Plotke v. White

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

APR 28 2005
PUBLISH PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

A. JANE PLOTKE, Ph.D.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
No. 02-3289
THOMAS E. WHITE, Secretary of the
Army,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
(D.C. No. 00-CV-2453-CM)

Jeffrey W. Bruce, The Bruce Law Firm, Belton, Missouri, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Nancy Landis Caplinger, Assistant United States Attorney, Topeka, Kansas (Eric
F. Melgren, United States Attorney, and Melanie D. Caro, Assistant United States
Attorney, Kansas City, Kansas, on the brief), for the Defendant-Appellee.

Before SEYMOUR, McKAY and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.
 Dr. A. Jane Plotke filed suit against the Secretary of the Army under Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, alleging the Army had

unlawfully terminated her from her employment as an historian due to her gender.

The district court granted summary judgment to the Army. Exercising jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse.

I.

Whether the Army was entitled to summary judgment is a question of law

we review de novo. Croy v. Cobe Labs., Inc., 345 F.3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir.

2003). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(c). In

applying this standard, “[a]ll inferences arising from the record before us must be

drawn and indulged in favor of the [nonmovant].” Stinnett v. Safeway, Inc., 337

F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). “Credibility

determinations [and] the weighing of the evidence . . . are jury functions, not

those of a judge . . . .” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Read in this light, the

record reflects the following facts.

Dr. Plotke was hired by Dr. Rodler Morris and Dr. Scott Lackey on July 10,

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1994, as a GS-12 historian at the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC),

Army Knowledge Network-Combat Training Center-Warrior Information Network

(CTC-WIN) located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Dr. Plotke’s employment was

subject to successful completion of a one-year probationary period pursuant to 5

C.F.R. § 315.801 et seq., after which she would be considered a permanent

career-conditional federal civilian employee. Dr. Plotke was the first and only

female to be hired as an historian at Fort Leavenworth.

Dr. Plotke testified that, on her first day of work, Dr. Lackey told her he

had been under pressure from the Civilian Personnel Office (CPO) to hire a

female historian; Dr. Plotke was the only female historian who had applied for the

position; and, rather than risk losing the position and funding, Dr. Morris and Dr.

Lackey had decided to hire Dr. Plotke. According to Dr. J. Patrick Hughes, the

CAC Assistant Command Historian, Dr. Lackey remarked that the EEO office

“would get off their back” and stop pressuring them to hire a female historian

because Dr. Plotke had received the position. 1 Aplt. App. at 522. Dr. Lew

Bernstein, a male, was hired as a CAC GS-12 historian at the same time as Dr.

Plotke, but was assigned to a different unit.

1
The Army argues that Dr. Hughes’ statements are inadmissible hearsay.
Aple. Br. at 52 n.23. We disagree. These statements come into evidence as
admissions of a party-opponent under Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A),
(C), and (D).

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 Immediately upon arriving at Fort Leavenworth, Dr. Plotke was informed of

a history office “staff ride” to the General Custer Battlefield at Little Big Horn,

South Dakota. Fellow historian George Mordica, who was a temporary and later a

term employee, was planning the event. Mr. Mordica was a retired Army Major

and had not obtained a Ph.D. When Mr. Mordica told Dr. Plotke about the staff

ride, he painted a picture of inhospitable living conditions and downplayed the

significance of the event. Mr. Mordica described the staff ride as involving “very

rough” camping conditions in a bunkhouse with a “dormitory arrangement”

lacking separate sleeping facilities for a female. Id. at 394, 673. Dr. Plotke

declined the “invitation” after determining that her participation was obviously

being discouraged. Mr. Mordica stated to others that having a female in

attendance on the trip would prevent the all-male group from “sitting around

drinking beer, smoking cigars, and farting.” Id. at 521, 1028. Contrary to the

negative representations he made to Dr. Plotke regarding the trip, Mr. Mordica

stated in a deposition that the staff ride was a very professionally rewarding

activity and experience.

Dr. Plotke was initially advised by Dr. Morris that a significant portion of

her job duties would include historical research, analysis and writing. But her

assignment from July until October 1994 was instead to “support” Dr. Lackey in

the drafting of a computer services contract, a task which was largely

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administrative and clerical in nature and fell outside of Dr. Plotke’s position

description. From October until December 1994, she was assigned to various

administrative and computer projects. By contrast, Dr. Bernstein, who had been

hired at the same time as Dr. Plotke, was assigned to historical research and

writing projects supervised by Dr. Richard Gorell. Dr. Plotke was not provided

any written performance appraisal by Dr. Morris or Dr. Lackey during the first

half of her probationary year, although her performance was highly praised

verbally. See id. at 365, 827 (Dr. Plotke’s job performance was described as

“fantastic” and “excellent” by Dr. Lackey and Dr. Morris).

Dr. Plotke complained to Dr. Lackey and the CPO about her initial job

assignments. In response, Dr. Lackey told Dr. Plotke that she could not perform

historical research and analysis until her security clearance arrived. In December

1994, Dr. Plotke discovered that her security clearance, along with Dr.

Bernstein’s, had arrived at the Fort Leavenworth CTC-WIN facility in late August

or early September 1994. Dr. Bernstein was given his clearance shortly after its

arrival but Dr. Plotke’s clearance was not delivered to her until mid-December

1994.

After she hunted down her own security clearance, Dr. Plotke was

temporarily assigned on detail to the “Haiti project” under the supervision of Dr.

Gorell. This assignment involved some historical research and analysis as well as

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administrative computer tasks similar to those Dr. Plotke had previously been

assigned. Dr. Gorell affirmed that Dr. Plotke’s performance on the Haiti project

was “excellent.” Id. at 550. He also testified that she was the only person

available with the technical expertise to do the job. Dr. Plotke’s work on the

Haiti project was highly and publicly praised by Lt. Col. Steve Dietrich of the

Army’s Center on Military History in Washington, D.C. It was also known by her

colleagues that she was very happy working on the Haiti project.

Despite Dr. Plotke’s success and personal satisfaction on the Haiti detail,

Dr. Morris abruptly removed her from the project in mid-May 1995, and

reassigned her to an administrative computer project supporting Dr. Lackey in

CTC-WIN. Dr. Morris claimed there was an urgent need to transfer Dr. Plotke

back to CTC-WIN, although Dr. Plotke’s work on the Haiti project was not yet

complete and there was no deadline to complete the CTC-WIN project. Dr.

