Morgan v. McCotter

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
APR 21 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT

NICHOLAS G. MORGAN, III,

Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 03-4046
v.

O. LANE MCCOTTER, an individual;
FRANK MYLAR, an individual; GIL
GARCIA, an individual,

Defendants - Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(D.C. No. 2:99-CV-73-TC)

Roger D. Sandack, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff - Appellant.

Nancy L. Kemp, Assistant Attorney General, (Bless Young, Assistant Attorney
General and Mark L. Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General, on the brief) for
Defendants - Appellees.

Before TACHA, Chief Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and KELLY,
Circuit Judge.

KELLY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Nicholas G. Morgan, III, appeals from the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees O. Lane

McCotter, the Executive Director of the Utah Department of Corrections

(“UDOC”), Frank Mylar, UDOC’s legal counsel, and Gil Garcia, an investigator

for the Utah Department of Public Safety. 1 Proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

Plaintiff claimed that he was deprived of a property interest in his continued

employment with the State of Utah as a career service employee without due

process of law when he was terminated “for cause” from an exempt position

without adequate procedural protections. He also claimed that he was deprived of

a liberty interest. The district court held that Plaintiff was provided adequate pre-

termination due process protections, and that he failed to utilize post-termination

proceedings available to him. IV Aplt. App. 1010-19. Rejecting the due process

claims, the district court declined to address Plaintiff’s remaining supplemental

state-law claim. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C § 1291. Because we find

that the case presents no justiciable controversy, we remand to the district court to

dismiss the action without prejudice.

Background

After a career in law enforcement, Plaintiff became employed by the State

1
In his brief, Plaintiff only refers to Defendant McCotter. Consequently,
any claims against the other Defendants are waived. See Tran v. Trs. of the State
Colls. in Colo., 355 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 2004).

-2-
of Utah in 1985. In 1993, he was appointed Deputy Director of the Utah

Department of Corrections. Under Utah law, the position of Deputy Director is

an “exempt” position, meaning that an individual occupying that position is

essentially an at-will employee, and as such may be terminated without cause at

any time. See Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-15(1)(d). This status stands in contrast to

that of most other state employees who are classified as “career service

employees.” “Career service employees” are essentially tenured public employees

who maintain a statutory property interest in their position and consequently may

not be terminated without cause. See Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18. If a career

service employee is subject to termination “for cause,” Utah law provides that

prior to the termination becoming effective, the employee must be afforded a

number of procedural protections including written notification of the reasons for

termination, an opportunity to respond to the charges, and an opportunity to be

heard by the department head. Id. Should a career service employee be

dissatisfied with a department head’s decision on the matter, he or she has a

statutory right to appeal this decision to the Career Service Review Board

(CSRB), an independent entity charged with reviewing the employment decisions

of the various state departments. See Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202.

Prior to his appointment as Deputy Director, Plaintiff had achieved career

service status through his service as a state employee. Consequently, if Plaintiff

-3-
were removed from his position as Deputy Director without cause, he would have

had automatic priority for reassignment to a comparable career service position if

one were available. According to Utah law, this priority would be effectuated

through the placement of Plaintiff’s name in a reappointment register designed

specially for those career service members terminated “without cause” from an

exempt position. See Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-17.

In late June 1996, Defendant McCotter met with Plaintiff and informed him

that he had received reports that Plaintiff had engaged in conduct that violated

departmental policies, and that such violations would have to be investigated.

Aplt. Br. at 4. On July 3, 1996, Defendant McCotter placed Plaintiff on

administrative leave with pay pending investigation of the charges. Id.

Following an investigation, on September 6, 1996, Defendant McCotter met with

Plaintiff and requested his resignation. Plaintiff refused to resign.

On September 16, 1996, Defendant McCotter sent Plaintiff a letter detailing

the results of the investigation 2 and terminating Plaintiff “for cause” effective

September 23, at 5:00 p.m. I Aplt. App. at 254. The letter concluded “[i]f you

2
Among the allegations contained in Defendant McCotter’s letter explaining
his decision to terminate Plaintiff for cause were: fraudulent billing of the state
for time Plaintiff had in fact been working for the military, maintaining an
inappropriate relationship with a female subordinate, and various instances of
disregarding department policies concerning competitive bidding, authorized
purchases, personal use of state property, and favoritism. See I Aplt. App. at 255-
58.

