F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
MAY 6 2005
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
JOAN LAWRENCE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 04-8030
MIKE REED, Rawlins Police Chief in
his official and individual capacities,
Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING
(D.C. NO. 03-CV-74-J)
Bruce T. Moats, Law Offices of Bruce T. Moats, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming, for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
Craig E. Kirkwood, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Patrick J. Crank,
Wyoming Attorney General and John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General,
with him on the brief) Office of the Wyoming Attorney General, Cheyenne,
Wyoming, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before BRISCOE , HARTZ , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges.
McCONNELL , Circuit Judge.
Defendant Mike Reed, the chief of police in Rawlins, Wyoming, seized
over 70 derelict vehicles from the property of Joan Lawrence, the plaintiff in this
case. Mrs. Lawrence sued Mr. Reed (along with the city and the mayor), alleging
violations of her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures and her
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The district court found that Mr.
Reed had violated Mrs. Lawrence’s clearly established rights under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments, but it held Mr. Reed immune from suit because his
consultation with the city attorney constituted “extraordinary circumstances”
preventing him from knowing the clearly established law. Mrs. Lawrence has
since settled with the city and the mayor, and she now appeals the district court’s
grant of immunity to Mr. Reed.
On appeal, Mr. Reed concedes that he violated Mrs. Lawrence’s clearly
established constitutional rights. The only question, then, is whether he should be
held immune from suit because of his consultation with the city attorney or,
alternatively, because of his reliance on the Rawlins derelict vehicle ordinance.
On the basis of these two circumstances, Mr. Reed argues that a reasonable
officer in his position should not have known that his conduct was unlawful. We
disagree and therefore REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of Mrs.
Lawrence’s claim and remand for further proceedings.
-2-
I.
Mrs. Lawrence owns a salvage yard in Rawlins, Wyoming. The yard sits
atop a hill south of Spruce Street. Between the hill and Spruce Street lies another
piece of property, also owned by Mrs. Lawrence. Part of that property (the part
next to the salvage yard) is zoned industrial; the rest, which fronts Spruce Street,
is zoned residential. Prior to the events giving rise to this suit, Mrs. Lawrence
stored an assortment of vehicles and scrap metal not only in the salvage yard, but
also on the industrial and residential portions of her land.
Across the street from Mrs. Lawrence lies the Carbon County Fairground,
home of the renowned Carbon County Fair and Rodeo (over 75 years running). 1
Apparently, fair-goers found the derelict vehicles unsightly and complained to the
city council. The council, ever responsive to its constituents, convened a
meeting.
Many meetings, in fact. Mrs. Lawrence’s vehicles had been a source of
contention since at least 1982, when the city sought to enjoin the late Mr.
Lawrence from storing derelict vehicles on the very same property. Mr. Lawrence
and the city entered a Settlement Agreement, according to which Mr. Lawrence
1
Slated for the 2002 Fair were barrel racing and roping competitions; horse
and dog shows; sheep, swine, and beef showmanship clinics; a dairy milk-out; a
beauty pageant; pie, cake, and chili cooking contests; and a demolition derby.
http://w3.trib.com/~rcccoc/fair.htm (last visited February 15, 2005).
-3-
relinquished any claim of right to store derelict vehicles on certain portions of his
property, including at least some of the land between the salvage yard and Spruce
Street. The parties disagree about whether Mr. Lawrence retained the right to
store derelict vehicles on the industrially zoned portion of the property.
Confronted with the sight of derelict vehicles and the rapidly approaching
August 2002 fair, the city council considered two options. Either it could go to
court and enforce the 1982 Settlement Agreement, or it could remove the vehicles
pursuant to the derelict vehicle ordinance. The former would involve ponderous
judicial proceedings, adversarial hearings before an impartial magistrate and the
like; the latter provided a streamlined process for seizing and junking derelict
vehicles, broadly defined. No hearings, no warrants—just a warning letter one
month beforehand, a few tags on the vehicles the day before, and then the city
could enter Mrs. Lawrence’s property and seize whatever vehicles arguably
appeared to be derelict. 2
2
A derelict vehicle is any vehicle that is: “(1) Inoperable to the extent that
it is unable to perform its original intended function; (2) Partially or wholly
dismantled; (3) Wrecked to the extent that prevents legal operation; (4) Junked or
intended to be recycled or scrapped.” Rawlins Municipal Code § 8.20.020(B).