Morris later admitted that subsequent to Dr. Plotke’s termination, the CTC-WIN

project was never completed. He also conceded that he transferred Dr. Plotke

after being informed by the CPO that her one-year probationary period was

nearing its completion. At the end of successful completion of her probationary

year, Dr. Plotke’s appointment could have been extended. Dr. Morris also

testified that he believed Dr. Gorell would have recommended Dr. Plotke’s

employment be extended beyond her one-year probationary period at the time of

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the transfer.

Dr. Plotke began working again under the full supervision of Dr. Lackey

for the CTC-WIN project on June 5, 1995. On June 8, Dr. Plotke submitted a

memo requesting permission to attend four seminars at a conference for historians

in Canada scheduled over two weeks in August. “[I]t was the office policy that

historians could (and were actually encouraged to) attend an all expenses paid

professional conference of their own choosing each year, even on topics for which

there was only a personal interest and not necessarily a business-related purpose.”

Id. at 522. Prior to June 1995, Dr. Plotke had not exercised her conference choice

for the fiscal year. Dr. Lackey and Dr. Morris agreed to send Dr. Plotke to only

two of the four seminar sessions. 2 Dr. Morris left it to Dr. Lackey to “make

recommendations” to Dr. Plotke regarding which two seminars she should attend.

Id. at 621, 660-61. In an e-mail memo dated June 16, Dr. Lackey advised Dr.

Plotke that she was limited to attending two seminars and suggested she attend

one concerning peacekeeping operations and another on computers and history.

Dr. Lackey did not indicate that Dr. Plotke was required to select the two

2
According to Dr. Lackey, the reasons for limiting Dr. Plotke’s
participation to two conferences were year-end financial considerations and a
desire to send another historian (Dr. Bernstein) to the other conferences.
However, neither Dr. Bernstein nor any other historian was sent to the Canada
conferences. Dr. Gorell, Dr. Bernstein’s supervisor, testified he was never
informed that Dr. Morris or Dr. Lackey wished to send a second historian from
his office to the Canada conferences.

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seminars he recommended, nor that her selections had to be scheduled in the same

week. In fact, Dr. Morris admitted that Dr. Lackey’s memo was not clear in

conveying its alleged intent that Dr. Plotke was to choose two sessions within the

same week.

Dr. Lackey requested that Dr. Plotke provide him with cost figures

regarding the seminars. Dr. Lackey’s secretary, Linda Darnell, contacted Dr.

Plotke to obtain those figures and Dr. Plotke faxed her the necessary information.

Ms. Darnell did not specifically advise Dr. Plotke that she was using the cost

information to prepare a DD Form 1610, “Request and Authorization for TDY

Travel of DOD Personnel.” The two seminars Dr. Plotke ultimately selected to

attend were scheduled in different weeks. Dr. Plotke also indicated to Ms.

Darnell that she intended to take two weeks of annual leave at the conclusion of

the conferences. Dr. Lackey anticipated that Dr. Plotke would take annual leave

in connection with her professional travel, as was common practice by the male

historians while on temporary duty, and he so stated in a memo to Dr. Morris. 3

Dr. Lackey admitted that he had never rejected an employee’s request for annual

leave, he “[m]ost likely” would have approved Dr. Plotke’s leave, and he had no

3
Dr. Lackey forwarded to Dr. Morris a copy of the June 16 e-mail he sent to
Dr. Plotke, after adding the following comment: “The next twist, of course, will
be that she will apply for annual leave and stay up there for the other two
conferences anyway, but at least we won’t be on the hook for the per diem.”
Aplt. App. at 588.

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reason to believe that Dr. Morris would have decided otherwise. Id. at 715.

From the information Dr. Plotke provided, Ms. Darnell prepared a budget

travel worksheet and a DD Form 1610. She then submitted the DD Form 1610 to

Dr. Gorell for his signature, mistakenly believing that he was Dr. Plotke’s

immediate supervisor at that time. 4 Dr. Plotke did not review the documents

because they were not submitted to her prior to being processed. Dr. Gorell signed

the form as the “requesting official,” and Ms. Darnell then forwarded the form to

Dr. Morris. Dr. Morris became upset because Dr. Gorell, rather than Dr. Lackey,

had signed the form and because Dr. Plotke had requested approval for

conferences that were scheduled in different weeks. Dr. Morris was also agitated

because Dr. Plotke had not obtained advance approval from Dr. Lackey to take

annual leave following the Canada conferences. Id. at 767. 5

On Dr. Morris’ command, Dr. Lackey conducted a fact-finding or “junior

counseling session” on June 21 with Dr. Plotke regarding the travel matter, which

became known as the TDY incident. Dr. Morris then held a “senior counseling

4
Ms. Darnell explained that Dr. Gorell had been Dr. Plotke’s supervisor the
last time Dr. Plotke was issued a DD Form 1610, and Dr. Plotke’s prior form was
saved in the computer. When Ms. Darnell pulled up Dr. Plotke’s form, Dr. Gorell
was still listed as her supervisor. Unaware that Dr. Lackey, rather than Dr.
Gorell, was actually Dr. Plotke’s supervisor at the time, Ms. Darnell did not alter
the supervisor’s name on the form.

As referenced supra, note 3, Dr. Plotke provided evidence to the contrary
5

indicating that Dr. Lackey told Dr. Morris he fully expected Dr. Plotke to apply
for annual leave so that she could attend additional conferences.

