F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
APR 14 2005
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
TEREZA GONZALES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ROBERT MARTINEZ; DOMINICK
No. 03-1348
GONZALES; JOHN SALAZAR, as the
Sheriff of Huerfano County, Colorado;
HUERFANO COUNTY,
COLORADO,
Defendants - Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 99-S-1152-OES)
Raphael M. Solot, (Darol C. Biddle, Pueblo, Colorado with him on the briefs), Denver,
Colorado for Plaintiff - Appellant.
David R. Brougham, Hall & Evans, Denver, Colorado for Defendants - Appellees.
Before SEYMOUR, PORFILIO, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
PORFILIO, Senior Circuit Judge.
In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994), the Court decided “a prison
official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions
of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and
disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” In this case, the
district court concluded plaintiff failed to meet her burden of establishing a constitutional
violation by presenting evidence jail officials knew of the substantial risk of physical
harm to prisoners in their facility and failed to take reasonable measures to prevent its
recurrence. Concluding the record indicates the contrary, we reverse.
I. Background
On the afternoon of October 13, 1998, Robert Martinez (Major Bob), the
administrator of the Huerfano County Jail in Walsenburg, Colorado,1 escorted inmate
Tereza Gonzales2 to the Jail commissary after she requested a comb. Inside the small
room, Major Bob used his knife to open a package of combs and then, with the knife in
his hand, blade open, told Ms. Gonzales, “Once you’re in this room, you belong to me.”
1
In his deposition, Sheriff Salazar stated the jail administrator is in charge of
overseeing and monitoring all operations at the Jail, including the control room, booking,
security, meals, medical needs, and employee paperwork. Although Martinez held the
title, “Major,” and was called Major Bob in the Jail, Sheriff Salazar indicated Martinez
asked for the title. As jail administrator, Major Bob reported directly to Sheriff Salazar,
whose wife is Martinez’s niece.
2
Ms. Gonzales had then served about a week of a 30-day sentence imposed for her
failure to appear in court on a pending charge. Except for when she was sent to Fort
Logan, Colorado, after her father killed her mother, she had never been incarcerated
before.
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Major Bob sexually assaulted her. On the same afternoon, Amanda Guel,3 another
inmate, was summoned to the control room by Dominick Gonzales,4 the senior detention
officer, who sexually assaulted her.
That evening, both women handed written statements describing the assaults to
two detention officers who called Huerfano County Sheriff John Salazar. Sheriff Salazar
then went to the jail and instructed the officers on duty to tell Ms. Guel and Ms. Gonzales
he had been notified and would speak to them the next morning.
Instead, Sheriff Salazar transported Ms. Gonzales to another of her court
appearances and learned she had written a second report on the sexual assault, which she
did not give him. Sheriff Salazar told her to give the statement to her public defender.
Shortly after her return to the women’s pod at the Jail, however, Major Bob,
speaking over the intercom, summoned Ms. Gonzales to the control room.5 There, Major
Bob grabbed her arm and stated, “Let’s start off where we left off yesterday.”
Ms. Gonzales told Major Bob “it was bad,” but he “pressed his body” against hers and
3
Ms. Guel filed similar claims against the same parties. After settlement, the
district court dismissed her case.
4
Tereza Gonzales and Dominick Gonzales are not related. However, Dominick
Gonzales is Sheriff Salazar’s son-in-law. To avoid confusion, Dominick Gonzales will
be referred to as “Dominick.”
At that time, the control room, the command center for Jail security, housed video
5
cameras to monitor some areas of the Jail.
-3-
tried to kiss her, before she “pushed [him] away and went back to the pod.” During the
encounter, she stated he did not “have anything unzipped.”
Although he did not speak with Ms. Gonzales until after the second encounter with
Major Bob and another of her court appearances on October 14th, Sheriff Salazar did
interview Ms. Guel around 1:00 p.m. that day. Later, he met with Ms. Gonzales and her
public defender, who, along with a Deputy District Attorney, instructed her to remain
silent.
