F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
APR 6 2001
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
RYSZARD KOWALCZYK,
Petitioner,
v.
No. 99-9541
IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER
OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
(No. A28 464 269)
John S. Castellano, Holland & Hart LLP, Denver, Colorado, for the petitioner.
Anthony C. Payne, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation (David V. Bernal,
Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation; Kristin A. Cabral, Attorney,
Office of Immigration Litigation, with him on the brief), Washington, D.C., for
the respondent.
Before SEYMOUR, McKAY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
LUCERO, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Ryszard Kowalczyk appeals from a final order of exclusion
entered by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his request for
asylum and withholding of deportation under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”), see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a). The BIA filed the order on October 18, 1999,
affirming the decision of an immigration judge (“IJ”) entered almost ten years
before on February 14, 1990. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1105a(a) (1994), 1
we reverse the decision of the BIA, vacate its order, and
remand for further proceedings.
I
At the age of thirty-two, Kowalczyk came to the United States to join the
crew of a fishing vessel run by his employer, a state-owned Polish fishing
company. He arrived in Anchorage, Alaska, on August 15, 1989 and, along with
eight others, informed immigration authorities that he wished to apply for
1
Our review under 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1994) is modified by the
transitional rules for judicial review contained in section 309(c)(4) of the
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 ( see Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996), Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat.
3009 (Sept. 30, 1996) , as amended by the Extension of Stay in the United States
for Nurses Act, Pub. L. 104-302, § 2, 110 Stat. 3656 (Oct. 11, 1996), and the
Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, Pub. L. 105-100, § 202,
111 Stat. 2193 (Nov. 19, 1997)).
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asylum. 2 Petitioner was immediately placed in exclusion proceedings and taken to
Denver, Colorado, for detention and hearings. 3
During his asylum proceedings, Kowalczyk alleged he had been beaten by
the Polish secret police and the militia for his membership and participation in the
activities of the labor union Solidarity. He further alleged that because of his
membership in Solidarity he was the target of repeated surprise searches for a
period of five years. He described one incident in 1989 when he and his son were
detained by the militia because he was carrying a bag with the Solidarity logo.
He was interrogated for hours and beaten in front of his son. After the incident,
he claims his son wet his pants every time he saw a Polish soldier and had
nightmares. Petitioner further alleged that the 1989 incident caused him to join
Fighting Solidarity, an uncompromisingly anti-Communist organization.
When offered the opportunity to travel to the U.S. as part of his job,
petitioner seized it, and before he left he posted a letter to the local militia
criticizing them for their brutality. When the government learned of petitioner’s
defection, they attacked his defection (as well as those of the other eight sailors
who defected) on television and called his wife to inform her to expect
2
Five of the nine sailors requested asylum before entering the United
States. The other four, including Kowalczyk, requested asylum after entering.
3
Petitioner subsequently was released from detention and remains free.
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disciplinary proceedings against him. Shortly after petitioner defected, Solidarity
became part of the Polish coalition government.
In proceedings that began in September 1989 and concluded in February
1990, an IJ heard and denied petitioner’s application for asylum and withholding
of deportation. The IJ found Kowalczyk’s claim of past persecution failed and
denied his claim of a well-founded fear of persecution. Kowalczyk filed a timely
notice of appeal to the BIA in March 1990.
More than nine years after Kowalczyk filed his notice of appeal and many
years after the appeals of his co-workers who defected at the same time were
decided, see, e.g. , Kapcia v. INS , 944 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1991) (affirming the
BIA’s decision regarding Kapcia and Saulo, who applied for asylum at the same
time as Kowalczyk), on October 18, 1999, the BIA finally denied Kowalczyk’s
application for asylum and withholding of deportation and dismissed his appeal.
The BIA reviewed the record de novo and found, as had the IJ, that petitioner
failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution and that he failed to
demonstrate any past persecution so severe that repatriation would be inhumane.
Integral to its decision was the fact, administratively noticed, that Poland has
transitioned “from a communist state to a functioning, multiparty democracy.” In
re Kowalczyk , File A28 464 269, slip decision at 3 (BIA Oct. 18, 1999)
(unpublished). “Given these sweeping political changes and the fact that the
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communists no longer control Poland, . . . the applicant’s fears of being
persecuted by Polish governmental authorities on account of his support for
Solidarity and Fighting Solidarity, and his opposition to the communists, are not
well founded.” Id. at 4.
In his appeal to this Court, Kowalczyk raises four issues. He argues that
the BIA violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process by taking
administrative notice of political changes in Poland and by relying on those facts
to deny his application without giving him an opportunity to respond. Second, he
asserts that the government should be equitably estopped from denying his
application because the more than nine years it took for the BIA to render a
decision constituted affirmative misconduct. He also claims his right to a fair
hearing was violated by the IJ’s refusal to consider evidence entered at the asylum
hearings. And finally, Kowalczyk argues that he is statutorily eligible for asylum.