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session” with Dr. Plotke on June 26. Id. at 906. The Army admits that Dr. Morris

decided to terminate Dr. Plotke on June 26 after concluding the senior counseling

session. Dr. Morris prepared a memo on June 27 for Dr. Plotke advising her she

was being terminated due to her unsatisfactory conduct. “This conduct involved:

failure to follow guidance issued by superiors; failure to follow established chains-

of-command; breakdown in the ethos and substance of customer service; and

fostering a climate of dissension and distrust within the Army Knowledge Network

Directorate.” Id. at 22. 6

On or shortly after June 27, Dr. Plotke’s official termination form was

submitted to Colonel William C. Ohl II, Chief of Staff at Fort Leavenworth, for

his signature. Col. Ohl testified he “did not know any of the facts or

circumstances surrounding the termination decision,” and was told “there was no

6
Dr. Morris claimed he was told in July 1994 (prior to hiring Dr. Plotke)
that Dr. Plotke applied for an historian position at Fort Leavenworth in late 1986
and misrepresented on her SF-171 form that she had completed her Ph.D. Dr.
Plotke contends she properly indicated on the form that she expected to complete
her Ph.D. in June 1987. Although Dr. Morris admitted the charge of SF-171
falsification was hearsay and no documentation supported such a charge, he
testified the allegation was a “piece of the picture” and “provided a context that
had some influence” in his losing trust in Dr. Plotke and ultimately terminating
her. Aplt. App. at 182-83, 717. Dr. Morris further acknowledged that he failed to
inform Dr. Plotke of these allegations, in violation of Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) regulations governing the rights of federal career-conditional
employees during their one year probationary period. See 5 C.F.R. § 315.805
(requiring advance written notice with specific and detailed reasons for
termination and an opportunity to respond “[w]hen an agency proposes to
terminate an employee serving a probationary or trial period for reasons based in
whole or part on conditions arising before his appointment”).

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documentation to support the termination.” Id. at 526. The Colonel “was not

comfortable approving a termination without valid reasons and documentation,”

but did so because Department of Defense personnel and legal advisors told him

that “federal regulations permitted the termination of a probationary employee

during the probationary period without cause and without documentation.” Id.

Col. Ohl insisted that he “personally meet with Dr. Plotke to inform her of the

termination decision” because he was the approving official. Id.

While preparing for his meeting with Dr. Plotke, Col. Ohl requested Dr.

Morris to forward his counseling files concerning Dr. Plotke. Dr. Morris’

response that he had no files or documentation to support the termination made the

Colonel suspicious, as he had never approved a termination absent a well-

documented counseling file. Col. Ohl therefore met with Dr. Morris and Dr.

Lackey, who both reported that Dr. Plotke had lied or at least was “trying to pull a

fast one” regarding her attendance at the Canada conferences. Id. at 526-27.

Neither Dr. Morris nor Dr. Lackey presented any other reason to Col. Ohl for

dismissing Dr. Plotke from her position.

After his meeting with Dr. Morris and Dr. Lackey, Col. Ohl met with Dr.

Plotke to discuss the termination decision. Dr. Plotke provided the Colonel with

her version of the TDY incident and described various other episodes that had

occurred during her employment. Dr. Plotke reported the following to Col. Ohl:

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“arrangements had been made for her to go out on a date with Dr. Lackey” (which

she politely refused); Dr. Morris’ and Dr. Lackey’s treatment toward her seemed to

worsen subsequent to that refusal; “she was referred to by Dr. Morris, Dr. Lackey,

and George Mordica as ‘Jane’ and male historians were referred to as ‘Dr. [last

name]’ in office meetings or introductions”; and “during an office meeting with

Dr. Morris, and in her presence, Dr. Lackey had removed his shoes and socks and

picked his toes.” Id. at 527. Dr. Plotke also reported that Dr. Lackey fondled his

genitals at the same meeting.

Colonel Ohl was “appalled by this information” and by Dr. Plotke’s report

that she had never been counseled by either Dr. Lackey or Dr. Morris for any

problems prior to the TDY incident. Id. As a result, he decided to investigate Dr.

Plotke’s claims by conferring with other employees. According to Col. Ohl, Dr.

Plotke’s allegations “were confirmed.” Id. Col. Ohl arranged another meeting

with Dr. Morris and Dr. Lackey during which the doctors themselves confirmed

many of Dr. Plotke’s allegations. 7 Dr. Morris and Dr. Lackey also reported to Col.

Ohl that “Dr. Plotke very well may not have attempted to deceive them concerning

the TDY incident and that they had no real solid proof that that was her intent.”

7
The doctors confirmed that “a date between Dr. Plotke and Dr. Lackey had
been arranged”; “they and George Mordica frequently addressed [Dr. Plotke] as
‘Jane’ . . . and saw nothing inappropriate about doing so even though they
addressed the male historians by Dr.”; and “Dr. Lackey had picked his toes in Dr.
Plotke’s presence during an office meeting with Dr. Morris.” Aplt. App. at 527.

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Id. 8

Based on his investigation, Col. Ohl believed that Dr. Plotke was unfairly

terminated and attempted to convince the CPO and the staff judge advocate to

reverse the termination decision. The decision was not reversed, however, due to

concerns that reinstatement would have an adverse impact on Dr. Plotke’s then

pending EEO discrimination and retaliation charges, which ultimately led to the

instant action. According to Col. Ohl, at no time before or after Dr. Plotke’s

termination did Dr. Morris or Dr. Lackey state to him that Dr. Plotke’s position

was being eliminated or was actively being considered for elimination.

In mid-July 1995, after Dr. Plotke’s termination, Dr. Morris met with

General Mountcastle and Lt. Col. Deitrich, both from the Army Center for Military

History, to convince them to reassign a new Gulf War computer digitalization

project to Dr. Morris’ department. Dr. Morris knew that Lt. Col. Dietrich was

very interested in hiring Dr. Plotke and that Dr. Plotke had applied for the

position. Dr. Morris approached Lt. Col. Dietrich, unsolicited, and threatened to

cut off all cooperation with the project if Lt. Col. Dietrich hired Dr. Plotke. Dr.

Morris told Lt. Col. Dietrich that he terminated Dr. Plotke because he “had lost

trust in her in terms of the TDY incident” and “it would be best not to retain her

Dr. Lackey received praise in his March 1996 written performance
8

evaluation for recommending the termination of Dr. Plotke. Dr. Morris prepared
the evaluation which was eventually signed by Dr. Lackey’s senior rater, Col.
Robinette.

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beyond the probationary period.” Id. at 718-19. Lt. Col. Dietrich was “deeply

disturbed by Dr. Morris’ comments and viewed them as a clear threat to take

retaliatory action if [he] did not heed his warning.” Id. at 524.

