F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
AUG 13 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
PARK LAKE RESOURCES LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY; PARK
COUNTY MINING ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. No. 02-1429
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE; ANN
VENEMAN, in her official capacity as
Secretary of Agriculture;
UNITED STATES FOREST
SERVICE; DALE BOSWORTH, in his
official capacity as Chief, U.S. Forest
Service; RICK CABLE, in his official
capacity as Regional Forester, Region
II, United States Forest Service;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF INTERIOR; GALE NORTON,
Secretary of Interior; PIET DEWITT,
in his official capacity as Assistant
Secretary of the Interior,
Defendants - Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. NO. 01-Z-388 MJW )
Christopher T. Massey of Mountain States Legal Foundation (William Perry
Pendley and Tara Burton Rismani, with him on the briefs), Lakewood, Colorado,
for Plaintiffs - Appellants.
Katherine J. Barton, United States Department of Justice, Environment & Natural
Resources Division, Appellate Section, Washington, D.C. (Nina Wang, Assistant
United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, Thomas L. Sansonetti, Assistant
Attorney General, and Kathryn Kovacs, United States Department of Justice,
Environment & Natural Resources Division, Appellate Section, Washington, D.C.,
with her on the brief), for Defendants - Appellees.
Before KELLY, HOLLOWAY , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
HARTZ Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs Park Lake Resources (Park Lake) and Park County Mining
Association (a not-for-profit corporation whose purpose is to assist miners and
mining companies) appeal the dismissal by the district court of their suit against
several government agencies and some of their officials. This is not the first time
Plaintiffs have brought suit over what is in essence the same issue. We affirm
because issue-preclusion doctrine bars Plaintiffs from contending that their claims
are ripe for review.
On August 1, 1996, Plaintiffs filed their first complaint in the District of
Colorado against the Department of Agriculture, the Forest Service, the Secretary
of Agriculture, the Chief of the Forest Service, and the Regional Forester for
Region II (which we will call collectively the “Forest Service”). The complaint
challenged the designation of a parcel of National Forest land as a Research
Natural Area (RNA) under 36 C.F.R. § 251.23, and alleged that the designation
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precluded Park Lake from developing its recorded mining claims in the area. The
district court upheld the designation. Park Lake Res., L.L.C. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., 979 F. Supp. 1310, 1315 (D. Col. 1997) (Park Lake I). On appeal we
vacated the judgment for lack of jurisdiction because the claim was not yet ripe
for review. Park Lake Res., L.L.C. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 197 F.3d 448, 450–51,
453 (10th Cir. 1999) (Park Lake II).
Two years later Plaintiffs filed the present complaint against the Forest
Service and several new defendants—the Department of the Interior, the Secretary
of the Interior, and the Assistant Secretary of the Interior—whom we shall refer
to collectively as the Department of the Interior (DOI). Plaintiffs’ complaint (as
amended), while continuing to challenge the RNA designation, additionally
alleges that as a direct result of the RNA designation, the DOI issued Public Land
Order No. 7195, which withdraws the RNA from mineral exploration, thereby
barring from the area all exploration for the purpose of staking new claims. This
prohibition on exploration is a different injury from the injury alleged in the
initial litigation. But the legal basis of the claim is unchanged. The only respect
in which the land order is alleged to be unlawful is that it was based on an
unlawful RNA. Moreover, this additional injury was readily knowable when the
complaint was filed in the initial litigation, because the land order had been
issued more than two months earlier, on May 16, 1996. See 61 Fed. Reg. 24,806.
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We exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and hold that our
dismissal of the earlier action for lack of ripeness requires dismissal of this action
as well. Plaintiffs can overcome the previous dismissal only by showing
satisfaction of the conditions for ripeness set forth in Park Lake II. Having failed
to do so, Plaintiffs cannot proceed with their claim.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Administrative Proceedings
Acting under the authority of 36 C.F.R. § 251.23, the Forest Service
designated 684 acres in the Arapaho National Forest and the Pike & San Isabel
National Forests as an RNA (the Hoosier Ridge RNA) on December 5, 1995. The
regulation provides:
[W]hen appropriate, the Chief [of the Forest Service] shall establish
a series of research natural areas, sufficient in number and size to
illustrate adequately or typify for research or educational purposes,
the important forest and range types in each forest region, as well as
other plant communities that have special or unique characteristics of
scientific interest and importance.
