. §

1306(a) (“No disclosure of any . . . record . . . obtained at any time by the

Secretary or by any officer or employee of the Department of Health and Human

Services in the course of discharging the duties of the Secretary under this chapter

. . . shall be made except as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe. . . .”).

The law does permit an individual to consent to the disclosure of his record. See

42 U.S.C. § 1306(b); 20 C.F.R. § 401.100(a). The district court had the authority

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to order Rodriguez to provide this consent. 5 Cf. United States ex rel. Woodard v.

Tynan, 776 F.2d 250, 252 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (holding federal district

courts have authority to order defendants to request release of their records from

parties maintaining them so defendants can comply with discovery obligations).

Throughout this litigation, Rodriguez has ignored his responsibility to turn

over information regarding his Social Security disability benefits. He blames IBP

for not seeking the release before trial, completely disregarding his counsel’s

numerous representations to the district court that he would turn over the

information. In light of Rodriguez’s failure to comply with his continuing duty to

disclose under Rule 26(e)(2) and the possibility of Rule 60(b) relief, this court

concludes the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Rodriguez to

provide a signed release for his Social Security records. 6

5
Rodriguez claims the Social Security Administration regulations do not
allow a district court to order the release of Social Security records. The
regulation governing orders from the court, however, does not apply in this case
because the order directed Rodriguez to sign a release. The district court did not
order the Social Security Administration directly to release the records. See 20
C.F.R. § 401.180.
6
Rodriguez also claims IBP had no legal basis to include a request for post-
trial discovery in its Rule 59 and 60 motions and that IBP was not entitled to use
information obtained during a settlement conference to procure a favorable ruling
that precluded Rodriguez from presenting evidence of damages. This court need
not consider these arguments, however, because Rodriguez fails to support them
with any authority. See Phillips v. Calhoun, 956 F.2d 949, 953-54 (10th Cir.
1992); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A) (“the argument . . . must contain appellant’s
contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities . . . on
which the appellant relies.”). Rodriguez also asserts a privacy right in his Social

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C. Contempt Order

A district court may exercise broad discretion in using its contempt power

to assure compliance with its orders. See Consumers Gas & Oil, Inc. v. Farmland

Indus., Inc., 84 F.3d 367, 370 (10th Cir. 1996). This court reviews a district

court’s exercise of its discretion for abuse of discretion. See O'Connor v.

Midwest Pipe Fabrications, Inc., 972 F.2d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 1992). “Abuse

of discretion is established if the district court’s adjudication of the contempt

proceedings is based upon an error of law or a clearly erroneous finding of fact.”

Reliance Ins. Co. v. Mast Constr. Co., 84 F.3d 372, 375-76 (10th Cir. 1996).

Rodriguez argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion

because the underlying court order requiring the release of his Social Security

records was unlawful. He further argues that because the district court did not

have jurisdiction to enter the order, it did not have jurisdiction to enforce it. This

court has already determined supra that the district court had the authority and

jurisdiction to order Rodriguez to provide a signed release.

The district court furthermore had the authority to sanction Rodriguez for

not complying with its order. See United States v. Prof’l Air Traffic Controllers

Security records based on an Eleventh Circuit decision. The Eleventh Circuit
case, however, contains no discussion of a privacy right and does not support his
assertion. See Perry v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 734 F.2d 1441, 1447
(11th Cir. 1984). Accordingly, his argument fails.

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Org., Local 504, 703 F.2d 443, 445 (10th Cir. 1983). The district court found

Rodriguez in contempt beyond a reasonable doubt, a standard higher than

required. See id. (holding “proof of contempt must be clear and convincing”).

Rodrguez’s belief that the discovery order was invalid did not excuse him from

compliance. While the ultimate sanction negated Rodriguez’s money judgment,

that did not render the sanction Draconian. The object of the sanction was to

protect the truth-seeking procedures of discovery, and the plaintiff himself

eschewed all opportunities to avoid the sanction. This court concludes the district

court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning Rodriguez for his continued

failure to comply with its order to provide a signed release of his Social Security

records.

IV. CONCLUSION

This court concludes the district court had the authority to order Rodriguez

to provide a signed release of his Social Security records. Rodriguez’s failure to

comply warranted the district court’s finding of contempt and imposition of

sanctions. Accordingly, the district court’s July 6 order, requiring the release of

Rodriguez’s records, and its subsequent contempt order are AFFIRMED. In light

of this holding, IBP’s appeal is DISMISSED as moot.

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