The district court granted summary judgment for the Army on the ground

that Dr. Plotke failed to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination

because she did not demonstrate her position still existed after her discharge.

Alternatively, assuming arguendo that a prima facie case was satisfied, the court

held the Army had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

terminating Dr. Plotke, her allegedly unsatisfactory conduct, and that Dr. Plotke

failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the

proffered reason was a pretext for gender discrimination. We address each issue

in turn.

II.

When a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence to prove employment

discrimination, we apply the three-step burden-shifting framework set forth in

McDonnell Douglas and its progeny. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411

U.S. 792, 800-07 (1973). McDonnell Douglas first requires the aggrieved

employee to establish a prima facie case of prohibited employment action. Id. at

802. The “burden of establishing a prima facie case . . . by a preponderance of the

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evidence” is “not onerous.” McCowan v. All Star Maint., Inc., 273 F.3d 917, 922

(10th Cir. 2001); see also Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

253 (1981). Furthermore, “[t]his burden is one of production, not persuasion; it

can involve no credibility assessment.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.

502, 509 (1993)). If the employee makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts

to the defendant employer to state a legitimate, “nondiscriminatory reason” for its

“adverse employment action.” Wells v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205,

1212 (10th Cir. 2003). If the employer meets this burden, then summary judgment

is warranted unless the employee can show there is a genuine issue of material fact

as to whether the proffered reasons are pretextual. Jones v. Denver Post Corp.,

203 F.3d 748, 756 (10th Cir. 2000).

With respect to Ms. Plotke’s prima facie case, the district court, citing

Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 2000),

required Dr. Plotke to show that she (1) belonged to a protected class; (2) was

qualified for her position; (3) was discharged; and (4) her position was not

eliminated after her discharge. Dr. Plotke established the first three elements of a

prima facie case of gender discrimination, but the district court concluded she

failed to establish the fourth element because she did not show her job remained

after her discharge. We disagree with the district court’s fourth element analysis.

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 The Supreme Court recognized in McDonnell Douglas that the articulation

of a plaintiff’s prima facie case may well vary, depending on the context of the

claim and the nature of the adverse employment action alleged. 411 U.S. at 802

n.13; see also Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977)

(emphasizing prima facie case is a flexible standard that may be modified to

accommodate different factual situations); Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d

1132, 1139 (10th Cir. 2000) (“The prima facie case was never intended to be rigid,

mechanized or ritualistic.”) (citations and quotations omitted). The essential

purpose served by the prima facie case, however, remains the same and “serves an

important function in the litigation: it eliminates the most common

nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff’s [adverse employment action].”

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54. The most common nondiscriminatory reasons for

discharge in a termination case are (1) “lack of qualification” or (2) “elimination

of the job.” Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1229. Neither of these reasons were proffered

by the Army as the legitimate business reason for Dr. Plotke’s termination.

Rather, the Army admits Dr. Plotke was highly and uniquely qualified for the

position she held and claims the nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to

terminate her was unsatisfactory conduct.

While we have held that one way a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case

is to include evidence that her job was not eliminated after her discharge, we have

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also noted that “[t]he elimination of the position . . . does not necessarily

eviscerate a plaintiff’s claim that her discharge was . . . motivated [by

discrimination].” Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1140 n.10 (10th Cir. 1999).

“The critical prima facie inquiry in all cases is whether the plaintiff has

demonstrated that the adverse employment action occurred ‘under circumstances

which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.’” Kendrick, 220 F.3d

at 1227 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). There must simply be a logical

connection between each element of the prima facie case and the inference of

discrimination. Id. (citing O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S.

308, 311-12 (1996)).

Thus, contrary to the district court’s implicit holding that the elimination of

Dr. Plotke’s position was per se fatal to her case, the fourth element of a prima

facie case is a flexible one that can be satisfied differently in varying scenarios.

See Hysten v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., 296 F.3d 1177, 1181

(10th Cir. 2002) (while “McDonnell Douglas defines the prima facie elements for

the archetypal discrimination case” the facts of a given case dictate the measure by

which the McDonnell Douglas and corresponding Kendrick tests should be

applied; “the Supreme Court . . . emphasized that McDonnell Douglas was never

intended to set an inflexible rule”) (emphasis added); Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1227

n.6 (“Collapsing the four-part prima facie case of McDonnell Douglas into a three-

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part test may occasionally be helpful when addressing discrimination claims that

either do not fall into any of the traditional categories . . . or present unusual

circumstances.”) (emphasis added); Chertkova v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins., 92

F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 1996) (“there is no unbending or rigid rule about what

circumstances allow an inference of discrimination when there is an adverse

employment decision”). Requiring Dr. Plotke to present evidence that her position

remained open subsequent to her discharge when her employer never even asserted

she was terminated because her position was eliminated is especially problematic.

Indeed, where an employer contends the actual reason for termination in a

discriminatory firing case is not elimination of the employee’s position but, rather,

unsatisfactory conduct, the status of the employee’s former position after his or

her termination is irrelevant. 9

9
In any event, Dr. Plotke’s evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact
concerning whether her position was actually eliminated. For instance, Dr.
Lackey testified that Dr. Plotke’s job was not eliminated when she was
terminated. Aplt. App. at 594. Significantly, at no time before or after Dr.
Plotke’s termination did Dr. Morris or Dr. Lackey report to Col Ohl – the ultimate
decision maker – that Dr. Plotke’s position was being eliminated or was being
actively considered for elimination. Id. at 527.
The evidence also indicates that several months after Dr. Plotke’s
termination, all of the historian positions in Dr. Morris’ department were
effectively eliminated but then realigned to the Army Network Knowledge
Directorate (AKND), with Dr. Plotke’s former position being the only one not
reestablished in the AKND. As noted in Atchley v. Nordam Group, Inc., 180 F.3d
1143, 1147-49 (10th Cir. 1999), we view with suspicion a corporate restructuring
justification used to counter a discrimination claim where the plaintiff’s position
was the only one eliminated.
(continued...)