Soon after, the District Attorney called Sheriff Salazar and told him to release
Ms. Guel and Ms. Gonzales immediately. That same afternoon, one of the District
Attorney’s investigators arrived at the Jail. Following her investigation, Major Bob and
Dominick were suspended and later charged with and convicted of the assaults.
Ms. Gonzales filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging “there were other
incidents of sexual assault at the Huerfano County Jail involving Martinez, Gonzales
and/or others of which Salazar and Martinez were aware, and that Salazar and Martinez
failed to take those steps necessary to assure the safety of the plaintiff.” As defendants,
she named Sheriff Salazar,6 Huerfano County,7 Martinez, and Dominick Gonzales. Ms.
The Magistrate Judge decided Sheriff Salazar was sued in his individual and
6
personal capacity.
Curiously, neither the district court nor defendants have challenged Ms. Gonzales’
7
designating “Huerfano County” as defendant. Under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 30-11-105, “the
name in which the county shall sue or be sued shall be, ‘The board of county
commissioners of the county of ...........’” “This statutory provision provides the exclusive
(continued...)
-4-
Gonzales alleged defendants knew of the danger Major Bob and Dominick posed and
failed to protect her in violation of her Eighth Amendment rights.8 Ms. Gonzales also
alleged Huerfano County owed a duty to employ competent law enforcement officers and
to supervise their conduct to prevent violations of prisoners’ civil rights.
Sheriff Salazar and Huerfano County moved for summary judgment alleging the
undisputed facts sustained no constitutional violation and the doctrine of qualified
immunity barred any such claim against Sheriff Salazar. The Magistrate Judge
recommended granting the motion.
7
(...continued)
method by which jurisdiction over a county can be obtained. An action attempted to be
brought under any other designation is a nullity, and no valid judgment can enter in such a
case.” Calahan v. Jefferson County, 429 P.2d 301, 302 (Colo. 1967). Were we to
overlook this jurisdictional flaw, we are still guided by Bristol v. Bd. of County Comm’rs
of Clear Creek, 312 F.3d 1213, 1215 (10th Cir. 2002) (under the Colorado constitution,
the County Sheriff is a distinct position, separate from the Board of County
Commissioners). The only claims Plaintiff made against the County were based on a
faulty premise. She asserted the County owed her a duty “to employ competent law
enforcement officers and to supervise the conduct of its sheriff and Chief Jail
Administrator.” That is not a valid premise under Colorado law. Id. Had Plaintiff
claimed the Sheriff set official policy of the County or was following policy established
by the County in the operation of the jail, we might have to reach a different conclusion.
See id. at 1221 (“counties can be held liable for the misdeeds of Sheriffs and their
employees when the Sheriff is held to set ‘official policy’ for the county.”). Yet, whether
because of the plain language of the statute or the Plaintiff’s failure to state a valid claim,
the action cannot lie against Huerfano County.
Her second claim for negligent supervision against Sheriff Salazar and Huerfano
8
County is subsumed within the first. Her third claim for assault and battery against Major
Bob and Dominick, was dismissed with prejudice after the district court dismissed the
§ 1983 and negligent supervision claims.
-5-
In an oral order from the bench, the district court embraced the Magistrate Judge’s
order in its entirety, holding that while the sexual assaults were undisputed, Sheriff
Salazar’s failure to prevent harm to Ms. Gonzales did not amount to deliberate
indifference. In response to prior incidents of sexual misconduct and violence at the Jail,
the court summarily concluded without citing any specific evidence, “Sheriff Salazar took
appropriate remedial measures at the time” but observed, Sheriff Salazar “was unable to
do anything” after the October 13th sexual assaults because Ms. Gonzales “refused to
discuss the matter with him on one occasion . . . on two occasions.” Ms. Gonzales seeks
de novo review of that judgment.
