F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
August 22, 2005
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
DAVID A. PEREZ, SR.; TONY B.
VIGIL; HAROLD PORTER; and
JAMES D. PORTER,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v. No. 04-2181
T. GLENN ELLINGTON; JAMES
BURLESON; DAVID FERGESON;
RICKY A. BEJARANO; and JAVIER
LOPEZ, in their individual capacities,
Defendants-Appellants,
---------------------------------------------
TOM TALACHE, Governor of Nambe
Pueblo; HERBERT YATES, Tribal
Councilman of Nambe Pueblo;
TAXATION & REVENUE
DEPARTMENT, STATE OF NEW
MEXICO,
Movants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. No. CIV-03-361 JP/LFG)
John B. Pound of Long, Pound & Komer, P.A., Santa Fe, New Mexico, for
Defendants-Appellants.
Daniel Yohalem (Richard Rosenstock with him on the brief), Santa Fe, New
Mexico, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Before BRISCOE, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
McKAY, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from the district court’s denial of summary judgment
based on a claim of qualified immunity and absolute immunity. Defendants-
Appellants are officials from the New Mexico Tax and Revenue Department
(TRD). The underlying facts surrounding this lawsuit are detailed and quite
involved. In light of the narrow issues presented by this appeal, we only recite
the facts relevant to our holding.
Plaintiffs, a faction of the Nambé Pueblo Indian Tribe, entered into a
contract with Mr. Ken Newton (acting for Gasplus, his gasoline distribution
corporation) regarding the management of Nambé Pueblo’s gasoline distribution
business (Gasplus agreement). Plaintiffs entered into the Gasplus agreement on
behalf of the Nambé Pueblo Development Corporation (NPDC). The NPDC is a
registered gas distributor and can take advantage of the gas tax deduction for
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Indian tribal distributors in the state of New Mexico. 1 Mr. Newton had previously
been investigated by TRD officials for his involvement with a fraudulent tax
scheme designed to illegally take advantage of such tax breaks.
Defendants, officials from the TRD, were contacted by Nambé Pueblo’s
governor, 2 Tom Talache (Governor Talache), numerous times regarding the
Gasplus arrangement. In a series of clandestine meetings, Governor Talache
voiced his concern to TRD officials about the validity of the Gasplus agreement.
After hearing Governor Talache’s accounts of Plaintiffs’ involvement with Mr.
1
N. M. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-4(F) (Michie 2004) states that
[the following] gasoline may be deducted from the total amount of
gasoline received in New Mexico during the tax period:
gasoline received in New Mexico and sold by a registered Indian
tribal distributor from a nonmobile storage container located within
that distributor’s Indian reservation, pueblo grant or trust land for
resale outside that distributor’s Indian reservation, pueblo grant or
trust land; provided the department certifies that the distributor
claiming the deduction sold no less than one million gallons of
gasoline from a nonmobile storage container located within that
distributor’s Indian reservation, pueblo grant or trust land for resale
outside that distributor’s Indian reservation, pueblo grant or trust
land during the period of May through August 1998; and provided
further that the amount of gasoline deducted by a registered Indian
tribal distributor pursuant to this subsection shall not exceed two
million five hundred thousand gallons per month, calculated as a
monthly average during the calendar year . . . .
Governor Talache is part of a political faction within Nambé Pueblo
2
opposed to Plaintiffs’ faction and was upset with the Gasplus agreement, an
agreement in which he took no part.
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Newton and Gasplus, Defendants decided to investigate the matter. 3
Fearing that a traditional investigation of the nation would prove difficult
because of tribal sovereign immunity protections, Defendants decided to issue a
jeopardy tax assessment against Plaintiffs. A jeopardy tax assessment is a method
used by New Mexico tax officials in emergency situations when an official
“reasonably believes that the collection of any tax for which a taxpayer is liable
will be jeopardized by delay . . . .” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-1-59(A) (Michie 2004).