36 C.F.R. § 251.23.
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiffs appealed the designation to the Forest Service,
but were denied their appeal on March 28, 1996. Although it was still possible
for Park Lake to engage in work in the RNA by filing a proposed plan of
operations (PPO) with the Forest Service to obtain permission to conduct mining
activities on its recorded claims in the RNA, see 36 C.F.R. §§ 251.50–251.65, it
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did not do so.
On May 16, 1996, the DOI issued Public Land Order No. 7195, granting the
Forest Service request that it withdraw the Hoosier Ridge RNA from mineral
entry and location. The order was authorized by § 214 of the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act, codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1714 (2000). See Public Land
Order No. 7195, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,806 (May 16, 1996). The stated purpose of the
withdrawal was “to protect the unique alpine ecosystem and associated plant life
within the [RNA],” preserving the RNA for the purpose for which it had been
designated. Id.
B. Prior Litigation
On August 1, 1996, Plaintiffs filed their first complaint against the Forest
Service, challenging the designation of the Hoosier Ridge RNA as arbitrary,
capricious, and contrary to law, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Park Lake I, 979 F. Supp. at 1312. The district
court ruled against Plaintiffs on the merits, holding that the Forest Service
designation of the RNA was “reasonable and in accordance with the law.” Park
Lake I, 979 F. Supp. at 1315. Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s ruling.
On appeal the government argued for the first time that the claim was not
ripe for review because Plaintiffs “ha[d] failed to show any present injury caused
by the RNA designation.” Park Lake II, 197 F.3d at 450. We agreed, and on
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November 19, 1999, vacated the judgment below and dismissed the suit for lack
of jurisdiction. Id. at 449. We noted that (1) Park Lake had not yet submitted a
PPO to the Forest Service, and (2) consequently, the Forest Service had not
affirmatively denied it permission to exploit its mining claims in the area. Id. at
450–53. The claim could, however, become ripe as a result of future actions. We
said that “Park Lake may seek review of this issue at a later date” after (i) it
submits a mining plan to the Forest Service, (ii) the Forest Service reviews the
plan, and (iii) the Forest Service “requests or requires any restrictions upon its
mining activities.” Id. at 453.
C. Present Litigation
In this new suit Plaintiffs reassert the claim they brought in Park Lake I
against the Forest Service for designating the Hoosier Ridge RNA. Plaintiffs also
challenge Order 7195, in which the DOI honored the Forest Service request to
withdraw the RNA from mineral entry and location. Plaintiffs complain that the
withdrawal is based “solely [on] the unlawful designation of the RNA,” Aplt.
App. at 16, and that the withdrawal prevents Park Lake from locating new mining
claims in the RNA.
The district court dismissed on ripeness grounds both (i) the claim against
the Forest Service for designating the RNA, and (ii) the claim against the DOI for
the withdrawal under Order 7195. The claim against the Forest Service was
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unripe, it said, because “[P]laintiffs ha[d] not filed a proposed plan of operations,
or a notice of intent.” Id. at 27. It held that the claim against the DOI was unripe
because “[P]laintiffs ha[d] not presented any evidence that this issue [wa]s ripe
for review.” Id.
II. DISCUSSION
Ripeness is a jurisdictional issue. Park Lake II, 197 F.3d at 450. “We
review the district court’s dismissal on ripeness grounds de novo and its findings
of jurisdictional fact for clear error.” Coalition for Sustainable Res., Inc. v.
United States Forest Serv., 259 F.3d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 2001). We need not
consider the ripeness of Plaintiffs’ claims anew, however, because principles of
res judicata bar the action until Plaintiffs take steps to cure the deficiencies
pointed out to them in Park Lake II.
Res judicata is “central to the purpose for which civil courts have been
established,” namely “the conclusive resolution of disputes within their
jurisdictions.” Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). “[A] party
who has had a full opportunity to present a contention in court ordinarily should
be denied permission to assert it on some subsequent occasion.” Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Res Nova in Res Judicata, 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1036, 1043 (1971). This
bar protects against “the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits,
conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing
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the possibility of inconsistent decisions.” Montana, 440 U.S. at 153-54.
Res judicata doctrine encompasses two distinct barriers to repeat litigation:
claim preclusion and issue preclusion. See Baker by Thomas v. General Motors
Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 n.5 (1998); 18 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller &
Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4402 at 7 (2d ed. 2002).
Claim preclusion bars a party from relitigating a claim or cause of action on
which final judgment has been rendered. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments
§ 24. “Under [claim preclusion], ‘a final judgment on the merits of an action
precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could
have been raised in that action’.” Sil-Flo, Inc. v. SFHC, Inc., 917 F.2d 1507, 1520
(10th Cir. 1990) (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)).
