Fitzgerald v. Corrections Corp. of America

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
APR 11 2005
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk

JAMES J. FITZGERALD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF
AMERICA; PRISON HEALTH No. 03-5029
SERVICES, INC.; BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF
TULSA COUNTY; TULSA COUNTY
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AUTHORITY;
and JOHN F. JOSEPHSON, M.D.,

Defendants-Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. 02-CV 518H(C)

Gina Cowley-Crabtree, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Appellant.

Matthew B. Free (Catherine L. Campbell, Best & Sharp, Tulsa, Oklahoma, and David A.
Graves and Jeffrey L. Wilson, The Barkley Law Firm, Tulsa, Oklahoma, with him on the
brief), for Defendants-Appellees Corrections Corporation of America, John F. Josephson,
M.D., and Prison Health Services, Inc.

Gretchen M. Schilling, Riggs, Abney, Neal, Turpen, Orbison & Lewis on the brief for
Defendants-Appellees Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County and Tulsa
County Criminal Justice Authority.

Before TACHA, Chief Judge, HOLLOWAY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant James J. Fitzgerald broke his hip while he was incarcerated at

the David Moss Criminal Justice Center. Fitzgerald alleges that he suffered this fracture

after experiencing a diabetes-related seizure and falling down, and he claims that his

injuries are a result of the prison authorities’ failure to adequately treat his diabetes and

failure to provide him with a wheelchair. Fitzgerald further alleges that prison authorities

did not secure a medical evaluation for his injuries until over five months after he

incurred them, and ultimately failed to provide any treatment for him at all.

Fitzgerald sued the jail’s private operator, the Corrections Corporation of America

(CCA), as well as the health care provider Prison Health Services (PHS), the Board of

County Commissioners of Tulsa County (BCC), the Tulsa County Criminal Justice

Authority (TCCJA), and John F. Josephson, M.D. (“Dr. Josephson”), attempting to assert

claims for disability discrimination under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act

and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. He also attempted to assert, against CCA, PHS and

Dr. Josephson, claims arising under state law for negligence or medical malpractice and

arising under federal law, i.e. 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based upon alleged violations of the

Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The District Court for the Northern

District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment to Dr. Josephson and dismissed the suit

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) against the remaining defendants. Fitzgerald now

appeals.

-2-
 As explained later, with respect to the dismissal of Fitzgerald’s claims against

CCA, PHS, BCC and TCCJA for failure to plead exhaustion of administrative remedies

sufficiently as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), we

vacate and remand for clarification whether dismissal of Fitzgerald’s claims was with or

without prejudice. We affirm the grant of summary judgment for Dr. Josephson with

respect to the federal claims against him. We reverse the summary judgment for him with

respect to the state law claims, and remand for further proceedings..

I

BACKGROUND

A. Fitzgerald’s Allegations

James Fitzgerald was an insulin-dependent diabetic with a history of low blood

sugar and seizures. Fitzgerald Amended Petition dated Feb. 22, 2002, Aplt. App. 20, 21,

¶ 2. As a result of his condition, he alleges that he was also particularly susceptible to

bone fractures. Id.

In August 1999 Fitzgerald was placed in the David Moss Criminal Justice Center.

Id. at 22-23, ¶ 7. Upon admission, he alleges that he “informed jail staff” that he required

a special diet and regular injections of insulin. Id. Fitzgerald alleges he further

“informed jail staff” that as a result of his diabetic condition, his bones were more

susceptible to fracture and that he had broken his leg while being housed in the old Tulsa

County jail several years earlier. Id. He also “informed jail staff” that he had a history of

-3-
low blood sugar, that this caused him to have seizures if his diet and medication were not

properly regulated, and that he required use of a wheelchair to prevent him from falling

and sustaining injury. Id. Fitzgerald alleges that defendants CCH and PHS failed to

accommodate his requests. Id at 23, ¶9.

