F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 1, 2005
PUBLISH
PATRICK FISHER
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 04-2072
JUAN CARLOS CONTRERAS-
MARTINEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico
(D.C. No. CR-03-2495-WPJ)
Vicki Mandell-King, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Raymond P. Moore,
Federal Public Defender, with her on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant.
Reeve Swainston, Assistant United States Attorney (David C. Iglesias, United
States Attorney, and David N. Williams, Assistant United States Attorney, on the
brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before SEYMOUR, BALDOCK and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.
Juan Carlos Contreras-Martinez appeals the district court’s imposition of a
consecutive sentence for his violation of supervised release. We affirm.
I.
On April 17, 1999, Mr. Contreras pled guilty in Arizona district court to
one count of illegally reentering the United States after deportation subsequent to
an aggravated felony conviction, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2).
The court sentenced him to 51 months imprisonment followed by a 24-month term
of supervised release. Mr. Contreras was released from federal custody on
January 13, 2003, and deported to Mexico. His period of supervised release was
to run from the date of his release until January 12, 2005.
On May 6, 2003, Mr. Contreras was arrested in New Mexico after he was
again found to be in the United States illegally. He pled guilty once again, this
time in the District of New Mexico, to illegal reentry after deportation subsequent
to an aggravated felony conviction. An Arizona probation officer filed a petition
to revoke Mr. Contreras’ supervised release, contending he had violated his
conditions of release by committing a federal offense during his term of
supervision. Jurisdiction on the revocation petition was subsequently transferred
to the District of New Mexico.
The New Mexico district court sentenced Mr. Contreras to a term of 30
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months imprisonment on the illegal reentry charge. The court thereafter held a
hearing on the revocation petition and found Mr. Contreras had violated his
conditions of supervised release. The court sentenced him to 21 months for the
violation of supervised release pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 7B1, to be served
consecutively to the 30-month term the court had ordered for his most recent
illegal reentry. On appeal, Mr. Contreras contends the district court erred by
failing to impose concurrent sentences for his immigration and supervised release
violations.
II.
In sentencing for a violation of supervised release, the court must consider
“the applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(B). One relevant guideline, U.S.S.G.
§ 5G1.3, is applicable to “Imposition of a Sentence on a Defendant Subject to an
Undischarged Term of Imprisonment.”
At the time of Mr. Contreras’ sentencing, § 5G1.3(a) required a consecutive
sentence when the defendant committed the instant offense while serving a term
of imprisonment, or before the defendant began serving such a term. Section
5G1.3(b) required a concurrent sentence when “a term of imprisonment resulted
from another offense that is relevant conduct to the instant offense of conviction.”
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Section 5G1.3(c), a policy statement, applied in any other case involving an
undischarged term of imprisonment, and authorized the district court to impose a
sentence to run concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively to the
undischarged sentence “to achieve a reasonable punishment.” The parties agree
subsection (a) did not apply here. Rather, Mr. Contreras contends subsection (b)
mandated the imposition of a concurrent sentence because his illegal reentry and
violation of supervised release sentences were based on the same underlying
relevant conduct.
Because Mr. Contreras failed to argue at sentencing that the court was
required, as a matter of law, to order the sentence it imposed for the supervised
release violation to run concurrently with the sentence imposed for his illegal
reentry, we review this claim for plain error. United States v. Hurlich, 348 F.3d
1219, 1220 (10th Cir. 2003). The plain error test requires Mr. Contreras to
demonstrate the district court (1) committed error, (2) that is plain, and (3) affects
substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). If Mr.
Contreras meets his burden of establishing the first three prongs of the plain error
test, we may exercise discretion to correct the error if it “seriously affect[s] the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Johnson v.
United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1997) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 736).
Here, however, we need not examine the second, third, or fourth prongs of the
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plain error test because we conclude the district court committed no error.
“U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)’s central aim is to ensure no defendant is punished
twice for the same crime.” United States v. Moyer, 282 F.3d 1311, 1316 (10th
Cir. 2002) (internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, § 5G1.3(b) provides
“credit[] for guidelines purposes [to] defendants who have already served time –
generally in another jurisdiction – for the same conduct or course of conduct.”
United States v. Johnson, 40 F.3d 1079, 1082 (10th Cir. 1994) (internal
quotations omitted). We thus declined in Moyer to apply § 5G1.3(b) where a
defendant’s conduct resulted in revocation of a term of probation plus an
additional sentence, because the original term of probation stemmed from a
separate offense. 282 F.3d at 1317; see also United States v. Tisdale, 248 F.3d
964, 974, 976-77 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that § 5G1.3(c) provides a district
court with discretion to sentence defendant consecutively or concurrently where
conduct giving rise to the instant offense resulted in revocation of probation).
