F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
November 9, 2005
PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee/Cross-
Appellant,
v. Nos. 03-2151, 03-2177
STANLEY HOWARD SIMS,
Defendant - Appellant/Cross-
Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico
(D.C. No. CR-00-0193-MV)
Tova Indritz, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Appellant.
David N. Williams, Assistant United States Attorney (David C. Iglesias, United
States Attorney, with him on the briefs), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Appellee.
Before EBEL, BALDOCK, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
This case first arose in an Internet chat room where Stanley Howard Sims
(“Defendant” or “Sims”), using the screenname “Nats565,” began a sexually
explicit conversation with “sweetthingforyou16”—a screenname Sims believed
belonged to a 16-year-old girl named Sue and a 12-year-old named Kate. In fact,
“sweetthingforyou16” was a middle-aged man in Springfield, Missouri, who had
assumed the Internet profile of a teenage dancer named Sue as a gag and who
represented himself as both Sue and Kate to Sims. For months, Sims and
“sweetthingforyou16” exchanged Internet communications of a graphic sexual
nature, with Sims sending sexually explicit images of himself and of other
children to the girls. The FBI became involved, and Sims was ultimately arrested
at a roller-skating rink in Missouri, where he had traveled to meet Sue and Kate.
After a jury trial, Sims was convicted of three counts. Count One involved
attempting to entice a minor to engage in sexual acts in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2422(b). Count Two involved traveling in interstate commerce for the purpose of
engaging in sexual acts with a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). Count
Three involved transporting child pornography by interactive computer system in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1). The district court entered a judgment of
acquittal on Count Four, which involved receiving child pornography in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). Sims was sentenced to 37 months imprisonment and
ordered to pay a $10,000 fine.
On appeal, Sims raises several issues including Fourth Amendment claims
relating to the investigation of his conduct, First Amendment and other challenges
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to his convictions, and several sentencing arguments. The Government also
cross-appeals aspects of Sims’s sentence, including the district court’s application
of an acceptance of responsibility adjustment and the decision to grant a nine-
level aberrant behavior departure.
After briefing in this case, Sims was permitted to file a supplemental brief
with an argument that his sentence was constitutionally defective under Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). After oral argument, this court permitted
further briefing from both sides relating to United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738
(2005).
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM Sims’s
conviction but REVERSE his sentence and REMAND for resentencing.
BACKGROUND
At the time of the events in question, Sims was employed as an engineer at
the National Transuranic Waste Program in Carlsbad, New Mexico. He had no
prior criminal history. We review the facts only to the extent necessary to decide
the issues presented in this appeal.
In September 1999, Sims, using the screen name “Nats565,” began using an
Internet chat room to converse with “sweetthingforyou16.” As far as Sims knew,
this screen name belonged to a 16-year-old girl named Sue Walker and was shared
by a 12-year-old named Kate, whom Sue babysat. Over a period of five months,
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Sims communicated with “sweetthingforyou16” frequently, usually daily, in chat
rooms and through instant messages. These conversations were of a sexual
nature. He gave the girls his personal e-mail address, and Sims eventually began
attaching sexually explicit images, of himself and of other children, to the e-mail
messages.
In reality, Sims was actually communicating with Michael Walker, an adult
male in Missouri. According to Walker, he created the profile
“sweetthingforyou16,” identifying himself as “Sue,” a dancer, as a gag, and he
was approached by “Nats565” in a Yahoo! chat room for persons interested in
model airplanes. Walker posed as a 16-year-old named Sue and a 12-year-old
named Kate, and he started saving the e-mails and images sent to “the girls” by
Sims.
In October 1999, Sims began suggesting he would travel to Missouri to
meet Sue and Kate. In his messages, he referred to previous encounters with
other young girls and emphasized that he was gentle and would not hurt the girls.
After Walker reported his Internet communications to the National Center
for Missing and Exploited Children, local police and the FBI became involved.
The FBI ultimately assumed the identities created by Walker and, as
“sweetthingforyou16,” made plans for Sims and the girls to meet at a roller-
skating rink in Missouri. Sims planned to pick up the girls, hide them in the back
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seat of his rental car, and go back to his motel to swim, engage in sexual acts, and
take photographs. Sims was arrested on January 22, 2000, when he arrived at the
roller-skating rink.
At the FBI office where he was taken, Sims signed a “Consent to Search”
form, and his luggage, briefcase, hotel room, rental car, and personal belongings
were searched—producing several cameras and film, gifts he bought for the girls,
and assorted sexual paraphernalia and aids. Sims also made a statement to FBI at
this time.
On the same day, Sims’s home in New Mexico was searched, with the FBI
seizing computer equipment, photographs, travel itineraries, and related items. A
few days later, the FBI searched Sims’s office, seizing other e-mail messages and
travel itineraries. The FBI also obtained a warrant to search the contents of
nineteen floppy disks found in Sims’s possession at the time of his arrest, which
produced several images of child pornography and other graphic e-mail messages.
The grand jury returned a four-count indictment against Sims, charging him
with:
• Count One—attempting to coerce and entice a minor to engage in
sexual acts, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b);
• Count Two—traveling in interstate commerce for the purpose of
engaging in sexual acts with a minor, id. § 2423(b));
• Count Three—transporting by interactive computer system visual
depictions of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct, id. §
2252(a)(1); and
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• Count Four—receiving visual depictions of minors engaging in
sexually explicit conduct, id. § 2252(a)(2).
Sims pled not guilty.
After pre-trial motions, the district court suppressed Sims’s post-arrest
statement on Miranda grounds after finding that Sims had requested, but not been
provided, an attorney. The court did admit the fruits of the consent search
following his arrest after finding Sims’s consent was voluntary and given before
any request for an attorney. The court also admitted the fruits of the other
warrant searches.
The jury convicted Sims on all four counts. The district court, however,
had doubts about whether the government had established real children were
depicted in the images that Sims received and therefore entered a judgment of
acquittal only as to Count Four. United States v. Sims, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1222
(D.N.M. 2002) (“Sims I”); see also United States v. Sims, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1255
(D.N.M. 2003) (“Sims II”) (denying motion to reconsider refusal to acquit as to
Count Three). The district court sentenced Sims to 37 months imprisonment and
a $10,000 fine.
