Martinez v. Uphoff

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 18 2001

TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
____________________________ Clerk
JESSICA N. MARTINEZ,
Individually and as the
natural mother and next friend
of DESEREE MARTINEZ,ALEESHA
MARTINEZ and CHRISTOPHER
MARTINEZ, minor children; et
al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
No. 00-8034
v.

JUDITH UPHOFF, Director of
Department of Corrections; et
al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Wyoming
(D.C. No. 99-CV-131-J)
____________________________

Terry W. Mackey, Hickey, Mackey, Evans & Walker, Cheyenne,
Wyoming, (Roger Fransen, Hickey, Mackey, Evans & Walker,
Cheyenne, Wyoming and Jason M. Tangeman, Anthony, Nichols &
Sharpe, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming, were with him on the briefs)for
Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Richard Rideout, Law Offices of Richard Rideout, PC, Cheyenne,
Wyoming, for Defendants-Appellees.
____________________________

Before SEYMOUR and BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, Senior
District Judge. *
____________________________

BROWN, Senior District Judge.
____________________________

*
Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior United States District
Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
 Plaintiff-appellants, pursuant to the provisions of 28

U.S.C. 1983 and 1988, appealed the district court’s entry of

summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court exercises

appellate jurisdiction under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §1291.

Corporal Martinez was a Wyoming Department of Corrections

Officer at the Wyoming State Penitentiary in Rawlings, Wyoming.

While on duty in the "Shift Command Office" of the Maximum

Security Unit at the prison, he was attacked and murdered by

three inmates who were attempting to escape.
All defendants are sued in their individual capacities.

Each was an employee of the Department of Corrections at the time
of Martinez's death. 1 Plaintiffs have brought this action under

the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§1983, 1988 upon the theory that

defendants' conduct deprived Martinez of substantive due process,
a guarantee that persons will not be deprived of life, liberty or

property through arbitrary and capricious state action. In this
case, plaintiffs alleged that defendants deliberately failed to

ensure proper training and supervision of penitentiary personnel,
failed to provide safe and adequate staffing, and failed to take

corrective action to protect Martinez. More particularly,

plaintiffs claimed that the prison officials knew or should have

known that an escape was planned by inmates, that they knew of

1
Judith Uphoff was the Director of the Department of
Corrections, Robert Ortega was the Deputy Director and Prison
Administrator, James Ferguson was the Warden, William Hettgar was
the Deputy Warden, and Kenneth Kinney was the Associate Warden of
Security.
2
the violent tendencies of two of the three inmate involved in the

murder, and that they had knowledge that the overcrowding and low

staffing in the "Maximum Unit" where Martinez met his death,

created dangerous working conditions, which the defendants failed

to modify. In this respect, plaintiffs relied on a series of

cases which have recognized potential liability for state actors

under the "danger creation theory."

The district court sustained defendants' motion for summary

judgment, ruling that plaintiffs' allegations failed to state a
claim under §1983 under a "danger-creation" theory. The district

court further determined that all defendants were entitled to the
defense of qualified immunity. In this appeal, plaintiffs claim

that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous because there

are disputed factual issues concerning the extent of defendants'

knowledge of the dangerous situation which led to Martinez's

death.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment by

applying the standards set out under Rule 56(c) Fed. R. Civ.
Proc. We must first determine if there is a genuine issue of

material fact in dispute, and, if not, then we determine if the

trial court correctly applied substantive law. Uhlrig v. Harder,
64 F. 3d 567, 571 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. den. 516 U.S. 1118, 133

L.Ed. 853.

After a review of the record, we find that the trial court's

order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment should be

affirmed.

3
 In affirming the grant of summary judgment, we will be

guided by the principles discussed in Uhlrig v. Harder, supra 64

F.3d 567, and Liebson v. New Mexico Corrections Dept. , 73 F.3d

274 (10th Cir. 1996). In both cases, we ruled that defendants

were entitled to entry of summary judgment.