Such jeopardy tax assessments give tax officials greater latitude to investigate
potential tax offenders. In this case, by issuing the jeopardy tax assessments,
Defendants were able to obtain access to Plaintiffs’ financial records.
Defendants’ decision to issue the jeopardy tax assessments was buttressed
by an opinion from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) that found the Gasplus
agreement invalid. After some preliminary investigation, Defendant Fergeson
agreed with the BIA’s conclusion regarding the invalidity of the Gasplus
agreement, and he reported this to Defendant Ellington who, in turn, issued a lien
against Plaintiffs’ property pursuant to the New Mexico Tax Administration Act.
Upon completion of its audit, however, Defendants determined that there
was nothing illegal about Plaintiffs’ agreement with Gasplus. Consequently, TRD
3
Defendant Ellington, a TRD official, allegedly knew of the factional
animosity within the Nambé Pueblo between Governor Talache and the previous
tribal administration which included the Plaintiffs.
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recommended an abatement of the jeopardy tax assessments. The abatements
were signed on March 11, 2002, by a TRD official and authorized a month later.
However, the liens associated with the tax assessments were not released until
July 1, 2003, more than one year later. 4
As a result of the above, Plaintiffs brought various claims under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1982, and 1983. Defendants asserted the defense of qualified and
absolute immunity and moved for summary judgment on each of the claims. The
district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all of Plaintiffs’
claims except their § 1983 claim based on the First Amendment right of
association. The district court held there to be “a question of material fact as to
whether the Defendants acted in an objectively reasonable manner,” Aplt. App.,
Vol. I, at 413 (Dist. Ct. Order), from which a reasonable juror could find a
deprivation of constitutionally protected rights by retaliating against Plaintiffs for
their association with Mr. Newton. The district court also denied Defendants’
claim of absolute immunity. Defendants brought this interlocutory appeal from
the denial of summary judgment on that claim.
Generally, we have jurisdiction to review purely legal questions that arise
from the denial of qualified immunity. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528
4
Typically, the tax liens associated with the jeopardy assessments are
released at the same time as the jeopardy assessment abatement.
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(1985). Our inquiry focuses on “whether the facts alleged . . . support a claim of
a violation of clearly established law.” Id. at 528 n.9. If our de novo review of
Plaintiffs’ version of the facts reveals that they do not amount to a violation of a
clearly established right, we can reverse on an interlocutory basis. Conversely, if
Plaintiffs’ version of the facts amounts to the violation of a clearly established
constitutional right, we lack jurisdiction to review the denial of summary
judgment on an interlocutory basis if Plaintiffs’ version of the facts is disputed.
We review de novo a district court’s denial of a summary judgment motion raising
qualified immunity questions. Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir.
2001).
It is first necessary to determine exactly which clearly established
constitutional right Plaintiffs claim Defendants violated. In this appeal, Plaintiffs
allege Defendants’ retaliatory actions violated their First Amendment right to
association. The First Amendment bars retaliation for exercising the right of
association. See DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1990).
Although retaliation is not expressly discussed in the First Amendment, it may be
actionable inasmuch as governmental retaliation tends to chill citizens’ exercise
of their constitutional rights. ACLU of Md., Inc. v. Wicomico County, 999 F.2d
780, 785 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
First Amendment retaliation claims are generally brought in the public
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employment context. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
In this case, Plaintiffs are not employed by Defendants, and no contractual
relationship exists between the parties. When the retaliation claim is not
grounded in the public employment context, we employ the substantive standard
we announced in Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir.2000). Therefore, to
establish a violation of the First Amendment right to associate, Plaintiffs must
demonstrate: “(1) that [they were] engaged in constitutionally protected activity;
(2) that [Defendants’] actions caused [Plaintiffs] to suffer an injury that would
chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; and
(3) that [Defendants’] adverse action was substantially motivated as a response to
[Plaintiffs’] exercise of constitutionally protected conduct.” Worrell, 219 F.3d at
1212 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In this case, Plaintiffs have alleged that they were unconstitutionally
discouraged from associating with non-tribal members because of Defendants’
retaliatory action. Plaintiffs support this allegation citing Defendants’ quick
issuance of the jeopardy tax assessments, Defendants’ failure to follow the normal
procedures for issuing jeopardy tax assessments, and Defendants’ failure to timely
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release the liens after their abatement. 5
Assuming the factual allegations above are true, it is necessary to determine
whether the law is so clearly established that under such circumstances persons of
“ordinary firmness” would be deterred from associating. Or, in other words,
whether the type of conduct above is so egregious that an official would be on
clear notice that his actions would deter the ordinary person from continuing in
that association. From the facts of this case, we hold that a reasonable factfinder
could conclude that Defendants caused Plaintiffs an injury sufficient to meet that
standard; Defendants’ quick decision to issue jeopardy tax assessments against
Plaintiffs could, if ultimately found by the jury to be the case, chill a reasonable
person from associating with an outside distributor who, as the facts of this case
show, happened to be at odds with Defendants. See Mimics, Inc. v. Village of
Angel Fire, 394 F.3d 836, 847 (10th Cir. 2005).