On or about September 17, 1999, Fitzgerald alleges that he slipped into a diabetic

coma or seizure and fell, fracturing his left upper femur. Id. Despite the apparent

severity of these injuries, Fitzgerald alleges he was not provided with the opportunity for

appropriate medical treatment until February 24, 2000. Id. at 23-24, ¶ 10-11. On or

about February 24, 2000, Fitzgerald was examined by Dr. John F. Josephson, who was

under contract with PHS. Id. at ¶ 11. Dr. Josephson reviewed Fitzgerald’s medical

records and interpreted x-rays with which he was provided. Affidavit of Dr. Josephson

dated Oct. 24, 2002, Aplee. Supp. App. at 75. Dr. Josephson offered three treatment

options for Fitzgerald’s injury. Id. Although Dr. Josephson advised that a surgical

procedure was the best form of treatment, he also informed PHS that an acceptable course

of treatment was to do nothing. Fitzgerald Petition, Aplt. App. at 23-24, ¶ 11. PHS chose

to do nothing. Id.

In November, 2000, Fitzgerald was transferred into the custody of the Oklahoma

Department of Corrections, having lived for fourteen months with an untreated broken

hip. Id. at 24, ¶ 13 Fitzgerald alleges that he received no medical treatment for his

injuries other than non-prescription pain medication during the time that he was in jail,

despite “numerous and repeated requests.” Id.

-4-
B. Procedural History

Fitzgerald first sued Defendants in the District Court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma.

The case was subsequently removed to the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Oklahoma, on notice by CCA. The U.S. District Court exercised jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, since the court was presented with claims arising under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. §§ 12102 et seq.),

the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.), and the United States Constitution. The

District Court also had supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over

Fitzgerald’s state negligence or malpractice claims against CCA, PHS and Dr. Josephson.

We have jurisdiction over the appeals involving these claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

In the District Court before Judge Holmes, BCC, CCA, PHS and TCCJA moved to

dismiss the claims against them under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), while Dr. Josephson

moved for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) and Local Rule 56.1. The

District Court found that Fitzgerald failed to adequately plead exhaustion of

administrative remedies before bringing suit, as is required by the Prison Litigation

Reform Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). As a result, the court dismissed Fitzgerald’s suit

entirely against BCC and TCCJA, because no state law claims were asserted against those

Defendants. Order (2d) dated Jan. 6, 2003, Aplt. App. 33, 37. The District Court also

granted the motions for CCA and PHS except for the state law claims, which were

remanded to the District Court of Tulsa County. Id.

-5-
 As for the claims against Dr. Josephson, the Federal District Court found first, as

with his federal claims against the other defendants, that Fitzgerald was unable to proceed

because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in compliance with 42 U.S.C. §

1997e. Order (1st) dated Jan. 6, 2003, Aplt. App. 26, 30. Further, the court found

Fitzgerald’s claims also failed against Dr. Josephson on the merits on the following

grounds: First, Fitzgerald failed to provide expert testimony as was generally required

under Oklahoma law to demonstrate medical negligence. Id. Second, the court

concluded that Fitzgerald failed to rebut an expert affidavit introduced by Dr. Josephson,

which asserted the doctor “met or exceeded the applicable standard of care.” Id. at 28.

As a result, the court found, this established as uncontroverted fact that Dr. Josephson’s

care was not substandard. Id. at 28, 30. Since Dr. Josephson’s conduct was not

substandard, it could not constitute either state law medical negligence, or a violation of

the ADA, Rehabilitation Act or Eighth Amendment. Id. at 30. The court further

concluded, as to Fitzgerald’s ADA claim, that he had no right to bring a private claim for

substandard medical treatment under the ADA in any case. Id. The court thus granted

summary judgment for Dr. Josephson on the entirety of claims against him. Id. at 31.

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Dismissal for Lack of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.

A district court’s finding of failure to exhaust administrative remedies is reviewed

-6-
de novo. Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2002).