In Uhlrig, the plaintiff was the executor of the estate of
his wife, Stephanie Uhlrig, an employee of a state mental

hospital. Mrs. Uhlrig was murdered by an inmate confined in the

institution. The action was brought under the provisions of 42
U.S.C. §1983 against administrators of the hospital who had

terminated a special unit in the institution reserved for the
criminally insane. Plaintiff claimed that defendants' reckless

decision to terminate the special unit led to the placement of

the inmate who murdered Mrs. Uhlrig in the general hospital

population where the deceased worked as an activity therapist.

In this respect, plaintiff claimed that defendants were liable
under §1983 for violating the employee's right to substantive due

process by recklessly creating the danger that led to her death.

In Liebson, plaintiff was employed as a librarian in a

community college, and under a contract; she was assigned to
provide library services to inmates housed in the maximum

security unit of the New Mexico State Penitentiary. A prison

guard was present in the library at all times that plaintiff was

on duty until March 21, 1992, when the prison administrators

changed library hours and the schedule of the library guard. A

few days later, plaintiff was on duty without a guard when she

4
was kidnapped, held hostage, and sexually assaulted by an inmate

library assistant.

"While state actors are generally liable under the Due

Process Clause only for their own acts and not for private

violence, DeShaney v. Winnebago Soc. Servs. , 489 U.S. 189, 196-

97, 117 L.Ed. 2 nd 249 (1989) 2, . . . there are two recognized ...
exceptions to this rule: (1) the special relationship doctrine;

and (2) the 'danger' creation theory." Uhlrig, supra, 64 F.3d at

572.3
In this case, the defendants can be liable only for acts

which created the danger that harmed Corporal Martinez. These
acts must go beyond mere negligence, since the evidence must

establish that defendants recklessly created the danger that led
to Martinez's death, or that they acted in a "conscience

shocking" manner which caused a constitutional violation under 42

U.S.C.A. §1983. In Uhlrig, this court discussed the type of

2
In DeShaney, state department of social services failed to
remove child from father’s custody although there was adequate
evidence child was abused. The Supreme Court held there was no
duty under §1983 when child was not in defendants’ custody.
3
The special relationship doctrine will apply only when the
state assumes such control over an individual that an affirmative
duty is undertaken to protect that person from danger. Examples of
such control include a person who is a prisoner, or is
involuntarily committed to a mental institution. Uhlrig, supra, 64
F. 2d at 572.
The trial court here correctly found that there was no
special relationship in the case of Martinez since he was an
employee of the state, a relationship which was consensual in
nature. See discussion, infra.
5
evidence which is needed to establish a recovery under the danger

creation theory:

. . . many state activities have the
potential for creating some danger - as is
true of most human endeavors - but not all
such activities constitute a "special" danger
giving rise to §1983 liability. For the
state to be liable under §1983 for creating a
special danger. . . a plaintiff must allege a
constitutionally cognizable danger. That is,
the danger creation theory must ultimately
rest on the specifics of a substantive due
process claim - i.e. a claim predicated on
reckless or intentional injury causing state
action which "shocks the conscience." (64
F.2d at 572)

We further emphasized that the "shock the conscience"

standard "requires a high level of outrageousness. . . . (since)
a substantive due process violation requires more than an

ordinary tort and that merely allowing unreasonable risks to

persist in the workplace is not necessarily conscience shocking."

(Uhlrig, 64 Fed. 3d at 574, quoting Collins v. City of Harker
Heights Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 128; 117 L.Ed. 2d 261 (1992)(No

remedy under §1983 for employee’s death.)

In this case, plaintiffs claimed that the defendants

deliberately failed to ensure proper training and supervision of
its personnel, deliberately failed to provide safe and adequate

staffing, and deliberately failed to take corrective action to

protect Martinez’s constitutional rights. Plaintiffs claim that

defendants knew or should have known that an escape attempt was

planned, and that defendants knew Martinez would be placed in a

life-threatening situation when he was assigned to the Maximum

6
Security Unit. It is also suggested that defendants knew of the

violent tendencies of two of the inmates involved in the murder,

but failed to take appropriate precautions to protect Corporal

Martinez. 4

In a lengthy memorandum and order, the trial court fairly

stated the facts giving rise to this action, and thoroughly

reviewed the applicable law pertaining to defendants' alleged

liability. Plaintiffs submitted numerous exhibits relating to

alleged deficiencies at the state prison, including overcrowding,
defendants' alleged failure to properly train and to supervise

its employees in safety measures, excessive turnover in employees
and inadequate staffing.