This appeal concerns the other branch of preclusion doctrine—issue
preclusion. In contrast to claim preclusion, issue preclusion bars a party from
relitigating an issue once it has suffered an adverse determination on the issue,
even if the issue arises when the party is pursuing or defending against a different
claim. See Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 203 F.3d 1190, 1198 (10th Cir. 2000) (“When
an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment,
that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future
lawsuit.” (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970))). In general,
issue preclusion applies when:
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(1) the issue previously decided is identical with the one presented in
the action in question, (2) the prior action has been finally
adjudicated on the merits, (3) the party against whom the doctrine is
invoked was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior
adjudication, and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is raised
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action.
Id.
Plaintiffs’ sole argument on appeal against application of issue preclusion
in this case is that the second condition has not been met—there was no final
adjudication on the merits in the original action against the Forest Service. They
are correct that there has been no final adjudication on the merits; their first
lawsuit ended in our dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction, and
jurisdictional dismissals are not “on the merits.” See Nilsen v. City of Moss
Point, 701 F.2d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc); Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
They are mistaken, however, in asserting that a jurisdictional dismissal can
have no issue-preclusive effect. There is an important exception to the general
rule that a final adjudication on the merits is a prerequisite to issue preclusion. It
has long been acknowledged that “[t]he principles of res judicata apply to
questions of jurisdiction as well as to other issues.” American Surety Co. v.
Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 166 (1932). In particular, dismissals for lack of
jurisdiction “‘preclude relitigation of the issues determined in ruling on the
jurisdiction question.’” Matosantos Commercial Corp. v. Applebee’s Int’l Inc.,
245 F.3d 1203, 1209 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting 18 Charles Alan Wright et al.,
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Federal Practice and Procedure § 4436 (1981)); see also 18 Wright, Miller &
Cooper § 4418 at 468 (“The same question of jurisdiction . . . cannot be reopened
in a second action . . . .”); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 cmt. c. at 119
(“When the question of the tribunal’s jurisdiction is raised in the original action,
in a modern procedural regime there is no reason why the determination of the
issue should not thereafter be conclusive under the usual rules of issue
preclusion.”).
Accordingly, even though our decision in Park Lake II did not result in an
adjudication on the merits, it has issue-preclusive consequences with respect to
the issue decided. We held in that case that Plaintiffs’ APA challenge to the
Hoosier Ridge RNA designation was not ripe because Park Lake had not yet
submitted to the Forest Service for approval a PPO for exploiting its existing
claims. See Park Lake II, 197 F.3d. at 450–54. Plaintiffs cannot now present an
argument that conflicts with our decision on that issue.
To be sure, a decision that a matter is not ripe for review does not
necessarily hold for all time. Things ripen. Under the curable-defect doctrine,
“suit may be brought again where a jurisdictional defect has been cured or loses
its controlling force.” Eaton v. Weaver Mfg. Co., 582 F.2d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir.
1978); see also Wright, Miller & Cooper § 4437 at 180 (“In ordinary
circumstances a second action on the same claim is not precluded by dismissal of
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a first action for prematurity or failure to satisfy a precondition to suit. No more
need be done than await maturity, satisfy the precondition, or switch to a different
substantive theory that does not depend on the same precondition.”). But the
change in circumstances that cures the jurisdictional defect must occur subsequent
to the prior litigation. See Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189, 1192 & n.4
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (“[P]roper application of res judicata should require some
demonstration that the plaintiff is relying upon a new fact or occurrence, and not
merely relying upon those that existed at the time of the first dismissal.”); Magnus
Elecs., Inc. v. La Republica Argentina, 830 F.2d 1396, 1401 (7th Cir. 1987) (“We
do not think that these additional factual allegations should preclude the operation
of res judicata when these facts were available to [the plaintiff] at the time it filed
its complaint in [the prior litigation].”). Here, nothing has ripened since Park
Lake I. (We need not consider the circumstances in which the original judgment
could be set aside—thereby losing its preclusive effect—because old facts are
“newly discovered.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2).)
Plaintiffs do not allege that Park Lake has complied with the requirement
set forth in Park Lake II by submitting a PPO to the Forest Service. Plaintiffs do,
however, point to an alternative ground for ripeness—one not raised before. In
the first litigation Plaintiffs contended that the Forest Service designation of 695
acres of the Hoosier Ridge as an RNA “was arbitrary, capricious, and not in
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accordance with the law,” and sought “a permanent injunction enjoining the
Forest Service from denying Park Lake motorized access to its [existing] mining
claims or otherwise restricting Park Lake’s mining activities within the Hoosier
Ridge.” Park Lake II, 197 F.3d at 450. Now, in addition to bringing the identical
APA challenge to the Forest Service designation of the RNA, Plaintiffs also
challenge the DOI decision to honor the Forest Service request to withdraw the
RNA from mineral entry and location. This withdrawal, they allege, has
prevented Park Lake from locating new mining claims in the RNA. Aplt. App. at
16 ¶ 33.