II. Prior Incidents Establishing Notice
To meet the Farmer test that Sheriff Salazar knew of and disregarded “an
excessive risk to inmate health and safety,” 511 U.S. at 837, Ms. Gonzales presented a
series of incidents both preceding and following her assault to establish a genuine issue of
material fact that the sheriff was both “aware of facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [] must also draw the inference.”
Id. Under this test, “an Eighth Amendment claimant need not show that a prison official
acted or failed to act believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that
the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious
harm.” Id. at 842 (emphasis added). “Whether a prison official had the requisite
knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual
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ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence.” Id. (emphasis added). To meet
this test, Ms. Gonzales presented a series of incidents at the Jail, which, she contends,
cumulatively establishes Sheriff Salazar failed to protect her “despite his knowledge of a
substantial risk of harm.” Id.
First, Ms. Gonzales presented evidence, including Sheriff Salazar’s testimony, he
had not conducted any employee performance evaluations since 1994, only occasionally
visited the jail, and left the investigation of all problems at the jail to his designee,
Sergeant Paul Zudar. Second, given this supervisory style, Ms. Gonzales set out a series
of specific incidents which occurred from August 1997 to October 1997.
Explaining his response to those events, Sheriff Salazar stated although
Major Bob, the Jail Administrator, “was concerned about the allegations, [] he didn’t
want to take the step forward to investigate, so I assigned a Sergeant Mike9 Zudar.” In
one incident on August 7, 1997, inmate Brent Maldonado alleged he was beaten up in C-
pod by fellow inmates who were drinking vodka; Dominick was in the control room and
failed to respond to his screams.10 On August 10, 1997, Detention Officer Ruiz filed an
incident report stating he saw inmates from C-pod sitting in the control room. He noted
Sheriff Salazar stated “Mike” although the record consistently refers to Sgt. Paul
9
Zudar.
10
Mr. Maldonado also reported he was beaten again on October 31, 1997, without
any intervention by guards. In his deposition, Sheriff Salazar did not remember whether
the investigation of these complaints established any fault on Dominick’s part but
believed Dominick was not disciplined. Mr. Maldonado’s attorney apparently did not
pursue an initial intent to sue notice.
-7-
some inmates had bloodshot eyes and appeared to know how to run the controls and
“bragged about knowing how to run the controls.” The inmates remained in the control
room for several hours before returning to their pod. He stated, “I overlooked the
situation because I was new to the job and did not know what to do.”
On October 14, 1997, Sergeant Montoya, a female deputy, received a report that
Dominick entered the women’s pod and exposed himself to inmates. Documenting their
complaints about the event, inmates Rebecca Flecksteiner11 and Josette Montez separately
wrote statements describing a setting of lax security in which Dominick would call female
inmates to the meds room and taunt them over the intercom operated in the control room
to “show us your tits.” Under his control, Ms. Flecksteiner complained Dominick
rewarded female inmates for participating or punished them for objecting.12 Asked about
these reports, Sheriff Salazar stated he did not believe them: “[t]he majority of the
inmates that we have in our facility would conjure up and work with other inmates to
disbelieve – or discredit one officer, because they are strict on rules.” When the matter
was referred for investigation, Sergeant Zudar testified he directly questioned Dominick
about the report and credited his direct eye contact and calm over the inmates’ reports.
No discipline followed.
11
Sheriff Salazar agreed a third woman, Barbara Garcia, verified Ms. Flecksteiner’s
report as well, although her statement is not in the record.
12
She wrote, “[t]he other women will not back me up - they will probably ostracize
me for this. Frankly, I don’t care. I would like to do my time in peace & be left alone. I
see no reason for our privileges to be up to the whims of Sgt. Gonzales. . . .”
-8-
Sometime in 1997, Stella Noga,13 who had served time at the Jail, met with
Huerfano County Commissioner Charles Montoya at his office and complained of sexual
and drug-related activities at the Jail, as well as her inability to get her prescription drugs.