In Steele v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204, 1208-09 (10th Cir. 2003),

we concluded that a plaintiff’s failure to meet the exhaustion requirement of § 1997e(a)

does not deprive us of subject matter jurisdiction over the action. We further determined

that under § 1997e, exhaustion was a pleading burden that falls on the plaintiff, and “a

complaint ‘that fails to allege the requisite exhaustion of remedies is tantamount to one

that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.’” 355 F.3d at 1209 (quoting

Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 731 (11th Cir. 1998)). To successfully allege exhaustion a

“prisoner must: (1) plead his claims with ‘a short and plain statement. . . showing that

[he] is entitled to relief,’ in compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); and (2) ‘attach[] a

copy of the applicable administrative dispositions to the complaint, or, in the absence of

written documentation, describe with specificity the administrative proceeding and its

outcome.’” Id (quoting Knuckles El v. Toombs, 215 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2000)).

In the instant case, Fitzgerald asserted that he “exhausted those administrative

remedies that were available to him, and stated so in his petition, although in more

expansive terms. He stated in detail the administrative remedies he sought.” Aplt. Br. at

17. Upon review of the record, the extent of Fitzgerald’s pleading was the following:

Plaintiff sought informal and formal relief from officials of CCA & PHS by
verbally requesting and filing formal grievances seeking a proper diet and
medical attention. The outcome of these requests for relief was a denial of
proper diet and medical attention and/or an inadequate response as is alleged
in more detail hereafter.

Fitzgerald Petition, Aplt. App. at 20, ¶ 1. In his Petition, Fitzgerald then proceeded to

-7-
outline the litany of woes he experienced as a result of his injuries. He did not, however,

attach any written documentation pertaining to any administrative disposition of any

complaints. Fitzgerald offered no description at all of any specific hearing or procedure,

nor even referred to a specific interaction with any particular guard or other prison

official, except for his consultation with Dr. Josephson. While the District Court’s

determination in this case preceded our opinion in Steele, in granting Defendants’ motion

to dismiss here the court correctly concluded that Fitzgerald’s petition was “facially

deficient under the requirements of § 1997e(a) as construed by the Sixth Circuit in

Knuckles El[.]” Order (2d), Aplt. App. at 37.

The District Court did not specify whether its dismissal of Fitzgerald’s claim for

lack of exhaustion was with or without prejudice. According to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b),

unless the court in its order specifies otherwise, such a dismissal “operates as an

adjudication on the merits.” However, we held in Steele that a dismissal based on lack of

exhaustion should ordinarily be without prejudice:

[f]ailure to exhaust administrative remedies is often a temporary, curable,
procedural flaw. If the time permitted for pursuing administrative remedies
has not expired, a prisoner who brings suit without having exhausted these
remedies can cure the defect simply by exhausting them and then reinstituting
his suit (in the event the administrative claim fails to afford him the desired
relief).

355 F.3d at 1213 (quoting Snider v. Melindez, 199 F 3d 108, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1999)).

Under certain circumstances, a district court may, notwithstanding failure to exhaust,

proceed to the merits of the claim and dismiss with prejudice if it concludes a party would

-8-
be unsuccessful even absent the exhaustion issue.1 Here, however, the District Court only

decided the exhaustion issue. Thus, while we uphold its determination that Fitzgerald

failed to exhaust, we vacate and remand for the court below to either modify its opinion

to specify that the dismissal is without prejudice, or make a determination on the merits

within its permissible scope to do so under 42 U.S.C. §1997e(c)(2).

In the event that the District Court determines dismissal should be without

prejudice, we note that as Plaintiff’s counsel conceded at oral argument, the time frame

for recourse to administrative remedies has now probably expired. We held in Jernigan

that a plaintiff “may not successfully argue that he had exhausted his administrative

remedies by, in essence, failing to employ them and since he may now be time barred

from pursuing them, they are exhausted by default.” 304 F 3d at 1033. As a result,

unless on remand Fitzgerald can offer evidence of exhaustion not submitted in his initial

petition, or alternatively, offer evidence that there was no administrative procedure

available in the prison for him to exhaust or that he was somehow prevented from

utilizing whatever procedure was available, his federal claims alleged against defendants

CCA, PHS, BCC or TCCJA must fail.

