F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JAN 3 2005
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
MIMICS, INC., a Texas corporation;
RICHARD WILDGRUBE;
MARGARET WILDGRUBE,
individually,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
No. 03-2214
THE VILLAGE OF ANGEL FIRE;
MARY FRANCES McKINLEY;
GARY STANSBURY,
Defendants,
and
CHARLES HASFORD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico
(D.C. No. CIV-99-839-MV/ACT)
Andrew S. Montgomery (Randy S. Bartell, Germaine R. Chappelle, with him on
the briefs), Montgomery & Andrews, P.A., Santa Fe, New Mexico, for Defendant-
Appellant.
Michael H. Schwarz, Santa Fe, New Mexico, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Before MURPHY, ANDERSON, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs-Appellees Richard Wildgrube, Margaret Wildgrube, and
MIMICS, Inc. (hereinafter and collectively, the “Wildgrubes”) brought this suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging rights violations under the First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. Defendant-Appellant Charles Hasford appeals the
district court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment premised on qualified
immunity. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm in
part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1
When the events that gave rise to this lawsuit occurred, the Wildgrubes
were residents of the Village of Angel Fire, New Mexico. Angel Fire is located
in northern New Mexico and has a population of approximately 1600. The
Wildgrubes own and operate MIMICS, Inc. (“MIMICS”), a Texas corporation
1
The factual recitation is based on a consideration of the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Wildgrubes, the parties against whom Hasford sought
summary judgment. Verdecia v. Adams, 327 F.3d 1171, 1174 (10th Cir. 2003).
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licensed to do business in New Mexico. MIMICS is a computer software
company that provides software to financial institutions nationwide. In or around
June 1996, MIMICS moved into the Racquet Club Commons (“Commons”)
condominium complex in Angel Fire. The Wildgrubes’ landlord at the Commons
was Robert Morrow. Morrow told the Wildgrubes that the Village of Angel Fire’s
Planning and Zoning Commission had approved MIMICS to operate at the
Commons without any waiver or variance. The Commons was zoned R-3,
Residential-Multiple Family, which did not permit use for business purposes that
are not ancillary to the permitted residential use.
Hasford was a resident of Angel Fire and during the relevant time period
served as the Village building inspector. As building inspector, Hasford was also
an ex officio member of the Planning and Zoning Commission. In addition,
Hasford held a contractor’s license and owned and operated Angel Fire Lock &
Key. Hasford eventually resigned as building inspector, effective January 23,
1997, over questions about a possible conflict of interest arising from his
possession of a contractor’s license while simultaneously serving as building
inspector.
In late 1996, Morrow became a Village councilor. Shortly thereafter two
opposing political factions developed among the members of the Village Council.
Morrow, who had been socially and politically allied with the Wildgrubes, was
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politically opposed to two other members of the Village Council, Gary Stansbury
and Mary Frances McKinley, who are also named as defendants in this action.
Hasford was aligned with Councilors Stansbury and McKinley.
On December 20, 1996, Hasford entered and inspected the MIMICS
property without permission from either the Wildgrubes or Morrow. Hasford’s
inspection was allegedly prompted by the observation of building materials
outside the building. Hasford entered through a back door at approximately 5:30
p.m. without announcing his presence. 2 The door through which Hasford entered
was typically kept locked. Mrs. Wildgrube testified that when she discovered
Hasford in the MIMICS office, Hasford asked in a demanding voice, “What the
hell is going on in here?” Mrs. Wildgrube directed Hasford to speak to either Mr.
Morrow or Pete Wasilewski, the Commons building manager. Hasford indicated
that he had observed construction that was not permitted. Mrs. Wildgrube
testified that she was disturbed and frightened by Hasford’s appearance and asked
Hasford to leave several times, but Hasford continued looking around the
premises. Mrs. Wildgrube stated that Hasford eventually responded by saying, “I
don’t care what Bob Morrow’s position is in this town. I am going to report him
All parties agree that in December it is dark in New Mexico at 5:30 p.m.
2
and Hasford concedes that the inspection was conducted after business hours.
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to the CID [Construction Industries Division (“CID”)].” Hasford eventually
exited through a different door from that which he entered.
