F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
SEP 24 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
NANA OSEI,
Petitioner,
v. No. 01-9515
IMMIGRATION &
NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A
DECISION OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
(No. A72-797-882)
L. Ari Weitzhandler, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner.
Marshall Tamor Golding, Attorney, (Richard M. Evans, Assistant Director, and
Carl H. McIntyre, Jr., Senior Litigation Counsel, with him on the briefs), Office
of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Before HENRY, McWILLIAMS, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
Nana Osei seeks review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(the “Board”) denying his Motion to Reopen and Motion for Stay of Deportation
Based on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. This court exercises jurisdiction
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1995), 1 grants the petition for review, vacates
the Board’s order, and remands to the Board for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Osei is a native and citizen of Ghana who entered the United States on July
17, 1993, pursuant to a valid non-immigrant visitor’s visa. In October of 1993,
prior to the expiration of his visa, Osei submitted a pro se application for asylum
to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”). As grounds for his
1
As this court recently explained,
In 1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a was repealed by section 306(b) of
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. IIRIRA dramatically
changed the scope and nature of judicial review in exclusion cases.
But because the INS commenced deportation proceedings against the
petitioner before IIRIRA’s effective date, April 1, 1997, and the final
deportation order was entered after October 31, 1996, our review is
governed by the pre-IIRIRA rules as amended by IIRIRA’s
transitional rules. See IIRIRA § 306(c)(1), reprinted as amended in
8 U.S.C. § 1252 note; IIRIRA [§] 309(a), (c)(1) & (4), reprinted as
amended in 8 U.S.C. § 1101 note. Under the transitional rules, §
1105a remains in effect but for minor procedural amendments.
Woldemeskel v. INS, 257 F.3d 1185, 1187 n.1 (10th Cir. 2001); cf. Aguilera v.
Kirkpatrick, 241 F.3d 1286, 1290-92 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2001) (discussing generally
in habeas context jurisdictional issues relating to motions to reopen deportation
proceedings).
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asylum request, Osei asserted that he had suffered past persecution in Ghana and
feared future persecution because of his political opinions and activities,
membership in the Resurrection Power Evangelical Ministries and the New
Patriotic Party, and his close familial relationship to the deposed and executed
former Ghanian head of state.
On September 23, 1996, the INS issued to Osei an order to show cause,
asserting that he was deportable because he had overstayed his visa without INS
authorization. Osei appeared with retained counsel at a master calendar hearing
conducted before an immigration judge in Denver, Colorado on March 4, 1997.
Osei admitted the allegations set out in the show cause order and conceded
deportability; he nevertheless requested a hearing on his request for asylum. A
hearing on the merits of Osei’s asylum application was conducted before the
immigration court in September of 1997; Osei was represented by counsel at the
hearing. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the immigration judge
denied the application, concluding as follows: (1) Osei failed to adduce evidence
demonstrating that he was actually related to the deposed head of state; (2) even if
Osei had, in fact, suffered persecution relating to his connection to the deposed
head of state, that persecution ended long before he left Ghana and he did not
have a well-founded fear of persecution at the time he left; (3) Osei’s claim that
he suffered religious persecution was not supported by record evidence and was
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contrary to reports issued by the State Department; and (4) Osei’s arrest and
incarceration in 1983 did not amount to past persecution because the arrest was
routine and Osei was not mistreated.
Osei filed a pro se notice of appeal with the Board in October of 1997,
raising the following two issues: (1) the immigration judge erred as a matter of
fact and law in determining that Osei’s prior experiences did not amount to
persecution; and (2) the immigration judge erred as a matter of fact and law in
determining that, even assuming Osei had experienced past persecution, Osei did
not qualify for asylum based on current country conditions. In his notice of
appeal, Osei indicated that he would be filing a separate brief in support of these
assertions. When Osei failed to file his brief, the Board summarily dismissed his
appeal for failure to clearly identify specific legal or factual errors and for his
failure to either file a timely brief or explain his failure to do so.