Commissioner Montoya testified he met with Sheriff Salazar who “thought maybe it was
a personal vendetta, or to that effect. Because Stella was kind of – I don’t know how you
would describe her, but I think kind of an arrogant little girl. And she did occasionally
cause problems, or whatever.” Commissioner Montoya explained Ms. Noga’s brother,
Miguel Duran,14 is married to his daughter, and he stated, “I know she was a
troublemaker.”
On October 16, 1997, police officers in Pueblo, Colorado, arrested Dominick, who
was hostile and combative after being removed from a local bar for harassing female
dancers. Finally restrained with pepper spray, Dominick told officers he was a “cop in
Walsenburg” and threatened injury.15 On October 21, 1997, Sergeant Zudar placed a
written warning in Dominick’s file for his violating “certain policies . . . one having
inmates in the control room,” although the additional allegations of sexual misconduct
were found unsubstantiated. However, because of the Pueblo arrest, Sergeant Zudar
Ms. Noga is also called Stella Duran in the depositions.
13
Miguel Duran was a sheriff’s deputy at the Jail before he was seriously injured
14
while driving a Sheriff’s vehicle in a storm.
15
The bouncers described Dominick as “very big” and were scared by his threats to
injure them.
-9-
demoted Dominick from sergeant to deputy and placed him on probation for six months,
explaining Dominick had “basically been a good officer up until the Pueblo incident and .
. . him having inmates in the control room.”
Ms. Gonzales further presented evidence of two incidents between October 1997
and October 1998, when the present sexual assaults occurred, to demonstrate the unsafe
atmosphere remained at the Jail. First, she listed an incident report in which an inmate
wrote that Dominick punched him after he had been restrained by other officers who had
left him alone with Dominick. Second, in April 1998, inmate Denise Tefteller wrote a
letter to Sheriff Salazar describing Dominick’s mercurial temperament and arbitrary
system of rewards and punishments based on his mood.16 In an affidavit, Ms. Tefteller
stated that when she was released, she gave her letter to Major Bob and asked him to give
it to Sheriff Salazar. In 2000, Sheriff Salazar responded to this affidavit in Ms. Guel’s
civil action, stating he never saw the letter before his attorney handed it to him at that
time. He attested that prior to the October 1998 incidents, “I had never received any
substantiated information concerning prior sexual improprieties by these Detention
Officers.” (emphasis added).
16
She described his angrily answering her call after her “blood pressure shot up,”
saying “he had a bone to pick with me. Didn’t I know Bob tells him everything I tell him
(Bob) & who they have in the control room is their business? (Referring to the Monday
night party.)” She wrote that Dominick “seems to enjoy” antagonizing inmates. “I’m
afraid someone, someday, is going to hurt that boy badly.”
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Finally, Ms. Gonzales described in detail Major Bob’s sexual assault on
October 13, 1998, accompanied by the investigative report of the District Attorney’s
Office. She also included Sheriff Salazar’s incident report in which he noted the on duty
officer’s concern the two female inmates’ complaints involved Major Bob and Dominick
and the “females were showing signs of emotion as far as being upset. I then read the
other statement which will be done on a separate report. I then instructed Officer sierra
[sic] to inform these females that he notified me and that the statements they provided
would be Investigated [sic]” and that he would speak to them in the morning. Sheriff
Salazar described interviewing Ms. Guel and his meeting with Ms. Gonzales and her
public defenders. At that time, approximately 2:30 p.m., shortly after Ms. Gonzales’
second encounter with Major Bob, Sheriff Salazar wrote in his report Ms. Gonzales, on
the advice of counsel, refused to speak with him, telling him he had her statement from
the night before. Shortly after, he acknowledged the District Attorney’s order to release
both women.