On January 16, 1997, Hasford again entered MIMICS unannounced and
without permission or a warrant. Mr. Wildgrube was in the office and walked
around a corner almost running into Hasford. Mr. Wildgrube testified that he
asked Hasford what he was doing and Hasford responded, “I want to see what’s
going on here!” The two men were standing nose-to-nose and Mr. Wildgrube
described the situation as physically threatening. Mr. Wildgrube asked Hasford if
he had spoken to Morrow and Hasford indicated that he had not. Mr. Wildgrube
testified that he told Hasford he was uncomfortable with the situation but Hasford
said, “I can come into any business in Angel Fire anytime I want to!” Mr.
Wildgrube stated that Hasford then said if Mr. Wildgrube did not want him there
he could ask Hasford to leave and that Hasford would then get a court order. Mr.
Wildgrube testified that he asked Hasford to leave, at which time Hasford wrote
something in his notebook and said, “That will be duly noted.”
At no time was MIMICS open to the general public. There were no signs
indicating the property was accessible to anyone but the occupants. All mail was
received at the post office and all customer service was handled by telephone,
modem, fax machine, or by visiting customers’ places of operations.
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After Hasford’s first uninvited entry into MIMICS, the Wildgrubes spoke to
Morrow. Morrow subsequently spoke to the Village Mayor about Hasford’s
conduct. In addition, at the December 12, 1996 and the January 9, 1997
Executive Sessions of the Village Council, Morrow raised the issue of Hasford
holding a contractor’s license while being Angel Fire’s building inspector.
Morrow also raised the issue of Hasford’s conduct toward the Wildgrubes at the
January 9 Executive Session. The Wildgrubes also complained about Hasford’s
conduct to Mayor Cottam, the Planning and Zoning Chairperson, and the
Municipal League. Mrs. Wildgrube was contacted by the Sangre De Cristo
Chronicle regarding Hasford’s purported conflict of interest. The paper ran
several stories regarding this conflict, one of which ran on January 16, 1997, the
day of Hasford’s second unannounced entrance into the MIMICS’ office and a
few days before Hasford’s resignation became effective.
On January 17, 1997, the Chief Inspector of the New Mexico CID inspected
MIMICS with the Wildgrubes’ consent. Also present during this inspection were
other CID officials, Hasford, Mayor Cottam, and the Planning and Zoning
Commission Chairperson. During the inspection, the Wildgrubes protested
Hasford’s conduct to the CID officials. The Wildgrubes testified that CID
officials told them that there were no problems with MIMICS’ occupancy and no
serious code violations.
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Notwithstanding the statements of CID officials assuring the Wildgrubes
that there were no problems with the property, on or about January 20, 1997,
Hasford wrote a letter alleging that there were nine building code violations and
submitted the letter to CID, the Angel Fire Village Council, and the Fire Marshal.
At the Planning and Zoning Commission meeting of January 30, 1997, the
Wildgrubes spoke out against what they felt was harassment directed toward
them. Subsequently, on February 13, 1997, the occupation of MIMICS in the
Commons was placed on the Planning and Zoning Commission agenda and the
commissioners decided to permit MIMICS to remain on the property for six
months.
The Wildgrubes filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Village of
Angel Fire, Hasford, McKinley, and Stansbury, alleging retaliation in violation of
the First Amendment and deprivation of their substantive and procedural due
process rights. The Wildgrubes also alleged violations of the New Mexico Tort
Claims Act. The district court thereafter granted the Wildgrubes’ motion for
leave to file an amended complaint. In their First Amended Complaint, the
Wildgrubes abandoned their substantive due process and state tort claims but
sought money damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 for Defendants’
alleged violations of their First Amendment rights of free speech and free
association, Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful searches, and
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Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of equal protection and procedural due
process.