Before trial, the district court noted that “there was evidence presented that
Mr. Sims suffers from brain deterioration.” Sims’s Presentence Investigation
Report (“PSR”) indicates on May 16, 2000, a neurologist conducting an
independent medical examination diagnosed Sims with Frontotemporal Dementia
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(“FTD”), a form of dementia which causes a progressive loss of basic cognitive
abilities.
Sims raises several issues on appeal. He alleges three violations of his
Fourth Amendment rights; asserts that the Government failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the images relied on in Count Three were images of “real
children” and that his convictions for Counts One and Two should be reversed
because they allege impossible acts; and claims several errors in his sentence.
The Government cross-appeals, arguing that the district court erred in
reducing Sims’s sentence based on an acceptance of responsibility adjustment and
in its application of an aberrant behavior departure.
Finally, Sims has supplemented his arguments with a claim that the use of
judicial fact finding to enhance his sentence violates his Sixth Amendment rights
under United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). Sims further argues that the
court’s application of the guidelines in a mandatory fashion is a non-
constitutional error warranting re-sentencing.
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DISCUSSION
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUES
We review the court’s reasonableness conclusions under the Fourth
Amendment de novo. United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1501 (10th Cir.
1996). However, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless clearly
erroneous. Id. We review a denial of a motion to suppress in the light most
favorable to the United States as the prevailing party. United States v. Gordon,
173 F.3d 761, 765 (10th Cir. 1999).
A. Facts
Sims raises three Fourth Amendment issues, which require a brief review of
the facts to analyze. First, early investigation into this case by the FBI and local
law enforcement included two warrantless searches. The first occurred on
January 10, 2000, when an information systems security manager at Sims’s place
of employment searched Sims’s office computer remotely through the server. The
district court suppressed the fruits of this search, finding that it had been done
solely at the behest of law enforcement and that, absent a warrant, it violated
Sims’s Fourth Amendment rights.
The second warrantless search was a nighttime search of Defendant’s office
and computer on January 11, 2000, conducted by Carlsbad police and two of
Sims’s co-workers. With some reservation, the district court accepted the
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government’s assertion that none of the information obtained on January 11 had
been, or would be, relied upon. Therefore, the court denied that portion of Sims’s
motion to suppress as moot.
The source of the instant disputes are (1) whether Sims gave valid consent
to search his car, personal belongings, and hotel room following his arrest; (2)
whether the arrest and search warrants were supported by probable cause where
the attached affidavits relied in part on the excluded fruits of the earlier
warrantless searches; and (3) whether the search of Sims’s office computer was
illegal where the warrant was executed one day late.
B. Consent to search
A warrantless search is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment
unless the government shows that the search falls within one of a carefully
defined set of exceptions, such as valid consent. United States v. Butler, 966
F.2d 559, 562 (10th Cir. 1992). “Before a district court may admit evidence
resulting from a consent search, it must determine from the totality of
circumstances that (1) the defendant’s consent was voluntary and (2) the search
did not exceed the scope of the consent.” U.S. v. Gutierrez-Hermosillo, 142 F.3d
1225, 1231 (10th Cir. 1998). Here, Defendant challenges only the voluntariness
of his consent to search.
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“[T]he question whether a consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or
was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to
be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.” Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). Therefore, “[w]hether voluntary consent
was given is . . . reviewed for clear error.” United States v. Zubia-Melendez, 263
F.3d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir. 2001). The Government establishes voluntariness only
if it (1) produces clear and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal,
specific, and freely given, and (2) proves that consent was given without duress or
coercion, express or implied. Butler, 966 F.2d at 562.
Here, Sims points out that he was arrested at 4:05 p.m., transported to the
FBI field station and placed in an interrogation room with two FBI agents and a
corporal of the Missouri Highway Patrol where he was questioned “until 8:00
p.m.” However, Sims points to no evidence of any coercive police conduct or the
use of any physical force. Instead, Sims asks us to exclude the fruits of this
search because Sims did not understand his rights, thought he had no choice but
to sign the consent form, and signed the consent form “while also asking for a
specific lawyer.” He also argues his consent was involuntary because the district
court found “evidence that Sims suffered from brain deterioration.” According to
Sims, this “made him unable to resist the pressure upon him at that time.”
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However, the district court specifically found that Sims signed the consent
to search form before he invoked his right to counsel. 1 Although there was
conflicting testimony from Sims and law enforcement officers regarding the
sequence of these events, “[e]valuation of the credibility of witnesses, the weight
to be given the evidence, and inferences to be drawn from the evidence are for the
district court.” Hernandez, 93 F.3d at 1498. We see no reason to find the district
court’s understanding of events clearly erroneous.
Moreover, “[w]hile knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to
be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the
sine qua non of an effective consent.” Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227. Indeed, this
court has held that “consent to search may be voluntary even though the
consenting party is being detained at the time consent is given, and law
enforcement agents fail to advise him of his Miranda rights.” United States v.
Dozal, 173 F.3d 787, 796 (10th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted) (collecting cases).
For this court, then, the most troubling issue is whether, given Sims’s
mental condition, his consent was nonetheless the “product of a rational intellect
and a free will” and made with a “mental awareness so that the act of consent was
that of one who knew what he was doing.” United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368,
1
On the other hand, the court did find that Sims’s statement came after he
requested an attorney, and therefore suppressed that statement.
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377 (10th Cir. 1985). This requires both understanding and judgment. However,
our cases have never required perfect mental ability to find a consent to search
was voluntary. E.g., id. at 376-77 (finding argument that consent was involuntary
had “no merit” where defendant was so intoxicated he “was staggering and
swaying as he walked” and slurred his speech but was able to answer officers’
questions and produce his driver’s license upon request); Gutierrez-Hermosillo,
142 F.3d at 1231 (affirming finding that 14-year-old girl gave voluntary consent
to search).
Although the record in this case suggests that FTD is a degenerative
disorder that could ultimately affect Sims’s judgment, Sims has not pointed this
court to any specific evidence of the extent of his impairment at the time of his
consent to search. Indeed, the officers testified that no aspect of Sims’s
dysfunction was apparent to them, and Sims’s co-workers also testified they were
not aware of Sims’s illness prior to his arrest. Indeed, Sims was cognizant
enough to ask for an attorney before he made any statement to the police.