II
A. Administrative Notice
We first address Kowalczyk’s argument that in taking administrative notice
of the purported changes in the Polish government without affording him an
opportunity to respond, the BIA violated his Fifth Amendment right to due
process. It is well established that “even those charged with entering the country
illegally, are entitled to due process when threatened with deportation.” Llana-
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Castellon v. INS , 16 F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing cases). “The
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S.
319, 333 (1976) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
This is not the first time we have considered the constitutionality of taking
administrative notice of facts during immigration proceedings, see Llana-
Castellon , 16 F.3d at 1096–1101; Baka v. INS , 963 F.2d 1376, 1379 (10th Cir.
1992), nor is it the first time we have considered the constitutionality of taking
administrative notice of the changes that occurred in the Polish government in
1990 and beyond. See Kapcia , 944 F.2d at 705–06. In accordance with our sister
circuits, we have held that the BIA may take administrative notice of commonly
acknowledged facts, which may include “current events bearing on an applicant’s
well-founded fear of persecution.” Kapcia , 944 F.2d at 705 (quoting
Kaczmarczyk v. INS , 933 F.2d 588, 593–94 (7th Cir. 1991)); see also
Gebremichael v. INS , 10 F.3d 28, 37 (1st Cir. 1993) (collecting cases).
Specifically, in Kapcia we concluded that because “Solidarity is [now] a part of
the Polish coalition government, the [BIA] properly took notice of this fact and
reasonably inferred that, generally speaking, Solidarity members will not be
persecuted.” Kapcia , 944 F.2d at 706 (agreeing with the Seventh Circuit’s
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conclusions in Kubon v. INS , 913 F.2d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1990), and
Kaczmarczyk , 933 F.2d at 594).
However, “simply because we have approved of [taking administrative
notice] in one context does not mean that it is appropriate in all. An agency’s
discretion to take administrative notice depends on the particular case before it.”
Llana-Castellon , 16 F.3d at 1097; see also Castillo-Villagra v. INS , 972 F.2d
1017, 1027 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he administrative desirability of notice as a
substitute for evidence cannot be allowed to outweigh fairness to individual
litigants.”). More importantly, in cases in which taking administrative notice may
be appropriate, this does not supplant the requirement that an individual must
have notice and an opportunity to “rebut the inferences drawn.” Kapcia , 944 F.2d
at 705; see also Gebremichael , 10 F.3d at 39 (holding petitioner’s due process
rights were violated when he was not given opportunity to respond to a fact newly
noticed by the BIA prior to an adverse decision against him); Kaczmarczyk , 933
F.2d at 596 (“We believe the due process clause of the fifth amendment requires
that petitioners be allowed an opportunity to rebut officially noticed facts . . . .
[N]ot to allow petitioners an opportunity to rebut noticed facts would sanction the
creation of an unregulated back door through which unrebuttable, non-record
evidence could be introduced against asylum petitioners outside of the statutorily-
mandated hearing context . . . .” (citation omitted)); Castillo-Villagra , 972 F.2d at
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1029 (holding that the BIA “erred in taking notice of the change of government
without providing the petitioners an opportunity to rebut the noticed facts”
because “due process requires that the applicant be allowed an opportunity to
rebut [administratively noticed facts]”). 4
Accordingly, in Kapcia , we found the
petitioners’ due process rights were not violated when the BIA took
administrative notice of Solidarity’s inclusion in the new Polish coalition
government; our holding was premised on the fact that “petitioners had ample
opportunity to address” the facts noticed. Kapcia , 944 F.2d at 705. The changed
conditions in Poland were first noticed during the proceedings before the IJs, and
petitioners presented extensive expert witness testimony to rebut the inferences
drawn from such changes.
We hold that, under the facts of this case, the BIA abused its discretion.
Unlike the petitioner in Kapcia , Kowalczyk never had an opportunity to respond
to some of the facts that were administratively noticed. Although Kowalczyk did
4
In Kaczmarczyk, the Seventh Circuit held that motions to reopen
immigration procedures allow asylum seekers sufficient opportunity to respond to
administratively noticed facts and thereby satisfy the requirements of due process.
933 F.2d at 597. Accordingly, because petitioners in that case did not file
motions to reopen and made no excuses for their behavior, the court concluded
their constitutional challenges were without merit. Id. We have rejected the
reasoning in Kaczmarczyk that “reopening procedures . . . protect an alien’s due
process rights, particularly because the BIA [can] deport the petitioner before
considering the motion to reopen.” Llana-Castellon, 16 F.3d at 1100. We
concluded that “[a] petitioner’s due process rights are not protected by a
procedure that depends entirely on the good faith of the BIA.” Id.