The derelict vehicle ordinance prohibits any property owner from
“allow[ing] or permit[ting] any derelict vehicle to remain unsheltered on such
property for more than thirty days,” and makes the property owner responsible for
the removal of any such vehicle. Id. § 8.20.040(A). Excepted from this
prohibition are “vehicle[s] on the premises of a business enterprise operated in a
lawful place and manner when necessary to the operation of the business
(continued...)
-4-
The city opted for simple seizure. City Attorney Lewis sent Mrs. Lawrence
a letter on February 26, 2002, notifying her that her vehicles violated the derelict
vehicle ordinance and had to be removed within thirty days. Mrs. Lawrence then
met with the city attorney and asked for more time, based on her need to undergo
eye surgery and the anticipated construction of a road to transport the vehicles
from the Spruce Street property up the hill to the salvage yard. City Attorney
Lewis relented.
But the problem flared up again in August 2002. By that time the Carbon
County Fair and Rodeo was in full swing and the complaints of fair-goers were
rolling in. The city council addressed the issue at its August 6 meeting. Shortly
thereafter, City Attorney Lewis sent another letter to Mrs. Lawrence, August 9,
2002, warning her that the vehicles had to be moved within thirty days or else the
city would remove them at Mrs. Lawrence’s expense.
Meanwhile, Police Chief Reed met with the city attorney and city manager
to discuss how to enforce the derelict vehicle ordinance. They discussed the 30-
day notice process, the 24-hour tagging requirement, and the removal of the
2
(...continued)
enterprise.” Id. § 8.20.040(C).
Once a vehicle “is reasonably determined to be derelict”—by whom, the
ordinance does not say—and once the city has given thirty-days’ notice, the city
may place on the vehicle a notice of intent to impound. Id. § 8.20.070(B).
Twenty-four hours later, the city may remove the vehicle. Id.
-5-
vehicles. When Mrs. Lawrence failed to respond to the August 9 letter, Mr. Reed
tagged her vehicles on October 7, 2002. That night, Mrs. Lawrence and a helper
moved all but a few vehicles from the residentially zoned property fronting
Spruce Street to the industrially zoned property behind. Based on the 1982
Settlement Agreement, Mrs. Lawrence believed she had the right to store the
vehicles there.
When Mr. Reed arrived the next morning to begin the removal operation,
he noticed that Mrs. Lawrence had moved the vehicles. Out of an abundance of
caution, he consulted the city attorney once more. He recalls that it was “[j]ust a
discussion as to whether to proceed or not proceed, and a decision to proceed was
made.” Over the next several days, the city towed over 70 of Mrs. Lawrence’s
vehicles to its landfill.
Mrs. Lawrence then initiated this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleged
that Mr. Reed (along with the city and the mayor) violated her Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights by seizing her property without a warrant or a
hearing. The district court denied the summary judgment motions of the city and
mayor, but granted Mr. Reed’s motion on the ground that he was immune from
suit. Mrs. Lawrence has since settled with the city and mayor, and now appeals
the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Mr. Reed. We review the
-6-
district court’s decision de novo. Reynolds v. Powell, 370 F.3d 1028, 1031 (10th
Cir. 2004).
II.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that “[e]very person” who acts under color of
state law to deprive another of constitutional rights “shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”
Although this statute “on its face admits of no immunities,” Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976), the Supreme Court has recognized several, including
the doctrine of qualified immunity, which exempts government officials from
suits for civil damages under certain circumstances. This grant of immunity is
intended to balance two concerns. On one hand, when an official abuses his
office, “an action for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication
of constitutional guarantees.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
On the other hand, exposing government officials to damages suits “entail[s]
substantial social costs,” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987), such
as “the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing
public issues, . . . the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office
. . . [and the deterrence of public officials from] ‘the unflinching discharge of
their duties.’” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
-7-
The Supreme Court has attempted to strike the balance between these two
concerns by shielding government officials from suits for civil damages “insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id. at 818. Although
courts have derived from this statement a variety of multi-part tests, the essential
inquiry is: would an objectively reasonable official have known that his conduct
was unlawful? See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. In the Tenth Circuit, we employ a
three-step inquiry. See Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1239-40,
1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2003). First, we ask “whether the plaintiff’s allegations, if
true, establish a constitutional violation.” Id. at 1239-40. If not, the suit is
dismissed; if so, we move to the second step: “whether the law was clearly
established at the time the alleged violations occurred.” Id. at 1247. This step
gives the official an opportunity to show that he “neither knew nor should have
known of the relevant legal standard” because the law was not clearly established
at the time he acted. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819. Where the law is not clearly
established, courts do not require officials to anticipate its future developments,
and qualified immunity is therefore appropriate.