Moreover, the district court found no evidence that the police had attempted to
exploit any of his vulnerabilities. 2
2
Certainly, if we were faced with assessing the voluntariness of Sims’s
confession following a Miranda warning, “coercive police activity is a necessary
predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary.’” Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). In Connelly, the defendant was a chronic
(continued...)
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Based on this evidence, we see no reason to conclude the district court’s
finding that Sims gave voluntary consent was clearly erroneous. Therefore, we
AFFIRM the district court’s ruling that this was a valid consent search.
C. Probable cause to issue warrants
The district court determined that the arrest warrant and the warrants
obtained to search Sims’s office, home computer, and the disks seized from
Sims’s luggage all relied in part on fruits from the illegal January 10, 2000,
warrantless search of Sims’s office. 3
Defendant argues these warrants were
2
(...continued)
schizophrenic who, at the time of his confession, was suffering a hallucination
that the “voice of God” was commanding him to confess. Id. at 161. However,
because the police were unaware of his condition and did not coerce the
confession, the Court refused to suppress it. Id. at 167.
This police-perspective test has not yet been applied directly to a consent to
search in any published circuit case this court has found. The D.C. Circuit
considered the question and noted that “[i]f police coercion . . . is also a
necessary predicate to the finding that a consent to search is not voluntary, then
the subject’s particular ‘vulnerable subjective state’ would be relevant only
insofar as the police knowingly took advantage of the vulnerability in eliciting a
consent to search.” United States v. Hall, 969 F.2d 1102, 1108 n.6 (D.C. Cir.
1992).
We are not called on to answer this question in the instant case because we
conclude Sims’s consent was voluntary despite his brain disorder; however, we
note that since Connelly our cases have continued to rely on the familiar “totality
of the circumstances” test articulated in Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227.
In this appeal, the Government argues that the district court’s decision that
3
this warrantless search was illegal was wrong in light of this court’s subsequent
decision in United States v. Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2002). In
Angevine, we held that a university professor did not have any reasonable
expectation of privacy in his office computer; however, we emphasized that this
(continued...)
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irretrievably tainted by this information and, moreover, that the supporting
affidavits were misleading because Agent Johnson never revealed her
involvement in that warrantless search. Therefore, Sims seeks to have the fruits
of these warrants, including the consent searches coming after his arrest warrant
was executed, suppressed.
When a warrant is tainted by some unconstitutionally obtained information,
we nonetheless uphold the warrant if there was probable cause absent that
information. Cusumano, 83 F.3d at 1250. “An affidavit containing erroneous or
unconstitutionally obtained information invalidates a warrant if that information
was critical to establishing probable cause. If, however, the affidavit contained
sufficient accurate or untainted evidence, the warrant is nevertheless valid.”
United States v. Snow, 919 F.2d 1458, 1460 (10th Cir. 1990).
“In determining whether probable cause supported the issuance of a search
warrant, we give ‘great deference’ to the decision of the issuing magistrate or
judge.” Cusumano, 83 F.3d at 1250 (quoting United States v. Williams, 45 F.3d
1481, 1485 (10th Cir. 1995)). We review only whether the issuing magistrate or
3
(...continued)
issue requires a case-by-case analysis. Id. at 1134-35. We need not decide that
issue here. See United States v. Cusumano, 83 F.3d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir. 1996)
(en banc) (holding that where a warrant is supported by probable cause absent
some disputed information, we should not decide the constitutionality of the use
of that disputed information based on the fundamental rule of judicial restraint).
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judge had a “substantial basis” for finding probable cause, requiring “a practical,
common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit before him . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of
a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of the reviewing court is
simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that
probable cause existed.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Here, in addition to the information coming from the warrantless office
search, the affidavit contained detailed information about Sims’s contacts with
Mike Walker and the FBI’s confirmation, after assuming the
“sweetthingforyou16” identity, that Sims was planning to travel to meet Sue and
Kate. The magistrate had information about the images sent to Walker, messages
and images sent to the FBI, Sims’s detailed plans to go to Missouri to meet Sue
and Kate, and that Sims used both his home and office computers to send these
messages.
In this case, the depth of the affidavit’s specific information regarding
Sims’s suspected activity was more than sufficient to warrant suspicion and give
the magistrate judge a reasonable ground to believe relevant evidence would be
found. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s ruling that the warrants here
were based on probable cause without regard to the prior warrantless searches.
D. Search warrant executed one day late
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Finally, Sims objects that the warrant issued for his office and office
computer allowed a search “on or before” January 24, 2000, but was not executed
until January 25, 2000. Defendant argues that because the warrant had expired by
its own terms one day earlier, the search on January 25 was warrantless and
violated Sims’s Fourth Amendment rights. The district court declined to suppress
the resulting evidence, concluding the error was not of a constitutional magnitude
and not prejudicial.
“The Fourth Amendment does not specify that search warrants contain
expiration dates.” United States v. Gerber, 994 F.2d 1556, 1559 (11th Cir. 1993).
However, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require that a “warrant must
command the officer to . . . execute the warrant within a specified time no longer
than 10 days.” Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 41(e)(2)(A).
In United States v. Pennington, 635 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1980), we
considered a violation of Rule 41’s separate requirement that a federal search
warrant be executed by federal officers and adopted a test that “violations of Rule
41 alone should not lead to exclusion unless (1) there was prejudice in the sense
that the search might not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the
Rule had been followed, or (2) there is evidence of intentional and deliberate
disregard of a provision in the Rule.” Id. at 1389-90 (emphasis added, quotations
omitted); see also United States v. Hugoboom, 112 F.3d 1081, 1087 (10th Cir.
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1997) (declining to apply exclusionary rule to a warrant that magistrate neglected
to limit to execution within a specific time frame given that the search was
executed almost immediately after issuance and easily within the mandatory ten-
day period); United States v. Gibson, 123 F.3d 1121, 1124-25 (8th Cir. 1997)
(holding that a four-day delay between the issuance of the search warrant and its
execution did not violate the “make immediate search” requirement on the face of
the warrant where no police manipulation and probable cause survived when
search did take place).
Although we are here dealing with a violation of the warrant itself, rather
than a violation of Rule 41 per se, we find the same analysis applies to technical
violations of the warrant. If non-prejudicial and unintentional violations of Rule
41 do not result in suppression, then a fortiori technical violations of the warrant
itself compel the same result.