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respond to the changing political climate at the time of his hearing and filing of
appeal in 1989 and 1990, he never had an opportunity to respond to facts that did
not exist until nine years after he filed his timely appeal. The BIA’s order relies
on a congressional report from 1999 to support the fact that “‘[t]he internal
security forces and the armed forces are subject to effective civilian control by the
government’ and that generally speaking, the Government respects the human
rights of its citizens.” Kowalczyk , File A28 464 269, at 4 (citing Department of
State, 106th Cong., II Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1998 1405
(Joint Comm. Print 1999)). Kowalczyk argued to the BIA that the changes in the
Polish government had not proliferated through the security forces and militia.
(See, e.g. , Administrative R. at 33 (“Despite the recent changes in the makeup of
the Polish Parliament, Solidarity is powerless to stop continued human rights
abuses at lower government levels.”); see also id. at 34.) To notice facts not
presented to Congress until 1999 without providing petitioner an opportunity to
respond, despite the more than nine years it took the BIA to decide Kowalczyk’s
appeal, violates Kowalczyk’s Fifth Amendment right to due process. One would
think that in those nine years there was ample opportunity both for the BIA to
present Kowalczyk with any new evidence it intended to consider and to allow
him time to respond. Moreover, if the delay was caused because petitioner’s case
was so difficult to review and decide based on the record, any new facts
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established during the nine-year period certainly should have been presented to
petitioner for his response. We simply cannot find that the “agency’s discretion
[was] exercised in such a way as to be fair in the[se] circumstances” and in such a
way that satisfies the constitutional mandate of due process. Llana-Castellon , 16
F.3d at 1097 (quoting Castillo-Villagra , 972 F.2d at 1028). The administrative
notice of facts key to petitioner’s asylum claim coupled with the enormous
amount of time in which the BIA could have given petitioner the opportunity to
respond but did not establish that petitioner’s due process rights were
compromised. Accordingly, we reverse the BIA’s decision, vacate the order of
exclusion, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
B. The BIA’s Delay
Kowalczyk further argues that the BIA should be equitably estopped from
enforcing its exclusion order against him because the nine years it took to decide
his appeal constituted affirmative misconduct. We are mystified by the amount of
time it took the BIA to decide petitioner’s appeal, particularly in light of the
relatively quick disposal of the similar applications by his co-workers who
defected at the same time. Furthermore, we are wholly unconvinced and
nonplused by the government’s argument that “[t]here is no proof that the lengthy
time spent in processing his appeal was . . . unwarranted given the inordinate size
of the administrative record . . . . It is only the operation of the administrative
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judicial process that has caused ‘delay.’” (Respondent’s Br. at 21.) Nevertheless,
under the present state of the record we can not conclude that equitable estoppel
lies against the government in this case.
Equitable estoppel allows one party to prevent another “from taking a legal
position inconsistent with an earlier statement or action that places his adversary
at a disadvantage.” Penny v. Giuffrida , 897 F.2d 1543, 1545 (10th Cir. 1990)
(summarizing estoppel law and focusing on estoppel against the government).
The elements of estoppel against a private party are “(1) the party to be estopped
must know the facts; (2) the party to be estopped must intend that his conduct will
be acted upon or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has the right to
believe that it was so intended; (3) the party asserting the estoppel must be
ignorant of the true facts; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must rely on the
other party’s conduct to his injury.” Id. at 1545–46.
Equitable estoppel does not lie against the government in the same manner
as it does against private litigants. Office of Personnel Mgmt. v. Richmond , 496
U.S. 414, 419 (1990). “When the Government is unable to enforce the law
because the conduct of its agents has given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the
citizenry as a whole in obedience to the rule of law is undermined.” Heckler v.
Cmty. Health Servs. , 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984) . In the course of rejecting estoppel
arguments asserted against the government, the Supreme Court has indicated that
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estoppel may lie against the government if some type of “affirmative misconduct”
can be shown. See INS v. Hibi , 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973) (per curiam). The Court has
repeatedly “le[ft] for another day whether an estoppel claim [can] ever succeed
against the Government.” Office of Personnel Mgmt. , 496 U.S. at 423; see also
Heckler , 467 U.S. at 60; id. at 67–68 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment)
(stating that the majority’s opinion “gives an impression of hospitality towards
claims of estoppel against the Government which our decided cases simply do not
warrant”); INS v. Miranda , 459 U.S. 14, 19 (1982) (per curiam); Schweiker v.
Hansen , 450 U.S. 785, 788 (1981) (per curiam); Montana v. Kennedy , 366 U.S.
308, 314 (1961).