If the law was clearly established, we reach the third step of the inquiry:
whether, in spite of the fact that the law was clearly established, “extraordinary
circumstances”—such as reliance on the advice of counsel or on a statute—“so
-8-
‘prevented’ [the official] from knowing that his actions were unconstitutional that
he should not be imputed with knowledge of a clearly established right.” Roska,
328 F.3d at 1251. This occurs only “rarely.” Id.
Mr. Reed has not challenged the district court’s finding that he violated
Mrs. Lawrence’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and that these rights
were clearly established at the time he acted. On the Fourth Amendment issue,
the district court found that neither exigent circumstances nor special needs
justified the warrantless seizure of Mrs. Lawrence’s vehicles, and that therefore
the seizure was unreasonable. Dist. Ct. Op. at 29-30. On the due process issue,
the court found that the derelict vehicle ordinance violated due process because it
allowed the city to deprive Mrs. Lawrence of her property without a hearing. Id.
at 30-32. We take these findings as a given because Mr. Reed does not challenge
them.
The only question on appeal, then, is whether “extraordinary
circumstances” excused Mr. Reed from knowing the clearly established law. Mr.
Reed points to two reasons why he neither knew nor should have known that the
seizure of Mrs. Lawrence’s vehicles violated clearly established law: his
consultation with the city attorney, and his reliance on the derelict vehicle
ordinance.
A.
-9-
In some cases consultation with an attorney can create the extraordinary
circumstances that excuse a violation of clearly established law. V-1 Oil Co. v.
State of Wyo., Dept. of Environmental Quality, 902 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir.
1990). “Of course, such [consultation] is not inherently extraordinary, for few
things in government are more common than the receipt of legal advice.” Id.
Instead, as noted above, the question is whether the consultation “so ‘prevented’
[the official] from knowing that his actions were unconstitutional that he should
not be imputed with knowledge of a clearly established right.” Roska, 328 F.3d at
1251. When evaluating such a claim, we look to the totality of the circumstances,
including such factors as: “[1] how unequivocal, and specifically tailored to the
particular facts giving rise to the controversy, the advice was, [2] whether
complete information had been provided to the advising attorney(s), [3] the
prominence and competence of the attorney(s), and [4] how soon after the advice
was received the disputed action was taken.” V-1 Oil, 902 F.2d at 1489 (internal
citations omitted). These four factors are not the only relevant circumstances.
In this case, we find particularly significant the fact that Mr. Reed and City
Attorney Lewis never once discussed the applicable constitutional law governing
Mr. Reed’s conduct. Mr. Reed concedes that a warrant or notice-and-hearing are
required before depriving a citizen of their property; he also concedes that these
constitutional requirements were clearly established and that he violated them.
-10-
Yet he now argues that his consultation with the city attorney—who never once
mentioned the requirement of a warrant or notice-and-hearing—somehow
prevented him from knowing that these procedures were constitutionally required.
This cannot be the case. What Mr. Reed really wants us to conclude is that it is
generally reasonable to rely on the city attorney’s advice—that it is the attorney’s
job, not the police officer’s, to point out when a statutorily authorized course of
conduct violates the Constitution. But this is an argument that officers should not
be held responsible for knowing the law in the first place, not that consultation
with the city attorney somehow interfered with that knowledge. Given Mr.
Reed’s concession that his conduct violated Mrs. Lawrence’s clearly established
rights, and given the Supreme Court’s admonishment that “a reasonably
competent public official should know the law governing his conduct,” Harlow,
457 U.S. at 819, Mr. Reed must point to something in his consultation with the
city attorney that prevented him from knowing the law. This he has not done.
The district court therefore erred by granting Mr. Reed immunity on the basis of
his consultation with the city attorney. Accord Roska, 328 F.3d at 1254
(reversing the district court’s grant of immunity based on attorney consultation
because “we cannot determine whether . . . [the attorney’s] advice related
specifically to the conduct in question: removing [the plaintiff] from his home
without any pre-deprivation procedures.”).
