F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JUN 16 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. Nos. 03-2182 and 03-2241
HECTOR TORRES,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. NO. CR-02-1595 MCA)
Richard B. McClarkin, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant - Appellant.
Laura Fashing, Assistant United States Attorney (David C. Iglesias, United States
Attorney, with her on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff -
Appellee.
Before EBEL , HENRY , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
HARTZ , Circuit Judge.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant Hector Torres pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent
to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) and 846. He reserved his right to appeal the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress statements and physical evidence. The
judgment of conviction was entered on July 25, 2003. Defendant did not file a
notice of appeal until August 12, 2003—beyond the 10-day period for filing
criminal appeals set forth in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(1). The
appeal was assigned number 03-2182.
Because the notice of appeal was filed more than 10 days but less than 40
days after entry of judgment, we partially remanded the appeal to the district court
so that it could assess whether the delay in filing was due to excusable neglect,
which could be grounds for a 30-day extension of the time to appeal. See Fed. R.
App. P. 4(b)(4). Defendant then filed in district court a “Motion for Enlargement
of Time and Leave to File Amended Notice of Appeal,” explaining that defense
counsel had incorrectly believed that Defendant had 30 days following entry of
judgment in which to file an appeal. The district court granted the motion on
October 7, 2003, finding that Defendant’s untimeliness was the result of
excusable neglect.
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On October 7, 2003, Defendant filed a second appeal (assigned number 03-
2241) seeking review of the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The
second appeal was consolidated with Defendant’s first appeal (number 03-2182)
for procedural purposes. We now dismiss both appeals for lack of jurisdiction
because the district court abused its discretion in finding that the untimely filing
of the notice of appeal was due to excusable neglect. Although the government
has not challenged our jurisdiction to hear this appeal, “it is the duty of the
federal court to determine the matter sua sponte.” Basso v. Utah Power & Light
Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974).
II. DISCUSSION
“A court of appeals acquires jurisdiction of an appeal only upon the filing
of a timely notice of appeal[;] this requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional.”
Gooch v. Skelly Oil Co., 493 F.2d 366, 368 (10th Cir. 1974). Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(b)(1)(A) states:
In a criminal case, a defendant’s notice of appeal must be filed
in the district court within 10 days after the later of:
(i) the entry of either the judgment or the order being
appealed; or
(ii) the filing of the government’s notice of appeal.
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But Rule 4 also provides that “[u]pon a finding of excusable neglect or good
cause 1, the district court may . . . extend the time to file a notice of appeal for a
period not to exceed 30 days from the expiration of the time otherwise prescribed
by this Rule 4(b).” Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4). “When a district court grants an
extension for excusable neglect, filing a notice of appeal within the thirty-day
extension allowed by the rule establishes appellate jurisdiction.” United States v.
Leonard, 937 F.2d 494, 495 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] trial court’s finding as to the
presence or absence of ‘excusable neglect’ as that term is used in Fed. R. App. P.
4 should not be overturned by us on appeal unless there has been a clear abuse of
discretion.” Gooch, 493 F.2d at 368.
The leading case on “excusable neglect” is Pioneer Investment Services Co.
v. Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993), in which the
Supreme Court addressed the meaning of that term in Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b).
The rule provides that:
when an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified
period by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of
court, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion . . .
on motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit
1
“Good cause comes into play in situations in which there is not fault--
excusable or otherwise. In such situations, the need for an extension is usually
occasioned by something that is not within the control of the movant.” Bishop v.
Corsentino, No. 02-1485, slip op. at 5-6 (10th Cir. June 9, 2004) (internal
quotation marks omitted). There is no claim of “good cause” here.
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the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable
neglect.
The bankruptcy court had mailed a notice to creditors announcing a meeting and
setting a bar date for filing proofs of claim against Pioneer. Pioneer, 507 U.S. at
383-84. Although the president of the respondents’ corporate general partners
received the notice, the respondents failed to file a proof of claim by the bar date.
Id. at 384. The respondents sought relief under Rule 9006(b)(1), explaining that
their attorney was not aware of the bar date because “he was experiencing a major
and significant disruption in his professional life caused by his withdrawal from
his former law firm,” and thus did not have access to the case file until the bar
date had passed. Id. at 384 (internal quotation marks omitted). The bankruptcy
court refused to accept the late filing on the ground that “a party may claim
excusable neglect only if its failure to timely perform a duty was due to
circumstances which were beyond its reasonable control.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted). The Supreme Court granted certiorari “[b]ecause of
the conflict in the Courts of Appeals over the meaning of ‘excusable neglect.’” Id.
at 387.
The Court rejected the notion that excusable neglect exists only when a
delay in filing is the result of circumstances beyond a party’s control, stating that
“by empowering the courts to accept late filings where the failure to act was the
result of excusable neglect, . . . Congress plainly contemplated that the courts
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would be permitted, where appropriate, to accept late filings caused by
inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness, as well as by intervening circumstances
beyond the party’s control.” Id. at 388 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court held that the determination whether a party’s neglect is excusable “is at
bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding
the party’s omission.” Id. at 395. Such circumstances include “[1] the danger of
prejudice to the [nonmoving party], [2] the length of the delay and its potential
impact on judicial proceedings, [3] the reason for the delay, including whether it
was within the reasonable control of the movant, and [4] whether the movant
acted in good faith.” Id.
