F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JAN 29 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 00-6458
JAMES ROBERT SMART,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. CR-00-67-T)
Submitted on the briefs. *
Daniel G. Webber, Jr., United States Attorney, Arlene Joplin, Assistant United
States Attorney, and Jerome A. Holmes, Assistant United States Attorney,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Burck Bailey and Warren F. Bickford of Fellers, Snider, Blankenship, Bailey &
Tippens, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
The case was therefore ordered submitted without oral argument on September
19, 2001.
Before LUCERO, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
ROGERS, ** District Judge.
BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge.
A jury convicted James Robert Smart of bribing a government official in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2). Federal agents developed significant evidence
used against Mr. Smart during the trial through the use of wiretaps allowing
agents to hear and record Mr. Smart’s telephone conversations. Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, 18
U.S.C.§§ 2510 - 2522 (1994 & Supp. 2000), requires federal agents seeking a
wiretap authorization to obtain approval first from the Attorney General, or a
designated Assistant Attorney General, and then in turn from a federal judge of
competent jurisdiction. United States v. Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d 1179, 1184-85
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 962, 522 U.S. 974 (1997). Moreover, agents
may only obtain authorization to investigate certain serious offenses enumerated
by statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2516. Mr. Smart asserts on appeal that during this
wiretap authorization procedure, investigating authorities and two federal judges
made references to offenses not enumerated in the statute, thereby rendering the
**
The Honorable Richard D. Rogers, United States District Judge for the
District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
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authorization and recordings illegal. Mr. Smart concludes he is entitled to a new
trial because the illegally obtained telephone recordings should have been
suppressed by the district court. Because we conclude the wiretap authorizations
were legal, we affirm the district court’s ruling.
BACKGROUND
In the late 1990s an extensive federal investigation focused on the activities
of Brent Eugene VanMeter, an Oklahoma State Department of Health official
responsible for the oversight of nursing homes throughout Oklahoma. Using a
variety of conventional investigation techniques, federal agents came to suspect
several illegal schemes designed to make money through defrauding the
government and nursing home patients. Hoping to flush out the extent of these
illegal activities, investigators sought permission to intercept the suspects’
telephone conversations.
On March 9, 2000, investigators obtained a memorandum from an Assistant
Attorney General allowing them to seek a court order authorizing interception of
wire communications for thirty days in order to investigate possible violations of
seven federal offenses. Five of these offenses are clearly enumerated as subject
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to investigation by wiretap. 1 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(c). However, the United States
Code sections involving two of the seven offenses are not specifically mentioned
in 18 U.S.C. § 2516. These two offenses are 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy to
violate the laws of the United States) and 42 U.S.C. § 1320a - 7b (fraud relating
to federal health care programs). 42 U.S.C. § 1320a - 7b is clearly not an offense
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2516. However, § 2516 does state that a federal judge
may authorize interception of wire communications “when such interception may
or has provided evidence of ... any conspiracy to commit any offense described in
any subparagraph of this paragraph,” thereby arguably extending to 18 U.S.C.
§ 371. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(p) (emphasis added). 2
The next day, a Department of Justice official submitted an application for
authorization to intercept wire communications to a United States district court
judge. In two places this application incorrectly characterized all seven of the
1
These five offenses are 18 U.S.C § 1951 (interference with commerce by
threats or violence); 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (interstate and foreign travel or
transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises); 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (laundering of
monetary instruments); 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (relating to engaging in monetary
transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity); and 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343 (fraud by wire, radio, or television).
2
18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) contains an apparent drafting error. It includes two
subparts (p). The conspiracy provision is in the second (p).