B. Summary Judgment with respect to claims against Dr. Josephson

“We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard

as the district court.” Ward v. Utah, 398 F.3d 1239. 1245 (10th Cir. 2005).

1
See our discussion of 42 U.S.C. §1997e(c)(2), infra at 10-13. See also Steele, 355 F.3d
at 1214.
-9-
 As in its dismissal of Fitzgerald’s claims against Defendants BCC and TCCJA,

discussed above, the District Court also considered the exhaustion issue and concluded

that Fitzgerald’s failure to exhaust provided one independent basis for granting Dr.

Josephson’s motion for summary judgment. In Steele, we noted that “normally, the

defendant should raise the exhaustion issue as early as possible in the litigation. If,

however, defendant submits a motion to dismiss after filing an answer, the motion should

be treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” 355 F. 3d at 1212 n. 4. (internal

citation omitted). Further, where a factual dispute may preclude dismissal, “[a] motion

for summary judgment limited to the narrow issue of exhaustion and the prisoner’s efforts

to exhaust would then be appropriate.” Id. at 1212.

Here the District Court did not limit summary judgment to the narrow issue of

exhaustion. Rather, the court concluded that in addition to Fitzgerald’s failure to exhaust,

his claims against Dr. Josephson also failed on the merits. One reason the court gave for

this conclusion, regarding both Fitzgerald’s federal and state claims, was that the record

“clearly establish[ed] that Dr. Josephson’s treatment was not substandard” and because

the treatment was not substandard, it could not constitute either medical negligence under

state law or a violation of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or the United States

Constitution. Order (1st), Aplt. App. at 30. This particular conclusion was not well

founded. For the reasons discussed below, however, we find that the District Court’s

grant of summary judgment for Dr. Josephson on Fitzgerald’s federal claims should be

properly upheld on other grounds. We must reverse and remand, nevertheless, on

-10-
Fitzgerald’s state law claim against Dr. Josephson.

1. Fitzgerald’s Federal Claims

We are persuaded by the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Perez v. Wisconsin Dep’t of

Corrections, 182 F.3d 532, 534 (7th Cir. 1999), that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) requires

exhaustion of administrative remedies as a precondition to bringing litigation, and

requires dismissal where a litigant has failed to complete such exhaustion. Except in

limited circumstances, the plain language of the statutory text does not allow the court to

skip ahead to the merits of the suit:

Application of a law designed to prevent decision on the merits cannot be
avoided by making the very decision whose propriety is contested, then
declaring the decision-avoidance statute "moot."[. . .] Examining the merits
first and then ordering a case dismissed on exhaustion grounds only if the
plaintiff is apt to prevail not only would disregard the statutory approach,
which puts administrative ahead of judicial inquiry, but also would border on
(if it would not transgress) the rule against issuing advisory opinions.

Id. This approach also echoes the conclusion of the Sixth Circuit in Brown v. Toombs,

139 F.3d 1102, 1004 (6th Cir. 1998):

The statutory language, "no action shall be brought" until all available
remedies are "exhausted," should be interpreted to mean precisely what is
obviously intended - that a federal court should not prematurely "decide" the
merits of any such action. Federal courts should not adjudicate any such claim
until after exhaustion unless the complaint satisfies [42 U.S.C.] § 1997e(c)(2).

In Perez, supra, the Seventh Circuit further held that such a rule should apply even where

it might otherwise serve the interest of judicial economy to resolve the merits of a case

-11-
while it is currently before the court. 182 F.3d at 535.2

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(2) provides that: “[i]n the event that a claim is, on its face,

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief, the court may dismiss

the underlying claim without first requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies.”