The district court, inter alia, denied Hasford’s motion for summary
judgment based on a defense of qualified immunity from the Wildgrubes’ First
Amendment claim, Fourth Amendment claim, and Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection claim. MIMICS, Inc. v. Village of Angel Fire, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1131,
1150, 1153, 1157 (D.N.M. 2003). It is that order which is the subject of this
appeal. 3
III. DISCUSSION
“Orders denying qualified immunity before trial are appealable to the extent
they resolve abstract issues of law.” Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1422 (10th
Cir. 1997). When, as here, “a defendant’s appeal of the denial of a motion for
summary judgment is based on the argument that, even under the plaintiff’s
version of the facts, the defendant did not violate clearly established law, then the
district court’s summary judgment ruling is immediately appealable.” Johnson v.
Martin, 195 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 1999).
The district court also granted the Wildgrubes’ motion for summary
3
judgment against defendants Village of Angel Fire and Hasford on the Fourth
Amendment claims. MIMICS, Inc. v. Village of Angel Fire, 277 F. Supp. 2d
1131, 1160-62 (D.N.M. 2003). Neither Hasford nor the Village of Angel Fire
have appealed that portion of the district court order.
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A denial of qualified immunity on summary judgment is reviewed de novo,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Verdecia v. Adams, 327 F.3d 1171, 1174 (10th Cir. 2003). To prevail on
summary judgment against a defendant who asserts a defense of qualified
immunity, a “plaintiff must show that (1) the official violated a constitutional or
statutory right; and (2) the constitutional or statutory right was clearly established
when the alleged violation occurred.” Id. The court must first determine if a
constitutional right was violated because “[i]n the course of determining whether
a constitutional right was violated on the premises alleged, a court might find it
necessary to set forth principles which will become the basis for a holding that a
right is clearly established.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
Requiring the law to be clearly established provides defendants with “fair
warning” that their conduct is unconstitutional. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,
739-40 (2002). “The law is clearly established when a Supreme Court or Tenth
Circuit decision is on point, or if the clearly established weight of authority from
other courts shows that the right must be as plaintiff maintains.” Roska v.
Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1248 (10th Cir. 2003). To be clearly established,
[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.
This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified
immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held
unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the
unlawfulness must be apparent.
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Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (citation omitted).
Usually, if the law was clearly established at the time of the relevant
events, the qualified immunity defense will fail. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818-19 (1982). “Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense claims
extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor should have
known of the relevant legal standard, the defense should be sustained.” Id. at
819. Exceptional circumstances which may render an official’s conduct
objectively reasonable and therefore justify qualified immunity include reliance
on a state statute or regulation, Roska, 328 F.3d at 1248, 1251, and reliance on the
advice of legal counsel, V-1 Oil Co. v. Wyo. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 902 F.2d
1482, 1488 (10th Cir. 1990). It is the defendant’s burden to claim such
extraordinary circumstances and prove that his conduct was objectively
reasonable. Roska, 328 F.3d at 1251.
A. Fourth Amendment Claim
The Wildgrubes allege that Hasford’s entry onto their property on
December 20, 1996 and then again on January 16, 1997 violated their Fourth
Amendment rights.
1. Constitutional Violation
The Fourth Amendment provides:
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. A search subject to Fourth Amendment protection occurs
“when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society
recognizes as reasonable.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
“[E]xcept in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private
property without proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by
a valid search warrant.” Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29
(1967).
Individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in commercial
property. United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 536 (10th Cir. 1994). The
circumstances of the particular commercial property dictate the level of an
individual’s expectation of privacy. As a consequence, a broad invitation to the
general public would result in a lesser expectation of privacy compared to the
expectation of privacy associated with a commercial property closed to the
general public. Id. at 536-37.
The Wildgrubes have demonstrated a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their property. The MIMICS office was not open to the public. All customer
interaction was conducted by phone, modem, email, fax, or by visiting a customer
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at its office. There were no signs at the MIMICS office that indicated it was open
to the general public. In addition, MIMICS’ mail was delivered to the post office.