-11-
B.
Alternatively, Mr. Reed argues that he should not be held responsible for
knowing the unlawfulness of his conduct because his conduct was authorized by
the Rawlins derelict vehicle ordinance. We have recognized that an officer’s
“reli[ance] on a state statute, regulation, or official policy that explicitly
sanctioned the conduct in question” may absolve the officer from knowing that
his conduct was unlawful. 3 Roska, 328 F.3d at 1251-52. This reflects the
sensible notion that officers should be able to “rel[y] on the legislature’s
determination that a statute is constitutional.” Grossman v. City of Portland, 33
F.3d 1200, 1210 (9th Cir. 1994). Of course, this principle is not without
limit—we have also said that “where a statute authorizes conduct that is ‘patently
violative of fundamental constitutional principles,’ reliance on the statute does
not immunize the officer’s conduct.” Roska, 328 F.3d at 1253 n. 33, quoting
Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1209. Thus, officers can rely on statutes that authorize
their conduct—but not if the statute is obviously unconstitutional. Again, the
3
We have even listed a few factors to help us determine when reliance on a
statute is reasonable: “(1) the degree of specificity with which the statute
authorized the conduct in question; (2) whether the officer in fact complied with
the statute; (3) whether the statute has fallen into desuetude; and (4) whether the
officer could have reasonably concluded that the statute was constitutional.”
Roska, 328 F.3d at 1253.
-12-
overarching inquiry is whether, in spite of the existence of the statute, a
reasonable officer should have known that his conduct was unlawful.
1.
Mrs. Lawrence presents a strong argument that the derelict vehicle
ordinance did not authorize Mr. Reed’s conduct. She maintains that the 1982
Settlement Agreement between her husband and the city reserved her the right to
store derelict vehicles on the industrially zoned portion of her property. Although
the Agreement specifically required the late Mr. Lawrence to remove the vehicles
from the residentially zoned portion of his property, it makes no mention of the
industrially zoned property next to the salvage yard. The implication, Mrs.
Lawrence argues, is that she retains the right to store vehicles on that portion of
her property, and the derelict vehicle ordinance does not apply.
There is some evidence that the city shared Mrs. Lawrence’s view of the
Settlement Agreement. A memorandum from Ron Kilgore, a city development
director in charge of code enforcement, states that “Mrs. Lawrence was informed
by this Department that numerous junk cars on her property . . . were located on
residentially zoned property and needed to be relocated to the industrially zoned
property to the south.” Aplt’s App. 54. A memorandum from Paul Wawrziniack,
a building official, to Paul Drinkhouse, the city manager, confirms this
-13-
understanding of the agreement. All of this suggests that the derelict vehicle
ordinance did not apply.
We are not concerned, however, simply with whether or not the derelict
vehicle ordinance applied, but with whether or not a reasonable officer would
conclude that it applied. Just as we do not require officials to predict novel
constitutional rulings, we do not require them to predict novel statutory rulings.
Instead, the focus of the qualified immunity inquiry is on what a reasonable
officer should have known. Here, Mrs. Lawrence concedes that the derelict
vehicle ordinance applies on its face to her property; but she argues that the 1982
Settlement Agreement carved out an exception for her industrially zoned property.
What she has failed to produce, however, is any evidence that Mr. Reed knew or
should have known about the 1982 Settlement Agreement. Absent such evidence,
we cannot conclude that the agreement rendered unreasonable Mr. Reed’s
conclusion that the derelict vehicle ordinance authorized his conduct.
2.
But this does not end our inquiry. Another important consideration is
whether Mr. Reed could reasonably have concluded that the statute was
constitutional. As we noted above, officers are not always entitled to rely on the
legislature’s judgment that a statute is constitutional: “where a statute authorizes
conduct that is ‘patently violative of fundamental constitutional principles,’
-14-
reliance on the statute does not immunize the officer’s conduct.” Roska, 328 F.3d
at 1253 n. 33, quoting Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1209. This means that some statutes
are so obviously unconstitutional that we will require officials to second-guess
the legislature and refuse to enforce an unconstitutional statute—or face a suit for
damages if they don’t. The question is whether Mr. Reed’s enforcement of the
derelict vehicle ordinance is such a case.
