F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
APR 6 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 02-4187
ARTHUR ALVIN OLIVER,
Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(D.C. NO. 2:01-CR-691-B)
Michael S. Lee, Assistant United States Attorney (Paul M. Warner, United States
Attorney, and Diana Hagen, Assistant United States Attorney, on the briefs),
Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Michael R. Sikora (Loni F. DeLand, with him on the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah,
for Defendant-Appellee.
Before LUCERO , HARTZ , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges.
HARTZ , Circuit Judge.
The government appeals the district court’s grant of Defendant Arthur
Alvin Oliver’s motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop. We
exercise jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 and reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
On the afternoon of October 13, 2001, Sergeant Ryan Bauer of the Utah
Highway Patrol was patrolling Interstate 15 in Beaver County, Utah, when he
observed a blue Ford driven by Defendant exceeding the speed limit. He turned
on his emergency lights and pulled the car over for speeding. The activation of
the lights triggered the police vehicle’s audio/video equipment, which recorded
the traffic stop and subsequent events, although the audio component of the
equipment failed to engage until later in the stop.
Defendant was the car’s sole occupant. Sergeant Bauer approached from
the passenger side, informed Defendant why he had been stopped, and asked for
his license and registration. Defendant produced a driver’s license and explained
that the car was rented. When Bauer asked to see the rental agreement, Defendant
opened the glove box to retrieve it.
Bauer saw in the glove box a cylindrical package approximately six inches
long, wrapped in brown paper with thin, partially clear tape. Bauer, a 10-year
veteran of the Highway Patrol who had been involved in approximately 400 drug-
interdiction cases in the previous six years, testified that based on his training and
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experience the packaging appeared consistent with the way drugs are transported
on interstate highways. He stated that he had “never seen anything wrapped like
that that was not drugs wrapped in masking tape.” Aplt.’s App. at 100.
Defendant could see that Bauer had noticed the package. He appeared to
push the package farther into the glove box and underneath some papers. Bauer
then asked Defendant what was in the package. Defendant did not answer, but his
demeanor “completely changed.” He began shaking and turned pale. He again
tried to push the package down into the glove box. Asked once more what the
package was, Defendant paused for a few seconds and replied that it was “fruit.”
Bauer twice asked to see the package. Defendant did not reply. Instead, he
took the package from the glove box, clutched it to his chest, covered it with his
hands, and stared straight ahead. He ignored Bauer’s repeated directions to drop
the package, shut off the engine, and leave the vehicle. Bauer testified that he
began to fear for his safety and drew his firearm. Eventually, Defendant put the
package on the passenger’s seat and left the car. By this time the traffic stop had
lasted about two-and-a-half minutes.
Once Defendant was outside, Bauer instructed him to go to the front of the
vehicle, turn around, kneel down, and put his hands behind his head. Defendant
complied. Bauer then called for backup, intending to keep Defendant in that
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position until more officers arrived. (At this point the audio portion of the police
recording engaged.)
While Defendant was kneeling, he appeared to Bauer to be extremely
nervous and agitated. Defendant repeatedly lowered his hands from his head and
moved them towards his waistband, despite Bauer’s numerous orders not to move.
After about six minutes in that position, Defendant stood up, approached the
officer, told him that he would not get back on the ground, and that Bauer “was
just going to have to shoot and kill him.” Aplt.’s App. at 91. Defendant said, “I
am just going to walk away,” id. at 92, and began doing so. Bauer used pepper
spray in an attempt to stop Defendant. But after being sprayed twice, Defendant
ran across the highway to the median. Backup officers then arrived and arrested
Defendant in the median. Following the arrest, Bauer can be heard on the
audio/video recording remarking to a fellow officer, “I don’t know what the
package is.”
Defendant, his car, and the package were transported to the Beaver County
Sheriff’s Office. At the station the package was subjected to a sniff test by a
drug-detection dog, who alerted to the presence of drugs. Without first obtaining
a search warrant, Bauer opened one end of the package and performed a field test
on its contents. The test indicated that the package contained methamphetamine.
