F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
SEP 17 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 01-1554
JOSEPH RAMIREZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 01-CR-189-M)
Before KELLY, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. *
John W. Suthers, United States Attorney and Kathleen L. Torres, Assistant United
States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff - Appellee.
Michael G. Katz, Federal Public Defender and Matthew Golla, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant - Appellant.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
*
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel
has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant-Appellant Joseph Ramirez pled guilty to armed bank robbery, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) & (d), and using and carrying a firearm during
and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He was
sentenced to 60 months and 84 months respectively, to be served consecutively,
and consecutively to a state court sentence now being served. He was also
sentenced to five years supervised release on each offense, to run concurrently,
and restitution of $1,120. Prior to sentencing, Mr. Ramirez filed an unopposed
motion requesting a competency evaluation based upon symptoms of paranoid
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder observed by the clinical director at the facility
where Mr. Ramirez was being held. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a); 1 1 R.S. Doc. 27 at 2.
Counsel also represented that Mr. Ramirez’s mental condition had deteriorated
after his plea. 1 R.S. Doc. 27 at 2. The government agreed to incur the cost of
the evaluation. Id. The district court denied the motion, but invited Mr. Ramirez
1
18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) provides:
Motion to determine competency of defendant.--At any time after
the commencement of a prosecution for an offense and prior to the
sentencing of the defendant, the defendant or the attorney for the
Government may file a motion for a hearing to determine the mental
competency of the defendant. The court shall grant the motion, or
shall order such a hearing on its own motion, if there is reasonable
cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a
mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the
extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of
the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.
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to revisit the issue at sentencing. 1 R.S. Doc. 28. At sentencing, the court denied
Mr. Ramirez’s oral motion for an evaluation pursuant to § 4241. On appeal, Mr.
Ramirez claims the district court violated both Mr. Ramirez’s due process rights
and the statutes governing competency determinations when it denied his request
for a competency evaluation. Aplt. Br. at 4. Our jurisdiction arises under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and we reverse and remand based upon
the statutory grounds.
Whether to order a competency examination is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. United States v. Prince, 938 F.2d 1092, 1095 (10th Cir. 1991). Abuse
of discretion occurs when a court has based its decision “on an erroneous
conclusion of law or relies on clearly erroneous fact findings.” Kiowa Indian
Tribe of Okla. v. Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 1998). Absent findings
of an insufficient factual basis for a § 4241(a) motion, or a lack of good faith in
making the motion, a competency evaluation is required. United States v. Hill,
526 F.2d 1019, 1023 (10th Cir. 1975). The evaluation becomes the first in a
three-step process of determining competency. United States v. Boigegrain, 155
F.3d 1181, 1184 n.1 (10th Cir. 1998).
According to the motion, Mr. Ramirez and the government were “in
agreement that a psychiatric evaluation would enable the Court to decide whether
Mr. Ramirez is competent to proceed at sentencing and also address any issues
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counsel may explore with respect to a downward departure pursuant to either
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13 (diminished capacity) and/or U.S.S.G. § 5H1.3 [policy
statement concerning mental and emotional conditions].” 1 R.S. Doc. 27 at 2.
The district court denied the motion on the grounds that (1) the Defendant had
additional time to be served in the Colorado state system, and (2) diminished
capacity was unavailable as a ground for departure. I R.S. Doc. 28 at 1.
Unfortunately, neither of these grounds address “whether there is reasonable
cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental
disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is
unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him
or to assist properly in his defense,” the standard of § 4241(a).
The government argues that Mr. Ramirez made an insufficient showing
unaccompanied by an offer of proof. But see United States v. Grimes, 173 F.3d
634, 636 (7th Cir. 1999) (“anything that points to the need for evidence is
admissible to help the judge decide whether reasonable cause for an evidentiary
hearing exists”). Of course, the government’s argument is tempered by its lack of
opposition to the motion and its concurrence in some of the supporting grounds.
The government also argues that the district court could deny the motion based
upon its observations of the Defendant at the plea and sentencing hearings. The
problem is that nothing indicates that the district court exercised its discretion on
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the basis of either of these arguments. We cannot substitute our discretion for
that of the district court. On remand, the parties should again be heard on the
need for a competency evaluation and a decision made in accordance with the
above standards.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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