Dr. Josephson argues that in this case, his motion for summary judgment should be

considered analogous to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, since in either

case “the court reviews the legal sufficiency of the allegations and, if appropriate,

dismisses the claim with prejudice.” Br. of CCA, PHS & Dr. Josephson at 28. According

to Dr. Josephson, the District Court was therefore within its authority to reach the merits,

notwithstanding the lack of exhaustion under § 1997e(c)(2). Dr. Josephson urges that we

2
The Seventh Circuit panel first noted that the Supreme Court had weighed policy
arguments for and against the exhaustion requirements of two other statutes in the cases:
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989) (Recovery Act of 1976) and McNeil
v. United States, 508 U.S. 106 (1993) (Federal Tort Claims Act). The panel concluded:

But arguments for and against exhaustion do not matter in the end. Judges are
not the ones to make the decision; the political branches have made it. Both
Hallstrom and McNeil conclude that statutes forbidding the commencement
of a suit are too clear to tolerate revisionism in the name of efficient litigation
management.

Id. See also McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2002):

While it is true that requiring dismissal may, in some circumstances, occasion
the expenditure of additional resources on the part of the parties and the court,
it seems apparent that Congress has made a policy judgment that this concern
is outweighed by the advantages of requiring exhaustion prior to the filing of
suit.

-12-
look to Thomson v. Gibson, 289 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2002), for an example where this

Court proceeded in a similar fashion to that taken by the District Court here.

In Thomson, we considered an inmate’s claims of Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendment violations based on his allegations that he was being provided inadequate

portions of food. Id. at 1220. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the district

court determined that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies regarding

his requested injunctive relief and that his monetary damage claims were without merit

and should be dismissed as frivolous. Id. at 1221. On review we concluded that the

record was unclear on the exhaustion issue. Id. However, we further concluded that on

the merits all of the plaintiff inmate’s claims were frivolous and it would therefore be

“pointless to remand” the case to the District Court. Id. at 1221-22.

Our opinion in Thomson did not specifically indicate the statutory grounds on

which we reached the merits, but in light of our disposition, it seems clear that the

decision was based on 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(2). In Thomson the District Court had

ordered the Department of Corrections to prepare a report pursuant to Martinez v. Aaron,

570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978), documenting the incidents alleged by Plaintiff Thomson,

and the Department’s response. Id. at 1220-21. This report demonstrated that Thomson

was receiving a nutritionally adequate diet. Id. at 1222. The fact that another doctor had

recommended double-portions merely established a medical difference of opinion, which

is not actionable under the Eighth amendment. Id. Likewise, Thomson’s equal protection

claim failed because he did not establish that he was treated differently than other inmates

-13-
because of any suspect classification, nor that the differential treatment he did receive was

not reasonably related to some penological purpose. Id.

(a) Fitzgerald’s Eighth Amendment Claim

For the purposes of asserting an Eighth Amendment claim under § 1983, we noted

in Thomson that a “medical need is serious if it has been diagnosed by a doctor, or if it

would be obvious to a layperson that doctor intervention was needed.” Thomson, 289

F.3d at 1222. An untreated broken hip, as alleged by Fitzgerald, could plausibly rise to

that level.

To support his motion for summary judgment Dr. Josephson introduced an

affidavit from another physician, Dr. Howard, which asserted without any explanation,

that in Dr. Howard’s opinion the treatment options outlined by Dr. Josephson, including

the option of no treatment for Fitzgerald’s fractured hip, were “appropriate” and “within

the accepted standard of care.”3 Fitzgerald, represented by counsel for the summary

3
Dr. Howard’s affidavit stated in full:
I, Brian C. Howard, M.D., of lawful age, being first duly sworn upon oath state:
1. I am a Medical Doctor duly licensed under the laws of the State of
Oklahoma and am Board Certified in Orthopedic Surgery.
2. I reviewed the medical records and x-ray films of James Fitzgerald.
3. The medical care rendered by John Josephson, M.D. to James Fitzgerald
was appropriate and within the accepted standards of care.
4. All of the options presented to James Fitzgerald for treatment or non-
treatment of the injured hip by John Josephson, M.D. exceeded the standard
of care.
5. The option of not treating the fracture was an appropriate method for
addressing this fracture and within the accepted standard of care.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.

-14-
judgment proceedings, submitted only a general denial directed to Dr. Howard’s affidavit,

without other evidence. Since the district court determined that no substandard treatment

was recommended, it concluded that Fitzgerald’s allegations “cannot form the basis of a §

1983 claim under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976),” as an Eighth Amendment

claim. Aplt. App. at 30.