-4-
disagree with this action, you may appeal this decision directly to me within five

(5) working days, where you will have a chance to respond to these allegations in

a personal meeting.” Id. at 258.

On September 23, Plaintiff’s attorney faxed a letter to Defendant McCotter

denying the truth of many of the allegations and “strongly urg[ing Defendant

McCotter] to reconsider [the] decision to terminate Mr. Morgan after considering

the whole story.” Id. at 280. Defendant McCotter responded the same day with a

letter confirming Plaintiff’s termination and stating that “[e]ven though the pre-

termination time has elapsed to present any further response, I will gladly review

any post-termination written argument and evidence you may wish to submit on or

before September 30, 1996.” Id. at 282.

Plaintiff’s attorney again responded to Defendant McCotter’s letter, again

requesting that Plaintiff’s termination be rescinded and that Defendant “allow a

reasonable period of time to review all the information provided . . . regarding

[Plaintiff] and submit a response for your consideration.” Id. at 284.

One more exchange of letters ensued in which Defendant McCotter refused

to withdraw Plaintiff’s termination and Plaintiff again requested recision of the

termination and more time to provide evidence in response. See Aplee. Br. at 6.

Following this exchange of letters, Plaintiff made no effort to appeal Defendant

McCotter’s decision to the CSRB, nor did he present any evidence that he in fact

-5-
desired reappointment to a career services position.

Plaintiff initiated this action on February 5, 1999. On appeal, what remains

is his claim that Defendant violated his constitutional rights by depriving him of a

property interest without affording him due process of law. See Snyder v. City of

Moab, 354 F.3d 1179, 1189 (10th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff essentially concedes he

has no property interest in the exempt position of Deputy Director, so his

termination from that position cannot form the basis of a procedural due process

claim. Rather, Plaintiff claims a property interest in his eligibility for

reassignment to another career service position, and that his termination as

Deputy Director resulted in the loss of that eligibility without due process of law.

See Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). As noted,

on cross motions for summary judgment the district court granted Defendants’

motion for summary judgment, finding that as a matter of law, Plaintiff was

afforded adequate due process in connection with his termination. See IV Aplt.

App. at 1010-19.

On appeal, Plaintiff advances three main arguments as to how Defendant

McCotter’s actions constituted a denial of his right to procedural due process.

Plaintiff argues that (1) Departmental regulations require the provision of a full

evidentiary hearing prior to the forfeiture of reassignment rights, see Aplt. Br. at

13-17; (2) even if no full evidentiary hearing was required at the pre-termination

-6-
stage, the limited procedures available to him at that stage did not comply with

federal constitutional requirements, see id. at 17-22; and finally, (3) because he

was not eligible to seek review of the termination decision with the CSRB he had

no opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing as due process demands, see id. at

23-28.

Discussion

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, employing the same legal

standard as the district court, specifically Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Kingsford v. Salt

Lake City Sch. Dist., 247 F.3d 1123, 1127-28 (10th Cir. 2001). Summary

judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of

material fact exists, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-

movant. Kingsford, 247 F.3d at 1128.

A. Justiciability Considerations

As an Article III court, our jurisdiction is limited by the Constitution to

“cases and controversies.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). Both the

Supreme Court and our court have expanded that constitutional limitation,

recognizing that prudential considerations “founded in concern about the proper--

-7-
and properly limited--role of the courts in a democratic society” must also inform

our determination of whether a justiciable dispute actually exists. Warth v.

Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Because the question of justiciability

implicates this court’s jurisdiction, even if neither party, nor the district court,

raised the issue, it is our duty to undertake an independent examination to

determine whether the dispute, as framed by the parties, presents a justiciable

controversy. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998);

People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Rasmussen, 298 F.3d 1198, 1202

(10th Cir. 2002). As is the case here, “[w]hen the case has been resolved in the

district court on summary judgment grounds, a plaintiff must establish that there

exists no genuine issue of material fact as to justiciability.” Z.J. Gifts D-4,

L.L.C. v. City of Littleton, 311 F.3d 1220, 1226 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Though raised by neither of the parties, our primary concerns regarding

justiciability focus on the twin questions of whether Plaintiff has standing to

maintain this action and whether the case is ripe for judicial review. While the

two concepts are analytically distinct, their substantial overlap in many cases

gives rise to significant confusion. See Airline Prof’ls Ass’n v. Airborne, Inc.,

332 F.3d 983, 988 (6th Cir. 2003). Our concern in this case is whether the

Plaintiff has yet sustained any injury in fact by Defendant McCotter’s actions;

-8-
thus, the issues of standing and ripeness are particularly difficult to divorce. See

id.; McInnis-Misenor v. Me. Med. Ctr., 319 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir. 2003).

Nonetheless, because the justiciability issues in this case implicate both doctrines,

we attempt to analyze them individually.

B. Standing

Foremost among the well-established elements of a justiciable controversy

is the requirement that the plaintiff have standing to maintain the suit. Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Z.J. Gifts D-4, 311 F.3d at

1226. “There are three requirements of Article III standing. First, the plaintiff

must suffer an injury in fact. An injury in fact is an invasion of a legally

protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or

imminent, i.e., not conjectural or hypothetical.” Essence, Inc. v. City of Fed.

Heights, 285 F.3d 1272, 1280 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A plaintiff must also demonstrate that the harm complained of is fairly traceable

to defendant’s conduct and that a favorable ruling from the court would redress

plaintiff’s injury. Id. Thus, a main focus of the standing inquiry is whether

plaintiff has suffered a present or imminent injury, as opposed to a mere

possibility, or even probability, of future injury. See also Rector v. City &

County of Denver, 348 F.3d 935, 942-43 (10th Cir. 2003).

In the present case, Plaintiff frames his injury as the deprivation of his

-9-
property interest in eligibility for reappointment to a career service position.

Specifically, Plaintiff contends that because he was terminated “for cause” from

his position as Deputy Director, he automatically lost his eligibility for

reappointment, and that this deprivation of his property interest without due

process of law constitutes a judicially cognizable injury.

Although Plaintiff devotes the majority of his argument to the proposition

that he was deprived of due process, comparatively little effort has been spent on

establishing that Plaintiff has sustained any injury as a result of that deprivation.

Under the facts of this case, such an injury is not self-evident. Moreover, our

cases indicate that the harm Plaintiff asserts here fails to constitute the type of

concrete and actual harm required to maintain standing.

In Loving v. Boren, 133 F.3d 771 (10th Cir. 1998), plaintiff, a university

professor, claimed that a university policy restricting access to certain computer-

based news services violated his First Amendment rights. Finding that plaintiff

lacked standing to maintain the suit, this court made clear that plaintiff must show

something more than simply a deprivation in the abstract. The court explained

“[n]owhere did plaintiff adduce evidence that he suffered any injury in fact as a

result of the University’s new policy . . . . Plaintiff simply presented no evidence

that he ever attempted to access news groups through the full service news server

and was denied access. . . .” Id. at 773; see also Storino v. Borough of Point

- 10 -
Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 297 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiff’s claimed

possibility that local zoning ordinance may require application for a variance does

not constitute injury in fact for standing purposes).

Plaintiff’s claim, however, like that in Loving, is framed entirely in the

abstract. Plaintiff has not represented to this court any intention, desire, or plan

to continue his employment in a career service position with the State of Utah.

Therefore, assuming without deciding that Plaintiff was deprived of due process,

he nonetheless fails to demonstrate any injury in fact as a result of that

deprivation. 3

This reasoning may not be answered by the assertion that the deprivation of

due process constitutes an injury independent of the surrounding circumstances.

Instructive on this point is our recent holding in Rector v. City & County of

Denver, 348 F.3d 935, 943-44 (10th Cir. 2003). There, plaintiffs brought a §

1983 action challenging the adequacy of the due process protections afforded to

individuals who received parking tickets from the city. Finding one of the main

plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain her claim, the court explained that because

3
It must be remembered here that because Plaintiff possessed no protected
property interest in his position as Deputy Director, the fact that his termination
served to deprive him of that position does not constitute a deprivation of a
property interest and thus does not entitle him to due process on that basis alone.
See Figuly v. City of Douglas, 76 F.3d 1137, 1142 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding no
right to due process in connection with termination when employee had no
protected property interest in his job).