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 Having relied on its argument that a Title VII discriminatory termination

prima facie case must include proof that the employee’s job was not eliminated,

the Army does not assert that Dr. Plotke’s proof is otherwise insufficient for a

prima facie case. In fact, Dr. Plotke presented ample evidence to permit an

inference of discrimination in her dismissal. To satisfy her de minimis prima facie

burden, Dr. Plotke only needed to demonstrate that her termination occurred

“under circumstances which give rise to an inference of discrimination.”

Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1227. Courts have enumerated a variety of circumstances

that can give rise to an inference of discriminatory motive, including:

9
(...continued)
In addition, Dr. Morris acknowledges that after he dismissed Dr. Plotke, her
duties were assumed by Dr. Lackey and Mr. Mordica. We have rejected an
employer’s argument that no inference of discrimination can be drawn where an
employee’s position was eliminated and his duties were divided among other
employees not in the protected class. Abuan v. Level 3 Communications, Inc., 353
F.3d 1158, 1169 (10th Cir. 2003). Like Abuan, the instant case does not involve a
reduction in force (RIF). Dr. Morris’ department and mission was expanding
rapidly in the months prior and subsequent to Dr. Plotke’s termination and the
CTC team was “short-handed” of personnel. Aplt. App. at 703, 704, 891.
Moreover, the Army, similar to the defendant employer in Abuan, asserts that its
reason for terminating Dr. Plotke was unsatisfactory performance, not elimination
of her position. See 353 F.3d at 1169. Finally, the plaintiff in Abuan presented
evidence that he was qualified for his position and he was replaced by three less
qualified individuals outside the protected class. Id. Dr. Plotke has made a
similar showing. In fact, Dr. Morris testified that subsequent to Dr. Plotke’s
termination her “functions” were “executed by combination of Lackey [and]
Mordica.” Id. at 854. For the foregoing reasons, Dr. Plotke has created a genuine
factual dispute concerning whether her position was actually eliminated or
otherwise filled.

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 actions or remarks made by decisionmakers that could be viewed as
reflecting a discriminatory animus . . . , preferential treatment given to
employees outside the protected class . . . , in a corporate downsizing, the
systematic transfer of a discharged employee’s duties to other employees . . .
, or a pattern of recommending the plaintiff for positions for which she is
not qualified [or over-qualified] and failure to surface plaintiff’s name for
positions for which she is well-qualified. A plaintiff might also rely upon
the fact that the defendant, following plaintiff’s termination, continued to
seek applicants to fill the position, . . . or, more generally, upon the timing
or sequence of events leading to plaintiff’s termination.

Chertkova, 92 F.3d at 91 (listing cases).

Among the many facts recited earlier in this opinion, Dr. Plotke was the first

and only female historian hired at Fort Leavenworth and Dr. Lackey informed her

she was hired largely because of administrative pressures to employ a woman at

the facility. Likewise, in contrast to her male counterpart, Dr. Bernstein, Dr.

Plotke’s job duties were generally limited to clerical and manual tasks, and she

was prohibited from engaging in higher-level functions within the CTC-WIN due

to the unexplained delay in delivering her security clearance. Many of her male

colleagues, at least one of whom had not achieved the same level of education as

she had, referred to her as Jane while referring to other male staff members with

their academic titles of “Dr.” Finally, despite her highly praised work and general

personal satisfaction while assigned on the Haiti project, Dr. Plotke was removed

from that project prior to its completion and reassigned to the CTC-WIN due to the

purported urgencies and importance of that project, although the project was never

completed. Dr. Plotke’s reassignment to CTC-WIN assured that she was under the

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supervision of Dr. Morris and therefore subject to his review regarding whether to

extend her employment beyond the one-year probationary period.

Taking all inferences from these facts in the light most favorable to Dr.

Plotke, we easily conclude she made the de minimis showing required for a prima

facie case of gender discrimination.

III.

The district court held that the Army proffered the following legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for discharging Dr. Plotke: “unsatisfactory conduct

including her failure to follow guidance issued by superiors, failure to follow

established chains-of-command, a breakdown in her attitude toward customer

service, and her fostering a climate of dissension and distrust within the Army

Knowledge Network Directorate.” Plotke v. White, 2002 WL 1461974, at *3 (D.

Kan. Jul. 2, 2002). This is sufficient to shift the burden to Dr. Plotke to show

there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Army’s proffered

reasons for terminating her are pretextual. Jones, 203 F.3d at 756. Dr. Plotke

contends the district court erroneously ignored her evidence of pretext and

intentional discrimination and failed to view the evidence in a light most favorable

to her, as it is obligated to do under Rule 56. We agree the court disregarded

evidence favorable to Dr. Plotke and failed to draw all inferences in her favor.

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 “[A] plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find

that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to

conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148;

see also Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 453 (10th Cir. 1995).

The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant
(particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may,
together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show
intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant’s proffered
reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional
discrimination . . . .

Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 (footnote omitted). A plaintiff can show pretext by

revealing “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or

contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a

reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence . . . .”

Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted);

see also Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1242 (10th Cir.

2002).

[T]he evidence which a plaintiff can present in an attempt to establish that a
defendant’s stated reasons are pretextual may take a variety of forms . . . . A
plaintiff may not be forced to pursue any particular means of demonstrating
that a defendant’s stated reasons are pretextual. A plaintiff typically makes
a showing of pretext in one of three ways: (1) with evidence that the
defendant’s stated reason for the adverse employment action was false . . . ;
(2) with evidence that the defendant acted contrary to a written company
policy prescribing the action to be taken by the defendant under the
circumstances . . . ; or (3) with evidence that the defendant acted contrary to
an unwritten policy or contrary to company practice when making the
adverse employment decision affecting the plaintiff.

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Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1230 (citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added).

The plaintiff’s evidence can also allow for an inference that the “employer’s

proffered non-discriminatory reasons [were] either a post hoc fabrication or

otherwise did not actually motivate the employment action (that is, the proffered

reason is a pretext).” Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994).

Dr. Plotke makes several arguments in support of her claim that the Army’s

justification for her discharge is pretextual. First, she contends the reasons for her

termination other than the TDY incident were pretextual, post-hoc justifications.