Although Pioneer did not involve the interpretation of the precise rule at
issue in this case, it is nonetheless highly persuasive. The Court’s discussion in
Pioneer was not confined to Bankruptcy Rule 9006. Indeed, in explaining why it
granted certiorari, the Court noted that the Courts of Appeals had “divided in
their interpretations of ‘excusable neglect’ as found in Rule 4(a)(5) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure.” Id. at 387 n.3. And the opinion extensively
addressed nonbankruptcy rules that use the term “excusable neglect.” See id. at
391-95. To be sure, the Court recognized that the term might not have the same
meaning in different rules, see id. at 394-95 (discussing difference between Rule
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9006(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)); but absent some specific reason to
depart from Pioneer, we should follow the Supreme Court’s lead.
Accordingly, in City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 31 F.3d
1041, 1046 (10th Cir. 1994), we concluded that “[b]ecause the [Pioneer] Court’s
analysis of what constitutes ‘excusable neglect’ in the bankruptcy context rested
on the plain meaning of the terms, there is no reason that the meaning would be
different in the context of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5).” We now likewise conclude
that the Supreme Court’s construction of “excusable neglect” in Pioneer also
applies to the term “excusable neglect” as it is used in Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(b)(4). See 16A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 3950.9 at 250 (3d ed. 1999) (“It is beyond belief that ‘excusable
neglect’ would have one meaning in Appellate Rule 4(a) and a different meaning
in Appellate Rule 4(b).”) ; cf. In re Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions, 327 F.3d
1207, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (suggesting that special interest of courts of appeal
in the filing of timely notices of appeal may justify stricter interpretation of
“excusable neglect” in that context).
Applying the Pioneer factors to the facts of this case, we determine that the
district court abused its discretion in finding excusable neglect. Three of the
relevant circumstances noted in Pioneer weigh in favor of a finding of excusable
neglect. Defendant filed his notice of appeal only 18 days after the entry of
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judgment; it does not appear that the government would be prejudiced by the
delay if Defendant’s appeal is permitted to proceed; and there is no indication that
defense counsel acted in bad faith. Nonetheless, “fault in the delay remains a
very important factor--perhaps the most important single factor--in determining
whether neglect is excusable.” City of Chanute, 31 F.3d at 1046; see Graphic
Communications Int’l Union v. Quebecor Printing Providence, Inc., 270 F.3d 1, 5
(1st Cir. 2001) (“We have observed that the four Pioneer factors do not carry
equal weight; the excuse given for the late filing must have the greatest import.”
(internal quotation marks and bracket omitted)); Lowry v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 211 F.3d 457, 463 (8th Cir. 2000) (same).
The reason for the delay here was simply that defense counsel confused the
filing deadlines for civil and criminal appeals. In Pioneer the Supreme Court said
that “inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not
usually constitute ‘excusable’ neglect.” Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 392. Even after
Pioneer adopted an equitable, balancing test, several circuits have embraced the
rule that “‘[t]he excusable neglect standard can never be met by a showing of
inability or refusal to read and comprehend the plain language of the federal
rules.’” Weinstock v. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 16 F.3d 501, 503 (2d
Cir. 1994) (quoting In re Cosmopolitan Aviation Corp., 763 F.2d 507, 515 (2d
Cir. 1985)); accord Prizevoits v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 76 F.3d 132, 133 (7th Cir.
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1996); see Lowry, 211 F.3d at 464 (“Notwithstanding the ‘flexible’ Pioneer
standard, experienced counsel’s misapplication of clear and unambiguous
procedural rules cannot excuse his failure to file a timely notice of appeal.”);
Advanced Estimating Sys., Inc. v. Riney, 130 F.3d 996, 998 (11th Cir. 1997) (“as a
matter of law, . . . an attorney’s misunderstanding of the plain language of a rule
cannot constitute excusable neglect such that a party is relieved of the
consequences of failing to comply with a statutory deadline”); cf. Mirpuri v. ACT
Mfg., Inc., 212 F.3d 624, 631 (1st Cir. 2000) (“A misunderstanding that occurs
because a party (or his counsel) elects to read the clear, unambiguous terms of a
judicial decree through rose-colored glasses cannot constitute excusable
neglect.”); McCurry v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 298 F.3d 586, 595 (6th
Cir. 2002) (interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1); “an attorney’s inaction or
strategic error based upon a misreading of the applicable law cannot be deemed
‘excusable’ neglect”). And one circuit, although unwilling to be categorical on
the matter, has indicated that the misreading of a clear rule is a highly unlikely
candidate for relief. See Halicki v. Louisiana Casino Cruises, Inc., 151 F.3d 465,
470 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Although . . . we [leave] open the possibility that some
misinterpretations of the federal rules may qualify as excusable neglect, such is
the rare case indeed. Where, as here, the rule at issue is unambiguous, a district
court’s determination that the neglect was inexcusable is virtually unassailable.”).
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But cf. Speiser, Krause & Madole P.C. v. Ortiz, 271 F.3d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 2001)
(interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1); “[w]hile an attorney’s egregious failure to
read and follow clear and unambiguous rules might sometimes be excusable
neglect, mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute excusable
neglect.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Vitamins Antitrust Class
Actions, 327 F.3d at 1209-1210 (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b) and 60(b)). In our
view, defense counsel’s misinterpretation of a readily accessible, unambiguous
rule cannot be grounds for relief unless “[t]he word ‘excusable’ [is to be] read out
of the rule.” Prizevoits, 76 F.3d at 134.
Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in finding that the delay
in filing was the result of excusable neglect. We therefore lack jurisdiction to
hear Defendant’s appeals. See Gooch, 493 F.2d at 368.
III. CONCLUSION
We DISMISS the appeals for lack of jurisdiction.
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