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suspected offenses as enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(c). 3 Later that day, the
district court issued an order authorizing federal agents to proceed with the
wiretaps. Using language closely tracking the application, the district court’s
findings also incorrectly characterized all seven of the suspected offenses as
3
For example, the March 10, 2000 Application for Authorization to
Intercept Wire Communications states:
This Application seeks authorization to intercept wire
communications of [the suspected offenders] ... concerning offenses
enumerated in Section 2516 of Title 18, United States Code
(Authorization for Interception of Wire Communications), that is,
offenses involving violations of:
1. Title 18, United States Code, Section 371
proscribes the engaging in a conspiracy to violate the
laws of the United States;
2. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951
proscribes inter alia, the obtainment of money or
property through extortion;
3. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1952
proscribes interstate transportation in aid of racketeering
enterprises;
4. Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1956
and 1957 proscribe money laundering;
5. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343
proscribes a scheme to defraud through the use of an
interstate wire; and
6. Title 42, United States Code, Section 1320a-7b
fraud relating to federal health care programs.
(Emphasis added.)
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enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(c). 4 However, in the portion of the order
setting out the district court’s directives, authorization to intercept wire
communications was limited to only three of the seven offenses. 5 These offenses
4
The wiretap order states:
A. There is probable cause to believe that [the suspects] have
committed, are committing, or are about to commit offenses
involving violations of:
1. Title 18, United States Code, Section 371
proscribes the engaging in a conspiracy to violate the
laws of the United States;
2. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951
proscribes inter alia, the obtainment of money or
property through extortion;
3. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1952
proscribes interstate transportation in aid of racketeering
enterprises;
4. Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1956
and 1957 proscribe money laundering;
5. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343
proscribes a scheme to defraud through the use of an
interstate wire; and
6. Title 42, United States Code, Section 1320a-7b
fraud relating to federal health care programs; which
violations are set forth in Title 18 United States Code,
Section 2516(1)(c).
(Emphasis added.)
5
The order states:
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Special
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation are authorized,
pursuant to an application authorized by an appropriate official of the
Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice, pursuant to
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were 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy), 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (interference with
commerce by threats or violence), and 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (interstate and foreign
travel or transportation in aid of racketeering).
For the next thirty days, federal agents proceeded to intercept telephone
calls and gather evidence against the targets of their investigation. On April 11,
2000, the Assistant Attorney General gave permission to seek a second wiretap
order extending the wiretap authorization an additional thirty days. This
memorandum added two additional offenses to the previous seven, referencing a
total of nine possible statutory violations. The added offenses were 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (relating to mail fraud) and 18 U.S.C. § 1518 (obstruction of criminal
investigation of health care offenses). Section 1341 is enumerated; however, 18
U.S.C. § 1518 is not an enumerated offense subject to wiretap investigation under
federal law. 18 U.S.C. § 2516. The Department of Justice then submitted an
application for an extension of time on the previous wiretap order. This
application also incorrectly characterized all the suspected offenses as enumerated
the power delegated to that official by special designation of the
Attorney General under the authority vested in him by Section 2516
of Title 18, United States Code: to intercept wire communications of
[the suspects] ... concerning the offenses set forth in paragraph A,
section 1-3, of this Order [see note 4, supra] ....
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in 18 U.S.C. § 2516. This second application was approved by a different federal
judge. The second order also incorrectly stated in the findings that all nine
offenses were enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2516. But once again, the order
authorized the use of wiretaps only for 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (interference with commerce by threats or violence), and 18 U.S.C. § 1952
(interstate and foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering).
On April 17, 2000, federal agents intercepted a telephone call between Mr.
VanMeter and Mr. Smart. During this call, Mr. Smart agreed to give Mr.
VanMeter money in exchange for Mr. VanMeter’s promise to falsify government
records with respect to Mr. Smart’s nursing home business. After the two men
met, allegedly for Mr. Smart to deliver the money to Mr. VanMeter, both men
were arrested. At a joint trial, Mr. Smart moved to suppress recorded telephone
conversations, arguing that the wiretap orders were unlawful. The district court
refused to suppress the telephone conversations. A jury convicted both men, and
the district court judge sentenced each to prison terms.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Mr. Smart argues references to non-enumerated offenses in the
wiretap application materials and orders rendered those orders “invalid on their
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face,” and “fundamentally flawed.” The government counters that in referring to
non-enumerated offenses “the Government was simply fulfilling its statutory duty
to fully disclose to the court the nature and scope of the investigation.” The
district court agreed with the prosecution, explaining that “a statement of the
government’s belief that certain non-enumerated offenses had been committed in
addition to enumerated offenses does not render invalid the subsequent orders
authorizing a wiretap to investigate three enumerated offenses.”