In support of this contention, Dr. Plotke offers evidence that before the TDY

incident, neither Dr. Morris nor anyone on his behalf had formally counseled her

on any performance deficiencies or misconduct issues. Dr. Plotke also points to

the fact that neither Dr. Morris nor Dr. Lackey raised any other reason besides the

TDY incident for relieving Dr. Plotke of her position to Col. Ohl, the ultimate

decision-maker regarding termination. Moreover, Dr. Morris admitted as of June

20 (prior to the TDY episode) that both he and Dr. Lackey would have

recommended Dr. Plotke be retained in permanent employment beyond her

probationary period. Dr. Morris did not consult Dr. Gorell for his input on

retaining Dr. Plotke in July, despite the fact that Dr. Gorell was her immediate

supervisor from January through May 1995, and Dr. Morris conceded he believed

that Dr. Gorell would have recommended Dr. Plotke’s employment be extended.

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Dr. Morris subsequently enhanced his reasons for terminating Dr. Plotke by

referencing additional pre-June 20 incidents to support his decision, as detailed in

the June 27 memo he prepared for Dr. Plotke regarding her dismissal.

The Army’s post-hoc reasons for Dr. Plotke’s termination, which predate the

TDY incident, constitute evidence of pretext. See Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial

P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 56 (1st Cir. 2000) (pretext can be shown with

after-the-fact justifications for termination decision); Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 (post

hoc fabrication can be evidence of pretext); see also Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155

F.3d 799, 809 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[a]n employer’s strategy of simply tossing out a

number of reasons . . . in the hope that one of them will ‘stick’ could easily

backfire . . . . [A] multitude of suspicious explanations may itself suggest that the

employer’s investigatory process was so questionable that any application of the

‘honest belief’ rule is inappropriate”) (cited with approval in Tyler v. RE/MAX

Mountain States, Inc., 232 F.3d 808, 814 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that when the

plaintiff casts substantial doubt on many of the employer’s multiple reasons, the

jury could reasonably find the employer lacks credibility)).

The district court erred in the summary judgment stage by accepting as true

the Army’s assertion that “the travel authorization incident was only one of several

incidents that plaintiff’s supervisors considered in their decision to terminate

plaintiff,” Plotke, 2002 WL 1461974, at *4, when there was evidence on the record

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to the contrary. Such a credibility determination is appropriately made only by the

fact finder:

It is not the purpose of a motion for summary judgment to force the judge to
conduct a “mini-trial” to determine the defendant’s true state of mind. So
long as the plaintiff has presented evidence of pretext (by demonstrating that
the defendant’s proffered non-discriminatory reason is unworthy of belief)
upon which a jury could infer discriminatory motive, the case should go to
trial. Judgments about intent are best left for trial and are within the
province of the jury.

Randle, 69 F.3d at 453.

Conflicting evidence regarding the point in time at which Dr. Morris made

the decision to terminate Dr. Plotke contributes to her showing of pretext. When

Dr. Morris met with Dr. Gorell and Ms. Darnell on either June 20 or June 21,

1995, Dr. Morris gave Dr. Gorell the impression that he had already made the

decision to terminate Dr. Plotke and simply wanted a “rubber stamp” to support

that decision. Aplt. App. at 563. Dr. Gorell testified that Dr. Morris said “in

essence, he was going to fire Dr. Plotke.” Id. at 557. Dr. Morris contends, to the

contrary, that Dr. Plotke would have kept her job if she had been responsive to

counseling and states that he decided to terminate Dr. Plotke subsequent to his

counseling session with her. The district court held that Dr. Plotke did not raise a

genuine issue of material fact demonstrating pretext because the “defendant’s

proffered reasons for terminating plaintiff do not depend on whether the decision

to fire plaintiff was made before or after counseling.” Plotke, 2002 WL 1461974,

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at *4. We disagree.

The conflicting evidence concerning the timing of Dr. Morris’ decision to

fire Dr. Plotke coupled with the conflicting evidence regarding the reasons Dr.

Morris decided to fire her raise credibility issues for the fact finder. As the

Supreme Court has reaffirmed,

[p]roof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence is simply
one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional
discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive . . . . In appropriate
circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the
explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory
purpose.

Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147. If Dr. Morris’ testimony concerning his timing and

reasoning for terminating Dr. Plotke is “unworthy of credence,” a reasonable jury

could infer from “the falsity of [his] explanation” that Dr. Morris is “dissembling

to cover up a discriminatory purpose.” Id.

In addition, evidence of the fabrication of a June 22 memoranda and

procedural irregularities regarding Dr. Plotke’s termination constitute relevant

evidence of pretext going to the termination decision. See Garrett v.

Hewlett-Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[E]vidence of

pretext may include, . . . disturbing procedural irregularities (e.g., falsifying or

manipulating [of relevant] criteria . . .”) (quoting Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep’t

of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1328 (10th Cir.

1999)); Mohammed v. Callaway, 698 F.2d 395, 401 (10th Cir. 1983) (pretext can

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be shown by serious procedural irregularities). The record indicates that Dr.

Morris and Dr. Lackey represented to Col. Ohl on or about June 27 that there was

no documentation relating to any counseling sessions with Dr. Plotke or her

termination. In contrast, Dr. Lackey claims that he submitted a written report of

his “junior counseling session” with Dr. Plotke to Dr. Morris on June 22. Dr.

Lackey’s declaration also refers to a June 27 memorandum he prepared after Dr.

Plotke’s “senior counseling session,” documenting his reasons for recommending

not to extend Dr. Plotke beyond her probationary period. Based on Dr. Lackey’s

declaration, the district court rejected Dr. Plotke’s argument that the June 22

memoranda was fabricated, finding that Col. Ohl simply would not have had

personal knowledge of the June 22 memoranda because it was an “internal

communication.” Plotke, 2002 WL 1461974, at *4.

Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, Dr. Plotke presented evidence

that establishes a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the

memoranda was fabricated subsequent to her termination. Dr. Morris and Dr.

Lackey represented to Col. Ohl on or about June 27 that there was no

documentation relating to any counseling sessions with Dr. Plotke or her

termination. Whether Dr. Lackey’s June 22 memoranda was an internal

communication is irrelevant. Col. Ohl had personal knowledge regarding the

existence or lack thereof of any counseling documents because he was a party to

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the conversation in which Dr. Morris and Dr. Lackey represented that no such

material existed. Consequently, Col. Ohl’s declaration casts doubt on Dr.