Similarly, Mr. Contreras’ conduct, his 2003 illegal reentry, resulted in revocation
of his term of supervised release and an additional sentence because the original
term of supervised release stemmed from a separate offense: his 1999 illegal
reentry. Consequently, § 5G1.3(b) simply did not apply in the instant case.
Moreover, at the time of Mr. Contreras’ sentencing, application note 3(C)
to § 5G1.3(c) specifically provided that
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[s]ubsection (c) applies in cases in which the defendant was on federal or
state probation, parole, or supervised release at the time of the instant
offense and has had such probation, parole, or supervised release revoked.
Consistent with the policy set forth in Application Note 4 and subsection (f)
of §7B1.3 (Revocation of Probation or Supervised Release), the
Commission recommends that the sentence for the instant offense be
imposed consecutively to the sentence imposed for the revocation.
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, cmt. n.3(C) (emphasis added). 1 This cross-reference makes it
clear that § 7B1.3(f) is the more appropriate sentencing provision when a
defendant’s supervised release has been revoked.
In the Introduction to Chapter 7, Part A, of the guidelines, the Sentencing
Commission states:
Under 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(3), the Sentencing Commission is required to
issue guidelines or policy statements applicable to the revocation of
probation and supervised release. At this time, the Commission has chosen
to promulgate policy statements only. These policy statements will provide
1
Under § 5G1.3(c), the sentencing court has the discretion to impose a
sentence concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively to the prior
undischarged term of imprisonment. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c). As this court has held:
§ 5G1.3(c) imposes no duty on the sentencing court but merely provides
that, in any case not covered by the other two sections, the sentence “may
be imposed to run concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively to
the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable
punishment for the instant offense.” The use of the permissive word “may”
and the reference to the need to achieve a reasonable punishment clearly
contemplate an individualized examination of particular factors and an
exercise of sentencing discretion by the sentencing court in assessing those
factors.
United States v. Tisdale, 248 F.3d 964, 978 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal citation
omitted).
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guidance while allowing for the identification of any substantive or
procedural issues that require further review. The Commission views these
policy statements as evolutionary and will review relevant data and
materials concerning revocation determinations under these policy
statements. Revocation guidelines will be issued after federal judges,
probation officers, practitioners, and others have the opportunity to
evaluate and comment on these policy statements.
U.S.S.G. Ch. 7, pt. A. Consistent with this statement, we have recognized that the
Chapter 7 provisions dealing with violations of supervised release are not
mandatory sentencing guidelines; rather, they merely constitute “advisory” policy
statements. United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d 1210, 1218 (10th Cir. 2004).
“Although the policy statements regarding revocation of supervised release are
advisory rather than mandatory in nature, they must be ‘considered by the trial
court in its deliberations concerning punishment for violation of conditions of
supervised release.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 957 F.2d 770, 774 (10th
Cir. 1992)). We made clear in Tsosie that “we will not reverse [a revocation
sentence imposed by the district court] if it can be determined from the record to
have been reasoned and reasonable.” Id. 2 See also United States v. Tedford, No.
04-7079, 2005 WL 1023434, at *2 (10th Cir. May 3, 2005)
2
This is the precise analysis now required for the application of all
sentencing guidelines by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 766 (2005) (citing United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d 1210,
1218-19 (10th Cir. 2004), for an example of the “reasonableness” standard of
review); see also United States v. Cotton, 399 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2005)
(holding new standard of review under Booker same as one used on review of
supervised release revocation).
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Our review of the record convinces us the district court in this case
committed no error in exercising its discretion and sentencing Mr. Contreras to
consecutive terms of imprisonment. The court received a memorandum from the
Arizona probation office which stated: “Provisions of Chapter Seven, including
the revocation range, are policy statements intended to provide guidance and are
not binding on the Court. § 7A1.” Rec., vol. II at 16. The memorandum stated on
the next page:
In the case of a Grade B violation, any term of imprisonment
imposed upon the revocation of supervised release shall be ordered to
be served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment that the
defendant is serving, whether or not the sentence of imprisonment
being served resulted from the conduct that is the basis of the
revocation of supervised release. § 7B1.3(f).
Id. at 17. Notwithstanding the seemingly mandatory language of § 7B1.3(f),
when the memorandum and the Chapter 7 provisions are read as a whole it is clear
the sentencing court was informed that § 7B1.3(f) is merely an advisory policy
statement. In addition, at Mr. Contreras’ sentencing hearing, the court entertained
an argument from defense counsel detailing why the court should impose
concurrent rather than consecutive sentences, further indicating the court knew
the Chapter 7 policy statements were not binding. In fact, nothing on the record
before us suggests the district court was unaware of the advisory nature of §
7B1.3(f).