We think it is. “The fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). Time and again, the Supreme
Court has made clear that “some form of hearing is required before an individual
is finally deprived of a property interest.” Id. And although the Court has crafted
a nice balancing test to determine what such a hearing should look like, 4 we need
not consider that test here because the Rawlins derelict vehicle ordinance
provides no hearing whatsoever.
This is precisely why Mr. Reed should have known that the ordinance was
unconstitutional. Had the derelict vehicle ordinance provided some form of pre-
or post-deprivation hearing—even a constitutionally inadequate one—we would
4
Mathews requires a balancing of (1) the private interest affected by
official action, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation and the value of additional
procedural safeguards, and (3) the government’s interest and the burdens of
additional procedural requirements. 424 U.S. at 335.
-15-
not necessarily expect a reasonable officer to know that it was unconstitutional.
For once the ordinance provides a hearing, its constitutionality turns on a court’s
resolution of the Mathews balancing test, which, in the absence of case law
directly on point, is not something we would require officers to predict. Here,
however, the ordinance provides no hearing whatsoever; an officer need not
understand the niceties of Mathews to know that it is unconstitutional. Our
decisions, and those of other circuits, have made abundantly clear that when the
state deprives an individual of property—for example, by impounding an
individual’s vehicle—it must provide the individual with notice and a hearing.
See Summers v. State of Utah, 927 F.2d 1165, 1169 (10th Cir. 1991) (owner of
impounded vehicle must receive a hearing); Propert v. District of Columbia, 948
F.2d 1327, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (same); Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 923
(9th Cir. 1986) (ordinance authorizing towing but providing no hearing violates
due process); Huemmer v. Mayor and City Council of Ocean City, 632 F.2d 371,
372 (4th Cir. 1980) (ordinance is “manifestly defective” when it provides no
hearing). This is especially true where, as here, the state not only impounds the
vehicles but permanently disposes of them. Cf. Propert 948 F.2d at 1332.
In sum, a hearing is “[t]he fundamental requirement of due process,”
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333, and the Rawlins derelict vehicle ordinance does not
even pretend to provide one. This is a sufficiently obvious constitutional
-16-
violation that Mr. Reed should have known about. Mr. Reed, therefore, was not
entitled to rely on the ordinance, and qualified immunity is inappropriate. Accord
Wong v. City & County of Honolulu, 333 F.Supp.2d 942, 957-58 (D. Haw. 2004)
(officer not entitled to rely on a statute authorizing impoundment and destruction
of derelict vehicles without notice or a hearing).
III.
Mr. Reed relies heavily, and not without reason, on our decision in V-1 Oil
Co. v. State of Wyo., Dept. of Environmental Quality, 902 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir.
1990), and a word is in order on why that case does not control here. In V-1 Oil,
the defendant, an official of the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality,
conducted a warrantless search of a V-1 Oil station in Lander, Wyoming. The
defendant noticed workers removing the concrete above the station’s underground
gasoline storage tanks, and he became concerned that the station, a known source
of groundwater pollution, was engaged in unlawful conduct. After twice being
refused permission to enter the property, the defendant consulted a senior
assistant attorney general. The attorney sought a court order authorizing an
inspection of the premises, but was unable to obtain one because no judge was
available. He then advised the defendant that the Wyoming Environmental
Quality Act authorized a warrantless search of the station. Later that night, the
defendant, along with a policeman and the Lander City Attorney, entered the
-17-
premises, inspected the underground tanks, and took a soil sample from the
exposed area.
Although we concluded that this search violated V-1 Oil’s clearly
established constitutional rights, we found the defendant immune from suit based
on his consultation with the assistant attorney general and his reliance on the
Wyoming Environmental Quality Act. We held that:
[A] reasonable officer in [the defendant’s] position—that is, an
officer who conducts a warrantless search on the same day he was
advised by fully informed, high-ranking government attorneys that a
particular statute, which had not yet been tested in any court,
lawfully authorized that particular search—should not be expected to
have known that the search was unconstitutional.
Id. at 1489. Mr. Reed argues that his case is analogous: he conducted a
warrantless seizure on the same day he was advised by the city attorney that a
previously unchallenged ordinance authorized his conduct.