Lackey’s credibility and creates an inference that Dr. Lackey fabricated documents

dated prior to June 27 in order to build a file to support the termination decision,

particularly since it is procedurally irregular for the Army to terminate personnel

without well-documented counseling files. Mohammed, 698 F.2d at 401 (holding

that “serious procedural irregularities” can support an allegation of pretext). In

this regard, Col. Ohl noted he had never approved or been involved in any

termination that did not include a well-documented counseling file and that Dr.

Morris’ and Dr. Lackey’s admissions made him “suspicious.” Aplt. App. at 526.

These inconsistencies and deviations from normal Army procedure, especially

when viewed in the aggregate with the other evidence proffered by Dr. Plotke, are

“sufficient to raise a genuine doubt about [d]efendant’s motivation . . . .” EEOC

v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1200 (10th Cir. 2000).

The timing and sequence of events leading up to Dr. Platke’s firing are also

evidence of pretext. Dr. Plotke provided evidence to support her contention that

her sudden reassignment from the Haiti project back to CTC-WIN in mid-May

1995 was part of a pre-ordained plot to terminate her. Dr. Plotke’s supervisor

confirmed that her work on the Haiti project was “excellent” and testified that she

was the only person with the technical expertise to do the job. Aplt. App. at 550.

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Dr. Plotke’s work on the Haiti project was also highly and publicly praised by Lt.

Col. Dietrich. Despite Dr. Plotke’s success on the project, Dr. Morris claimed

there was an urgent need in mid-May to transfer Dr. Plotke from the Haiti detail to

CTC-WIN. As noted previously, at the time of transfer, Dr. Plotke’s work on the

Haiti project was not complete and there was no deadline for the CTC-WIN

project. In fact, Dr. Morris admitted that the CTC-WIN project was never

completed subsequent to Dr. Plotke’s termination. Dr. Morris also conceded he

transferred Dr. Plotke only after being informed that her one-year probationary

period was nearing its completion and that he would have to certify her for

continued employment beyond that period. And he admitted he believed Dr.

Gorell would have recommended an extension to Dr. Plotke’s employment at the

time of the transfer, which would have provided her protection against termination

under federal regulations.

In addition to her hasty reassignment back to CAC-WIN, Dr. Plotke claims

that the TDY incident was totally contrived and grossly exaggerated. Dr. Morris

admitted that before the TDY episode, both he and Dr. Lackey would have

recommended Dr. Plotke be retained in permanent employment beyond her

probationary period. Dr. Morris says the TDY incident caused him to lose trust in

Dr. Plotke because (1) Dr. Gorell, rather than Dr. Lackey, had signed Dr. Plotke’s

TDY form; (2) Dr. Plotke had requested approval for conferences scheduled in

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different weeks; and (3) Dr. Plotke had failed to obtain advance approval from Dr.

Lackey to take annual leave following the Canada conference. But Ms. Darnell,

not Dr. Plotke, was entirely responsible for the administrative error of submitting

Dr. Plotke’s TDY request to Dr. Gorell rather than Dr. Lackey. Dr. Morris

admitted Dr. Lackey’s memo was not clear in conveying its alleged intent and

guidance that Dr. Plotke should choose two sessions within the same week. And

Dr. Lackey’s e-mail to Dr. Morris noting that Dr. Plotke would probably apply for

annual leave so she could attend additional conferences supports her claim that Dr.

Morris and Dr. Lackey expected her to take leave in conjunction with the

conference. Dr. Lackey further admitted he had never rejected an employee’s

request for annual leave, he “[m]ost likely” would have approved Dr. Plotke’s

leave, and he had no reason to believe that Dr. Morris would have decided

otherwise. Id. at 715. 10

Most importantly, Dr. Morris and Dr. Lackey admitted to Col. Ohl that Dr.

Plotke “very well may not have attempted to deceive them” and that they “had no

real solid proof that was her intent.” Id. at 527 (emphasis added). Courts view

with skepticism the use of subjective evaluations in making termination decisions.

See, e.g., Garrett, 305 F.3d at 1217-18 (holding that subjectivity by decision

Dr. Lackey himself had taken leave in Austria in conjunction with TDY
10

assignment in Germany in April 1995, during a “very hectic, changing time” for
the CAC History Department and without objection from Dr. Morris. Aplt. App.
at 589.

-30-
maker in termination decision is relevant evidence of pretext); Simms, 165 F.3d at

1328 (“Evidence of pretext may include . . . the use of subjective criteria.”); Bauer

v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1046 (10th Cir. 1981) (although subjective criteria not

wrongful per se, “[o]bviously subjective decision making provides an opportunity

for unlawful discrimination”); see also Bergene v. Salt River Project Agric.

Improvement & Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2001) (subjective

criteria evidence of pretext); Burrus v. United Tel. Co. of Kansas, Inc., 683 F.2d

339, 342 (10th Cir. 1982) (subjective employment criteria may provide

opportunities for unlawful discrimination). The Army has not denied that Dr.

Lackey’s and Dr. Morris’ evaluation of Dr. Plotke’s intent was wholly subjective.

The inconsistencies and contradictions noted above raise disputed issues of fact as

to whether the TDY incident was even a reason for Dr. Morris’ and Dr. Lackey’s

actions towards Dr. Plotke. See Garrett, 305 F.3d at 1219; Morgan, 108 F.3d at

1323. On this record, a jury could reasonably infer the Army discriminated against

Dr. Plotke by suddenly reassigning her from the Haiti Project to CAC-WIN and

then contriving and grossly exaggerating the TDY incident as a means of

exercising gender animus towards her.

Dr. Plotke’s final contention is that the district court erred by rejecting as

irrelevant to the pretext issue her evidence of several incidents not directly related

to the termination decision. These incidents include but are not limited to:

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referring to Dr. Plotke as “Jane” instead of “Dr.”; calling her a “femi-Nazi” and

“wire-head,” aplt. app. at 315-16, 522, 631; advising her that she “should be quiet

and not make [her]self noticed,” id. at 316; remarking that her presence would

prevent the all-male group from “sitting around drinking beer, smoking cigars, and

farting” on a professional staff ride, id. at 521, 1028; comments that CAC was

under pressure to hire a female historian; and disparaging Dr. Plotke’s professional

competence and yelling at her to “keep [her] mouth shut” in the presence of her

peers and supervisor. Id. at 330. The district court held that these incidents “do

not constitute direct evidence of gender discrimination,” Plotke, 2002 WL

1461974, at *5, and that under McDonnell Douglas, they would only be considered

if offered as pretext evidence on the issue of the falsity of defendant’s stated

reasons for termination. We disagree.