We might well have decided in the first instance that the DOI withdrawal of
the Hoosier Ridge RNA from exploration would be a matter ripe for review. Yet
Plaintiffs’ claim against the DOI rises or falls on the propriety of the Forest
Service RNA designation. Plaintiffs assert no independent reason why the DOI
action violated the APA as arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. They allege
only that the Forest Service RNA designation violated the APA and that the DOI
order of withdrawal occurred “solely because of the unlawful designation of the
RNA.” Id. ¶ 32. In essence, Plaintiffs are raising the same claim—that the RNA
designation was contrary to law—and are simply attempting to put forth a new
theory why that claim is ripe. That new theory is not based on any facts
postdating the prior litigation; the DOI order predated the filing of Plaintiffs’ first
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complaint against the Forest Service. In our view, the ripeness issue before us is
therefore “in substance the same” as that raised in Park Lake II, and cannot be
relitigated. Montana, 440 U.S. at 155. As the Seventh Circuit has noted, “it does
not make sense to allow a plaintiff to begin the same suit over and over again in
the same court, each time alleging additional facts that the plaintiff was aware of
from the beginning of the suit, until it finally satisfies the jurisdictional
requirements.” Magnus Elecs., 830 F.2d at 1401; see also Redwood v. Council of
the Dist. of Columbia, 679 F.2d 931, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“[Petitioner] may not
be permitted to bring essentially the same action two years later citing a less
obvious basis for federal jurisdiction.”); Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Homestake Mining
Co., 722 F.2d 1407, 1411–12 (8th Cir. 1983) (“None of the new theories [of
relief] presented correct the lack of jurisdiction problem . . . [because they] are
simply additional arguments why this Court should have reached a different result
[in its jurisdictional ruling].”).
Adding the DOI as a defendant does not assist Plaintiffs. Although we
require that “the party against whom [issue preclusion] is invoked [be] a party, or
in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication,” Dodge, 203 F.3d at 1198
(emphasis added), issue preclusion can be invoked by any third party. See Sil-
Flo, 917 F.2d at 1521 (allowing new defendant to assert issue preclusion against
plaintiff that brought two claims on essentially the same issue); Restatement
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(Second) of Judgments § 29 at 291 (“A party precluded from relitigating an issue
with an opposing party . . . is also precluded from doing so with another
person . . . .”). To decide otherwise would be to “[p]ermit[] repeated litigation of
the same issue as long as the supply of unrelated defendants holds out,” a practice
that would “reflect[] either the aura of the gaming table or a lack of discipline and
of disinterestedness on the part of the lower courts.” Blonder-Tongue Labs. v.
Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Of course, when, as is often the case, the identity of the defendant is central
to the jurisdictional dismissal—as when there is no personal jurisdiction over the
party, the party’s citizenship is not diverse, or the party is protected by sovereign
immunity—issue preclusion does not bar suit against a third party. The
jurisdictional issue in the second case—e.g., whether the court has personal
jurisdiction over the new defendant—is simply not the same as that decided
before.
Here, however, the sole ground for the claim against the DOI is that the
RNA designation was unlawful, and the jurisdictional issue—whether Plaintiffs’
challenge to the RNA designation is ripe—is therefore the same issue decided in
Park Lake II. We see no unfairness in denying Plaintiffs a second chance to
argue ripeness on the same available facts. We note that other circuits have
applied issue preclusion with respect to jurisdictional dismissals in prior litigation
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not involving the defendants asserting the doctrine during the second round of
litigation. See, e.g., Harley v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 284 F.3d 901, 909
(8th Cir. 2002) (dismissing suit against corporate pension committee on res
judicata grounds after prior suit against corporation itself was dismissed for lack
of standing); Redwood, 679 F.2d at 932–33 (dismissing on res
judicata/jurisdictional grounds a suit against correctional officials, mayor and city
council, when the mayor and city council were added in the second suit). Indeed,
given that Plaintiffs present no theory that the DOI withdrawal violated the APA
except that it was “caused” by the unlawful Forest Service designation of the
RNA, one could say that the Forest Service and the DOI stand in privity on the
issue raised by Plaintiffs’ complaint.
III. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the ruling of the district court.
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