The Magistrate Judge rejected all of Ms. Gonzales’ evidence of prior events either
as insubstantial and unsubstantiated or disconnected from any specific evidence that
Major Bob, the jail administrator, posed a substantial risk; that is, the generalized
atmosphere of the Jail would not suffice. Instead, “Salazar’s deliberate indifference must
be tied specifically to acts of [Major Bob] of which Salazar was aware.” Hence, to prove
Sheriff Salazar’s deliberate indifference, the Magistrate Judge, citing Hovater v.
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Robinson, 1 F.3d 1063, 1068 (10th Cir. 1993), and Lopez v. LeMaster,172 F.3d 756, 761
(10th Cir. 1999), asserted “plaintiff must present evidence that would establish that
Salazar had knowledge of facts that would lead to an inference that [Major Bob], not
other deputies, presented a ‘substantial risk of harm.’” Embracing this recommendation,
the district court exonerated Sheriff Salazar from any constitutional consequence, finding,
because Ms. Gonzales refused to speak with him, “he was unable to do anything.” The
court further found Sheriff Salazar “took appropriate remedial measures at the time” in
addressing past conduct, evidencing “his policy to take appropriate remedial measures
when anything was reported to him, including investigation and further disciplinary action
where appropriate.” In granting the motion for summary judgment, the court concluded
Ms. Gonzales failed to present a triable issue of fact Sheriff Salazar knew Major Bob
posed a substantial risk of harm to her.
III. Summary Judgment
The district court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s order denying Ms. Gonzales’
Eighth Amendment claim on the merits. Having found no constitutional violation in the
first instance, neither the Magistrate Judge nor the district court ruled on the issue of
qualified immunity; thus, we do not review summary judgment here “somewhat
differently than other summary judgment rulings.” Hovater, 1 F.3d at1066, citing
Hannula v. City of Lakewood, 907 F.2d 129, 130 (10th Cir. 1990). Rather, we review
the district court's grant of summary judgment on the merits of Ms. Gonzales’ Eighth
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Amendment claim de novo, applying the same legal standard used by the district court
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant. Seymore v. Shawver & Sons, Inc., 111 F.3d 794, 797 (10th Cir. 1997).
Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Thus,
we ask the “threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting
the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?”
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).17
IV. Deliberate Indifference
We preface each foray into this difficult area (“Prisons are necessarily dangerous
places; they house society’s most antisocial and violent people in close proximity with
one another.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 858 (Thomas, J., dissenting)) with the Eighth
Amendment proviso requiring “prison officials to ‘provide humane conditions of
confinement,’ which includes taking ‘reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of
inmates.’” Giron v. Corr. Corp. of America, 191 F.3d 1281, 1285 (10th Cir. 1999),
quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832; see also, Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1310
(10th Cir. 1998). Thus, in a claim that officials failed to prevent harm, an inmate must
17
This standard of review does not ignore the fact that, in the end, defendant still
bears the usual summary judgment burden of showing that no material facts remain in
dispute that would defeat the qualified immunity defense. Farmer v. Perrill, 288 F.3d
1254, 1259 (10th Cir. 2002).
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show, first, “she is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
harm,” and, second, that officials had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Farmer,
511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)). “Thus, the
deliberate indifference standard in a prison-conditions case is a ‘subjective’ and not an
‘objective’ requirement. That is, a prison official is liable only if the ‘official knows of
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.’ It is not enough to establish
that the official should have known of the risk of harm.” Pulsipher, 143 F.3d at 1310
(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
Further, as stated in Pulsipher, a plaintiff’s uncontroverted claim of “deprivations
resulting from sexual assault” are “sufficiently serious to constitute a violation under the
Eighth Amendment.” Id. In both Hovater and Pulsipher, however, a constitutional
violation was not found because the only proof of prison officials’ knowledge of a
substantial risk of serious harm to a female inmate and failure to protect was predicated
on the existence of a per se violation of a written jail policy. In Hovater, the policy
dictated that a male guard never enter a woman’s cell alone, except in an emergency, 1
F.3d at 1068; and, in Pulsipher, two jailers were required to be present when female
prisoners were removed from their cell, 143 F.3d at 1310-1311. We explicitly stated in
Hovater, however, “[h]ad Sheriff Hill possessed information that Mr. Robinson as an
individual posed a threat to the safety of female inmates, our decision would be
different.” 1 F.3d at 1068.