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Defendant was indicted for possession of 50 grams or more of a mixture or
substance containing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
and for using or carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). (The record on appeal does not indicate how,
when, or where the firearm was found.) He moved to suppress the
methamphetamine discovered during the traffic stop, arguing that Bauer lacked
reasonable suspicion to inquire about the package in the glove box. (He also
argued that by drawing his firearm and ordering Defendant out of the car and onto
the ground, Bauer effectively arrested him without probable cause, but he does
not press that argument on appeal.) Following a hearing at which only Bauer
testified, the magistrate judge recommended that Defendant’s motion be granted
because the package “was not obviously contraband,” Aplt.’s App. at 45; Bauer
lacked reasonable suspicion to ask about its contents (the magistrate judge
discounted the officer’s alleged experience with such packages because “the
particulars of the experience were not identified or equated to the facts of this
stop,” Aplt.’s App. at 52); and Defendant’s reaction to Bauer’s questioning was
therefore fruit of an illegal inquiry. The magistrate judge also found that Bauer
had unlawfully opened the package at the police station without a warrant. The
district court adopted the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation in its
entirety and granted Defendant’s motion to suppress. The government appeals.
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II. DISCUSSION
“In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and accept
the district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.”
United States v. Massie, 65 F.3d 843, 847 (10th Cir. 1995). “The ultimate
question of whether a search and seizure was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment is a question of law that we review de novo.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). We address in turn the district court’s rulings that the officer
violated the Fourth Amendment by (1) questioning Defendant about the package
during the traffic stop and (2) opening the package at the police station without a
warrant.
A. Questioning during the traffic stop
Defendant’s sole argument with respect to his detention during the traffic
stop is that Sergeant Bauer’s questions regarding the package in the glove box
violated the Fourth Amendment. He contends that all the officer’s observations
following those questions, along with the drugs seized from the car, resulted from
this unlawful inquiry and therefore must be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous
tree.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). He does not
challenge the initial stop or Bauer’s ordering him out of the car and requiring him
to kneel at the side of the road until backup officers arrived. We are thus
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confronted with the narrow issue of whether Bauer’s questions about the
package—asked after he observed both the package and Defendant’s apparent
attempts to push it under the papers in the glove box—violated the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV. We conclude that they did not.
“A traffic stop is a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
‘even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite
brief.’” United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). The “touchstone” of Fourth
Amendment analysis “is always the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the
particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.” Pennsylvania
v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “Reasonableness, of course, depends on a balance between the public
interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary
interference by law officers,” id. at 109 (internal quotation marks omitted), and
“is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances.”
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996). We analyze the reasonableness of a
traffic stop under the principles relating to investigative detentions set forth in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1228
(10th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
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At the outset we must distinguish between questioning that prolongs the
detention and questioning that does not. When questioning prolongs the
detention, the prolongation in itself constitutes a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment, so we have repeatedly held that the questioning must be supported
by at least reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d
537, 542-43 (10th Cir. 1994) (questioning about contraband that prolonged
detention unreasonable because unsupported by reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity); United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 816 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1991)
(same).
As for questions that do not extend the duration of the stop, panels of this
circuit have mentioned the matter in dictum on two occasions. In Walker we held
that the defendant had been unconstitutionally detained for questioning during a
traffic stop. We added, however:
[O]ur determination that the defendant was unlawfully detained
might be different if the questioning by the officer did not delay the
stop beyond the measure of time necessary to issue a citation. For
example, this case would be changed significantly if the officer
asked the same questions while awaiting the results of an NCIC
license or registration inquiry.
Id. (emphasis added).
In the second case, United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860 (10th Cir. 1995), we
considered police questioning about narcotics during a traffic stop. The
questioning occurred while the officer was awaiting word from his dispatcher
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regarding whether the driver’s license had been suspended. We upheld the police
conduct as justified by reasonable suspicion. We stated, without any reference to
Walker and in apparent disagreement with what had been said in that opinion:
Once the driver produces a valid license and proof that she is entitled
to operate the car, the driver must be permitted to proceed.
Subsequent or concurrent detentions for questioning are justified
only when the officer has reasonable suspicion of illegal transactions
in drugs or of any other serious crime.
Id. at 872 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis added).