In this case, there was no showing that the one-day delay was the result of
any intentional disregard of the terms of the warrant. Moreover, it was executed
within the 10-day requirement of Rule 41, and there is no evidence the execution
on January 25 rather than January 24 had any effect on the Government’s
probable cause to search Sims’s office computer whatsoever. Indeed, we see no
probable cause reason the search was limited to four days to start. As such, we
affirm the district court.
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II. CONVICTION
Sims claims his conviction in Count Three should be reversed because the
Government failed to prove that the images at issue depicted real children. He
also asserts that his convictions under Counts One and Two should be reversed
because they allege impossible acts.
A. Images involving “real children”
As a threshold matter, we must determine the nature of the burden of proof
involved in this offense. The statute Sims was convicted under penalizes any
person who “knowingly transports . . . in interstate . . . commerce by any means
including by computer . . . any visual depiction, if the producing of such visual
depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
such visual depiction is of such conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1). “Minor,” in
turn, “means any person under the age of eighteen years.” Id. § 2256(1).
We agree with Sims that this statue requires the Government to prove, as an
element of the offense, that the images at issue depict real minors engaged in
sexually explicitly conduct—as opposed to virtual images of such conduct that do
not depict actual children. This conclusion is evident from the face of the statute
and is further supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
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In Free Speech Coalition, the Court held that the Government can prohibit
non-obscene child pornography only to achieve “the State’s interest in protecting
the children exploited in the production process.” Id. at 240, 250 (citing New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982)). Because no real children are used in
production of virtual child pornography, which instead uses youthful-looking
adult actors or computer-generated images, virtual child pornography is not
“speech that itself is the record of sexual abuse.” Id. at 250. Therefore, the Court
held that a statute prohibiting images that only appeared to depict minors or
merely conveyed the impression of depicting minors was unconstitutionally
overbroad. 4 Id. at 258 (invalidating 18 U.S.C. §§ 8(B), (D) (2000)). Although
this same statute is not at issue in this case, the Court’s reasoning supports our
conclusion that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that real
children are depicted in the images giving rise to a § 2252(a)(1) prosecution.
In this appeal, the parties dispute precisely how the Government must meet
this burden. Sims argues that the Government must either (1) identify the actual
4
We note for the purpose of clarification that the Court in Free Speech
Coalition expressly did not decide the constitutionality of “a more common and
lower tech means of creating virtual images, known as computer morphing,”
which is the alteration of “innocent pictures of real children so that the children
appear to be engaged in sexual activity.” Id. at 242 (citing 18 U.S.C. §
2256(8)(C)). However, the Court noted that these morphed pictures “implicate
the interests of real children” and therefore might be more likely to implicate the
state’s interest in protecting children from exploitation. Id.
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child victim in the depiction or (2) prove, presumably through expert testimony,
that the images were not computer generated.
However, our cases since Free Speech Coalition have consistently held that
juries can review the images themselves to determine whether real children are
depicted. Indeed, in United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1083 (2003), we considered a defendant’s challenge to his
conviction under the same statute at issue here on the ground that Free Speech
“requires either direct evidence of the identity of children in the proscribed
images or expert testimony that the images depicted are those of real children
rather than computer generated ‘virtual’ children.” Id. at 1140. The Government
had introduced only the e-mails and images retrieved from the defendant and his
computer. Id. at 1135-36. We concluded:
Free Speech Coalition, did not establish a broad, categorical
requirement that, in every case on the subject, absent direct evidence
of identity, an expert must testify that the unlawful image is of a real
child. Juries are still capable of distinguishing between real and
virtual images; and admissibility remains within the province of the
sound discretion of the trial judge.
Id. at 1142.
Although in Kimler we were specifically reviewing only for plain error,
Kimler’s underlying conclusion that the content of an image in many cases can
speak for itself and suffice to prove that real children are depicted has been
affirmed and applied in several subsequent cases. E.g., United States v. Riccardi,
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405 F.3d 852, 870-71 (10th Cir. 2005) (experts not always necessary to assist
juries in determining unidentified images depict actual minors); United States v.
Cervini, 379 F.3d 987, 993 n.4 (10th Cir. 2004) (juries can determine “based on
the image alone and without expert evidence, that the image is actual”); United
States v. Harms, 371 F.3d 1208, 1213 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “where no
evidence suggests that the images are anything other than real, the government
need offer no supporting evidence beyond the images themselves”). 5
Therefore, we hold that the Government has the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the images at issue in a § 2252 prosecution depict actual
minors. However, this does not necessarily require expert testimony or
identification of the actual child victims. See Kimler, 335 F.3d at 1142. Instead,
juries often will be able to distinguish between real and virtual images, and
“where no evidence suggests that the images are anything other than real, the
government need offer no supporting evidence beyond the images themselves.”
Harms, 371 F.3d at 1213.
With this analysis of the Government’s burden in mind, we turn to the
issues of the instant case. On appeal, Sims argues (1) that there was insufficient
5
In addition, several of our sister circuits have agreed. See, e.g., United
States v. Deaton, 328 F.3d 454, 455 (8th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); United States v.
Hall, 312 F.3d 1250, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Farrelly,
389 F.3d 649, 653 (6th Cir. 2004).
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evidence of “real children” in his case and (2) that the jury was given an incorrect
instruction as to this element. 6
6
At the outset, we note that Sims’s trial was conducted under circumstances
that concern this court. Prior to opening statements, outside the presence of the
jury, the parties debated the nature of the Government’s burden of proof on this
real children issue. At that point, the district court instructed defense counsel:
I’m not familiar with the case law on this issue. I’m not going to
permit you to inject it in your opening statement, or to question on it.
I will take a look at the case law on this issue sometime today and
give you a ruling, but for purposes of opening statement, you will not
be permitted to raise the question as to—or to challenge the issue as
to whether they are real children or not.
Later, after analyzing the pre-Free Speech Coalition case law on point, the district
court concluded—again outside the presence of the jury—that proof that the
children depicted are real children “is not an element required by the Government
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Certainly, this was an inaccurate statement of the law at the time. See Sims
I, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1226 (recognizing error). Sims’s inability to cross examine
witnesses or discuss in his opening statement the real children issue raises real
concerns about the fairness of Sims’s trial. However, Sims does not claim any
due process violation in his opening brief and instead asserts only the
insufficiency of the evidence and jury instruction issues. Certainly, a defendant
can waive a constitutional claim. See United States v. Green, 405 F.3d 1180,
1190-91 (10th Cir. 2005).