In its ruling, the district court found that it was "not

entirely clear. . . how the inmates who murdered Corporal

Martinez obtained access to the Shift Command Office in which he

was working." (Aplt. App. B-1, p. 20). While the official policy
at the prison was that the Shift Command Office door should be

kept locked at all times, it appears that this rule was not

always followed because items issued to inmates were kept in the

office. The trial court found that "(t)he materials before the

Court do not shed much light on what happened on June 26, 1997

4
Plaintiffs suggest that prison records indicated that one
inmate was not in segregation although he had a history of
discipline problems, had tested positive for drugs the week before,
and contraband had been found in his cell. Another inmate had a
known history of mental problems and had tested positive for drugs,
while the third inmate was not in segregation although he had been
identified as dangerous and assaultive.
7
when Corporal Martinez was attacked and murdered and leave open

to speculation why Corporal Martinez allowed the door to the

Shift Command Office to remain open and unlocked so as to allow

the inmates to gain entry to that office.” (Ibid at p. 21).

After reviewing all of the evidence submitted by the parties

on the motion for summary judgment, the trial court determined

that

plaintiffs had failed to state a claim. In so doing, the court

viewed the evidence in this manner:
The plaintiffs' claims regarding the created
danger are essentially threefold: the prison
was overcrowded, understaffed, and training
for prison employees was not adequate. While
the Court does not intend to suggest that
these concerns are not of tremendous
significance to employees. . . as well as the
general public, they are not such that they
come within the established contours of the
law regarding the danger creation theory and
are not of such a magnitude that the Court is
able to conclude they shock the
conscience,....
* * * *
... the level of culpability of the
defendants in this case must be analyzed
against the backdrop of causation. The
defendants are not alleged to have harmed
Corporal Martinez or have caused his death.
The claims against the state actors in this
case are a number of steps in the causative
chain removed from Corporal Martinez’ tragic
death at the hands of inmates Dowdell,
Collins and Harlow. Corporal Martinez knew
the prison was a dangerous environment within
which to work. He had the choice of being
employed as a guard at the WSP or not being
so employed.
(Aplt. App. B, pp. 43-44)
As pointed out by the district court, the plaintiff failed

to provide facts which would tie the institutional deficiencies

8
at the prison to the death of Corporal Martinez. There was no

evidence that he or any other guard was not aware of "the mental

states or violent propensities" of inmates confined in the

Maximum Security Unit. There was no evidence that the

confiscation of weapons or contraband, or the presence of drugs

within the prison were specifically related to the death of

Martinez. 5 We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that,

under the circumstances of this case, "inaction in the face of

known dangers or risks [was] not enough to satisfy the danger-
creation theory's conscience shocking standard." ( Ibid. at p.
45)
We have considered plaintiffs reliance on Sutton v. Utah

State School for the Deaf and Blind , 173 F. 3d 1226 (10th Cir.

1999) and agree with the trial court's conclusion that it is

clearly distinguishable from the situation involving the Wyoming

State Penitentiary. That case involved sexual molestation of a
minor child who suffered from cerebral palsy, mental retardation,

total blindness and inability to speak. The school

superintendent, the principal, and the child's teacher had been

previously informed of a prior attack on the child. These

defendants assured the mother that this could not happen. The

Sutton case involved a "special relationship" situation, an

5
As the lower court noted, the fact that inmates were tested
for drugs and that weapons had been confiscated through regular
searches tended to prove that prison officials demonstrated "an
affirmative step .... intended to eliminate or reduce risks to WSP
staff and guards...." ( Ibid at p. 44).
9
exception to the general rule that a state will not be liable for

the actions of private parties. Corporation Martinez's situation

was not in any way similar to that of the child in Sutton.

Since plaintiffs failed to state a claim for denial of

substantive due process under the danger creation theory, we

further agree with the conclusion of the district court that

defendants are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.

Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary judgment

in favor of defendants in AFFIRMED.

10