Hasford, relying on this court’s decision in Artes-Roy v. City of Aspen,
argues that no search occurred and even if there was an unreasonable search any
violation of the Fourth Amendment was de minimis. 31 F.3d 958, 962-63 (10th
Cir. 1994). In Artes-Roy a building inspector who had previously issued a stop
work order when the plaintiff did not comply with the building code, observed
continuing construction activity at the plaintiff’s home in violation of the
outstanding order. Id. at 960. The inspector and his supervisor went to the
plaintiff’s home where they informed the construction workers on the roof that
they were in violation of the work order. Id. The inspector pushed open the door
of the plaintiff’s home and stepped into the entryway without consent from the
plaintiff. Id. at 962. Before the inspector’s entry, the plaintiff and her husband
had previously been in communication with him regarding the status of the
construction. Id. at 960. The court concluded no search occurred because the
defendant was “not on the premises to inspect for a violation of the building code;
[he and the inspector] had already seen what they considered violations of the
stop work order, from outside the premises.” Id. at 962. The court alternatively
held that even if the entry was considered a Fourth Amendment violation, it was
de minimis. Id. at 962-63.
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The rationale given by the court in Artes-Roy belies Hasford’s suggestion
that the case should be the basis for granting his motion for summary judgment.
The court in Artes-Roy said that “[a] different rule [i.e., concluding the
defendant’s entry onto plaintiff’s property was a search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment] would subject to liability every public official who inadvertently, or
by invitation of an unauthorized person, steps inside the door of a private
residence.” Id. at 962.
There is evidence in this case that Hasford’s entries were intentional,
uninvited, and in furtherance of an inspection. As the district court noted:
Hasford’s nonconsensual entry did not take the form of simply
stepping into an open door when Plaintiffs were not looking or
opening a door after having spoken with Plaintiffs, and standing in
the entryway for a few minutes. It is undisputed that on both
occasions in question, Hasford sought entry to examine the interior
of the premises and not, as in Artes-Roy, to discuss his observations
with anyone who might be present.
Mimics, Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1155. Hasford’s conduct may have far exceeded
that of the defendant in Artes-Roy. There is evidence that on December 20, 1996,
after working hours at approximately 5:30 p.m., Hasford entered MIMICS without
permission through a back door. Mrs. Wildgrube testified that Hasford did not
announce his presence and that she found Hasford “sneaking around.” Mrs.
Wildgrube also testified that Hasford continued looking around after she told him
to leave and exited through a different door than the door through which he
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entered thus allowing a more thorough search. On January 16, 1997, there is
evidence that Hasford again entered MIMICS without permission and without a
warrant and was discovered by Mr. Wildgrube “snooping around” the office.
Hasford argues though that, like the officials in Artes-Roy, he did not enter
the property with the purpose of conducting a search and thus no search occurred.
He supports this assertion by arguing that “he had reason to believe that a
building code violation was occurring.” Unlike the situation in Artes-Roy,
however, Hasford did not have previous communications with the Wildgrubes
regarding the construction and there was no outstanding stop work order.
Hasford’s suggestion that he entered the building because he noticed potential
building code violations would indicate that he entered the property with the
purpose of conducting a search. Even Hasford later stated that “he intended to
investigate whether Mr. Morrow should have obtained a building permit, whether
he had violated other building code requirements, and whether a stop work order
should be issued.” Moreover, evidence of Hasford’s behavior indicates that he
was conducting inspections of the property.
Hasford also argues that he believed the property was vacant thus he “could
not possibly have entered with the purpose of searching” it. Based on the
evidence presented by the Wildgrubes, a reasonable factfinder could determine
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that Hasford’s alleged belief that the property was vacant at the time of the first
entry was unreasonable. 4
With regard to the second entry on January 16, 1997, Hasford contends he
was simply seeking consent to investigate. There is evidence, however, from
which a jury could infer the purpose for his second entry was to inspect and not to
acquire consent.
Having concluded that there is evidence that Hasford’s entries into
MIMICS were more than de minimis searches under the Fourth Amendment, the
remaining inquiry is whether there is evidence the searches were unreasonable so
as to constitute Fourth Amendment violations. “It is well-established that a
warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment
and therefore invalid unless it falls within a specific exception to the warrant
requirement.” Roska, 328 F.3d at 1240; see also Camara, 387 U.S. at 529.
Although Hasford uses the words “special need,” we do not read Hasford’s
argument as suggesting the special needs exception applies.