In addition, Sims’s position at trial, as reflected in his proposed jury
instruction on the point, was that if “the government has not proved that the
images involved here are not computer-generated, then you must find Mr. Sims is
not guilty.” Indeed, Sims wanted to propose a jury instruction explaining the
process of “morphing” innocent images of children into depictions of children
engaged in sexually explicit conduct and noting that “[t]he technology of
computer-imaging makes it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish computer-
generated from photographic depictions of child sexual activity.”
Aside from attempting to inject this near-impossible burden on the
Government to prove this negative, Sims has presented no evidence that would
cast any doubt on the authenticity of the images at issue in this case whatsoever.
Indeed, there is a total failure of proof as to what Sims’s cross-examination of any
(continued...)
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1. Sufficiency of the evidence
Sufficiency of the evidence is a legal issue that we review de novo. United
States v. Dashney, 117 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1997). However, we will not
reverse a jury verdict unless no jury, presented with the evidence introduced at
trial together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Our review of this issue is significantly hampered by the fact that Sims
selected only two of the e-mails, and the two sets of images attached to those e-
mails for our review of the sufficiency of the evidence on Count Three. The fact
that Sims did not include all of the evidence in the record for our review is
“virtually fatal” to his claim that there was insufficient evidence below. Kimler,
335 F.3d at 1138.
6
(...continued)
witness would have been or what it would have done to help Sims’s case.
Moreover, although Sims renewed his argument about the government’s burden at
the close of the Government’s case, and immediately before closing arguments,
Sims never renewed his objection when any witnesses were on the stand. Absent
a more definitive district court ruling, it is difficult to review any purported
errors. See generally United States v. Mejia-Alarcon , 995 F.2d 982, 987 (10th
Cir. 1993). However, most fundamentally, absent any actual proffer of evidence
or suggestion as to how specific witnesses could have assisted his case, it is
essentially impossible to find prejudice.
- 23 -
Sims points out that the images he did designate are the same images the
district court relied on when it found “substantial” evidence that real children
were involved in Count Three and therefore denied Sims’s motion for a judgment
of acquittal on that count. However, we review a denial of a judgment of
acquittal de novo in the light most favorable to the government and therefore are
not bound only to rely on the images the district court used. See Riccardi, 405
F.3d at 870.
Based only on the secondhand descriptions of the evidence at trial, which is
all that has been provided us, we are more than convinced a reasonable jury could
have inferred from the images, and from Sims’s statements regarding those
images, that they depicted real children.
2. Jury instructions
“The question of whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of
law, and thus, our review is de novo.” United States v. Lee, 54 F.3d 1534, 1536
(10th Cir. 1995). However, “[w]e review the district court’s refusal to give a
particular jury instruction for abuse of discretion.” Id. “In assessing whether the
court properly exercised that discretion, a reviewing court must examine the
instructions as a whole to determine if they sufficiently cover the issues in the
case and focus on the facts presented by the evidence.” Id.
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Here, Sims asserts that the jury’s instructions failed to inform the jury they
had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the images involved in Count Three
depicted real children. However, the instruction given did articulate an accurate
standard:
The defendant can be found guilty of the offense charged in count 3
only if all of the following facts are proved beyond a reasonable
doubt:
That on or about September, 1999, until and including
January 22nd, 2000;
Second, the defendant knowingly transported or shipped
a visual depiction in interstate or foreign commerce by
any means, including by computer;
And third, the production of such visual depiction
involved the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct;
Fourth, that such visual depiction is of a minor engaged
in sexually explicit conduct;
And fifth, that the defendant knew that such visual
depiction was of sexually explicit conduct;
And sixth, the defendant knew that at least one of the
persons engaged in sexually explicit conduct in such
visual depiction was a minor.
A minor for purposes of this offense is a person under the age of 18.
(Emphasis added). Before reading this instruction, the court also summarized the
charge against Sims by saying he was accused of “knowingly transport[ing] . . .
visual depictions of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct which were
produced using minors engaged in such conduct.”
We have implied that a similar instruction requiring the jury to find that
“the production . . . involves the use of a minor engaging in sexual activity”
- 25 -
would be proper after Free Speech Coalition. See United States v. Pearl, 324
F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir. 2003).
Although we agree that future instructions might be more clear on the
requirement that the Government prove real children are depicted, this instruction
accurately states the law. Therefore, we affirm the district court.
3. Conclusion
Accordingly, although this case certainly comes to us under unusual
circumstances, based on the limited record before us, and the limited issues
presented for our review, we AFFIRM Sims’s conviction for Count Three. 7
B. Impossible acts
In Count One, Sims was convicted for attempting to coerce and entice a
minor to engage in sexual acts in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). In Count
Two, Sims was convicted for traveling interstate for the purpose of engaging in
sexual acts with a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). There is no dispute
both of these counts specifically involved “Kate,” the fictitious 12-year-old
persona assumed by Michael Walker, an adult male, and later the FBI. Sims
argues that because Kate does not exist, he could not be convicted of violating
either statute because there was no actual minor involved, only adult men who
7
Because we find no reversible error in Sims’s Count Three conviction, we
deny Sims’s further argument that his trial on Counts One and Two was so tainted
by Count Three that a new trial is warranted.
- 26 -
“communicated extensive fantasy with Walker misrepresenting . . . age and
gender.”
Initially, we see nothing impossible about traveling with a specific purpose,
which the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt he did. Therefore, we reject
Sims’s claim as to Count Two as meritless. See United States v. Han, 230 F.3d
560, 562-63 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing nature of offense).
Moreover, as to his Count One conviction for attempting to entice a minor,
“[f]actual impossibility is generally not a defense to criminal attempt because
success is not an essential element of attempt crimes.” United States v. Hankins,
127 F.3d 932, 934 (10th Cir. 1997). We agree with our sister circuits that this
general rule applies to the case at bar—that is, it is not a defense to an offense
involving enticement and exploitation of minors that the defendant falsely
believed a minor to be involved. United States v. Root, 296 F.3d 1222, 1227
(11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Farner, 251 F.3d 510, 512-13 (5th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705, 717 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, we affirm
Sims’s convictions on these counts.