We conclude, as a matter of law, that the affidavit of Dr. Howard, submitted by Dr.

Josephson, was insufficient to support summary judgment as to any claims.4 We have

long held that “conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative

value.” See, e.g. Nichols v. Hurley, 921 F.2d 1101, 1113 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting Evers

v. General Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985)); See also Morgan v.

Dated 10/18/02
S/ Brian C. Howard, M.D

Appellee’s Supplemental Appendix at 76.
4
The dissent says, p. 1, that the majority opinion does not conclude that Fitzgerald’s
brief in opposition to summary judgment in any way controverted Dr. Howard’s affidavit.
We disagree. Fitzgerald’s Answer to Dr. Josephson’s motion for summary judgment
stated clearly Fitzgerald’s contention that the “proffered affidavit is not evidence, having
not been subjected to examination by the plaintiff, or even qualified as expert. Neither is
it a learned treatise of which the court could take judicial notice. As such, it should not be
considered.” Aplee. Supp. App. at 77-78. We are convinced that this challenge to the
affidavit, among others, made clear Fitzgerald’s position controverting the affidavit.
Along the same line, the dissent argues, p. 2, that Fitzgerald does not raise the
issue of admissibility of Dr. Howard’s affidavit on appeal; that this issue of the challenge
to the affidavit, even if raised below, should be treated as abandoned on appeal. Again,
we disagree with the dissent. It is clear that Fitzgerald, in any event, challenges the
summary judgment which was based on the insufficient affidavit. Since this is the thrust
of his appeal, we cannot agree that waiver of the affidavit’s insufficiency can be tortured
out of the briefs and arguments of Fitzgerald on appeal.
-15-
Willingham, 424 F.2d 200, 201 (10th Cir. 1970) (“[S]ummary judgment cannot rest on

purely conclusory statements either in pleading or affidavit form.”); and Claar v.

Burlington Northern R. R., 29 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1994) (upholding refusal of trial

court to consider affidavits from physicians which failed to explain the basis for their

conclusion that parties had been injured by workplace chemical exposure). Here, Dr.

Howard’s affidavit provided no basis for his conclusion that the care rendered by Dr.

Josephson was “appropriate” or met or exceeded the accepted standard of care. The

District Court erroneously relied on Dr. Howard’s insufficient affidavit as the central

basis for its grant of summary judgment for Dr. Josephson.

We do feel that there was an alternative, sufficient ground for granting summary

judgment for Dr. Josephson on the Eighth Amendment claim against him. This is

because Dr. Josephson’s conduct, as alleged by Fitzgerald, cannot rise to the level of an

Eighth Amendment violation. As the Court stated in Estelle v. Gamble:

[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a
medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under
the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional
violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a
cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful
to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The conduct of Dr. Josephson, as alleged, did not amount to an

act or omission “sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs.” Thus the Eighth Amendment claim again Dr. Josephson fails and may

properly be disposed of on the merits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997 e(c)(2).

(b) Fitzgerald’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims
-16-
 Fitzgerald’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims are also on tenuous grounds. In

addition to ruling that Fitzgerald did not receive substandard medical care, the District

Court further held, with respect to Fitzgerald’s ADA claim: “it is well settled that the

ADA does not provide a private right of action for substandard medical treatment.”

Order (1st), Aplt. App. at 30. The District Court did not comment on the Rehabilitation

Act, but for practical purposes the requirements to state a claim under either statute are

identical here.

Under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, Fitzgerald is obligated to show

that he was “otherwise qualified” for the benefits he sought and that he was denied those

“solely by reason of disability.” See, e.g., Johnson by Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d

1487, 1492 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 910 (1993). Further, we have held

that “the term otherwise qualified cannot ordinarily be applied ‘in the comparatively fluid

context of medical treatment decisions without distorting its plain meaning.” Johnson,

971 F.2d at 1493-94. As to whether treatment was denied “solely” by reason of

disability, the Second Circuit has stated: “Where the handicapping condition is related to

the condition(s) to be treated, it will rarely, if ever, be possible to say. . . that a particular

decision was ‘discriminatory.’” United States v. University Hospital, 729 F.2d 144, 157

(2nd Cir. 1984) (Rehabilitation Act).