4
Hasford says that part of the reason he stopped to investigate on December
20, despite his alleged belief that the building was vacant, was because there was
a newly built deck located on the outside of the building. Hasford had attended
the Planning and Zoning Commission meeting in May 1996 during which the
presence of MIMICS in the Commons was discussed. Hasford also inspected a
water leak at the Commons in early autumn 1996 when MIMICS was occupying
the premises. Based on the foregoing, a factfinder could determine it was
unreasonable for Hasford to believe that the property was vacant on December 20,
1996.
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Hasford does suggest that balancing the important government interest in
safe construction against any individual harm from government intrusion justifies
as reasonable brief, unauthorized investigative entries like the ones he conducted.
New Mexico’s interest in safeguarding the well-being of the public by prohibiting
unsafe construction does not necessarily equate with a need for nonconsensual,
warrantless, investigative entries. Cf. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600 (“a warrant may
not be constitutionally required when Congress has reasonably determined that
warrantless searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme”). The very
statutes upon which Hasford relies to support his claim of an important
government interest in construction safety suggest otherwise. The New Mexico
Building Code, incorporated by reference into the Village of Angel Fire
Ordinance, specifies that inspections should be attempted during reasonable
hours, presumably so that the owners/occupiers will be present and consent can be
sought. 1991 N.M. Bldg. Code § 202(a), CID-GCB-NMBC-91-1. In the absence
of consent, “the inspector shall proceed to obtain a search warrant.” Id. Based on
this statutory scheme it is clear that New Mexico has recognized that it does not
have a need for nonconsensual, warrantless, administrative entries. Thus, the
very statutes upon which Hasford relies do not support his argument.
As the district court noted, the Supreme Court has expressly held that
“administrative entry, without consent, upon the portions of commercial premises
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which are not open to the public may only be compelled through prosecution or
physical force within the framework of a warrant procedure.” See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967). Hasford did not have consent to enter
MIMICS on December 20, 1996, made no attempt to seek consent before entering,
and allegedly continued inspecting the property after being told to leave. Having
been told to leave the premises once before, Mr. Wildgrube testified that Hasford
again entered MIMICS without permission on January 16, 1997, and told Mr.
Wildgrube, “I want to see what’s going on in here.” Construing the evidence in
the Wildgrubes’ favor, as we must do on summary judgment, Hasford has failed,
at least at this point in the proceedings, to establish that he is entitled to qualified
immunity on the Wildgrubes’ Fourth Amendment claim.
2. Clearly Established Law
Hasford is challenging the district court’s conclusion that the Wildgrubes
satisfied their burden of showing that he violated their clearly established rights
under the Fourth Amendment. Hasford does not dispute that, as a general matter,
it is clearly established that commercial property owners have some protection
under the Fourth Amendment. See id. Hasford, however, contends that under
Artes-Roy it was clearly established that his entries into MIMICS did not violate
the Fourth Amendment or were at most de minimis violations. No reasonable
person, however, could conclude that Hasford’s conduct as described by the
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Wildgrubes was authorized by the holding of Artes-Roy. In Artes-Roy, the
plaintiff saw the inspectors coming, the intrusion was minimal with the inspectors
standing approximately a foot inside the entryway, and the inspectors had already
seen the violations from outside the premises and thus had no intention of
investigating the interior of the property. 31 F.3d at 962. In contrast, there is
evidence that Hasford first entered MIMICS through a back door, after working
hours, without permission, and without announcing his presence. Mrs. Wildgrube
testified that after a confrontation with Hasford in which she told him to leave,
Hasford exited through a different door from that which he entered. A few weeks
later, Mr. Wildgrube testified that Hasford again entered MIMICS unannounced
and without permission or a warrant. Accepting the Wildgrubes’ testimony as
true, Hasford has failed to establish that he is entitled to qualified immunity on
the Wildgrubes’ Fourth Amendment claim.
3. Exceptional Circumstances
Ordinarily, when the law is clearly established the qualified immunity
defense will fail unless the defendant demonstrates “extraordinary circumstances .