We, however, conclude that V-1 Oil is distinguishable. True, Mr. Reed,
like the defendant in V-1 Oil, consulted with an attorney who told him that a
previously unchallenged statute authorized his conduct. But two important
factors underlying the grant of immunity in V-1 Oil are absent here. First, this
case lacks the urgency that was present in V-1 Oil, where, we have said, the
attorney’s advice was “required to be acted on immediately.” Cannon v. City and
County of Denver, 998 F.2d 867, 876 (10th Cir. 1993). In V-1 Oil, any delay in
-18-
acting on the attorney’s advice—by, for example, waiting until the following
morning to find a judge who could issue a court order authorizing the
search—risked the loss of potentially valuable evidence of an ongoing regulatory
violation. Thus, we gave proportionally greater weight to the officer’s reliance on
advice of counsel where circumstances demanded a snap decision in the face of
uncertainty. Here, by contrast, there was no urgency, as Mr. and Mrs. Lawrence
and the City of Rawlins had been wrangling over the same derelict vehicles for
over two decades.
A second reason for distinguishing V-1 Oil is the difference in the relied-
upon statutes. As we noted above, officers are not entitled to rely on statutes they
should know are unconstitutional. And this is precisely where V-1 Oil and the
present case diverge: although both cases involve reliance on an unconstitutional
statute, the unconstitutionality of the statute in V-1 Oil was a close call, whereas
the unconstitutionality of the Rawlins derelict vehicle ordinance is obvious.
As an initial matter, the constitutional inquiry in V-1 Oil was substantially
more complex than it is here. There, the relevant statute was the Wyoming
Environmental Quality Act, and the constitutional question was whether the act fit
within an exception to the warrant requirement for “pervasively regulated
businesses.” Resolution of this constitutional question required a multi-stage
inquiry. First, the Court had to determine whether V-1 Oil was part of a
-19-
pervasively regulated industry, taking into account the various federal, state, and
local regulations governing gasoline dealers, and comparing those regulations to
the regulatory regimes in other industries. V-1 Oil, 902 F.2d at 1486. After
concluding that V-1 Oil was, in fact, a pervasively regulated industry, the Court
had to determine whether the authorized inspection was “reasonable,” applying
the three-part test of New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987). The most
important part of this test, the Court found, was the requirement that the statute
“provide[] a constitutionally adequate substitute for a search warrant,” V-1 Oil,
902 F.2d at 1486, which means that the statute (1) “must be sufficiently
comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot help but
be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for
specific purposes,” and (2) “must be carefully limited in time, place, and scope.”
Id. at 1485-86 (internal quotations omitted), quoting Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-03.
After a fairly detailed statutory analysis, the Court concluded that the statute was
not “sufficiently comprehensive and defined” to provide a constitutionally
adequate substitute for a warrant, and was therefore unconstitutional. See id. at
1487.
The question then becomes, should the officer in V-1 Oil have known that
the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act was unconstitutional? We thought not.
We do not expect even reasonable officers to conduct and resolve complicated,
-20-
multi-part constitutional tests. And that is precisely what was required in V-1 Oil.
An officer confronting the constitutional issue in V-1 Oil would have to wade
through several layers of multi-part inquiries before he even reached the
dispositive standards. Once he reached those standards (Is the statute
“sufficiently comprehensive and defined,” and is it “carefully limited in time,
place, and scope”?), he would find that they were much more difficult to apply
than a bright-line rule. Finally, even if the officer knew how to apply those
standards, he would find that the facts of V-1 Oil presented a close case—indeed,
we and the district court disagreed on the ultimate resolution of the constitutional
issue. Under these circumstances, it would be too much to expect the officer to
know that the statute was unconstitutional.
The constitutional inquiry in Mr. Reed’s case, by contrast, is markedly
simpler. Does the statute deprive an individual of a protected property interest?
If so, does the statute provide a hearing? In the context of the Rawlins derelict
vehicle ordinance, these are not difficult questions and they yield a clear result. It
is therefore not too much to expect Mr. Reed to know that the ordinance was
unconstitutional.
IV.
In spite of the layers of complexity built up around the doctrine of qualified
immunity, the fundamental inquiry is fairly simple: should the officer have known
-21-
that his conduct was unlawful? For the reasons set forth above, we find that Mr.
Reed should have known that his conduct was unlawful, and we therefore
REVERSE the district court’s grant of immunity and its dismissal of Mrs.