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act allows judges
of competent jurisdiction to issue ex parte orders authorizing interception of wire
communications where an application from authorized investigators shows
probable cause of the commission of one or more certain enumerated offenses.
[T]he judge may enter an ex parte order ... authorizing or approving
interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications ... if the
judge determines on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant
that –
(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is
committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular
offense enumerated in section 2516 of this chapter ....
18 U.S.C. § 2518(3). On appeal from a motion to suppress evidence obtained
pursuant to such a wiretap, we accept the district court’s factual findings unless
clearly erroneous and review questions of law de novo. Castillo-Garcia, 117 F.3d
at 1186. Because the issue of whether references to non-enumerated offenses in
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wiretap application materials and orders invalidates those orders is entirely one of
law, we apply de novo review. Nevertheless, “a wiretap authorization order is
presumed proper, and a defendant carries the burden of overcoming this
presumption.” United States v. Quintana, 70 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 1995).
We read applications for wiretap orders “in a practical and commonsense manner
rather than hypertechnically.” United States v. Johnson, 645 F.2d 865, 867 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 866 (1981). Mr. Smart’s argument for the
suppression of telephone conversations obtained through use of the March 10,
2000 and April 11, 2000 wiretap orders is best addressed in two parts. First, we
consider whether the orders’ inclusion of 18 U.S.C. § 371 as a predicate for the
wiretaps constituted an unlawful authorization to investigate a general conspiracy.
Second, we discuss whether references in wiretap application documents and
orders to non-enumerated offenses, some of which are incorrectly characterized as
enumerated, invalidate those wiretap orders.
Initially, Mr. Smart argues the March 10, 2000 and April 11, 2000 wiretap
orders unlawfully “authorized an investigation into a general conspiracy.”
Although § 371 is not specifically mentioned on the list of offenses subject to
wiretap investigation, a conspiracy to commit any of the other offenses
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) is a lawful predicate for a wiretap. 18 U.S.C.
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2516(1)(p). Accordingly, at least one district court has explicitly held it is
permissible for an order to include authorization to wiretap for evidence of a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. United States v. Arnold, 576 F. Supp. 304, 310 n.4
(N.D. Ill. 1983), aff’d, 773 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1985). Moreover, there are several
cases upholding orders predicating wiretaps in part on 18 U.S.C. § 371 where
defense counsel made no challenge to inclusion of the offense. See, e.g., United
States v. Argusa, 541 F.2d 690, 692 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045
(1977); United States v. Gambino, 734 F.Supp. 1084, 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d
in part rev’d in part on other grounds, 920 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990); United
States v. Escandar, 319 F.Supp. 295, 297 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
Contrary to Mr. Smart’s contention, there is no reason to assume the
Federal Bureau of Investigation was investigating general conspiracy. Because
the order included two other expressly enumerated offenses – in addition to § 371
– a plausible interpretation order is that it authorized investigation of a conspiracy
to commit either or both of the other two explicitly enumerated offenses. Since
we must presume the wiretap orders were valid, we interpret the orders as
predicating the wiretaps upon only a conspiracy to commit 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and
18 U.S.C. § 1952. Thus, a common sense reading of the orders in this case does
not suggest the wiretapping was based on suspicion of a general conspiracy.
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Given the facts of this case, we hold 18 U.S.C. § 371 was an enumerated offense
for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 2516, where the wiretap order concurrently
authorized investigation of two other offenses specifically listed in § 2516.
However, this case presents no opportunity to determine whether a wiretap order
including only 18 U.S.C. § 371, without additional explicitly enumerated
offenses, would survive appellate review.
