F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JUN 18 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
No. 03-8069
DANNY RAY CAMPBELL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Wyoming
(D.C. No. 02-CR-193-D)
Submitted on the briefs: *
Mary M. Dunn, Casper, Wyoming, for Defendant-Appellant.
Matthew H. Mead, United States Attorney, and David A. Kubichek, Assistant
United States Attorney, Casper, Wyoming, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before EBEL, MURPHY and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case therefore is ordered
submitted without oral argument.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
Danny Ray Campbell (“Defendant”) pled guilty to the charge of being a
felon in possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and
924(a)(2). Although one of the eight rifles recovered from Defendant’s residence
was not listed in the indictment for this count, the district court included it as
relevant conduct in sentencing and enhanced Defendant’s sentence by 4 levels
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B) (8-24 firearms). Defendant argued at his
sentencing hearing that the uncharged rifle could not be included as relevant
conduct for sentencing because the government had not proven that it had been in
interstate commerce. The district court decided that there was no need for the
government to prove an interstate nexus, relying instead on the government’s
argument that Defendant was a “prohibited person” whose possession of any
firearms brought him into the reach of the § 2K2.1(b)(1) enhancement.
Defendant appeals this enhancement, and the government candidly admits
its error below. The government now agrees with Defendant that the district court
committed legal error when it failed to require an interstate nexus before applying
the 4-level enhancement. It also agrees that the current record cannot support the
finding of such a nexus. We thus REVERSE and REMAND for resentencing.
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BACKGROUND
While Defendant was serving a term of supervised released in connection
with a prior federal controlled substances conviction in Texas, agents from the
United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms executed a search
warrant of Defendant’s residence in Lance Creek, Wyoming (PSR, para. 5, at 3-4)
and discovered eight firearms. (PSR, para. 6, at 4.) Based on the discovery and
seizure of these weapons, Defendant was indicted by a grand jury and charged
with two violations of federal law. In Count One, Defendant was charged with
being a convicted felon in possession of firearms which had previously traveled in
and affected interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and
924(a)(2). The specific firearms alleged in Count One did not include a Marlin
rifle or a sawed-off Winchester shotgun, both of which had been seized from
Defendant’s residence. Count Two charged Defendant with unlawfully
possessing the sawed-off Winchester because it was not registered to him in the
National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record, in violation of 26 U.S.C.
§§ 5861(d) and 5871.
Defendant reached a plea agreement with the United States pursuant to
which he agreed to plead guilty to Count One in consideration for, among other
things, the United States’ agreement to dismiss Count Two at the time of
sentencing. (ROA, Vol. 3 at 3.) During Defendant’s plea colloquy, the district
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court mistakenly included the Marlin rifle in the “statement of elements” that the
government would have had to prove. (Id. at 15-16.) 1 After this colloquy, the
pre-sentence report (“PSR”) was completed that calculated Defendant’s base
offense level at 22 under U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(a)(3). The PSR also proposed
increasing Defendant’s base offense level by four levels pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(b)(1)(B) (8-24 firearms), based on Defendant’s possession of eight
firearms (including the Marlin rifle). After deducting three offense levels for
Defendant’s acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, the PSR
concluded that Defendant’s final offense level was 23. This offense level, when
combined with Defendant’s criminal history score of 9 points (which put him in
criminal history category IV) resulted in the PSR’s recommendation of a
sentencing range of 70-87 months.
Defendant’s principal objection to the PSR for purposes of the instant
appeal challenged the PSR’s proposed four-level increase under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B).
He argued that since he was only indicted for seven firearms, he should only be
sentenced for seven firearms under § 2K2.1(b). This would result in a two
1
To the extent that the district court thought Defendant was pleading guilty
to possession of the Marlin rifle, it committed plain error since the indictment did
not include that firearm. Although Defendant raises this on appeal, we note that
the government does not argue that he pled guilty to possession of this rifle and
the district court later recognized the error in relying on the Marlin rifle only for
purposes of “relevant conduct” sentencing calculations.
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offense level reduction in his total offense level under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) (3-7
firearms).
At the sentencing hearing, the court recognized that the indictment did not
include the Marlin rifle, but insisted on including it in its sentencing calculations
as “relevant conduct” under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. (ROA, Vol. IV at 4-8.) During
this hearing, Defendant raised the argument that the government had not proven
that the uncharged eighth firearm (the Marlin) had been in interstate commerce
and thus could not be counted at all under § 2K2.1(b)(1). (Id.) Instead of
requesting a continuance to garner the requisite evidence, the government argued
that there was no need for it to prove any interstate nexus. (Id.) The district
court agreed and imposed the sentence as recommended by the PSR (including the
four-level enhancement for Defendant’s possession of all eight firearms). (ROA,
Vol. V at 14-18.) The district court stated that “a felon in possession of a firearm
under 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) does not include as an essential element of the
crime that there’s an interstate nexus with the gun. He merely has to be a person
who is a prohibited person who is in possession of a firearm.” (ROA, Vol. IV at
4-8.) Defendant was ultimately sentenced to 70 months’ imprisonment. (ROA,
Vol. V., at 30.)
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DISCUSSION
Standard of Review:
We review the district court’s interpretation of the sentencing guidelines de
novo, as it presents a legal question. United States v. Plotts, 347 F.3d 873, 875
(10th Cir. 2003).