Lawrence’s claims, and REMAND for further proceedings.
-22-
04-8030, Lawrence v. Reed
HARTZ , Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The Supreme Court opinion providing for qualified
immunity in “extraordinary circumstances” despite the violation of clearly
established law, Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982), gives little
guidance on what circumstances are “extraordinary.” The majority may well
have construed the term correctly. But the very concerns expressed in Harlow
suggest to me that Sheriff Reed is entitled to qualified immunity.
Recognition of qualified immunity balances the interest in vindicating the
rights of a victim injured by a violation of law against the “social costs” of suits
against government officials: “the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official
energy from pressing public issues, . . . the deterrence of able citizens from
acceptance of public office, [and] the danger that fear of being sued will ‘dampen
the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials],
in the unflinching discharge of their duties.’” Id. at 814 (quoting Gregoire v.
Biddle , 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J.)) (second brackets in
original).
Before Harlow, qualified immunity was unavailable if the official “knew or
reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official
responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiff, or if he took
the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional
rights or other injury.” Id. at 815 (internal emphasis, brackets, and quotation
marks omitted). But requiring proof of the subjective element of this defense
“frequently ha[d] proved incompatible with [the] admonition . . . that
insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial.” Id. at 815-16. The official’s
subjective good faith was a question of fact that ordinarily could not be resolved
by summary judgment. Id. at 816. Not only did officials therefore have to bear
the burden of trial, but also the issue could justify searching, burdensome
discovery of the official’s thought processes. Id. at 816-17.
To ease these burdens Harlow held “that government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id. at
818. “Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct, as
measured by reference to clearly established law,” the Court explained, “should
avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many
insubstantial claims on summary judgment.” Id.
Thus, the purpose of the objective clearly-established-law test was to act as
a shield to protect public servants from litigation, not as a sword to impose
liability on them. The Court recognized, however, that the clearly-established-
-2-
law test also can serve as the standard for imposing liability. The traditional
qualified-immunity test had denied immunity when the official knew or
reasonably should have known that the action was unlawful, id. at 815; and the
Court observed that “[i]f the law was clearly established, the immunity defense
ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know
the law governing his conduct.” Id. at 818-19. At this point the Court introduced
the exception to the clearly-established-law test that we grapple with in this case:
“Nevertheless,” it said, “if the official pleading the defense claims extraordinary
circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the
relevant legal standard, the defense should be sustained. But again, the defense
would turn primarily on objective factors.” Id. at 819.
It seems to me that the meaning of extraordinary circumstances must be
examined in light of the policies underlying the Harlow decision. The policy
behind Harlow’s objective test was to permit prompt termination of litigation that
is unlikely to succeed. Overly strict application of that test, however, could
undermine the policy of protecting reasonably competent public officials from
litigation. Given the complexities of the law today, it should not be surprising to
find intelligent, conscientious, well-trained public servants who do not know all
the clearly established law governing their conduct. The statement in Harlow that
-3-
reasonably competent public officials know clearly established law, id. at 818-19,
is a legal fiction.
Nevertheless, the objective test, and the legal fiction it embraces, can
advance the policies behind qualified immunity if the extraordinary-circumstances
exception is properly understood. The extraordinary-circumstances exception
should encompass those situations in which the legal fiction does not make sense
and applying that fiction would create problems that qualified immunity is
intended to avert. In my view, this goal can be advanced by including as an
extraordinary circumstance the official’s reliance on specific advice by a
nonsubordinate attorney of sufficient stature regarding the specific challenged
action. Although, as I previously stated, it is doubtful that reasonably competent
public officials actually know all the clearly established law governing their
conduct, it is largely true that reasonably competent public officials are
sufficiently versed in the law that they know not to take certain actions without
seeking proper legal advice. If they violate clearly established law without
having sought legal advice, holding them liable makes good sense. But there is
little sense in holding officials liable for unlawful action that received the
imprimatur of properly sought legal advice. The Harlow legal fiction should not
be extended to say that reasonably competent public officials know when the legal
advice they receive is contrary to clearly established law.