Several circuits have expressly concluded that neither the ADA nor the

Rehabilitation Act provide remedies for alleged medical negligence. See Bryant v.

Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (“ADA does not create remedy for medical

-17-
malpractice”); Grzan v. Charter Hospital of Northwest Indiana, 104 F.3d 116, 121, 123

(7th Cir. 1997) (affirming district court’s dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) of

plaintiff’s section 504 claim because “section 504 [which ‘is materially identical to the

ADA’] does not provide a federal malpractice tort remedy” and allegations of

discriminatory medical treatment do not fit into the four-element framework required by

Section 504.”).

In the instant case, the principal basis for Fitzgerald’s claim against Dr. Josephson

is the doctor’s recommendation that the prison may “do nothing” as an acceptable course

of treatment for Fitzgerald’s injuries. Dr. Josephson suggested the non-treatment option

as one option, but also recommended surgery as another option. He did not make the

final decision to deny treatment. Even if Dr. Josephson had been the final decision-

maker, Fitzgerald would not have been “otherwise qualified” for such treatment in the

absence of his alleged disability – his alleged disability in this case was the reason why

Fitzgerald was seeking medical treatment. These are the sort of purely medical decisions

that we have held do not ordinarily fall within the scope of the ADA or the Rehabilitation

Act. Fitzgerald’s claims against Dr. Josephson under the ADA and Rehabilitation Acts

were therefore properly rejected on the merits under §1997e(c)(2).

2. Fitzgerald’s State Law Claims

Fitzgerald’s attempt to assert a state law medical negligence claim is hampered by

his apparent inability to proffer an expert affidavit as to the proper standard of care.

Oklahoma law generally requires expert testimony to establish the standard of care. See,

-18-
e.g., Boxburger v. Martin, 552 P.2d 370, 373 (Okla. 1976).5 An affidavit to that effect

would normally be required in response to a well-supported motion for summary

judgment. Dr. Josephson’s motion for summary judgment was not well-supported as to

the state law negligence claim, however, because as discussed above, Dr. Josephson’s

motion relied solely on the affidavit by Dr. Howard that Dr. Josephson’s conduct was

“appropriate” and “within the accepted standard of care.” Because the Howard affidavit

was conclusory and insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment, Fitzgerald

was not required to produce a contrary affidavit. Therefore the District Court’s grant of

summary judgment on the medical negligence claim against Dr. Josephson must be

reversed.

Upon dismissing Fitzgerald’s federal claims against CCA, PHS, BCC and TCCJA,

the Federal District Court remanded Fitzgerald’s remaining state law claims against those

defendants to the District Court of Tulsa County. Aplt. App. at 37. This was within the

court’s discretion under 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3), because the court had dismissed all

claims for which it had original jurisdiction.

The District Court initially made a discretionary decision to retain jurisdiction over

all claims against Dr. Josephson, and granted him summary judgment on both the federal

5
There is some question whether Oklahoma provides an exception to this requirement
where the medical practitioner’s lack of care would require only common knowledge and
experience to understand and judge it. See e.g. Boxburger, 552 P.2d at 373 (“[W]hen a
physician’s lack of care has been such as to require only common knowledge and
experience to understand and judge it, expert testimony is not required to establish that
care.”). However, we need not address this issue of state law.
-19-
and state claims against him. On remand, the Federal District Court should reconsider

whether further consideration of Fitzgerald’s remaining claims against Dr. Josephson is

merited in light of the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity or

whether those claims would be more suitably addressed by the Oklahoma court.

III

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we vacate the dismissal of Fitzgerald’s claims against the defendants

except Dr. Josephson and remand for clarification whether such dismissals are with or

without prejudice. We affirm the summary judgment rejecting the Eighth Amendment,

the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act claims against Dr.