- 27 -
III. Sentencing
The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. ----,
125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), has fundamentally changed the way defendants are
sentenced. However, even after Booker, district courts must still consult and take
into account the Guidelines when sentencing. United States v. Doe, 398 F.3d
1254, 1257 n.5 (10th Cir. 2005). Moreover, when assigning sentences outside of
the Guidelines-authorized range, district courts “should also continue to apply the
Guidelines departure provisions in appropriate cases.” United States v.
Sierra-Castillo, 405 F.3d 932, 936 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005).
Here, we consider a pre-Booker sentence. “[W]e review legal questions de
novo and we review any factual findings for clear error, giving due deference to
the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.” Doe, 398 at 1257;
see also United States v. Souser, 405 F.3d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 2005).
This case raises several sentencing issues. Both Sims and the Government
challenge the calculation of Sims’s offense level and the district court’s decisions
regarding departures. In addition, Sims claims the court erred in assessing a
$10,000 fine. Finally, Sims alleges the district court committed constitutional and
non-constitutional Booker error. Ultimately, we agree with the Government that
the district court erred in applying acceptance of responsibility adjustment and in
departing on the basis of aberrant behavior. Therefore, we reverse and remand
- 28 -
for resentencing. Given this disposition, we need not address any of Sims’s
Booker claims. See, e.g., Doe, 398 at 1257 n.5 & 6; United States v. Cano-Silva,
402 F.3d 1031, 1039 (10th Cir. 2005).
A. Calculation of Guidelines range
1. Acceptance of responsibility
On cross-appeal, the Government argues that the district court erred in
granting Defendant a three-level acceptance of responsibility adjustment. The
district court found “that the defendant’s confession at the time of the arrest . . .
is sufficient to establish acceptance of responsibility.”
However, the application note to the acceptance of responsibility guideline
provides that this “adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the
government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual
elements of guilt.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, appl. n.2. There are, however, “rare
situations” where a defendant may “demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility
for his criminal conduct even though he exercises his constitutional right to a
trial” such as “where a defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do
not relate to factual guilt (e.g., to make a constitutional challenge to a statute or a
challenge to the applicability of a statute to his conduct).” Id. There, “a
determination that a defendant has accepted responsibility will be based primarily
upon pre-trial statements and conduct.” Id.
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Our cases make equally clear that acceptance of responsibility adjustments
after trial are very rare. See United States v. Wooten, 377 F.3d 1134, 1145-46
(10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Salazar-Samaniega, 361 F.3d 1271, 1280-82
(10th Cir. 2004). Indeed, in the one case in which we approved the practice, the
defendant “admitted to all the conduct with which he was charged” but “simply
disputed whether his acknowledged factual state of mind met the legal criteria of
intent” required by the applicable statute. United States v. Gauvin, 173 F.3d 798,
806 (10th Cir. 1999). To the contrary, where the defendant argued there was
insufficient evidence to prove the factual element, the right to claim an
acceptance of responsibility adjustment is forfeited. Salazar-Samangiega, 361
F.3d at 1281.
In this case, Sims did contest an essential factual element of the crime;
therefore, an acceptance of responsibility adjustment is not available here.
Although Sims responds on appeal that he went to trial to preserve First
Amendment issues relating to the lack of evidence that the images at issue
depicted real children, as well as certain “substantive constitutional issues . . .
including the denial of several pre-trial motions,” we are not convinced even this
motivation would distinguish Sims’s case from Salazar-Samangiega. Moreover, it
is clear Sims did contest his factual innocence as to Counts One and Two. He
argued that his conversations with “sweetthingforyou16” were nothing but sexual
- 30 -
fantasy, his purpose for traveling to Missouri was a business meeting, and he was
trapped and provoked.
This is not the rare situation in which an acceptance of responsibility
adjustment is available after a full jury trial. Because this clearly affected the
district court’s selection of the sentence imposed, we reverse and remand for
resentencing. See Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992).
2. Grouping
Next, Sims challenges the court’s “grouping”of Sims’s multiple counts in a
manner that resulted in a two-level increase from an offense level of 31 to 33. 8
His essential arguments are that the district court erred by not grouping all of his
When a defendant is convicted of multiple counts, the sentencing court
8
determines a single base offense level by a process called grouping:
Roughly speaking, when a defendant has been convicted of multiple counts,
the Guidelines require the sentencing court to divide the counts into distinct
groups of closely related counts, compute the offense level for each group,
and then determine the combined offense level by increasing the highest
offense level for any group by an amount based on the number of “units,”
which depends upon the number of groups with offense levels comparable
to the highest level.
United States v. Jose-Gonzalez, 291 F.3d 697, 700 (10th Cir. 2002); see
also U.S.S.G. ch. 3, pt. D. The Guidelines provide that “[a]ll counts involving
substantially the same harm shall be grouped together into a single Group.”
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. Generally, counts involve substantially the same harm when
they involve the same victim, transaction, or criminal objective; are measured
based on the same quantity of a substance that is the basis for total harm; or share
a specific guideline offense characteristic. Id.
- 31 -
counts together based on a single, shared harm to society in general and in
creating two separate groups for attempting to entice both Sue and Kate when
these girls were in fact the product of a single imagination and sexual conduct
with Sue, 16, would not have been “prohibited.” 9
As to this first argument, we disagree with Sims that the only victim of his
offenses was society. The guideline itself provides that society-at-large is the
victim only where “there are no identifiable victims (e.g., drug or immigration
offenses . . . ).” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, appl. n.2. Here, Sims attempted to engage in
sexual acts with specific minors, and if Sue and Kate had “been available, they,
rather than society in general, would have been harmed.” United States v. Butler,
92 F.3d 960, 963-64 (9th Cir. 1996). We agree with the Ninth Circuit in Butler
that fictitious children, used as part of an undercover sting operation, may be
treated as separate victims for grouping purposes.
9
Sims also objects to the district court’s application of a cross-reference to
reach this original base offense level based on a finding that Sims traveled “for
the purpose of producing a visual depiction” of a minor engaged in sexually
explicit conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1(c)(1). However, Sims’s arguments here
have no merit. The district court did not have to find that the singular purpose of
Sims’s trip was to produce child pornography, and there was more than sufficient
evidence that this was a purpose of his trip. Sims sent e-mails to another adult
saying he would send pictures of the girls when he returned, emailed Sue and
Kate about taking pictures of them, and had at least three cameras in his
possession when he was arrested at the roller-rink.