On a motion for summary judgment, the district court is required to review

the record “taken as a whole.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150. Plaintiffs are not

precluded from introducing “quite probative evidence of earlier acts of

discrimination to support a claim of current discriminatory intent,” even if prior

events are beyond the limitations period. Goodwin v. General Motors Corp., 275

F.3d 1005, 1012-13 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotation and citation omitted); see also

Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 402 n.13 (1986) (“evidence of pre-Act

discrimination is quite probative”); Noland v. McAdoo, 39 F.3d 269, 271-72 (10th

-32-
Cir. 1994) (prior events not actionable may provide relevant circumstantial

evidence to explain later, actionable events).

The Supreme Court has emphasized that courts should not reject a plaintiff’s

evidence of additional circumstantial gender-based comments and treatment simply

because they “were not made in the direct context of [the plaintiff’s] termination.”

Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151-53. Accordingly, we have held that gender-based

comments by a plaintiff’s supervisor can be relevant evidence of pretext

demonstrating that the supervisor had “preconceived notions premised on [the

plaintiff’s] gender” and “ultimately terminated her based at least in part on his

gender bias,” even where such comments were not directly limited to the

termination decision. Stone, 210 F.3d at 1140-41 (discussing Tomsic v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 85 F.3d 1472, 1477-79 (10th Cir. 1996)). A plaintiff

simply must show a nexus between the allegedly discriminatory statements and the

employer’s decision. Tomsic, 85 F.3d at 1479. 11

In Tomsic v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 85 F.3d 1472 (10th Cir.
11

1996), an employer made several comments to female employees from which the
court determined an inference could be drawn that the employer subsequently
discriminated against the employees based on their gender. Id. at 1479. The
employer’s comments included telling one employee that he did not think she
would succeed because “her husband made too much money and that therefore she
would lack incentive.” Id. at 1474. He told another employee that she devoted
too much time to her career and “that marital problems might arise in a few years
because she would likely be earning more than her husband.” Id. at 1475. The
court rejected any argument that these comments were merely “stray remarks,” id.
at 1479, and determined a jury could infer from the comments in their total
(continued...)

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 Like the remarks at issue in Tomsic, the comments in the instant case made

by Dr. Morris, Dr. Lackey and Mr. Mordica, were not random, “general,” or “stray

remarks,” but were specifically directed to or about Dr. Plotke. Id. Moreover, Dr.

Morris was Dr. Plotke’s supervisor and ultimately decided to recommend that her

employment not be extended beyond the probation period, relying heavily on the

recommendations of Dr. Lackey and Mr. Mordica. We think there exists a

sufficient nexus between these additional circumstantial comments and Dr.

Plotke’s termination. A reasonable jury could infer from the remarks of Dr.

Morris, Dr. Lackey, and Mr. Mordica that unlawful gender bias was a motivating

factor in Army’s adverse employment decision.

In the context of this case it is also relevant that Dr. Plotke was the first and

only woman ever employed as an historian at Fort Leavenworth. Evidence that Dr.

Plotke was hired so that “the EEO office at Ft. Leavenworth would ‘get off

[CAC’s] back,’” aplt. app. at 522, coupled with Dr. Lackey’s delegation of clerical

and administrative tasks to Dr. Plotke and the extravagantly delayed receipt of Dr.

Plotke’s security clearance, certainly raise questions concerning Dr. Morris’ and

Dr. Lackey’s motives and intent in initially hiring Dr. Plotke. Finally, post-

termination incidents including efforts to black-list Dr. Plotke’s future

(...continued)
11

context that “unlawful bias was a motivating factor” in the employer’s
termination decisions. Id.

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employment opportunities and the “praise” bestowed by Dr. Morris in his

performance appraisal of Dr. Lackey for recommending Dr. Plotke’s termination,

present concrete evidence sufficient to permit a rational jury to conclude Dr.

Plotke was discharged because of her gender. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519

U.S. 337 (1997) (post-termination conduct directed against a former employee is

actionable under Title VII).

In sum, we hold that Dr. Plotke has established a prima facie case of gender

discrimination. She has also demonstrated genuine issues of material fact as to

pretext that, under controlling precedent of this circuit, preclude the entry of

summary judgment for the Army. We REVERSE the district court’s decision to

the contrary and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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02-3289, Plotke v. White

TYMKOVICH, J., concurring.

I concur in the result, but differ with the majority in two areas.

First, I conclude that reversal is necessary because there is a genuine issue

of fact concerning whether Dr. Plotke’s position was actually eliminated. See Slip

Op. at n.9. I would not stray from the teaching of Kendrick v. Penske Transp.

Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 2000), that a plaintiff bears the burden

of showing that her position was not in fact eliminated after discharge. Here, I am

satisfied that the evidence is uncertain enough as to whether the Army eliminated

her position, and if so, whether the elimination occurred long enough after the

alleged discriminatory conduct such that the Kendrick test has been met. In any

event, it appears the Army has at no point argued that it in fact fired her because it

was eliminating her position.

While I also agree that Dr. Plotke has shown enough “inconsistencies” and

“contradictions” in the Army’s proferred explanation of her termination to show

disputed facts as to pretext, I differ with the majority’s characterization of some of

the evidence. Dr. Plotke is entitled to show at trial that the defendants were biased

against her and made the termination decision because of her sex. But many of the

examples showing pretext are generalized statements of personal dislike. Personal

dislike does not necessarily equate with intentional discrimination. Although
statements or comments “may serve as circumstantial evidence of [pretext], the

plaintiff must still show some nexus between the statements and the defendant’s

decision to terminate the employee.” Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d

1204, 1209-10 (10th Cir. 1999). I am confident that the district court at trial will

be able to assess the relevancy of any proffered testimony to the alleged

discriminatory conduct.

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