Osei did not seek judicial review of the Board’s decision. Instead, he
retained new counsel and filed a motion to reopen (the “Motion”) his case with
the Board. The Motion sought to introduce additional evidence in support of
Osei’s application for asylum and alleged that this additional evidence was not
submitted at the time of the asylum hearing because of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The Board denied the Motion, ruling as follows:
[Osei] has not provided any explanation why he did not previously
raise this claim when he had the opportunity in his appeal. As this
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evidence could have been presented on appeal, the respondent’s
motion to reopen is denied. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c)(1) (stating that a
motion to reopen shall not be granted unless it appears that the
evidence is material and was not previously available).
Osei thereafter filed the instant petition for review with this court, seeking review
of the Board’s denial of the Motion.
ANALYSIS
The Board denied the Motion pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c)(1), which
provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “A motion to reopen proceedings shall not
be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is
material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at
the former hearing . . . .” This court reviews the Board’s determination that a
motion to reopen does not satisfy this requirement for abuse of discretion. See
INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 106-07 (1988); see also INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314,
323 (1992). “An abuse of discretion may be found in those circumstances where
the Board’s decision provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs from
established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or
conclusory statements . . . .” Zhao v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83,
93 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). On the record before this court, and in light
of the parties’ submissions on appeal, we conclude that the Board’s denial of the
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Motion, supported as it was by a mere citation to 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c)(1), constituted
an abuse of discretion.
This court has recognized that the Fifth Amendment guarantees aliens
subject to deportation the right to a fundamentally fair deportation proceeding.
See Trench v. INS, 783 F.2d 181, 182-83 (10th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, although
there is no right to appointed counsel in deportation proceedings, a petitioner like
Osei can state a Fifth Amendment violation if he proves that retained counsel was
ineffective and, as a result, the petitioner was denied a fundamentally fair
proceeding. See Akinwunmi v. INS, 194 F.3d 1340, 1341 n.2 (10th Cir. 1999) (per
curiam); Michelson v. INS, 897 F.2d 465, 468 (10th Cir. 1990).
In recognition of the right to due process, the Board has “decided that
ineffective assistance of counsel is a valid ground for reopening a deportation
case in ‘egregious circumstances.’” Stroe v. INS, 256 F.3d 498, 501 (7th Cir.
2001) (quoting In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (BIA), aff’d, 857 F.2d 10
(1st Cir. 1988)); see also In re N-K, 21 I. & N. Dec. 879, 880 (BIA 1997)
(providing that an alien may move to reopen proceedings when his counsel’s
incompetence has prevented him “from reasonably presenting his case”).
Notably, this court, along with other circuits, have concluded that because the
Board has created in Lozada a mechanism for hearing due-process based claims of
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ineffective assistance of counsel, such claims must first be presented to the
Board. See Akinwunmi, 194 F.3d at 1341 (collecting cases).
The INS nevertheless asserts that the terms of 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c)(1) clearly
provide that no alien may assert a claim of ineffective assistance if the evidence
of counsel’s ineffectiveness was available on direct appeal from an immigration
judge’s decision. The problem with this argument is that the INS has not pointed
to any decision of the Board indicating that § 3.2(c)(1) operates in this fashion.
In particular, the INS has not cited a single case, except the summary order before
this court on Osei’s petition for review, in which the Board has denied a motion
to reopen raising a claim of ineffective assistance on the basis that the motion to
reopen fails to comply with § 3.2(c)(1). Instead, the Board has regularly
evaluated such motions to reopen based merely on whether they satisfy the
requirements set out in Lozada. 2 For instance, in In re N-K, the Board was faced
2
In In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 638-39 (BIA) aff’d, 857 F.2d 10 (1st
Cir. 1988), the Board decided that ineffective assistance of counsel is a valid
ground for reopening a deportation case when the ineffective assistance prevented
the alien from reasonably presenting his case. In order to fit within the
parameters of the rule set out by the Board in Lozada, the alien must meet the
following requirements:
First, the motion should be supported by an affidavit of the allegedly
aggrieved applicant attesting to the relevant facts. Second, before
the allegation is presented to the Board, the former counsel must be
informed of the allegations and allowed the opportunity to respond.