- 11 -
that plaintiff presented no basis for challenging the ticket on the merits, she

sustained no injury in fact from a deprivation of due process. Id. at 945.

In an exceptionally lucid discussion of this issue, the court made clear that

although the right to due process in connection with a deprivation of a property

interest is absolute, “the Constitution does not protect procedure for procedure’s

sake.” Id. at 943. The court explained that the determination whether the denial

of due process constitutes an injury in fact “lies in the adoption of an ex ante

perspective.” Id. at 944. In other words, because the plaintiff in Rector proffered

no defense on the merits, due process would not have affected the outcome, thus

the plaintiff sustained no injury through the denial of due process. See Michael

H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.5 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that

right to a hearing must be premised upon a claim of substantive entitlement to the

right sought to be vindicated).

By contrast, had the plaintiff in Rector offered to defend against the

parking tickets on the merits, an ex post determination that such a defense would

not have succeeded would not alleviate the injury plaintiff would have sustained

by the city’s failure to afford due process. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,

266 (1978). In such a case, plaintiff would have sustained an injury in fact

through her lack of opportunity to convince the city that her ticket was issued

erroneously.

- 12 -
 To employ a more concrete example, the test for whether a denial of due

process constitutes an injury in fact is similar to that used to determine the

sufficiency of a complaint in a civil action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See

Fry Bros. Corp. v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 614 F.2d 732, 733-34 (10th Cir.

1980). That is, one must ask whether, assuming the truth and validity of all of a

plaintiff’s factual allegations and legal theories, the due process protections

would have alleviated any harm.

In this case the answer must be in the negative. The factual scenario here

is even more illustrative of the proposition that due process is not purely an end

in itself than under the facts of Rector. Although, unlike Rector, Plaintiff does

contest the factual allegations supporting his loss of eligibility for reappointment,

he does not claim that the loss of reappointment eligibility would cause him any

harm. Because Plaintiff has made no allegation that he in fact desires

reappointment to a career service position he has suffered no injury in fact from

the loss of his eligibility for such a position. Even assuming the truth of all of his

allegations, no amount of due process can remedy a harm that Plaintiff never

claims to have sustained.

Not only has Plaintiff failed to demonstrate any injury in fact, but what is

more, Defendant McCotter was legally powerless to effect any deprivation of

Plaintiff’s property interest. Although Defendant McCotter did have the authority

- 13 -
to terminate Plaintiff for cause, under the relevant statutory scheme that decision

alone cannot deprive Plaintiff of his right to reassignment. Under Utah law, the

Department of Human Resource Management (“DHRM”) has plenary control over

the placement of individuals on the reappointment register. See Utah Code Ann.

§ 67-19-8; Holland v. Career Servs. Review Bd., 856 P.2d 678, 681 (Utah Ct.

App. 1993) (“certification of employees’ eligibility for reappointment is within

the sole province of DHRM.”). Thus Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant’s decision

to terminate him for cause rendered him ineligible for reassignment is not

consistent with Utah law as we understand it. As demonstrated by the court’s

holding in Holland, Defendant McCotter had no legal authority to render Plaintiff

ineligible for reassignment. That authority rests solely with the DHRM.

Consequently, Defendant McCotter was legally powerless to compromise

Plaintiff’s property interest in reassignment.

This construction is entirely consistent with the text of Utah Code Ann.

§ 67-19-17, which states that “[a]ny career service employee accepting an

appointment to an exempt position who is not retained by the appointing officer,

unless discharged for cause . . . shall . . . be appointed . . . provided an opening

exists; or . . . be appointed to a lesser position pending [an opening].” Although

this section mandates that any such employee be reappointed, the converse is not

true. The statute does not demand that any employee terminated for cause become

- 14 -
automatically ineligible for reappointment, but only refuses to mandate such

reappointment. In accordance with the holding in Holland, the remaining

discretion is vested in the DHRM.

C. Ripeness

In contrast to standing, “[r]ipeness is a justiciability doctrine designed to

prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling

themselves in abstract disagreements.” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dept. of

Interior, 538 U.S. 803, ___, 123 S. Ct. 2026, 2029 (2003) (internal quotation

marks omitted); see New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d

1495, 1499 (10th Cir. 1995). Like standing, the ripeness inquiry asks whether the

challenged harm has been sufficiently realized at the time of trial. The ripeness

issue, however, focuses not on whether the plaintiff was in fact harmed, but rather

“whether the harm asserted has matured sufficiently to warrant judicial

intervention.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 n.10 (1975).

Though rooted in the “cases and controversies” requirement of Article III,

the ripeness doctrine also reflects important prudential limitations on a court’s

exercise of jurisdiction. See Coalition for Sustainable Res., Inc. v. United States

Forest Serv., 259 F.3d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Application of the ripeness

doctrine . . . remains a confused mix of principle and pragmatic judgment

reflecting its mixture of article III case and controversy requirements with

- 15 -
prudential restraints on the exercise of jurisdiction.”) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Consequently, should this court find this case to meet the constitutional

standard for ripeness, prudential considerations may require us to stay our hand

until the issues in this case have become more fully developed.

Determining whether the issues presented by this case are ripe for review

“requir[es] us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and

the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Abbott Labs. v.

Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Califano v.

Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977). Application of the fitness standard requires us

to ask “whether the case involves uncertain or contingent future events that may

not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” New Mexicans for Bill

Richardson, 64 F.3d at 1499 (internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, the

hardship inquiry may be answered by asking “whether the challenged action

creates a direct and immediate dilemma for the parties.” Id. (internal quotations

marks omitted). Our answers to these tandem inquiries convince us that this case

is not ripe for review.

Instructive on the ripeness issue is this court’s decision in Keyes v. School

District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 119 F.3d 1437 (1997). In Keyes, appellants

sought a declaration that the Busing Clause of the Colorado Constitution

conflicted with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and

- 16 -
was thus unconstitutional. Finding the issue not ripe, the court explained that

“[a]ppellants . . . make no effort to establish that any particular school desires to

implement voluntary integration plans, let alone that any school has been deterred

by the Busing Clause from implementing such a plan. . . . This court may not

speculate about future conflict between the Busing Clause and the . . . District’s

policies . . . .” Id. at 1444-45.

The holding in Keyes is quite applicable to the facts we confront today.

Although the Busing Clause of the Colorado Constitution presented an apparent

and theoretical obstacle to the enactment of integration measures by means of

busing, the constitution had not presented any actual impediment to a proposed

plan of integration through busing. Likewise, Plaintiff in the present case is

ostensibly subject to rejection from further employment in a career service

position because of his prior termination. Until Plaintiff expresses a desire for

such a position, the controversy, like that in Keyes, remains purely theoretical.

Action by this court in the face of such an undeveloped controversy would

be exactly the type of anticipation of contingent events that the prudential

doctrine of ripeness was intended to forestall. At best, further developments

would undoubtedly sharpen the factual issues in this case; at worst, the failure of

certain contingent events may render a decision completely advisory. See Am.

Sav. Bank, FSB v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 436, 439-40 (2d Cir. 2003).

- 17 -
 Nor are we convinced that Plaintiff would suffer any undue hardship if we

allow this case to develop more fully before ruling on the merits. See John Roe

#2 v. Ogden, 253 F.3d 1225, 1231 (10th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff has expressed no

desire to continue in a career service position since his termination. Thus, as

discussed previously, he has suffered no concrete harm. As a matter of pure

logic, postponing decision on this case until Plaintiff has suffered some concrete

harm cannot itself constitute an independent harm to Plaintiff. See Pub. Water

Supply Dist. No. 10 v. City of Peculiar, 345 F.3d 570, 573 (8th Cir. 2003)

(finding that district would suffer no hardship from delay because it has no

present injury).

Finally, we address Plaintiff’s claimed deprivation of a liberty interest

without due process of law. The analysis set forth above is equally applicable to

this claim. Because Plaintiff fails to present this court with any concrete harm

resulting from a deprivation of a liberty interest, no justiciable controversy exists.

REMANDED with instructions to dismiss the pending claims without

prejudice. The motion to certify state question is DENIED. The motion to

correct appellant’s brief is GRANTED.

- 18 -