- 32 -
This conclusion is bolstered by the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1, which
has been amended since Sims’s offense conduct to expressly define the victim of
an enticement offense to “include an undercover law enforcement officer.”
U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1, appl. n.1; see also id. at app. C, amend. 592 (2001 manual) at
1074, 1083 (making amendment effective November 1, 2000). Although Sims
argues this amendment is a substantive change that cannot be applied to him
without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause, see United States v. Swanson, 360
F.3d 1155, 1166 (10th Cir. 2004), we disagree. In its reasoning statement for
Amendment 592, the Commission did not discuss this addition to § 2G1.1
specifically but did say, in the context of a very similar addition in § 2A3.2, that
several definitions were added “including clarifying that ‘victim’ includes an
undercover police officer who represents to the perpetrator of the offense that the
officer was under the age of 16 years.” U.S.S.G., app. C, amend. 592 at 1082
(emphasis added).
In addition, we have already found another aspect of Amendment 592,
which the Commission described as “clarif[ying] the meaning of the term ‘item’ .
. . [and] adopt[ing] the holding of all circuits that have addressed the matter that a
computer file qualifies as an item for purposes of the enhancement” to be
clarifying. United States v. Thompson, 281 F.3d 1088, 1092-93 (10th Cir. 2002)
(quotation omitted). As in Thompson, here the effect of Amendment 592 is to
- 33 -
create a guideline consistent with the existing precedent in Butler and to revise a
commentary note rather than a guideline. In addition, the Commission has
characterized it, at least in the explanation of a parallel change in § 2A3.2, as
“clarifying.” Therefore, we agree with the district court that the victims for the
groups here at issue in Count One were the fictitious girls, not society at large.
As to Sims’s alternative argument that his conduct as to Count One should
not have resulted in separate groups for Sue and Kate, we find little merit. 10 Sims
asserts that Sue and Kate were products of the same imagination and sexual
conduct with a 16-year-old would not have been “prohibited.”
We reject the idea that two fictitious victims from a single undercover
operation must be treated as a single victim for grouping purposes. This is
inconsistent with the reasoning of Butler, 92 F.3d at 963-64, which permitted
three fictitious minor identities to be grouped as three separate victims.
We also reject Sims’s argument that sexual conduct with 16-year-old Sue,
as she was presented in the e-mail and instant message exchanges, would not have
been prohibited. Prohibited sexual conduct is defined as “any sexual activity for
10
As a matter of Guidelines application, we note that the Guideline for
Count One expressly provides: “If the offense involved more than one victim,
Chapter Three, Part D (Multiple Counts) shall be applied as if the promoting of
commercial sex act or prohibited sexual conduct in respect to each victim had
been contained in a separate count of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1. Therefore,
the fact that there are two groups for this single Count One conviction is
consistent with the Guidelines.
- 34 -
which a person can be charged with a criminal offense” and includes “the
production of child pornography.” U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1 (cross-referencing to
definition at § 2A3.1, appl. n.1). Although Sims asserts that the age of consent to
sexual relations in the federal jurisdiction is 16, see 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a), the
Guidelines definition is not so limited. Sims could have been charged with a
multitude of offenses had he engaged in sexual conduct with Sue—including
Missouri’s second degree statutory rape offense. See Mo. Stat. Ann. § 566.034
(penalizing anyone over 21 having sex with someone under 17). Therefore, we
find no error in the court’s grouping in this case.
B. Departure issues
The district court refused to depart on the grounds of diminished capacity
or based on a combination of discretionary factors pushed by Sims. However, the
court did depart down nine levels on the basis of aberrant behavior. Both sides
appeal.
1. Jurisdiction
We have no jurisdiction to review a district court’s “discretionary decision
to deny a motion for downward departure on the ground that a defendant's
circumstances do not warrant the departure.” Sierra-Castillo, 405 F.3d at 936.
Instead, our review extends only to “the very rare circumstance that the district
court states that it does not have any authority to depart from the sentencing
- 35 -
guideline range for the entire class of circumstances proffered by the defendant.”
United States v. Brown, 316 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 2003).
Here, Sims sought a departure on a combination of discretionary factors
including victim misconduct, the likelihood of abuse in prison, and a combination
of factors including Sims’s unlikelihood of his recidivism, job loss, and age. The
district court concluded a discretionary departure was not warranted on these
grounds. Because the court clearly knew it had authority to depart on these
grounds but simply elected not to do so in this case, we cannot entertain these
issues on appeal.
On the other hand, in denying the diminished capacity departure, the
district court explained that Sims was “not qualified, and is therefore, ineligible
for a departure based on diminished capacity, because [Sims’s] offense conduct
involves a serious threat of violence. The Court views this fact as disqualifying it
from permitting a reduction based on diminished capacity.” Therefore, we have
jurisdiction to review this specific denial of a departure. See, e.g., United States
v. Mitchell, 113 F.3d 1528, 1535-36 (10th Cir. 1997).
2. Diminished capacity
The diminished capacity policy statement permits a sentence below the
applicable guideline range if the defendant suffered from a significantly reduced
mental capacity. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13. “However, the court may not depart below
- 36 -
the applicable guideline range if . . . the facts and circumstances of the
defendant’s offense indicate a need to protect the public because the offense
involved actual violence or a serious threat of violence.” Id.
Upon Defendant’s motion for a departure based on diminished capacity in
this case, the district court noted that “the defendant has established by a
preponderance of the evidence that his dementia significantly impaired his mental
abilities.” However, the district court believed Sims was ineligible for such a
departure because the “offense involved actual violence or a serious threat of
violence.”
Section 5K2.13 does not define which offenses, or what offense conduct,
involve actual violence or a serious threat of violence. However, in United States
v. Constantine, we found it obvious that a threat of violence was “inherent” in a
conviction for possession of a firearm, and that the diminished capacity guideline
was therefore inapplicable in that case. 263 F.3d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir. 2001).
Other potentially violent crimes to which this bar has been applied include bank
robberies, threatening communications, and kidnapping. See Andrew M.
Campbell, Annotation, Downward Departure under § 5K2.13 of United States
Sentencing Guidelines, 128 A.L.R. Fed. 593 §§ 20-24.
We have found no “clear or obvious error” where a district court
determined that both enticing a minor and traveling for the purpose of engaging in
- 37 -
sexual acts with a minor are crimes of violence under the definition in 18 U.S.C.