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Material facts remain in dispute on Ms. Gonzales’ Eighth Amendment claim that
stand in stark contrast to the absence of any such evidence in Hovater and Pulsipher.
Here, Ms. Gonzales did not rely upon any official policy which could be substituted for
Sheriff Salazar’s knowledge the Huerfano County Jail where she was assaulted was not a
safe place.18 Instead, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to her, as we must, it
may be fairly inferred Sheriff Salazar’s purported ignorance of the dangerous conditions
in the jail was a direct result of his lackadaisical attitude toward his responsibility to run
the institution. An inference of the sheriff’s lack of responsiveness can also be drawn
from other facts.
First, Sheriff Salazar explicitly stated his Jail Administrator did not want to
investigate allegations of problems at the Jail. Second, the evidence indicates the
sheriff’s consistent willingness to ignore inmate complaints by attributing them to
attitudes of the complainants, characterizing them as “troublemakers” or “conjuring up”
incidents to “discredit” his deputies,” allowed him to excuse his failure to pursue the
issues any further. Finally, and most astonishing, when first advised two visibly “upset”
female inmates accused two of his jailers of sexually assaulting them, he not only left the
prisoners unprotected in the jail, but also in the custody and control of the very men
18
Indeed, in 2002 deposition testimony submitted in Defendants’ supplemental
appendix, Sheriff Salazar described instituting written policies and procedures, including
hiring additional female staff and new hiring practices, to address a 2001 incident
involving four counts of sexual assault of a female inmate by a male detention officer in
the Jail.
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accused of the assaults. When the women were removed for their protection, the decision
to do so was not made by Sheriff Salazar, but by the District Attorney. None of this
evidence is controverted, and its significance was seemingly ignored by the district court.
Finally, we are constrained to note the district court misread Farmer, believing it
required Ms. Gonzales to show Sheriff Salazar specifically knew Major Bob posed a
substantial risk of harm to her. Rather, the Farmer Court noted a prison official could not
escape liability by showing although “he was aware of an obvious, substantial risk to
inmate safety, he did not know that the complainant was especially likely to be assaulted
by the specific prisoner who eventually committed the assault.” 511 U.S. at 843 (emphasis
added). “[I]t does not matter whether the risk comes from a single source or multiple
sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack for
reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk.” Id.
The undisputed evidence of the physical assaults on inmates set against the facts of
Sheriff Salazar’s knowledge of reported risks to inmate health or safety, including the
documented lapse of security in the control room, complaints of sexual harassment and
intimidation, Dominick’s demotion for, as Sergeant Zudar characterized it, “a combination
of things,” as well as the presence in the record of Ms. Tefteller’s letter, which she attested
was handed to Major Bob, surely raise a reasonable inference that Sheriff Salazar knew of
and disregarded an excessive risk to Ms. Gonzales. Under these circumstances, at the
least, Ms. Gonzales has raised a triable issue of material fact that Sheriff Salazar had the
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“requisite knowledge of a substantial risk,” which, Farmer acknowledges, may be
demonstrated “in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence.”
511 U.S. at 842 (emphasis added).
In the interstice between the facts presented and the inferences arising from
evidence of Sheriff Salazar’s knowledge of activities at the Jail, this triable issue was
prematurely dismissed at the summary judgment stage. Left on remand is for the trier of
fact, then, to decide whether these inferences are sufficiently strong to cast constitutional
responsibility on Sheriff Salazar’s conduct. We therefore REVERSE the district court’s
order granting summary judgment and REMAND for further proceedings.
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