The matter received some clarification in our en banc opinion in Holt, 264
F.3d 1215. The government had argued, relying on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436-38 (5th Cir. 1993), that “during a
traffic stop based on probable cause, length is the only constraint on questioning,”
id. at 1228 (emphasis added). We rejected this notion, agreeing with the Seventh
Circuit’s panel decision in United States v. Childs, 256 F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 2001),
see Holt, 264 F.3d 1229 n.4, a decision that was subsequently set aside by the
Seventh Circuit en banc, see United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 949 (7th Cir.
2002) (“Questions asked during detention may affect the reasonableness of that
detention (which is a seizure) to the extent that they prolong custody, but
questions that do not increase the length of detention (or that extend it by only a
brief time) do not make the custody itself unreasonable or require suppression of
evidence found as a result of the answers.”). In Holt we emphasized that
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reasonableness is the overarching inquiry in Fourth Amendment analysis, see
Holt, 264 F.3d at 1220, and we held that the “Fourth Amendment reasonableness
of a traffic stop . . . must be judged by examining both the length of the detention
and the manner in which it is carried out.” Id. at 1230.
The Holt court did not expand upon the standard for determining the
propriety of questions that do not prolong the detention. But when it said that the
“reasonableness of a traffic stop . . . must be judged [in part] by the manner in
which [the detention] is carried out,” it implied that the test, not surprisingly, is
reasonableness. In other words, we must ask whether the circumstances made it
reasonable for the officer to ask the questions, even when the questioning did not
prolong the detention.
As we understand Holt, a question may be “reasonable” despite the absence
of the particularized evidence of crime required for “reasonable suspicion.” After
all, Holt allows the officer routinely to ask about travel plans and the presence of
loaded firearms during a lawful traffic stop. Id. at 1217-18, 1221. In addition,
we see nothing in Holt to suggest that the only circumstances relevant to
reasonableness are those known to the officer at the outset of the stop, to the
exclusion of what is learned during the course of the stop.
Holt, as we read it, is consistent with Fourth Amendment principles. The
“reasonable suspicion” standard governs whether a seizure, or the continuation of
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a seizure, is constitutional. Protection against seizures is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment, whose office is to protect “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. In contrast, protection against rude, officious,
or intrusive police questioning is not a core concern of that Amendment.
Questioning in itself does not constitute a search or seizure. See Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). Moreover, although a person detained on
reasonable suspicion is not free to leave, a person questioned by an officer is free
to refuse to answer the question, see Holt, 264 F.3d at 1224. Thus, it makes sense
to treat non-detaining questioning differently than we treat actual seizures. As
recognized in Walker, our analysis may “be changed significantly” depending
upon whether we are reviewing questions that prolonged the detention or
questions that did not. 933 F.2d at 816 n.2.
In our view, Bauer’s questions regarding the contents of the package were
reasonable. They were prompted by and directly related to Defendant’s
objectively suspicious behavior: After the package caught the officer’s attention,
Defendant apparently responded by attempting to push it farther into the glove
box and underneath the paperwork inside. At that point all Bauer asked was what
was in the package.
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When we say that Bauer’s questions were reasonable in light of the
circumstances, we could perhaps say that we are applying the “reasonable
suspicion” standard. But we do not wish to dilute the meaning of that standard.
The district court in this case believed that the evidence available to Bauer did not
rise to the level of “reasonable suspicion,” as the term is generally understood.
As we have explained, however, a less-confined reasonableness standard is
appropriate in this context. And we hold that this overarching reasonableness
standard is met here.
Accordingly, we reject Defendant’s contention that Sergeant Bauer’s
questions regarding the package violated the Fourth Amendment.
B. Search of the package at the police station
Having determined that the questioning during the traffic stop was not
unreasonable (and therefore did not taint all subsequent events), we now turn to
the district court’s alternative ruling that Sergeant Bauer violated the Fourth
Amendment when he opened the package at the police station later that same day
without a search warrant. The government concedes that opening the package to
test it for drugs was a “search” under the Fourth Amendment for which a warrant
ordinarily would be required. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 550 (10th
Cir. 1985) (absent an exception to the warrant requirement, “warrantless searches
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are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment”). It argues, however, that
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement applies here. We agree.
Under the automobile exception, “police officers who have probable cause
to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the
road may search it without obtaining a warrant.” Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S.
