F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
August 26, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 04-3101
(D. Kan.)
ARLETTE Y. HERNANDEZ-BAIDE, (D.Ct. No. 03-CR-10072-MLB)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, and PORFILIO and BRORBY, Senior
Circuit Judges.
This case is before us after being vacated and remanded by the United
States Supreme Court for further consideration in light of United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). See Hernandez-Baide v. United States, ___
U.S. ____, 125 S. Ct. 1993 (2005). Ms. Hernandez-Baide pled guilty to one count
of illegal reentry of a deported alien previously convicted of an aggravated
felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). See United States v.
Hernandez-Baide, 392 F.3d 1153, 1154 (10th Cir. 2004). On appeal, we affirmed
the district court’s denial of a downward departure under the lesser harms
provision contained in United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual
(U.S.S.G.) § 5K2.11. Id. at 1155, 1158-59. While Ms. Hernandez-Baide’s case
was pending before this court on the Supreme Court’s remand, the government
filed a motion to dismiss her appeal as moot, to which Ms. Hernandez-Baide
objected. After consideration of the parties’ arguments, we grant the
government’s motion, dismiss Ms. Hernandez-Baide’s appeal on remand as moot,
and reinstate our prior decision affirming her conviction and sentence.
The circumstances surrounding Ms. Hernandez-Baide’s underlying guilty
plea, conviction, and sentence are more fully set forth in our prior decision. Id. at
1153-59. On January 21, 2005, following our disposition of her appeal, Ms.
Hernandez-Baide satisfied her prison sentence and was released from
imprisonment, and on February 9, 2005, the federal government deported Ms.
Hernandez-Baide from the United States to Honduras.
On January 12, 2005, during the pendency of Ms. Hernandez-Baide’s
appeal to the Supreme Court, it decided United States v. Booker, in which it
determined the Sentencing Guidelines should be applied in an advisory rather than
a mandatory capacity. 543 U.S. at ___, 125 S. Ct. at 764-65. While Ms.
Hernandez-Baide did not raise an Apprendi-, Blakely-, or Booker-related issue on
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direct appeal, she apparently raised such an issue in her appeal to the Supreme
Court, and on May 2, 2005, it vacated our previous decision and remanded Ms.
Hernandez-Baide’s appeal to us for consideration in light of Booker. See
Hernandez-Baide v. United States, ___ U.S. at ___, 125 S. Ct. at 1993. This court
then ordered the parties to file briefs, in conjunction with Booker, regarding the
mandatory sentence imposed by the district court. We now address the issues
raised by the government in its intervening motion to dismiss Ms. Hernandez-
Baide’s appeal as moot.
While the government concedes Booker error occurred in the mandatory
sentencing of Ms. Hernandez-Baide, it suggests her appeal is moot because she:
1) satisfied her term of imprisonment; 2) has been deported to her native country
of Honduras; 3) is barred for life from reapplying for admission to the United
States, based on her prior California conviction for possession of cocaine base
with intent to distribute; and thereby 4) is unavailable for resentencing with
respect to her three-year supervised release and not subject to any collateral
consequences stemming from the error alleged. In support, it argues that under
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998), and United States v. Meyers, 200 F.3d 715
(10th Cir. 2000), this court lacks jurisdiction to remand for the purpose of
resentencing Ms. Hernandez-Baide, as she is permanently banned from reentering
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this country under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). Ms. Hernandez-Baide counters
that her case is not moot so long as she is under a term of supervised release and
that the district court could, under a Booker advisory sentencing scheme, impose a
lesser or no term of supervised release.
In Meyers, we explained:
When an incarcerated criminal defendant appeals his
conviction, the ongoing incarceration constitutes an injury from which
the defendant seeks relief in satisfaction of Article III. ... If,
however, that same defendant completes his sentence prior to the
appellate court decision, the court must determine whether sufficient
collateral consequences flow from the underlying judgment and the
completed sentence to save the appeal from mootness.
200 F.3d at 718 (relying on Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7-8). While we acknowledged
past Supreme Court precedent established “a presumption of sufficient collateral
consequences when a defendant who has already served his sentence appeals the
propriety of his initial conviction,” we also noted that in Spencer “the Court
declined to extend this presumption of collateral consequences to challenges of
parole termination.” Id. at 718. We then declined to extend the presumption of
collateral consequences to supervised release, stating, “when a defendant appeals
the revocation of his supervised release and resulting imprisonment and has
completed that term of imprisonment, the potential impact of the revocation order
and sentence on possible later sentencing proceedings does not constitute a
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sufficient collateral consequence to defeat mootness.” Id. at 722. We further
recognized that under Spencer collateral consequences cannot be based on the
speculation that an individual will receive an enhanced sentence in future
sentencing proceedings in connection with a crime he has not yet committed. Id.
at 719 (relying on Spencer, 523 U.S. at 13-15). Finally, we determined the
appellant bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of sufficient collateral
consequences to save the action from mootness. Id. at 722.
Drawing on the principles explained in Spencer and Meyers, we find the
collateral consequence suggested by Ms. Hernandez-Baide concerning
resentencing for a lesser or no term of supervised release is more than speculative.
To begin, Ms. Hernandez-Baide is no longer within the jurisdiction of any court of
the United States, including the district court, for the purpose of resentencing.
The situation is compounded by the fact that her return to this country is
prohibited, given her prior drug conviction bars her for life from reapplying for
admission to the United States. As the Second Circuit pointed out in a similar
situation, a defendant’s prior drug trafficking conviction rendering entry into the
United States inadmissible would result in “only a quixotic chance of legally
returning to the United States.” See United States v. Mercurris, 192 F.3d 290, 294
(2d Cir. 1999) (determining that inadmissible reentry issue made possibility that
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defendant’s aggravated felon status “could make a difference to him under the
immigration statutes ... too speculative to create an Article III case or
controversy”). Even if Ms. Hernandez-Baide did enter the United States and was
prosecuted for committing another crime, we find it highly unlikely a reduction in
her supervised release would have the collateral consequence of affecting any
future sentence. Thus, we decline to find collateral consequences exist based on
the mere speculation Ms. Hernandez-Baide may some day return to the United
States (albeit illegally) and receive an enhanced sentence in connection with a
crime she has not yet committed. For these reasons, we find Ms. Hernandez-Baide
has not carried her burden of showing the existence of sufficient collateral
consequences to save the action from mootness.
Accordingly, we GRANT the government’s motion, DISMISS Ms.
Hernandez-Baide’s appeal on remand as moot, and REINSTATE our prior
decision affirming her conviction and sentence.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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