F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
AUG 29 2003
PUBLISH
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 02-2292
RUDI ISMAEL FUENTES,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico
(D.C. No. CR-01-1409 JC)
Submitted on the briefs:
David C. Iglesias, United States Attorney, and Laura Fashing, Assistant U.S.
Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Rosanne Camunez, Las Cruces, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before SEYMOUR, MURPHY and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.
The government appeals the sentence imposed upon defendant Rudi Ismael
Fuentes, alleging error relating to a downward departure. For the reasons set
forth below, we vacate Mr. Fuentes’ sentence and remand for resentencing. 1
I
Mr. Fuentes pled guilty to an information charging him with one count of
illegal reentry after deportation subsequent to an aggravated felony conviction.
He entered into a plea agreement that provided he would be sentenced at offense
level seventeen, in a range of thirty-seven to forty-six months. At the sentencing
hearing, the court refused to accept the plea agreement. However, the court then
departed downward from the guideline range contemplated by the plea agreement
and imposed a sentence of thirty months. 2
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
2
In the absence of the plea agreement, Mr. Fuentes’ base offense level
would have been twenty-four, with a three-level reduction for acceptance of
responsibility. Taking into account his criminal history category (IV), the
applicable guideline range without the plea agreement was fifty-seven to seventy-
one months.
The court did not state the range from which it was departing downward.
Although the court explicitly rejected the plea agreement out of hand, it also
stated “I’m going to give him a seven month break,” Aplt Appx. vol. I at 44,
which indicates that the departure to a thirty month sentence was taken from the
(continued...)
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The government argues on appeal that the sentencing court erred first by
failing to give the government notice of its intent to depart downward from the
sentencing guidelines. The government further argues that having rejected the
plea agreement, the court abused its discretion by departing twenty-seven months
from the applicable sentencing guideline without specifically finding exceptional
circumstances existed, without stating its reasons for the departure, and by failing
to explain the methodology by which it related the degree of departure to the
sentencing guidelines.
II
The initial point the government raises is one of first impression in this
circuit. The government maintains it is entitled to notice that the court is
considering a downward departure so that it may develop a full record and
advance arguments on the propriety of departure. Six of our sister circuits have
considered this question and all have determined this to be a proper statement of
the law. See United States v. Martin, 221 F.3d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 2000); United
States v. Pankhurst, 118 F.3d 345, 357 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Green,
2
(...continued)
range contemplated by the plea agreement, rather than from the otherwise
applicable range. To reach a sentence of thirty months, the departure from the
otherwise applicable range would have been twenty-seven months.
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105 F.3d 1321, 1322 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Maddox, 48 F.3d 791, 799
(4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Andruska, 964 F.2d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117, 1120 (2d Cir. 1991). No circuit has held
otherwise.
In United States v. Burns, 501 U.S. 129, 138-39 (1991), the Supreme Court
held that a sentencing court must give the defendant reasonable notice of its
intention to depart upward from the applicable guideline range on a ground not
identified as a ground for departure in either the presentence report or a
prehearing submission to the court. The Court held that Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 32 requires such notice, including the specific identification of the
ground for the intended departure. Id. The Court included a footnote stating
“[i]t is equally appropriate to frame the issue as whether the parties are entitled to
notice before the district court departs upward or downward from the Guidelines
range. Under Rule 32, it is clear that the defendant and the Government enjoy
equal procedural entitlements.” Id. at 135 n. 4 (emphasis in original).
The six circuits deciding the question applied the holding of Burns to
downward departures, recognizing the importance of an opportunity for both the
government and the defendant to develop a full record on which to consider a
departure in either direction. See, e.g., Pankhurst, 118 F.3d at 357-58; Green,
105 F.3d at 1322; Maddox, 48 F.3d at 799; Andruska, 964 F.2d at 643-44. We
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agree with the rationale in these cases and hold that the parties are entitled to
reasonable notice of a district court’s intention to depart from the guidelines in
either direction on a ground not previously identified. Because the district court
erred by not providing adequate notice in this case, we vacate and remand for
resentencing.
III
Aside from the issue of notice, the government raises several arguments
relating to the manner in which the court executed its downward departure. We
review the district court’s departure from the guidelines de novo. United States v.
Jones, 332 F.3d 1294, 1299 (10th Cir. 2003).
It is well established that a sentencing court is required to select a sentence
within a range calculated with reference to the Sentencing Guidelines unless
exceptional circumstances exist to distinguish the defendant in a given case from
others who have been convicted of the same criminal activity. See U.S.S.G. Ch.
1, pt. A, intro. comments 3-4. In reviewing the validity of departures from the
guidelines:
First, we must ascertain whether the district court set forth, in a
written order of judgment, its specific reasons for departure. Second,
we must consider whether the factors the district court relied upon
“advance the objectives set forth in [18 U.S.C.] section 3353(a)(2)”
and ensure that the district court’s reliance on those factors did not
violate any specific prohibition in the Guidelines . . . . Third, we
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must consider whether the factors the district court relied upon were
“authorized under section 3553(b)” and “justified by the facts of the
case.”. . . Finally, we must ask whether the district court’s sentence
“departs to an unreasonable degree from the applicable guidelines
range.”
Jones, 332 F.3d at 1299-1300 (citations and footnotes omitted). See also 18
U.S.C. § 3742(e).
We begin from the basic proposition that the sentencing court may not
depart unless it has found an exceptional circumstance that warrants doing so.