Any subsequent response from counsel, or report of counsel’s failure
or refusal to respond should be submitted with the motion. Finally, if
it is asserted that prior counsel’s handling of the case involved a
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with the motion to reopen in which it was clear that the claim of ineffective
assistance could have been raised on direct appeal to the Board. 21 I. & N. Dec.
at 880-81. Although the INS opposed the motion on the basis of § 3.2(c)(1), the
Board did not address this question. Instead, the Board granted the motion to
reopen, concluding that the movants had satisfied the factors set forth by the
Board in Lozada. Id. This court, along with numerous other circuits, has clearly
understood this to be the Board’s practice. See Akinwunmi, 194 F.3d at 1341
(“The BIA permits an alien to move to reopen the administrative proceedings
when his counsel’s incompetence has prevented him ‘from reasonably presenting
his case.’” (quoting In re N-K)); see also, e.g., Iavorski v INS, 232 F.3d 124, 129
(2d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he vehicle commonly used to redress claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel in deportation proceedings has been an administrative
motion to reopen proceedings. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel satisfy
the general requirement that motions to reopen present ‘new facts’ that are
‘material and [were] not available and could not have been discovered or
presented at the former hearing.’” (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(b)(3)) (alteration in
original) (citations omitted)); Bernal-Vallejo v. INS, 195 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir.
violation of ethical or legal responsibilities, the motions should
reflect “whether a complaint has been filed with appropriate
disciplinary authorities regarding such representation, and if not, why
not.”
In re N-K, 21 I. & N. Dec. 879, 881 (BIA 1997) (quoting Lozada).
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1999) (“The BIA has procedures to hear ineffective assistance of counsel claims
through a motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c). Mindful that such claims
may be frivolous and brought as a device to delay deportation, the BIA uses the
criteria set forth in [Lozada] as a screening device and does not generally
consider the merits of such claims until the alien has met certain threshold
requirements.”). In fact, several courts have responded to claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel raised for the first time in a petition for review by entering
stays of deportation, thereby allowing the petitioners an opportunity to submit
motions to reopen to the Board. See, e.g., Casteneda-Suarez v. INS, 993 F.2d
142, 146 (7th Cir. 1993); Sewak v. INS, 900 F.2d 667, 674 (3d Cir. 1990).
There may very well be excellent reasons to require that aliens raise a claim
of ineffective assistance on appeal to the Board rather than in a motion to reopen.
See Abudu, 485 U.S. at 107-08 (setting forth reasons why motions to reopen are
disfavored). Nevertheless, on the record before this court, it appears clear that
the Board has consistently evaluated motions to reopen exclusively on the factors
set out in Lozada, concluding that if those factors are satisfied, the material
omitted could not have reasonably been adduced in the prior proceedings.
Although an administrative agency is permitted to change rules it
created in common law fashion, that is, as a byproduct of
adjudication—and that is the character of the Lozada rules—by the
same, common law method, it is not permitted to do so without a
reasoned explanation for its change of mind. That is, the agency
cannot, as a legislature can, reverse course without any explanation;
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its about-faces must be reasoned; in this respect, the legislative-
judicial hybrid, which is what an administrative agency is, is
assimilated to a court, which, under the doctrine of stare decisis, is
likewise required to give reasons for abandoning a precedent.
Stroe, 256 F.3d at 502-03 (citations omitted). Against this backdrop, the Board’s
summary citation to § 3.2(c) in disposing of Osei’s Motion constitutes an abuse of
discretion.
Osei’s petition for review is granted, the order of the Board denying
Osei’s Motion is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Board for further
proceedings. On remand, the Board is free to set out a reasoned explanation, if
one is available, why this case is distinguishable from Lozada and In re N-K. It is
likewise free to change course as to the manner in which it evaluates motions to
reopen, as long as the reasons for such a change of course are set forth in its
order. Finally, the Board is also free to simply proceed to the question whether
Osei’s motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel satisfies the
requirements set forth in Lozada. 3
3
Although the Board noted in a footnote that the Motion did not satisfy the
Lozada requirements, it declined to base its decision on that ground. In these
circumstances, the INS quite correctly notes that the matter must be remanded to
the Board to consider the issue in the first instance. See Alameda Water &
Sanitation Dist. v. Browner, 9 F.3d 88, 91 (10th Cir. 1993) (“A court may not
uphold an agency action on grounds not relied on by the agency.”).
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