-4-
Moreover, to extend the legal fiction that far would undermine a critical
purpose of qualified immunity—reducing “the danger that fear of being sued will
dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible public
officials, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.” Id. at 814 (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted). Surely public policy favors the practice of
public officials seeking legal advice regarding questionable practices. Is it wise
to hold those officials liable when they follow that advice? When the proper
discharge of the official’s duties requires action, do we want the official to flinch
in acting—because of fear of litigation—even after counsel advises that the action
is lawful? Thus, in my view, incorrect legal advice is an extraordinary
circumstance cloaking an official with qualified immunity when, as here, it comes
from the highest level nonsubordinate attorney with whom the official is to
consult and the attorney is fully informed of the planned action and the
surrounding circumstances.
As I understand them, this court’s precedents are consistent with this view.
We have recognized four considerations in determining whether reliance on
counsel constitutes extraordinary circumstances: “[1] how unequivocal, and
specifically tailored to the particular facts giving rise to the controversy, the
advice was, [2] whether complete information had been provided to the advising
attorney(s), [3] the prominence and competence of the attorney(s), and [4] how
-5-
soon after the advice was received the disputed action was taken.” V-1 Oil Co. v.
Wyo. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality , 902 F.2d 1482, 1489 (10th Cir. 1990) (internal
citations and footnotes omitted). The relevance of the first two considerations is
obvious: the official is not entitled to rely on advice unless the official has
provided the attorney with all relevant information and the advice authorizes the
specific action taken by the official.
The third and fourth factors—the stature of the attorney and the time to
take action—are interrelated. One should seek the best possible legal advice that
time allows. For example, if immediate action is required, there may be time to
consult with only an assistant city attorney; if the assistant has expertise on the
applicable law, it may be appropriate to rely on the assistant’s advice. I would
reject Ms. Lawrence’s argument on appeal that the extraordinary-circumstances
test cannot apply here because there was no need for Chief Reed to act
immediately. Chief Reed consulted with the City Attorney. What was the Chief
to do with the extra time—go to the law library to check whether the City
Attorney had misread the cases?
I disagree with the majority’s reading of our precedents as requiring the
public official to discuss the pertinent law with the advising lawyer. In the real
world—not the world of legal fictions—officials, even the most competent of
them, go to counsel with an idea of what they want to do and inquire whether
-6-
there is some law (constitutional, statutory, regulatory, or case-based) that
prohibits or restricts them from doing so. The attorney does not need the
official’s legal advice or argument to reach a conclusion. What is important is
whether the official provides all relevant information concerning both the
problem and the intended course of conduct.
I suspect that the greatest hurdle for Chief Reed is the Supreme Court’s use
of the term “ extraordinary circumstances” in delineating this exception to the
clearly-established-law rule. How can one view the seeking of legal advice as
extraordinary ? Public officials do it, and should do it, all the time. It truly is an
extraordinary circumstance, however, when a public official is prevented from
knowing a clearly established legal proposition because the official is misdirected
by a fully informed chief counsel. It certainly appears that reported cases are
rare.
Perhaps some may fear the possibility of collusion between the public
official and the government attorney, with the official seeking a free pass from
the attorney for conduct they both know to be unlawful. This fear of collusion is
one reason why reliance on advice from private counsel that conduct is lawful is
not a defense to crime under the Model Penal Code § 2.04 and in almost every
jurisdiction. See 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.6(e)(4) (2d
ed. 2003). On the other hand, the Model Penal Code § 2.04(3)(b)(iv) recognizes a
-7-
defense for reasonable reliance on “an official interpretation of the public officer
or body [who undoubtedly relied on government counsel] charged by law with
responsibility for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of the law
defining the offense.” And surely the risk of collusion is less when turning to a
nonsubordinate government attorney than when relying on a private attorney paid
by the person seeking clearance. Moreover, the government attorney who may be
tempted to shield a public official from liability would likely be deterred by the
risk of his or her own liability in authorizing a specific unlawful act despite being
fully informed of the circumstances.
In the present case Sheriff Reed fully informed the City Attorney of the
relevant surrounding circumstances and how he intended to proceed. The City
Attorney gave his imprimatur. It would be contrary to Harlow’s underlying
concern about “dampen[ing] the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most
irresponsible public officials, in the unflinching discharge of their duties,” 457
U.S. at 814, to tell officials like the sheriff that they cannot rely on their chief
nonsubordinate government attorneys but must postpone action (to conduct their
own research or call a professor at the nearest law school?) or risk being sued.
I would affirm the judgment below.
-8-