The court must find this circumstance to be “of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating
the guidelines that should result in a [lower] sentence . . . .” 18 U.S.C. §
3553(b)(1). If the court finds that such a circumstance exists, it must state at the
time of sentencing the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence different
from that described by the applicable guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c); see
also United States v. Hannah, 268 F.3d 937, 941 (10th Cir. 2001). Furthermore,
to justify the particular degree of departure, “the district court must specifically
articulate reasons for the degree of departure using any reasonable methodology
hitched to the Sentencing Guidelines, including extrapolation from or analogy to
the Guidelines.” Hannah, 268 F.3d at 941 (emphasis added) (internal quotation
omitted). That “reasonable methodology” should attempt to predict what the
Commission would have set as a guidelines had it adequately considered the
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circumstance the court has found to warrant a departure. See United States v.
Whiteskunk, 162 F.3d 1244, 1254 (10th Cir. 1998).
In the case before us, the district court articulated no specific reason or
exceptional circumstance warranting a departure. The court did not find a
circumstance that was of a kind or a degree not contemplated by the Commission.
The court did not even mention the sentencing guideline range (either the one
contemplated by the plea agreement or the one applicable in the absence of the
agreement), and certainly did not provide any reasonable methodology hitched to
the guidelines to explain its degree of departure.
From our review of the transcript of the sentencing hearing, it appears the
only conceivable reason for which the court chose to depart downward was based
on Mr. Fuente’s age at the time of the underlying convictions. The court engaged
in a brief and relatively informal discussion with counsel and the probation
officer regarding whether the Guidelines take into account the circumstance in
which an offense was committed prior to age eighteen. The prosecuting attorney
cited the relevant guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d), which clarifies the manner in
which the Commission determined this factor should be considered. The court
then abruptly, and without any other mention of the guidelines, applicable ranges,
or the plea agreement, stated “I’m going to give him a seven-month break.” Aplt.
Appx. Vol. I at 44. The court then formally sentenced the defendant without
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allowing any further remarks by either attorney. At the conclusion of his
pronouncement of the sentence, the court stated:
As justification for this sentence, I’m going to adopt all justifications
which are included in this report and notice that your sentence does
conform to the mandates of the Sentencing Guidelines and that the
Court has departed at its own instance for the fact – for the reason
stated in the record.
Aplt. Appx. vol. I at 45.
The report to which the court referred is presumably the presentence
investigation report. However, that report explicitly states there are no factors
that might warrant a departure. Aplt. Appx. Vol. II at 56. Moreover, the court’s
conclusory statement that Mr. Fuente’s sentence conformed to the mandates of the
Sentencing Guidelines is insufficient. In fact, it is incorrect, particularly in light
of the court’s explicit refusal to accept the plea agreement which had adjusted the
base offense level downward. Finally, although the court referred to “the reason
stated in the record,” the court had not in fact stated any reason for its downward
departure. 3
When the court moved on to ask the attorneys to discuss Mr. Fuentes’ right
3
As the government points out, the only conceivable interpretation of the
court’s action must be that the court departed downward on the basis of Mr.
Fuentes’ age at the time of the underlying conviction. However, as the
government had attempted to clarify for the court, that factor was already taken
into consideration in the Guidelines section regarding those under age eighteen,
and could not in this case of the conviction of a seventeen-year-old be considered
present to a degree not adequately taken into consideration.
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to appeal, both attorneys attempted to raise the subject of the plea agreement and
the guideline range it had contemplated. The court simply stated its blanket
refusal to accept any such plea agreements. When the probation officer stated the
guideline range in the plea agreement, the court replied, “I give him 30 [months]
because I departed.” Aplt. Appx. Vol. I at 45. The court provided no further
explanation for its action and summarily dismissed all those present, saying “go
away.” Aplt. Appx. Vol. I at 46. The hearing lasted only eight minutes.
The court’s failure to make appropriate findings and state the reasons and
methodology behind the departure as well as the particular degree of departure
require that we vacate Mr. Fuentes’ sentence and remand for resentencing.
IV
The government also points out in its brief that the district court failed to
follow the procedures then required under Rule 11(e)(4) in rejecting the Rule
11(e)(1)(c) plea agreement. Rule 11(e)(4), before its December 1, 2002
amendment, required that if a court chose to reject a Rule 11(e)(1)(c) plea
agreement,
the court shall, on the record, inform the parties of this fact, advise
the defendant personally in open court . . . that the court is not bound
by the plea agreement, afford the defendant the opportunity to then
withdraw the plea, and advise the defendant that if the defendant
persists in a guilty plea . . . the disposition of the case may be less
favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by the plea
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agreement.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4) (before amendment effective Dec. 1, 2002). In this
case, after the court had pronounced the sentence, the following exchange took
place:
Mr. Ossorio [Assistant United States Attorney]: Your Honor, I believe this
is a Rule 11(e)(1)(c) plea, whereby –
The Court: I don’t accept Rule 11(e)(1)(c)s. Do you want to
withdraw the plea? No, you don’t.
Ms. Camunez [defense counsel]: No.
The Court: I don’t take 11(e)(1)(c)s.
Mr. Ossorio: Your honor –
The Court: Y’all insult me when y’all come up with that kind of plea.
What do you want?
Probation officer: The Guideline Range is 37 to 46 months.
The Court: I give him 30 because I departed. Didn’t you hear that?
Probation officer: No, Your Honor. I’m sorry.
The Court: I just said that. All right. Go away.
Aplt. Appx. Vol. I at 45-46.
Clearly this exchange does not satisfy the requirements of former Rule
11(e)(4). On remand, if the sentencing court chooses to reject the plea agreement,
it must comply with the procedure now delineated in Rule 11(c)(5) (effective Dec.
1, 2002), which mirrors the procedures detailed in former Rule 11(e)(4).
Accordingly, we VACATE the sentence and REMAND for resentencing
consistent with this opinion.
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United States v. Fuentes
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2003-08-29
Citations: 341 F.3d 1216
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion