F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
APR 30 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
JIM FOSTER; DWIGHT MOORE;
RAY O’BRYAN; ROGER KILGORE;
PAUL JONES; KEITH ROBERTS;
MAYNARD CASTOE; JERRY HARP;
DOUGLAS BRANNON; MIKE
TAYLOR; DAVID HOUSTON; JOEL
JAKUBOWSKI; DONALD BOYLES; No. 03-5101
DEETTA HAWKINS; CECIL
ZORNES; BENNY MORRISON;
MATTHEW KISSIRE; JIM MILLER;
PAM DUNCAN, Special
Administrator for the Estate of
DWAYNE DUNCAN; JACK
MCKERRELL; JERRY DECKER;
JAMES HILL; VERNON HARRIS;
JOHNNY BAILEY; JOHN PALMER;
LAWRENCE BLACKBOURN; and
DANNY POSTRACH,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
RUHRPUMPEN, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. NO. CV-01-600-P)
Steven R. Hickman, Frasier, Frasier & Hickman, LLP, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for
Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Randall G. Vaughn (Kevin P. Doyle and John L. Randolph, Jr., with him on the
brief), Pray, Walker, Jackman, Williamson & Marlar, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for
Defendant-Appellee.
Before HENRY, HOLLOWAY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
HENRY, Circuit Judge.
Jim Foster and twenty-six other individual plaintiffs filed this action
against Ruhrpumpen, Inc., alleging that Ruhrpumpen violated their rights under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, by
failing to retain them as employees after purchasing the pump manufacturing
plant at which they had worked. The district court granted summary judgment to
Ruhrpumpen, holding that 1) the plaintiffs were never employed by Ruhrpumpen
and therefore could not sue Ruhrpumpen for wrongful termination; 2) the
plaintiffs never filed a failure to hire claim with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the court was therefore without
jurisdiction to hear such a claim; and 3) the four plaintiffs who failed to file with
the EEOC could not “piggyback” on the claims of the plaintiffs who did file. The
plaintiffs now appeal.
We agree with the district court that the plaintiffs cannot assert wrongful
-2-
termination claims because they were never employed by Ruhrpumpen. However,
we disagree with the district court’s analysis of the plaintiffs’ failure to hire
claims.
In particular, as to the twenty-three plaintiffs who filed charges of age
discrimination with the EEOC, we conclude that those charges sufficiently
identified the parties and the action or practices at issue. Accordingly, the
charges satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement, see 29 C.F.R. §
1601.12(b), and those plaintiffs thus exhausted their failure to hire claims. As to
the four plaintiffs who did not file charges with the EEOC, we conclude that their
failure to hire claims may be heard by the district court pursuant to the single
filing or “piggybacking” rule. Those four plaintiffs are similarly situated to the
plaintiffs who did file failure to hire charges, and their claims arose out of the
same circumstances and occurred within the same general time frame as the
exhausted claims. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to Ruhrpumpen and remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
Prior to January 2001, the plaintiffs were employed by a pump
manufacturing plant known as Flowserve, Inc., located in Tulsa, Oklahoma. In
late 1999 or early 2000, Flowserve entered into an agreement to purchase another
-3-
pump manufacturer called IDP. Subsequent to this development, and as a result
of action taken by the United States Department of Justice, Flowserve was
ordered to divest itself of its Tulsa facility. In November 2000, Flowserve and
Defendant Ruhrpumpen, Inc., entered into an agreement pursuant to which the
Tulsa facility would be sold and transferred from Flowserve to Ruhrpumpen. The
agreement established the end of December 2000 as a target date for the closing
and transfer of the Flowserve facility. Prior to the transfer, Flowserve advised all
its employees that “[w]ith the sale, each employee is effectively terminated from
employment with Flowserve” and that severance benefits would be provided to all
former Flowserve employees who were not re-hired by Ruhrpumpen. Aplts’ App.
at 182.
Leading up to the transfer, Don McCourt, the President of Ruhrpumpen and
former Operations Manager of Flowserve, asked Michael Brantley, the
Superintendent of Production at both Flowserve and Ruhrpumpen, to perform an
assessment of the number of employees needed to run the plant after the sale. Mr.
Brantley estimated that Ruhupumpen would need approximately ninety production
and maintenance employees to operate the plant at the desired annual sales
volume of between $30 and $35 million. Prior to the transfer, 120 production and
maintenance workers were employed at the Flowserve plant.
In November 2000, the Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy
-4-
Workers International Union (hereinafter “PACE” or “the Union”) representing
the production workers at the Flowserve plant, was informed that only ninety-four
production and maintenance employees would be needed following the transfer.
PACE entered into negotiations with Flowserve management to determine which
ninety-four employees would be retained. At PACE’s insistence, management
agreed to retain employees based entirely on seniority by classification.
Twenty-six former production and maintenance workers were laid off
pursuant to the Union negotiations and were given separation packages prior to
December 29, 2000. The remaining ninety-four production and maintenance
workers reported for their first day of work with Ruhrpumpen on January 3, 2001.
Id. at 206. They then learned that only fifty-seven employees had been re-hired
by Ruhrpumpen. The other thirty-seven former Flowserve employees present on
January 3 were processed for severance benefits. The plaintiffs make up the bulk
of this group.
After learning that they would not be retaining their jobs, all but four of the
plaintiffs filed charges of age discrimination with the Oklahoma Human Rights
Commission and the EEOC. The charges state:
1. I am over forty years of age and have years of experience at
the plant. I was doing satisfactory work when terminated on 3
Jan. 2001.
2. They terminated me and numerous others on 3 Jan. 2001,
almost all of whom were older than the retained employees,
-5-
who were younger than those let go.
3. A significant motivating factor was age-based factors [sic].
4. This charge is made on behalf of all others similarly situated.
Id. at 144-68 (Charges filed with Oklahoma Human Rights Comm’n and EEOC).
The charges identify Ruhrpumpen as the employer responsible for the
discrimination and state that the discrimination occurred on January 3, 2001.
On July 24, 2001, the plaintiffs filed a petition in the Oklahoma District
Court for Tulsa County, alleging wrongful termination and failure to hire in
violation of the ADEA. Ruhrpumpen then removed the case to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma and filed a motion for
summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to
Ruhrpumpen, holding that the plaintiffs could not sue Ruhrpumpen for wrongful
termination because they were never employed by Ruhrpumpen and that they had
failed to exhaust their failure to hire claims with the EEOC.
II. DISCUSSION
In this appeal, the plaintiffs challenge the grant of summary judgment to
Ruhrpumpen on their failure to hire claims. “We review a summary judgment
grant de novo and apply the same legal standard used by the district court.” Jones
v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 1260, 1265 (10th Cir. 2003). We consider the two groups
-6-
of plaintiffs separately, beginning with 1) the twenty-three plaintiffs who filed
age discrimination charges with the EEOC (“Group l”), and then proceeding to 2)
the four plaintiffs who did not file any such charges (“Group 2”). As to the first
group, we conclude that the filed charges were sufficient to satisfy the ADEA’s
exhaustion requirement. As to the second group, we conclude that the single
filing or “piggybacking” rule allows their claims to proceed in the district court
despite their failure to file individual charges with the EEOC.
A. Group 1 Plaintiffs
As noted above, all but four of the plaintiffs in this action timely filed
charges of age discrimination with the EEOC. However, in their EEOC charges,
these plaintiffs alleged that they were “terminated” by Ruhrpumpen. Aplts’ App.
at 144-68. Ruhrpumpen argues that the plaintiffs’ wrongful termination claims
cannot succeed because termination by Ruhrpumpen is a necessary element of
such claims, and employment must precede termination. As Ruhrpumpen never
actually employed the plaintiffs, it argues, this element is not satisfied.
The evidence is fairly clear that the plaintiffs were terminated by
Flowserve, not by Ruhrpumpen, and that Ruhrpumpen never officially re-hired
them. The plaintiffs may have been under the impression that they were retaining
their jobs due to confusion stemming from the Union negotiations, but there is no
evidence to suggest that they ever received word from Ruhrpumpen that they had
-7-
been officially hired as Ruhrpumpen employees.
The plaintiffs’ failure to hire claims seem to more accurately describe the
discrimination that allegedly occurred. However, the Group 1 plaintiffs did not
use the language “failure to hire” in the charges they filed with the EEOC.
Pointing to this omission, Ruhrpumpen argues that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust
their failure to hire claims, and that as a result, the court lacks jurisdiction to
consider the claims. The district court agreed with that analysis. Aplts’ App. at
265 (Dist. Ct. Order, filed June 11, 2003) (“No charge has been filed by any
Plaintiff based upon a failure to hire by Ruhrpumpen based upon age
discrimination.”). The central question in this case is, therefore, whether the
Group 1 plaintiffs’ EEOC charges were sufficient to exhaust their failure to hire
claims.
“[A] plaintiff normally may not bring a Title VII action based upon claims
that were not part of a timely-filed EEOC charge for which the plaintiff has
received a right-to-sue letter.” 1 Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep’t of Mental
1
As the ADEA and Title VII have virtually identical requirements with
respect to the filing of EEOC charges, Title VII cases are applicable here. See
Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 151 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that “the
administrative exhaustion requirement is the same under the ADEA as it is under
Title VII” and that, as a result, judicially-recognized exceptions to the Title VII
filing requirement “also apply to claims brought pursuant to the ADEA”); see also
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 395 n.11 (1982) (observing that
“when Congress in 1978 revised the filing requirement of the Age Discrimination
(continued...)
-8-
Health and Substance Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). This
individual filing requirement is intended to protect employers by giving them
notice of the discrimination claims being brought against them, in addition to
providing the EEOC with an opportunity to conciliate the claims. See Manning v.
Chevron Chem. Co., 332 F.3d 874, 878 (5th Cir. 2003) (“One of the central
purposes of the employment discrimination charge is to put employers on notice
of the existence and nature of the charges against them.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1060 (2004); Ingels v. Thiokol Corp., 42
F.3d 616, 625 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that the administrative exhaustion
requirement fulfills the dual purposes of notice and conciliation).
In light of congressional findings that “the setting of arbitrary age limits
regardless of potential for job performance has become a common practice” and
in an effort to effectuate the ADEA’s stated purpose of “prohibit[ing] arbitrary
age discrimination in employment,” 29 U.S.C. § 621, 2 we liberally construe
(...continued)
1
in Employment Act of 1967,” it “was modeled after Title VII”).
In passing the ADEA, Congress made the following findings and
2
announced the following purposes:
(a) The Congress hereby finds and declares that -
(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers
find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and
especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for
(continued...)
-9-
charges of age discrimination filed with the EEOC. See Lyons v. England, 307
F.3d 1092, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “[w]e are required to construe
appellants’ EEOC charges with utmost liberality”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Kells v. Sinclair Buick-GMC Truck, Inc., 210 F.3d 827, 836 (8th Cir.
2000) (“In determining whether an alleged discriminatory act falls within the
scope of a discrimination claim, the administrative complaint must be construed
liberally in order not to frustrate the remedial purposes of the ADA and the
ADEA.”) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). EEOC
regulations explicitly state that “a charge is sufficient when the Commission
receives from the person making the charge a written statement sufficiently
2
(...continued)
job performance has become a common practice, and certain otherwise
desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of older persons;
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term
unemployment with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and
employer acceptability is, relative to the younger ages, high among
older workers; their numbers are great and growing; and their
employment problems grave;
(4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary
discrimination in employment because of age, burdens commerce and
the free flow of goods in commerce.
(b) It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to promote employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary
age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find
ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment.
29 U.S.C. § 621.
-10-
precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices
complained of.” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (emphasis added).
Applying, as we must, the principle of liberal construction, we hold that the
Group 1 plaintiffs have exhausted their failure to hire claims. We agree with the
plaintiffs that “[t]he charges filed [] do identify the people complaining, and,
also, that Ruhrpumpen is being complained about. They describe generally the
problem – age discrimination [,] [and] [t]hey give sufficient detail, referring to
the events of January 3, 2001.” Aplts’ Br. at 7-8. Because the charges as filed
“identify the parties” and “describe generally the action or practices complained
of,” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b), they satisfy the requirements set forth in the EEOC
regulations. Moreover, the central purposes of the administrative exhaustion
requirement have clearly been met in this case. There is no doubt that
Ruhrpumpen could discern from the charges filed that the plaintiffs were accusing
the company of age discrimination stemming from the events of January 3, 2001,
and the charges did not deprive the EEOC of an opportunity to conciliate the
claims, as the EEOC could quite easily have discovered in the course of
investigating the plaintiffs’ allegations that while not terminated on January 3,
2001, the plaintiffs were in fact not hired by Ruhrpumpen on that same date.
The case of O’Keefe v. Varian Assocs., Inc., No. 95 C 4281, 1998 WL
417498, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 1998), is particularly instructive here. In
-11-
O’Keefe, as in this case, a group of plaintiffs who were not retained following the
sale of a company filed EEOC charges alleging wrongful termination in violation
of the ADEA. The defendant company argued that the plaintiffs were barred from
raising their failure to hire claims because their EEOC charges only stated a claim
for wrongful termination. The court disagreed, holding that
[t]hough plaintiffs’ charges may have been factually
incorrect in asserting that other employees were not
terminated, the allegations in the charges informed the
EEOC and the defendants that plaintiffs were complaining
that other employees continued working at the . . . facility
after plaintiffs were terminated. Because the charge
provided notice that the plaintiffs were complaining about
the fact that they were not allowed to continue working,
the concerns that underlie the “scope of the charge”
doctrine are not present.
Id. at *6; see also Jones v. Dresser Indus., Inc., No. 88 C 9780, 1990 WL 93259,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 1990) (declining to bar plaintiff’s retaliation and failure
to hire claims even though his EEOC charge only complained of wrongful
termination because “it is premature to conclude that [defendant’s] failure to hire
was not within the scope of [plaintiff’s] EEOC charge”).
In conclusion, the Group 1 plaintiffs simply used the wrong words,
charging that they were “terminated” rather than “not hired.” As their brief points
out, “Plaintiffs, having worked at the same plant for many years, under different
owners, understandably would have considered it but a single employment. When
they showed up for work on January 3, 2001, they could understandably consider
-12-
being told to go home as a termination.” Aplts’ Br. at 8. The outcome in the
district court forecloses the plaintiffs’ ability to seek a remedy for a violation of
their federally-protected rights based on a technicality. There is no suggestion
that the charges as filed deprived Ruhrpumpen of fair notice of the plaintiffs’
claims, thus we see no reason to bar their failure to hire claims.
B. Group 2 Plaintiffs
Four plaintiffs–Deetta Hawkins, Pam Duncan, Vernon Harris, and Danny
Postrach–did not file charges with the Oklahoma Human Rights Commission or
the EEOC. Instead, they attempted to “piggyback” their claims on to the filings
made by the other plaintiffs. These Group 2 plaintiffs contend that they are
similarly situated to those plaintiffs who did file with the EEOC, bringing them
within the “piggybacking” or “single filing” exception to the EEOC individual
filing requirement.
The district court held that the plaintiffs could not piggyback their claims
because “Plaintiffs have never alleged that this is a class action, wherein other
non-party former employees who were similarly situated as the party Plaintiffs are
alleged to have claims of a pattern or practice of discrimination by Ruhrpumpen.”
Aplts’ App. at 267. Thus, in order to determine whether the Group 2 plaintiffs
may proceed with their claims in district court, we must consider the scope of the
single filing rule and whether it is applicable in this case.
-13-
Generally speaking, each plaintiff must exhaust his or her administrative
remedies by filing a timely EEOC charge prior to bringing suit. See Simms,165
F.3d at 1326. However, given the widespread concern over discriminatory
employment practices and the congressional intent behind Title VII and the
ADEA, the federal courts have universally recognized an exception to the
individual filing rule which provides that “in a multiple-plaintiff, non-class action
suit, if one plaintiff has filed a timely EEOC complaint as to that plaintiff’s
individual claim, then co-plaintiffs with individual claims arising out of similar
discriminatory treatment in the same time frame need not have satisfied the filing
requirement.” Allen v. United States Steel Corp., 665 F.2d 689, 695 (5th Cir.
1982). This exception to the individual filing requirement is known alternatively
as the “single filing rule,” see id., or “piggybacking,” Howlett v. Holiday Inns,
Inc., 49 F.3d 189, 195 (6th Cir. 1995); Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 852
F.2d 1008, 1013 (7th Cir. 1988).
“The principle behind the piggybacking rule is to give effect to the
remedial purposes of the ADEA and to not exclude otherwise suitable plaintiffs
from an ADEA class action simply because they have not performed the useless
act of filing a charge.” Grayson v. K-Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1103 (11th Cir.
1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). The act of filing a charge is deemed
“useless” in situations in which the employer is already on notice that plaintiffs
-14-
may file discrimination claims, thus negating the need for additional filings. See
Horton v. Jackson County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 343 F.3d 897, 899 (7th Cir.
2003); see also Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1110 (10th
Cir. 2001) (“The policy behind the single filing rule is that it would be wasteful,
if not vain, for numerous employees, all with the same grievance, to have to
process many identical complaints with the EEOC.”) (internal quotation marks
and alteration omitted); Tolliver v. Xerox Corp., 918 F.2d 1052, 1057 (2d Cir.
1990) (“The purpose of the administrative charge requirement is to afford the
agency the opportunity to ‘seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by
informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.’ If the agency
charged with that task is satisfied that a timely filed administrative charge affords
it sufficient opportunity to discharge these responsibilities with respect to similar
grievances, it serves no administrative purpose to require the filing of repetitive
ADEA charges . . . .”) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)).
Courts employ several different tests to determine when the single filing
rule should apply.
The broadest test requires only that the claims of the
administrative claimant and the subsequent plaintiff arise
out of the same circumstances and occur within the same
general time frame. . . . A somewhat narrower test requires
that the administrative claim give notice that the
discrimination is “class-wide,” i.e., that it alleges
discrimination against a class of which the subsequent
plaintiff is a member. A still narrower test requires that
-15-
the administrative charge not only allege discrimination
against a class but also allege that the claimant purports to
represent the class or others similarly situated.
Howlett, 49 F.3d at 195 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, regardless
of which test is used to determine the scope of the rule, “[i]t is uncontroversial
that the ‘single filing rule’ is not limited to class actions but also can permit a
plaintiff to join individual ADEA actions if the named plaintiff filed a timely
administrative charge sufficient to permit ‘piggybacking’ by the joining plaintiff.”
Id. at 194; see also Tolliver, 918 F.2d at 1056 (“In Title VII suits, the ‘single
filing rule’ is not limited to class actions but also permits aggrieved plaintiffs to
join in a lawsuit brought by individuals who have filed a timely administrative
charge . . . .”). In fact, “only the Third Circuit confines the doctrine to class
actions.” Horton, 343 F.3d at 900 (7th Cir. 2003).
Recently, the Seventh Circuit declined to apply the single filing rule and
adopted a more limited view of the rule’s proper application in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536
U.S. 101 (2002). See Horton, 343 F.3d at 899-900 (noting that “the [single filing]
doctrine predates National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101
(2002), which, though principally about the continuing violation doctrine, is
emphatic that ‘each discrete discriminatory act [i.e., an act that is not a part of a
continuing violation] starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act’”)
-16-
(quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113). Yet the Horton court stopped short of
concluding that the rule is only applicable to class actions, instead specifically
limiting the doctrine to cases like this one “in which the unexhausted claim arises
from the same unlawful conduct.” Id.
This circuit recognized the single filing rule in Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1110
(noting that “[f]ederal courts universally hold that an individual who has not filed
an administrative charge can opt-in to a suit filed by any similarly situated
plaintiff under certain conditions”) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is not
entirely clear from Thiessen which test has been adopted by this circuit. Thiessen
references both the broadest test, allowing a non-filing plaintiff “to piggyback on
the EEOC complaint filed by another person who is similarly situated,” id.
(quoting Mooney v. Aramco Services Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1223 (5th Cir. 1995)),
and the somewhat narrower test, requiring that “the EEOC charge actually filed
gave the employer notice of the collective or class-wide nature of the charge,” id.
(quoting Gilitz v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 129 F.3d 554, 558 (11th Cir.
1997)). However, while Thiessen did concern a group of non-filing plaintiffs who
wanted to opt-in to a class (though the class was decertified), nothing in that
decision can be construed as limiting the single filing rule to class action
situations.
We conclude that the single filing doctrine is applicable here. This case
-17-
involves twenty-six plaintiffs, making it much more like a class action than the
two-plaintiff action in which the Seventh Circuit declined to apply the single
filing rule in Horton. Moreover, the plaintiffs’ unexhausted claims stem from the
same conduct as the filed charges. In fact, as noted, this case is practically
identical to the situation that the Horton court used as an example when single
filing is most appropriate. See Horton, 343 F.3d at 899 (“If for example the
employer has fired every worker over the age of 40 and one of them has filed a
timely charge, he can guess that others will, and there is no need to flood the
EEOC with identical charges.”).
As stated above, Thiessen references two slightly different tests for
determining whether the single filing rule applies. We need not decide at this
time whether the Group 2 plaintiffs must satisfy the broadest test for determining
whether the rule applies or the slightly narrower test, as the plaintiffs have
satisfied the requirements of each.
In particular, the Group 2 plaintiffs undoubtedly satisfy the broadest form
of the test, as they are clearly similarly situated to the Group 1 plaintiffs, and
their claims “ar[o]se out of the same circumstances and occur[ed] within the same
general time frame.” Howlett, 49 F.3d at 195. The plaintiffs also satisfy the
somewhat narrower test, as the filed charges stated, “This charge is made on
behalf of all others similarly situated.” See Aplts’ App. at 144-68. The inclusion
-18-
of that phrase clearly suggested to Ruhrpumpen that there were or might have
been other plaintiffs, and it can easily be construed as having given Ruhrpumpen
notice of the “collective or class-wide nature of the charge.” See Theissen, 267
F.3d at 1110 (noting that “[a]s long as the EEOC and the company are aware of
the nature and scope of the allegations, the purposes behind the filing requirement
are satisfied and no injustice or contravention of congressional intent occurs by
allowing piggybacking”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, we
hold that the four non-filing plaintiffs should be excused from the individual
exhaustion requirement by virtue of the single filing rule and that the district
court erred in dismissing their claims.
III. CONCLUSION
We conclude that the Group 1 plaintiffs did exhaust their failure to hire
claims with the EEOC and that the Group 2 plaintiffs, who failed to timely file
charges with the EEOC, are entitled to “piggyback” on the claims of the Group 1
plaintiffs. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to Ruhrpumpen and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
-19-