The Chapter 7 policy statements applicable to Mr. Contreras recommend
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revocation of supervised release and a term of imprisonment from 21 to 27
months because Mr. Contreras’ conduct violating supervised release was a “Grade
B” violation and he was in Criminal History Category VI at the time of his
original sentencing. U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1(a)(2), 7B1.3(a)(1), 7B1.4(a). Thus, it
was Mr. Contreras’ criminal history category and his commission of a Class B
violation – not relevant conduct – that resulted in the 21 to 27 month guideline
range. U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a).
The violation of a condition of supervised release is a breach of trust and,
while the sentencing court at revocation takes into account the seriousness of the
underlying crime, it is primarily the breach of trust that is sanctioned. U.S.S.G.
Ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. The district court was well within its discretion to
order Mr. Contreras’ sentence for violation of his supervised release to run
consecutively to his sentence for illegal reentry. In other words, the court’s
election to apply the Chapter 7 advisory policy statement exactly as written was
not unreasonable. See Tsosie, 376 F. at 1218 (applying reasonableness standard
to revocation sentence).
Mr. Contreras argues that because the district court gave no reasons for its
discretionary decision to impose consecutive sentences, we cannot determine
whether the sentences were reasoned and reasonable. We disagree. A court faced
with a violation of supervised release is required to “consider” various factors set
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forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in exercising its discretion in sentencing. Id. §
3583(e)(3); see also United States v. Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir.
2004). 3 In Kelley, we “made it quite clear that the sentencing court is not
required to consider individually each factor listed in § 3553(a) before issuing a
sentence.” Id. at 1305. Moreover, we do not “demand that the district court
‘recite any magic words’ to show us that it fulfilled its responsibility to be
mindful of the factors that Congress has instructed it to consider.” Id. at 1305
(internal quotation omitted). 4
As we previously noted, prior to sentencing the district court reviewed a
memorandum from the probation office stating that the provisions of Chapter 7
3
Those factors include: the nature and circumstances of the offense; the
history and characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence imposed to
afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and provide the defendant with
needed educational or vocational training, medical care or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner; pertinent guidelines; pertinent policy
statements; the need to avoid unwanted sentence disparities; and the need to
provide restitution. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
4
In United States v. Rose, we noted that § 3553(c) imposes a general burden
on the district court, which extends to all cases, to “state in open court the reasons
for its imposition of the particular sentence.” See 185 F.3d 1108, 1111-12 (10th
Cir. 1999) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)). As a result, we held it was error for the
district court to impose consecutive terms under 18 U.S.C. § 3584 without any
statement in the record of the court’s reasoning because it left the panel in the
“zone of [appellate] speculation.” Id. at 1112-13. The present case is
distinguishable from Rose because § 7B1.3(f) explicitly recommends consecutive
sentences, and as we discuss above, the record indicates the district court made it
clear it was following this recommendation in imposing its sentences
consecutively. Consequently, we are not in the “zone of appellate speculation.”
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applied to Mr. Contreras’ sentence and that these provisions were “not binding on
the Court.” Moreover, at the revocation hearing the court entertained arguments
from both Mr. Contreras and his counsel concerning concurrent sentencing.
Ultimately, the court stated on the record it was sentencing Mr. Contreras
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 7B1, and then imposed a consecutive sentence that is
consistent with the guidelines and policy statements. We are thus convinced the
court properly considered the nature and circumstances of Mr. Contreras’ offense,
his criminal history, and all other relevant factors when it sentenced him to
consecutive terms of imprisonment. Under these circumstances, we have no
difficulty concluding the court’s sentence was reasoned and is reasonable.
Finally, Mr. Contreras contended for the first time at oral argument that the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005),
applies to his appeal and warrants a remand for resentencing. Specifically, Mr.
Contreras argues that the district court erroneously sentenced him to consecutive
sentences under a mandatory guidelines system. Because Mr. Contreras did not
raise his Booker argument in the district court, we review for plain error. Id. at
769 (emphasizing whether a new sentencing hearing is required depends on
“ordinary prudential doctrines,” such as “whether the issue was raised below and
whether it fails the ‘plain-error’ test”).
In Booker, the Court held the appropriate remedy for any Sixth Amendment
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violation resulting from the guidelines’ mandatory nature was to sever and excise
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), rendering the guidelines advisory. Id. at 756-57. The
Court also made clear the new advisory-guidelines system applies retroactively on
direct review, whether or not a Sixth Amendment violation is present in any given
case. Id. at 769 (“we must apply today’s holdings – both the Sixth Amendment
holding and our remedial interpretation of the Sentencing Act – to all cases on
direct review”) (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987)). Because
the guidelines governing revocation of supervised release are policy statements,
however, the district court was functioning under a sentencing regime that even
before Booker was advisory with respect to violations of supervised release. See
United States v. Fleming, 397 F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 2005). The district court
knew that it was not bound by the Chapter 7 policy statements. Mr. Contreras’
Booker claim fails the first prong of plain error analysis precisely because in
exercising its discretion to impose consecutive sentences, the district court
committed no error.
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM.
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