. . such that defendant was so prevented from knowing that his actions were
unconstitutional that he should not be imputed with knowledge of an admittedly
clearly established right.” Cannon v. City & County of Denver, 998 F.2d 867, 871
(10th Cir. 1993) (quotations omitted); see also Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19; V-1
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Oil, 902 F.2d at 1488. Reliance on a statute “that explicitly sanctioned the
conduct in question” can be just such an extraordinary circumstance. Roska, 328
F.3d at 1251.
Hasford argues that, even if his conduct violated the Wildgrubes’ clearly
established rights, he is entitled to qualified immunity because he relied on the
relevant New Mexico laws and regulations and the Village of Angel Fire
ordinance. Under the New Mexico Construction Industries Licensing Act, “[a]
state certified inspector may, during reasonable hours, enter any building or go
upon any premises in the discharge of his official duties for the purpose of
making an inspection of work performed . . . .” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 60-13-42
(2004) (repeal effective July 1, 2006). At the time, the New Mexico Building
Code provided:
If the owner or occupier of any building, premise or portion thereof
refuses to allow an inspector to enter the building, premises or
portion thereof at reasonable hours in the discharge of the duties
imposed upon the inspector by this code, the inspector shall proceed
to obtain a search warrant from a municipal magistrate upon oath or
affirmation.
1991 N.M. Bldg. Code § 202(a), CID-GCB-NMBC-91-1. The relevant local
ordinance states:
The building or construction of any new building and structures
within the municipal boundaries of the Village of Angel Fire,
including new construction, additions, alterations or repairs, shall
comply with all the requirements of the Uniform Building Code . . .
and with the New Mexico Building Code . . . . It shall be the duty of
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the Building Inspector to examine all applications for building
permits and to inspect at such intervals as he or she deems
appropriate, all ongoing construction within the Village of Angel
Fire in order to ascertain compliance with the building codes and all
other applicable ordinances and laws. For this purpose, the Building
Inspector shall have the power to seek inspection of any property or
structure at reasonable hours to determine compliance.
Village of Angel Fire, N.M., Ordinance No. 1990-03.
Reliance on a statute does not make an official’s conduct per se reasonable.
Roska, 328 F.3d at 1252. It is, however, “one factor to consider in determining
whether the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable, keeping in mind that
the overarching inquiry is one of fair notice.” Id. at 1253 (citation and quotation
omitted). Determining whether reliance on a statute makes an official’s conduct
objectively reasonable, despite violating the plaintiff’s clearly established rights,
depends on “(1) the degree of specificity with which the statute authorized the
conduct in question; (2) whether the officer in fact complied with the statute; (3)
whether the statute has fallen into desuetude; and (4) whether the officer could
have reasonably concluded that the statute was constitutional.” Id. (footnotes
omitted).
Reliance on a statute or regulation will not make an official’s conduct
objectively reasonable if the statute or regulation is obviously unconstitutional or
if the officer “unlawfully enforces [such] ordinance in a particularly egregious
manner, or in a manner which a reasonable officer would recognize exceeds the
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bounds of the ordinance.” Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1209-10
(9th Cir. 1994); Roska, 328 F.3d at 1253. To the extent Hasford is interpreting
the Village ordinance and New Mexico statutes to permit nonconsensual
warrantless entries at any time and under any circumstance, his understanding is
not objectively reasonable. It has long been the rule that such warrantless
nonconsensual entries into commercial property not open to the public violate the
Fourth Amendment. See See, 387 U.S. at 545.
More importantly, Hasford’s reliance on the statue and regulations does not
make his conduct objectively reasonable because there is evidence that Hasford
did not comply with the terms of the statute and regulations. See Roska 328 F.3d
at 1253. There is evidence the first entry on December 20, 1996 was not
conducted during reasonable hours as required by the Village ordinance and by
New Mexico statute. Hasford himself concedes that his visit was “after hours.”
This is no trivial concern; the reasonable business hours requirement is necessary
so that the owner/occupier is present and the inspector can seek consent. Mrs.
Wildgrube testified that Hasford entered MIMICS after reasonable business
hours, did not knock or announce his presence, entered by the back door, and was
discovered snooping around the office, suggesting that he was not there to seek
consent, but was actually conducting an inspection in violation of the statute and
regulations. The second entry on January 16, 1997 was conducted after the
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Wildgrubes had previously refused Hasford entry. Under the statutory authority
upon which Hasford purportedly relied, he was required to seek a warrant to
remain in compliance with the Fourth Amendment. 1991 N.M. Bldg. Code §
202(a), CID-GCB-NMBC-91-1.