380, 381 (1984) (per curiam). Moreover, if there is probable cause to believe that
a container in a lawfully stopped vehicle contains contraband, the police may
search the container without a warrant. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565,
580 (1991). Furthermore, “the justification to conduct such a warrantless search
does not vanish once the car has been immobilized,” Michigan v. Thomas, 458
U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (per curiam), and “[t]here is no requirement that the
warrantless search of a vehicle occur contemporaneously with its lawful seizure.”
United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 484 (1985); see Texas v. White, 423 U.S.
67, 68 (1975) (“police officers with probable cause to search an automobile at the
scene where it was stopped could constitutionally do so later at the station house
without first obtaining a warrant”). Accordingly, a container in a vehicle may be
searched without a warrant within a reasonable time after its removal from the
vehicle. See Johns, 469 U.S. at 480 (approving “a warrantless search of packages
several days after they were removed from vehicles that police officers had
probable cause to believe contained contraband”); United States v. Corral, 970
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F.2d 719, 726 (10th Cir. 1992) (because police had probable cause to believe that
package in automobile contained contraband, automobile exception permitted
package’s warrantless seizure and subsequent search at police station). Thus, if
there was probable cause to believe Defendant’s package contained contraband at
the time it was seized from his vehicle, no warrant was necessary for the later
search.
Here, there was probable cause to believe that the package in the vehicle
contained contraband. Although Defendant makes a perfunctory assertion, with
only the suggestion of an argument, that probable cause was absent, his bizarre
conduct—culminating in his flight from the scene—after being asked about the
package established “a fair probability that the car contain[ed] contraband or
evidence.” United States v. Vasquez-Castillo, 258 F.3d 1207, 1212 (10th Cir.
2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. United States v. Bell, 892 F.2d 959,
967 (10th Cir. 1989) (suspicion that defendant was transporting drugs blossomed
into probable cause when he fled from police detention). Accordingly, we hold
that Sergeant Bauer did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he opened the
package at the police station without a warrant.
III. CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the district court’s grant of Defendant’s motion to suppress
and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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No. 02-4187, United States v. Oliver
LUCERO , J., concurring.
I join the concurrence of Judge McConnell insofar as its analysis is
predicated on reasonable suspicion. Expressly, I do not join Judge Hartz’s
analysis that is based on a generalized “reasonableness” standard; such a standard
is contrary to the established en banc precedent of this court. United States v.
Holt , 264 F.3d 1215, 1230 (10th Cir. 2001) (applying Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1
(1968) to the issue of whether questions in the course of a traffic stop violate the
Fourth Amendment).
No. 02-4187, United States v. Oliver
McCONNELL , J., concurring.
I join Judge Hartz’s opinion, but wish to add that I consider it far from
clear that Sergeant Bauer lacked “reasonable suspicion” to question Mr. Oliver
about the contents of the unusual package in his glove compartment. The package
was about six inches long, cylindrical, wrapped in brown paper with tape. The
police officer, a 10-year veteran of the Highway Patrol who had been involved in
approximately 400 drug-interdiction cases, testified that based on his training and
experience the packaging appeared consistent with the way drugs are transported
on interstate highways. He stated that he had “never seen anything wrapped like
that that was not drugs wrapped in masking tape.” Aplt’s App. 100. Add to this
Mr. Oliver’s clumsy attempt to hide the package from the police officer, which
together with the unusual appearance of the package could reasonably have
incited suspicion. It is therefore arguably not necessary to debate precisely what
standard we must apply to questions beyond the scope of the initial traffic stop –
reasonableness or reasonable suspicion – because even the more demanding
standard is satisfied under these facts.
In concluding there was no basis for reasonable suspicion, the Magistrate
Judge found that the package was “not obviously contraband.” Aplt’s App. 45.
But a package does not have to be “obviously” contraband to give rise to
reasonable suspicion. Indeed, if it were “obviously contraband,” it would
constitute probable cause for search and arrest – not just a basis for asking a few
more questions. Moreover, the defendant’s attempt to hide the package
heightened the officer’s suspicions. Thus, I do not think a legal conclusion that
Sergeant Bauer had a basis for reasonable suspicion is inconsistent with the
factual finding.
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