Supreme Court jurisprudence establishes that estoppel against the
government in the immigration context has a particularly high bar. For instance,
in Miranda , 459 U.S. at 18–19, the Court held the government was not estopped
from enforcing the immigration laws because of an eighteen-month delay incurred
while the INS considered a spousal immigrant visa application. “Proof only that
the Government failed to process promptly an application falls far short of
establishing [affirmative misconduct.]” Id. at 19. Undoubtedly, the eighteen-
month delay at issue in Miranda pales in comparison to the more than nine-year
delay involved in this case. As the Court made clear in Miranda , however, the
immigration laws are of exceptional public interest and the courts must give
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“[a]ppropriate deference” to the INS. Id. (“An increasingly important interest,
implicating matters of broad public concern, is involved in cases of this kind.
Enforcing the immigration laws, and the conditions for residency in this country,
is becoming more difficult. Moreover, the INS is the agency primarily charged by
Congress to implement the public policy underlying these laws. Appropriate
deference must be accorded its decisions.” (citations omitted)); id. at 18
(“Montana and Hibi make clear that neither the Government’s conduct nor the
harm to the respondent is sufficient to estop the Government from enforcing the
conditions imposed by Congress for residency in this country.”); see also INS v.
Pangilinan , 486 U.S. 875, 883–84 (1988) (discussing the unavailability of
equitable estoppel against the government in a naturalization case, explaining that
administration of the immigration laws is best left to the agencies, and stressing
that courts can not interfere in a manner inconsistent with applicable statutes).
Against the background of a Supreme Court jurisprudence which raises an
extremely high bar to claims of equitable estoppel against the government,
particularly in the immigration context, we conclude in light of the facts in the
record before us that equitable estoppel would not prevent the BIA from
enforcing its order in this case. Cf. Che-Li Shen v. INS , 749 F.2d 1469, 1473–74
(10th Cir. 1984) (holding that the INS was not equitably estopped from deporting
petitioner where it took three years to rule on petitioner’s first application and
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almost two years to rule on petitioner’s renewed application; relying in part on the
fact that petitioner failed to demonstrate affirmative misconduct because there
was “no indication that the [administrative] delay was deliberate or even
unwarranted”); Roman v. INS , 233 F.3d 1027, 1033–34 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding
the BIA was not equitably estopped from denying asylum after a five-year delay
in considering petitioners’ appeal because the court failed to find any prejudice
from the delay). We are deeply troubled by the nine-year delay and see it as a
malfunction of the administrative process instead of, as the government argues,
“the operation of the administrative judicial process.” (Respondent’s Br. at 21.)
In the absence of a showing that the delay in the present case was deliberate or
resulted in identifiable prejudice to the petitioner’s case, however, the delay is
insufficient to demonstrate affirmative misconduct necessary to equitably estop
the government from administering the immigration laws entrusted to its
enforcement by Congress. 5
5
We emphasize that our review is conducted under the INA and not under
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Unlike the INA, the APA includes a
judicially enforceable duty to proceed within a reasonable time. See 5 U.S.C.
§§ 555(b), 706(1). See also Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879, 894–900 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (remanding for district court to determine whether FDA’s delay violated the
requirement to act within a reasonable time and discussing factors to be
considered by the district court in assessing the claim of unreasonable delay).
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C. IJ’s Refusal to Consider Documents
Kowalczyk claims that his right to a fair hearing was violated by the IJ’s
refusal to consider certain documents offered at the asylum hearing. The IJ
concluded that those documents addressed “subject matter in which the Court has
no jurisdiction over as [it is] not in a policy making position.” (Administrative R.
at 104.) In its de novo review, the BIA agreed with Kowalczyk that the materials
should have been considered by the IJ and considered the materials itself before
affirming the denial of Kowalczyk’s application. Kowalczyk , File A28 464 269,
at 4 n.7.
We review only the decision of the BIA and not that of the IJ. Luna-
Rodriguez v. INS , 104 F.3d 313, 315 (10th Cir. 1997). Because the BIA
considered the contested materials in its review of Kowalczyk’s application, and
because the IJ’s decision is not properly before us, we decline to hold that
petitioner’s fair trial rights were violated by the IJ’s decision.
D. Eligibility for Asylum
Kowalczyk’s final claim is that he is “statutorily eligible for asylum on the
basis of a well-founded fear of future persecution, alone or in combination with
past persecution.” (Petitioner’s Br. at 17.) It is not necessary for us to reach this
claim because the BIA will be required to reconsider its previous determination in
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light of any responses submitted by Kowalczyk to the administratively noticed
facts.
III
The decision of the BIA dismissing petitioner’s appeal is REVERSED , the
BIA’s order is VACATED , and the cause is REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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