Analysis:
In determining that the uncharged Marlin rifle should be counted as
“relevant conduct” for the purposes of the § 2K2.1(b)(1) four-level enhancement,
the district court ruled that so long as Defendant was a “prohibited person” under
18 U.S.C. § 922(g), his possession of any firearm was unlawful, regardless of
whether that firearm had previously affected interstate commerce. As the
government now concedes, the district court’s interpretation of the sentencing
guidelines was in error.
Section 2K2.1(b) provides that if the offense involved three or more
firearms, the court should increase the defendant’s offense level in accordance
with a table which provides for a graduated increase in the number of additional
levels depending upon how many additional firearms were involved. If the
defendant’s offense involved from 3 to 7 firearms, two levels should be added.
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A). If the offense involved from 8 to 24 firearms, four
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levels are to be added. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B). In the instant case, the
question of whether two levels, instead of four levels, should have been added
depends on whether the eighth firearm, the uncharged Marlin rifle, should have
been included as relevant conduct under § 2K2.1(b)(1).
Application Note 9 to § 2K2.1 provides that, in assessing enhancements
under this guideline, courts must only count those firearms “that were unlawfully
sought to be obtained, unlawfully possessed, or unlawfully distributed, including
any firearm that a defendant obtained or attempted to obtain by making a false
statement to a licensed dealer.” Thus, the relevant question is whether
Defendant’s possession of the Marlin rifle was indeed unlawful.
Section 922(g)(1) makes it an offense for any person who has previously
been convicted of a felony to “possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). One
essential element for establishing this offense is proof that the firearm was at
some point transported in interstate or foreign commerce. Scarborough v. United
States, 431 U.S. 563, 575-77 (1977); United States v. Dorris, 236 F.3d 582, 586
(10th Cir. 2000) (“Section 922(g)(1) by its language only regulates those weapons
affecting interstate commerce by being the subject of interstate trade.”).
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Therefore, as the government now concedes, as far as the eighth firearm
was concerned, “Defendant’s possession of it cannot have been unlawful under
§ 922(g)(1) unless the government proved that, at some point prior to the
Defendant’s possession of it, it had traveled in interstate commerce.” (Aple. Br.
at 23.) The government also concedes that it “never either alleged or proved that
this Marlin .22 caliber rifle had ever traveled in interstate commerce prior to the
Defendant’s possession of it.” (Id.) We conclude that the district court erred in
finding the Marlin rifle to count as relevant conduct under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B) on
the basis that it was possessed in violation of federal law. 2 Accordingly, we
REVERSE and REMAND for resentencing.
The government requests that we remand for de novo resentencing so that it
can provide new evidence to show the requisite interstate nexus for the eighth
rifle. Although the general rule is that a remand for resentencing allows the
district court to conduct a de novo review, see United States v. Keifer, 198 F.3d
2
The government also concedes that it failed to prove that Defendant
possessed the Marlin in violation of state law, since Wyoming law only forbids
persons with prior “violent felony” convictions from possessing firearms. (Aple.
Br. at 24, citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(xii) (2003)). Defendant’s criminal
history reveals no convictions for any “violent felonies” under Wyoming law.
(Id.)
The government further agrees that we cannot find Defendant’s possession
of the Marlin to be in violation of any probation conditions because those
conditions are not part of the record before us. (Aple. Br. at 25.)
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798, 801 (10th Cir. 1999), we exercise our discretion in the instant case under 18
U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1) and limit our remand to the record as it now stands.
“Under well-established Tenth Circuit precedent, the government has the
burden of proving sentence enhancements and increases.” Id. at 800; see also
United States v. Guzman, 318 F.3d 1191, 1198 (10th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that
government bears burden of proving sentencing enhancements). The government
failed to meet its burden of proof on the clearly established element of interstate
nexus, and we decline to give it a second bite at the apple. See United States v.
Noble, 367 F.3d 681, 682 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Poor Bear, 359 F.3d
1038, 1043-44 (8th Cir. 2004) (discussing United States v. Hudson, 129 F.3d 994,
995 (8th Cir. 1997)). Although Defendant alerted the government to the
deficiency in its evidence, 3 the government did not seek to cure the deficiency,
and instead made patently erroneous legal arguments as to why such proof was
not needed. Our reversal and remand for resentencing here “does not invite an
open season for the government to make the record that it failed to make in the
first instance.” United States v. Torres, 182 F.3d 1156, 1164 (10th Cir. 1999).
3
It is true that Defendant did not raise the “interstate nexus” argument until
his sentencing hearing, but the government could have sought a continuance at
that point and failed to do so. Although a defendant’s failure to object to facts in
a PSR deems such facts admitted, United States v. Green, 175 F.3d 822, 838 (10th
Cir. 1999), the PSR in the instant case did not state that the Marlin rifle had been
in interstate commerce and thus Defendant never admitted that crucial fact.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND for resentencing
on the record as it now stands. 4
4
Because we hold that the district court erred in including the Marlin rifle
as relevant conduct for sentencing, we need not address Defendant’s argument
(first raised on appeal) that the Marlin lacked firing capability and thus lacked
“firearm” status under the guidelines.
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United States v. Campbell
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2004-06-18
Citations: 372 F.3d 1179
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