As to the third element of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claim,
Defendants’ extreme delay in releasing the liens on Plaintiffs’ property evidences
a retaliatory motive. See DeLoach, 922 F.2d at 620 (“An act taken in retaliation
for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable under § 1983
even if the act, when taken for a different reason, would have been proper.”)
Plaintiffs claim to have experienced various problems with their credit
5
because of the liens.
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(citation omitted).
We conclude that “the facts alleged . . . support a claim of a violation of
clearly established [First Amendment right to associate] law.” See Mitchell, 472
U.S. at 528 n.9. We point out that Defendants may be able to rebut Plaintiffs’
allegations at trial. Defendants may be able to convince the trier of fact that their
actions were all based on a good faith belief that Plaintiffs were involved in an
illegal agreement with Gasplus and that Defendants’ extreme time lapse in
releasing the liens after the agreement was determined to be legal was purely a
result of Defendants’ negligence. However, because the record contains evidence
from which a factfinder could conclude that Plaintiffs have established a violation
of clearly established law, the district court did not err in denying Defendants’
motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim.
Defendants also appeal the district court’s ruling that they are not entitled
to absolute immunity. Defendants ask to be treated like prosecutors because of
the unique nature of their positions as tax assessment officials and to find them
absolutely immune from suit. Aplt. Br. at 28. We find this argument to be
without merit, and affirm the district court’s ruling.
We review determinations of absolute immunity de novo. Scott v. Hern,
216 F.3d 897, 908 (10th Cir. 2000). State officials are absolutely immune from
suit if they “perform functions analogous to those of a prosecutor in initiating and
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pursuing civil and administrative enforcement proceedings.” Pfeiffer v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1484, 1490 (10th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted).
Absolute immunity does not extend to actions “that are primarily investigative or
administrative in nature” but, instead, attaches only to actions which a prosecutor
must perform while fulfilling his duty as an officer of the court. Id. (quotation
omitted).
We apply a functional approach to determine whether absolute immunity
applies to a defendant. This approach requires us to examine “the nature of the
function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.” Malik v.
Arapahoe County Dept. of Social Services, 191 F.3d 1306, 1314 (10th Cir. 1999)
(quotation omitted). “The more distant a function is from the judicial process, the
less likely absolute immunity will attach.” Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 687
(10th Cir. 1990). The state official claiming absolute immunity has the burden of
showing why absolute immunity should apply instead of the more common
qualified immunity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988).
As a general proposition, state officials, like Defendants acting in a merely
investigatory capacity, are not entitled to absolute immunity. See Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (“A prosecutor’s administrative duties and
those investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate’s preparation for
the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings are not entitled to
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absolute immunity.”). Applying the law regarding determinations of absolute
immunity to the facts of this case, we agree with the district court’s opinion on
this point.
The district court’s denial of summary judgment regarding Plaintiffs’ First
Amendment right of association claim is hereby AFFIRMED. The district
court’s denial of absolute immunity is also AFFIRMED.
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