Josephson. We reverse the grant of summary judgment rejecting the state law medical

negligence claim against Dr. Josephson and remand for further proceedings on that claim.

-20-
Fitzgerald v. Corrections Corp. of America, et al., No. 03-5029

TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part.

I concur in the majority’s opinion except for its reversal of the summary judgment

for Dr. Josephson on the medical malpractice claim.

In support of his motion for summary judgment, Dr. Josephson attached an

affidavit from Dr. Howard, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon who has reviewed the

medical records of Mr. Fitzgerald. This affidavit avers that Dr. Josephson’s treatment of

Mr. Fitzgerald was “appropriate” and within the “accepted standard of care.” The District

Court concluded that Mr. Fitzgerald failed to present any evidence in his brief in

opposition to summary judgment to controvert this claim. Because there was no genuine

issue of material fact as to whether Dr. Josephson’s treatment failed to meet the

applicable standard of care, the court granted summary judgment for Dr. Josephson on the

state law medical malpractice claim.

The majority reverses the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on this

claim. The majority does not, however, conclude that Mr. Fitzgerald’s brief in opposition

to summary judgment in any way controverted Dr. Howard’s affidavit. Instead, the

majority holds that this affidavit is “insufficient to support summary judgment as to any

claims”—even in the absence of controverting evidence—because the “affidavit provided

no basis for [Dr. Howard’s] conclusion that the care rendered was ‘appropriate.’” Maj.

op. at 15. Because Mr. Fitzgerald does not argue on appeal that Dr. Howard’s affidavit

was inadmissable, this issue is not properly before this Court, and therefore I respectfully
dissent.

If the issue of the admissibility of Dr. Howard’s affidavit was preserved below and

raised on appeal, this Court would review the District Court’s consideration of this

evidence for abuse of discretion. See Goebel v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R.R.

Co., 346 F.3d 987, 990 (10th Cir. 2003). Mr. Fitzgerald, however, does not raise this

issue on appeal.1 As a result, this issue—even if raised below—should be treated as

abandoned on appeal. See Tran v. Trustees of State Colleges in Colorado, 355 F.3d 1263,

1266 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Issues not raised in the opening brief are deemed abandoned or

waived.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, the majority considers this

issue sua sponte without any discussion of why the traditional rule precluding

consideration of issues not raised on appeal is inapplicable to this case.

In deciding this issue, the majority concludes that the affidavit has no evidentiary

value with little discussion of why the affidavit is insufficient. Determining whether the

conclusions drawn by an expert witness are adequately supported by fact is a complicated

inquiry. As the cases cited by the majority make clear, Maj. op. at 15, the question

whether an expert’s affidavit is admissible turns on the interplay between Federal Rules

of Evidence 104(a), 702, 703, and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of these rules in

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). For example, in Claar

1
Mr. Fitzgerald’s sole argument for reversing the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on
the medical malpractice claim is that the facts pleaded in his complaint are sufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact. Because it is well-settled that a plaintiff cannot rely on the facts
pleaded in his complaint in opposing summary judgment, see Applied Genetics Int’l, Inc. v. First
Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990), I would not reverse the District
Court’s grant of summary judgment on this basis.
-2-
v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499, 500–02 (9th Cir. 1994), the district court

granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the physicians’

affidavits submitted in support of the plaintiff were inadmissable because they failed to

state the basis on which the experts drew their conclusions. In affirming, the Ninth

Circuit concluded that, although the affidavits could not have been found inadmissible

under Rule 703, the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert made clear that the affidavits

were properly excluded under Rule 702. Id. The majority, however, concludes that Dr.

Howard’s affidavit is insufficient without expressly holding that, in light of Daubert and

the Federal Rules of Evidence, the District Court abused its discretion in considering this

expert testimony.

Mr. Fitzgerald does not challenge the admissibility of Dr. Howard’s affidavit on

appeal. As such, I would not reach the issue of whether the affidavit was sufficient as a

matter of law. Furthermore, the majority concludes that the District Court erred in

considering the affidavit without applying our normal abuse-of-discretion review. I

respectfully dissent.

-3-