B. First Amendment Claim
The Wildgrubes allege that Hasford’s conduct was in retaliation for their
constitutionally protected speech regarding Hasford and their protected political
association with Morrow.
1. Constitutional Violation
“An act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected
right is actionable under § 1983 even if the act, when taken for a different reason,
would have been proper.” DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1990)
(quotation omitted). A First Amendment retaliation claim such as this requires
proof
(1) that the plaintiff was engaged in constitutionally protected
activity; (2) that the defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff to suffer
an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from
continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) that the defendant’s
adverse action was substantially motivated as a response to the
plaintiff’s exercise of constitutionally protected conduct.
Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted). On
appeal Hasford does not contest that the Wildgrubes engaged in constitutionally
protected conduct. Although not explicitly disclaimed, Hasford also makes no
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argument challenging the second of the elements above. The focus is solely on
the district court’s conclusion that Hasford’s actions were “substantially
motivated” by the Wildgrubes’ constitutionally protected conduct. 5
“[P]roof of an official’s retaliatory intent rarely will be supported by direct
evidence of such intent.” Poole v. County of Otero, 271 F.3d 955, 962 (10th Cir.
2001) (quotation omitted). In the context of a summary judgment motion on a
qualified immunity defense to a claim involving the defendant’s state of mind, the
defendant must first show that the challenged conduct was objectively reasonable.
Gehl Group v. Koby, 63 F.3d 1528, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995), implicitly overruled on
another issue by Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 916 (10th Cir. 2001). Because
this court has determined that there is evidence Hasford’s entries into MIMICS on
December 20, 1996 and January 16, 1997 were not objectively reasonable, we
need not conduct any further analysis. 6 Construing the evidence in the
5
The Wildgrubes alleged that Hasford’s December 1996 and January 1997
entries into MIMICS along with Hasford’s February 1997 meeting with New
Mexico CID officials, Stansbury, and McKinley formed the basis of the retaliation
claim. MIMICS, Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1146. The district court, however,
rejected the Wildgrubes’ argument that the meeting in February was retaliatory
because Hasford put forward an objectively reasonable explanation for the
meeting and the Wildgrubes failed to show that the meeting was motived by
animus. Id. at 1146, 1149. The Wildgrubes do not challenge the district court’s
decision regarding the February 1997 meeting. This court will therefore address
only the December 1996 and January 1997 entries as the bases for the First
Amendment retaliation claim.
Hasford acknowledges that the focus of his appeal is his assertion that his
6
conduct was objectively reasonable for purposes of the First and Fourth
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Wildgrubes’ favor, as we must do on summary judgment, Hasford has failed, at
least at this point in the proceedings, to establish that he is entitled to qualified
immunity on the Wildgrubes’ First Amendment claim.
2. Clearly Established Law
It has long been clearly established that the First Amendment bars
retaliation for protected speech and association. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523
U.S. 574, 592 (1998); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968)
(concluding that public school employee may not be terminated because of
exercise of employee’s First Amendment rights). Hasford’s conduct was
motivated by a desire to retaliate against activity protected by the First
Amendment. It would not be reasonable for a person acting as it is asserted
Hasford did to believe that such conduct did not infringe upon the Wildgrubes’
First Amendment rights.
C. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim
The Wildgrubes charge that Hasford acted “arbitrarily, capriciously, in
spite, ill will, and with a malignant animosity.” The Wildgrubes claim they were
“singled out and not treated like other similarly situated businesses” in the Village
of Angel Fire. 7
Amendments.
The conduct that forms the basis of the equal protection claim involved
7
Hasford’s two entries into MIMICS and Hasford reporting possible building code
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1. Constitutional Violation
The Wildgrubes do not allege as part of their equal protection claim that
they are part of an identifiable group. The Supreme Court, however, has
recognized equal protection claims brought by a “class of one, where the plaintiff
alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly
situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam)
(quotation omitted). To succeed on such an equal protection claim, the
Wildgrubes must prove that they were “singled out for persecution due to some
animosity,” meaning that the actions of Hasford were a “spiteful effort to ‘get’
[the Wildgrubes] for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state activity.”