§ 16. United States v. Johnson, 183 F.3d 1175, 1179 (10th Cir. 1999). The Sixth
Circuit has also held that enticing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct
for the purpose of producing a visual depiction is a crime of violence under
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 because it presents a serious potential risk of physical injury.
United States v. Champion, 248 F.3d 502, 506 (6th Cir. 2001). Moreover, the
commentary for § 2A3.1, the guideline Sims was sentenced under for Count Two
(traveling with intent to engage in sexual conduct with a minor), specifically
states: “Sexual offenses addressed in this section are crimes of violence. Because
of their dangerousness, attempts are treated the same as completed acts of
criminal sexual abuse.” 11 Id. § 2A3.1, appl. n.5.
Based on this, we easily agree with the district court that Sims’s offenses
included a serious threat of violence. Therefore, a departure based on diminished
capacity is not permissible under the guidelines.
11
Indeed, we have regularly held crimes involving sexual contact with
minors to be crimes of violence. See, e.g., United States v. Rowland, 357 F.3d
1193, 1197-98 (10th Cir. 2004) (affirming “crime of violence” classification
under § 4B1.2 where “Oklahoma’s statutory definition of sexual battery presents
the serious possibility of risk of physical injury”) (citations omitted); United
States v. Vigil, 334 F.3d 1215, 1223-24 (10th Cir. 2003) (concluding risk of
injury “inherent” in Colorado’s aggravated incest offense makes it a crime of
violence under § 4B1.2 even though, like arson or burglary, there might be some
cases where incest occurs without actual physical injury).
- 38 -
3. Aberrant behavior
Finally, we consider the district court’s decision to depart downward nine
levels on the basis of aberrant behavior. 12 The guideline provides that “[a]
sentence below the applicable guideline range may be warranted in an
extraordinary case if the defendant’s criminal conduct constituted aberrant
behavior. . . . ‘Aberrant behavior’ means a single criminal occurrence or single
criminal transaction . . . without significant planning[,] . . . of limited duration[,
and that] represents a marked deviation by the defendant from an otherwise law-
abiding life.” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.20 & appl. n.1. The commentary specifically
include a defendant’s “record of prior good works” and “motivation for
committing the offense” as proper circumstances to consider in departing on these
grounds. Id. at appl. n.1. However, the departure requires more than just the
absence of a prior criminal record. United States v. Benally, 215 F.3d 1068, 1074
(10th Cir. 2000).
In deciding to depart here, the district court emphasized Sims’s (1) medical
condition, (2) long history of living an “exemplary” law-abiding life, (3)
significant support from family and friends, (4) prior history of close relationships
12
Both the Government and Sims object to the size of this departure.
Predictably, the Government asserts it was unreasonably large while Sims claims
it was too small where the district court earlier suggested it would depart ten
levels. Because we ultimately conclude the aberrant behavior departure was not
warranted at all, we do not reach these issues of degree.
- 39 -
with children without any sexual abuse reports, and (5) continued good behavior
subsequent to his arrest. However, the Government asserts that Sims is not
qualified for such a departure because he distributed pornographic images on the
Internet for almost a year and spent months planning his trip to Missouri to meet
Sue and Kate.
Certainly, we can agree with the district court’s finding that Sims’s
criminal behavior represented “a marked deviation by the defendant from an
otherwise law-abiding life.” However, we simply cannot decipher how Sims’s
well-planned, detailed scheme over the course of several months to entice and
rendevous with minor girls, as well as what seems to be repeated distribution of
child pornography, was a “single criminal occurrence or single criminal
transaction . . . without significant planning [and] of limited duration.” In cases
with similar facts, courts have not permitted such a departure. E.g., United States
v. Orrega, 363 F.3d 1093, 1097-98 (11th Cir. 2004) (no aberrant behavior
departure where defendant convicted of enticing minor to engage in sexual acts
where defendant had two 90-minute online conversations, almost one month apart,
with undercover agent posing as 13-year-old girl, during which he requested that
they engage in sexual acts, he sent naked picture of himself to agent, arranged
meeting place, and drove to meeting place).
- 40 -
Furthermore, here we cannot consider Sims’s mental condition as a grounds
for a diminished capacity departure because the crime involves a risk of violence,
and we cannot agree that the Guidelines permit the use of aberrant behavior as an
end run around this limitation. Therefore, giving Sims’s extended planning and
enticement of Sue and Kate, combined with frequent distribution of child
pornography, we must reverse this departure.
C. Fine
Finally, Sims objects to the court’s imposition of a $10,000 fine. Although
Sims did make some objections to the PSR’s asset calculation, Sims did not object
to any fine-related issue at the sentencing hearing. Therefore, we review this fine
for plain error.
Sims’s current financial situation does appear to be problematic, as he lost
his engineering job in New Mexico and, according to Sims’s own objection to the
PSR, “was not represented by counsel in his divorce proceedings and his former
wife was left with all the assets and defendant ended up with only the debts.”
The PSR also notes, however, that “[a]ccording to the defendant, he and his ex-
wife chose to divorced [sic] for financial purposes; however, they continue to
reside together as a family.” Moreover, prior to the divorce, Defendant “reported
having various trust and retirement accounts which had an aggregated value of
one million dollars.”
- 41 -
We are struck by the fact that Defendant appears to have concealed assets
by getting a divorce for financial purposes . Given these suspicious
circumstances, we cannot say the district court committed plain error in setting
the fine at $10,000 in this case. Therefore, we affirm this fine.
IV. Conclusion
We AFFIRM Sims’s convictions and the district court’s pre-trial rulings in
this case. We REVERSE the district court’s sentence as to the acceptance of
responsibility adjustment and the aberrant behavior departure. We REMAND
with instructions to vacate Sims’s sentence and to resentence under advisory
Guidelines. Therefore, we do not reach Sims’s Booker claims. 13 14
Before this court is also Sims’s motion to strike portions of the
13
Government’s brief referencing Sims’s suppressed confession and a pending civil
proceeding unrelated to the instant case. Because we have not relied on any of
the contested information in reaching this decision, we deny Sims’s motion. Sims
also requested additional oral argument on the Booker issues in this case.
Because we do not need to reach those issues here, we DENY that request.
14
Sims’ Motion to Supplement the Record on Appeal is granted.
- 42 -