Mr. Smart also argues the wiretap application documents and orders are
invalid because they refer to non-enumerated offenses and incorrectly characterize
some of those offenses as enumerated. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act allows judges to authorize wiretaps where, among other
requirements, an application shows probable cause to suspect an enumerated
offense. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a). Title III further provides for the suppression of
all evidence derived from a wiretap if "the communication was unlawfully
intercepted," or "the order of authorization or approval under which it was
intercepted is insufficient on its face," or "the interception was not made in
conformity with the order of authorization or approval." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a).
The Supreme Court has elaborated that we should “require suppression where
there is failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly and
substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept
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procedures.” United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974).
It does not follow from these rules that where investigators suspect both
enumerated and non-enumerated offenses wiretaps are impermissible. See United
States v. McKinnon, 721 F.2d 19, 21-23 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding authorization to
investigate enumerated offenses was lawful where officers advised the court that
conversations relating to non-enumerated offenses might inadvertently be
intercepted). To hold otherwise would create perverse incentives for law
enforcement officers to only disclose suspicion of enumerated crimes and for
criminals to commit non-enumerated offenses to insulate their communications
from interception. Mr. Smart presents no case law, and we can find none,
indicating mere references to non-enumerated offenses will invalidate wiretap
application documents or orders. 6 Nevertheless, we are troubled by the wiretap
application materials’ and orders’ incorrect characterizations of 42 U.S.C. § 1320
and 18 U.S.C. § 1518 as enumerated offenses under the wiretap statute. These
6
On the contrary, in United States v. Levine a federal district judge
persuasively reasoned failure to disclose evidence of other non-enumerated
offenses “might give rise to an inference of bad faith.” 690 F. Supp. 1165, 1170
(E.D.N.Y. 1988). See also United States v. O’Neill, 27 F. Supp.2d 1121, 1127
(E.D. Wisc. 1998) (“[The Defendant] offers no support for his argument that
inclusion of a reference to a non-listed offense in the surveillance authorizations
completely invalidates those authorizations.”).
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two offenses are not included in 18 U.S.C. § 2516. The government’s insistence
that inclusion of the non-enumerated offenses was merely a forthright attempt to
disclose the full and complete facts and circumstances surrounding the
investigation does not explain misrepresentation about whether offenses are
enumerated.
The failsafe of these misleading documents lies in the limited scope of the
offenses actually approved for wiretap investigation. Although the March 10,
2000 and April 11, 2000 orders discuss suspicion of both enumerated and non-
enumerated offenses, the orders authorize investigation only of three enumerated
offenses. The record on appeal provides no indication that these three offenses
were a false pretext or subterfuge to justify investigation of non-enumerated
crimes. Rather, what we have are two poorly drafted but narrowly authorizing
orders. We cannot say that either reference to non-enumerated statutes or even
the incorrect description of two non-enumerated statutes as enumerated amounts
to a failure to satisfy a statutory requirement that directly and substantially
implements congressional intent. This is to say these misidentifications in the
application materials and findings of the orders “did not affect the fulfillment of
any of the reviewing or approval functions required by Congress.” United States
v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 575 (1974). Rather, the federal judges issuing the
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orders fulfilled their reviewing function by limiting the scope of the wiretap
investigation to only three enumerated offenses. Accordingly, we hold the
incorrect description of suspected non-enumerated offenses as enumerated in
application materials and findings in a wiretap order does not invalidate that order
where the authorization to wiretap itself was limited to only enumerated offenses.
The question of whether an order authorizing wiretapping in investigation of both
enumerated and non-enumerated offenses would survive review is saved for
another day.
For these reasons, we reject Mr. Smart’s contention that the incriminating
telephone conversations were unlawfully intercepted. We AFFIRM the trial
court’s order denying his motion to suppress. 7
7
The government filed a motion to supplement the record, asking to
include a transcript of an April 17, 2000 telephone conversation between Mr.
VanMeter and Mr. Smart. Because a transcript of the April 17 conversation
would not materially aid our decision, the government’s motion to supplement the
record is denied.
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