Bartell v. Aurora Public Schools, 263 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation
omitted). In addition, the Wildgrubes must prove that they were treated
differently than those similarly situated. Id.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Wildgrubes, they
have established an equal protection violation sufficient to preclude summary
judgment in favor of Hasford based on qualified immunity. The Wildgrubes have
provided extensive testimony demonstrating that they were treated differently
than others who were similarly situated. Linda Libbey, the Chairperson and later
violations to New Mexico state authorities.
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Director of the Planning and Zoning Commission, stated that she had “knowledge
of businesses similarly situated to MIMICS that were treated differently.” Libbey
further provided a chart detailing the treatment of various businesses which
demonstrates the differential treatment of MIMICS.
More importantly, the Wildgrubes’ descriptions of Hasford’s conduct and
other evidence of his behavior indicate that Hasford was conducting a “campaign
of official harassment directed against [the Wildgrubes] out of sheer malice.” Id.
(quotation omitted). Both Mr. and Mrs. Wildgrube describe angry confrontations
with Hasford during the inspections. The selective targeting of MIMICS is
arguably the direct result of the Wildgrubes’ support of a political faction on the
Village Council. Having determined that there is evidence that the entries by
Hasford were objectively unreasonable, we view Hasford’s reporting of MIMICS’
potential code violations to government officials as part of his overall conduct.
At this stage of the litigation, the Wildgrubes have thus presented sufficient
evidence that the whole of Hasford’s conduct was motivated by political spite and
that the Wildgrubes were treated differently than others similarly situated.
2. Clearly Established Law
The district court concluded that there was “no doubt that Plaintiffs’ rights
to equal protection were clearly established well before Hasford’s conduct took
place.” MIMICS, Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1153. A few days after the initial entry
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into MIMICS by Hasford on December 20, 1996, however, this court held that
state officials had qualified immunity against an equal protection claim “where
the plaintiff alleges that he is an individual victim of purposeful discrimination,”
but not part of a suspect class, because it “is not well enough established to hold
the individual defendants to knowledge of it.” Norton v. Village of Corrales, 103
F.3d 928, 933-34 (10th Cir. 1996). In so ruling, the court pointed to the failure of
the plaintiffs to supply any case law establishing their equal protection theory and
indicated that the court itself “found no authoritative opinion in this circuit on
this issue.” Id. at 934. 8
The purpose of requiring the law to be clearly established in qualified
immunity determinations is so state officials have fair notice that their conduct is
unconstitutional. Hope, 536 U.S. at 739-40; see also Lintz v. Skipski, 25 F.3d
304, 305-06 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that “defendants are not usually lawyers and
they do not have familiarity with the contents of the Federal Reporter” so the
question of when the law becomes clearly established “is one of fairness in light
8
In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, the Supreme Court definitively
established the availability of an equal protection claim brought by a “class of
one.” 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam) (“Our cases have recognized
successful equal protection claims brought by a ‘class of one,’ where the plaintiff
alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly
situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”).
Subsequent to that decision, this court explicitly spelled out the elements of a
“class of one” equal protection claim. Bartell v. Aurora Public Schools, 263 F.3d
1143, 1148-49 (10th Cir. 2001).
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of all the facts”). Because Norton held that the specific type of equal protection
claim advanced by the Wildgrubes was not clearly established at the time of
Hasford’s first entry into MIMICS, Hasford is entitled to qualified immunity as to
the first entry. Moreover, because Norton failed to conduct an analysis of
whether an equal protection violation occurred in that case, it would be equally
unfair to deny Hasford qualified immunity for his conduct that occurred soon
after that decision. Therefore, Hasford is entitled to qualified immunity on the
Wildgrubes’ equal protection claim and the district court’s decision holding to the
contrary is reversed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, this court AFFIRMS in part and
REVERSES in part the district court’s summary judgment order on qualified
immunity and REMANDS the case to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
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