F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
February 22, 2006
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
JOHN L. BERREY, Chairman;
COLLEEN WILSON AUSTIN;
EDWINA FAYE BUSBY; REBERTA
HALLAM KYSER; FLORENCE
MATHEWS; ARDINA REVARD
MOORE; JEAN ANN LAMBERT;
EDWARD RODGERS, individually
and on behalf of all other members of
the Quapaw Tribe of Oklahoma
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs, No. 04-5131
and
THE QUAPAW TRIBE OF
OKLAHOMA (O-GAH-PAH),
Plaintiff-Counter-
Defendant-Appellant,
v.
ASARCO INCORPORATED, Sued as:
Asarco, Inc.; CHILDRESS ROYALTY
COMPANY, sued as: Childress
Royalty Comp., Inc.; DOE RUN
RESOURCES CORPORATION, sued
as: The Doe Run Resources Corp.;
EAGLE-PICHER INDUSTRIES, INC.;
NL INDUSTRIES, INC.; UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA; GALE
NORTON, United States Department
of Interior; PUTATIVE CLASS
MEMBERS; BILLYE D. ALBRIGHT;
JAMES E. GILMORE; BEATRICE A.
GRIFFIN; EMMA LOU GRIFFIN;
JULY GRIFFIN PEBEAHSY;
BUDDY L. RICHARDS; FRED L.
RICHARDS; YAUNAK
STEPHENSON; JOHN DOE, sued as:
John & Jane Does 1-300; JANE DOE,
sued as: Jane Does 1-300; CYNTHIA
D. HOLI BLANCHARD; JEB
DEHANAS; PATRICIA ANN
GILLENWATER; LINDA L.
HOLIDAY; SARAH D. JUSTICE;
BETTY LEE McDONALD; MYRON
MOUNTFORD; DONNA RAE
REEVES; JACQUELINE CE
STILLWELL; GEORGE VALLIERE;
JUDY GARNER VANDERFLUTE;
BETTY J. WEITHONER; MARY
LOU WORKS; JOHN DOE, sued as
John and Jane Does 301-600
(Landowners); JANE DOE, sued as
John and Jane Does 301-600
(Landowners),
Defendants,
and
BLUE TEE CORPORATION, sued as:
Blue Tee Corp.; GOLD FIELDS
MINING CORPORATION, LLC, sued
as: Gold Fields Mining Corp.,
Defendants-Counter-
-2-
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. 03-CV-846-H(C)
Stephen R. Ward (Shelley L. Carter, with him on the briefs), Conner & Winters,
LLP, Tulsa Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant.
Stanley D. Davis, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP, Kansas City, Missouri (Kirk F.
Marty, Rebecca J. Schwartz, Barbara M. Smith, Shook, Hardy & Bacon, LLP,
Kansas City, Missouri; Robert J. Joyce, Joyce, Paul & McDaniel, P.C., Tulsa,
Oklahoma, with him on the brief), for Defendants-Counter-Claimants-Appellees.
Before HENRY, McWILLIAMS and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
I. Introduction
Plaintiff-Appellant Quapaw Tribe brought suit against Defendants-
Appellees Blue Tee Corporation and Gold Fields Mining, alleging Defendants and
their predecessors in interest caused environmental contamination on Quapaw
lands as a result of their mining activities in the 1900s. Defendants asserted
counterclaims for contribution and indemnity. The Tribe filed a motion to
dismiss Defendants’ counterclaims, arguing they were barred by tribal sovereign
immunity. The district court denied the motion. It concluded the Tribe had
-3-
waived its immunity as to Defendants’ counterclaims, which sounded in
recoupment, by filing suit. The Tribe appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Osage Tribal Council v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 187
F.3d 1174, 1179 (10th Cir. 1999). Because a tribe waives its sovereign immunity
as to counterclaims sounding in recoupment by filing suit, and Defendants’
counterclaims for common law contribution and indemnity are claims in
recoupment, we affirm.
II. Background
The issue on appeal is the propriety of an order denying a motion to dismiss
Defendants’ counterclaims. We thus recite the facts largely as alleged in the
counterclaims. The United States allotted to the Quapaw lands located in the far
northeastern corner of Oklahoma along Tar Creek. Lead and zinc ores were
discovered in the area in the late 1800s and a period of extensive mining began.
The Tribe and the United States Department of Interior (“DOI”) negotiated
mining leases with various companies, including Defendants’ predecessors in
interest. Many of the mining leases required debris from mining processes,
known as chat, to be deposited in piles where it became the property of the
landowner. The Tribe profited from the sale of this chat for use as road base,
surface material, and railroad ballast in the Tar Creek region and elsewhere.
Mining ended in the 1970s, and in 1983, the Tar Creek Superfund Site was placed
-4-
on the National Priorities List. Among the environmental hazards alleged to exist
at the site are contaminated water runoff from chat piles and former floatation
ponds, acid mine drainage, subsidence of the ground, air pollution, erosion, and
migration of contaminated water and sediment into downstream rivers and lakes.
The Quapaw Tribe owns in fee approximately eighty acres of the Tar Creek
Superfund Site and has an undivided fifty-one percent interest in an additional
forty acres. To initiate a cleanup of the site, the Tribe and several individual
Tribe members brought suit against former mine owners and operators and their
successors in interest. 1 The Tribe asserted claims of public and private nuisance,
trespass, unjust enrichment, strict liability, and deceit by false representations,
nondisclosure, and/or concealment. Subsequently, the Tribe amended its
complaint to add claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9607, and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924, 6972,
and for administrative action in violation of law.
Defendants filed counterclaims for common law contribution and
indemnity, and contribution under CERCLA. The Tribe filed a motion to dismiss
1
The Tribe brought suit as parens patriae under the common law public
trust doctrine. The individual Tribe members sued as representatives of a class of
“former and current owners, and possessors of real property located within the
Quapaw Reservation.”
-5-
Defendants’ counterclaims, arguing they were barred by tribal sovereign
immunity. The district court denied the motion and a subsequent motion to
reconsider, concluding the Tribe waived its sovereign immunity as to claims in
recoupment by suing Defendants. Moreover, the district court determined
Defendants’ counterclaims are claims in recoupment under the test established in
FDIC v. Hulsey, 22 F.3d 1472, 1487 (10th Cir. 1994).
III. Discussion
A. Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, Defendants argue the Tribe’s appeal is jurisdictionally
barred for failure to file a timely notice of appeal. The Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure require a notice of appeal to be filed “within 30 days after
the judgment or order appealed from is entered,” except when the United States is
a party. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). The district court denied the Tribe’s motion to
dismiss on May 18, 2004. The Tribe’s motion to reconsider was denied on June
21, 2004. The Tribe filed an untimely notice of appeal on August 27, 2004. Prior
to this filing, however, the Tribe filed a motion to certify the district court’s order
denying dismissal. 2 The motion to certify was filed on July 21, 2004, the thirtieth
2
The Tribe claims it sought to certify the district court’s order because it
was not clear at the time whether denials of tribal sovereign immunity were
immediately appealable. Five years earlier, however, this court held the denial of
tribal immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.
Osage Tribal Council v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 187 F.3d 1174, 1179 (10th
-6-
day after the district court entered its order denying reconsideration. 3 A footnote
in the motion stated
[s]hould this Court determine that the Tribe’s appeal is by right
under the Collateral Order doctrine, the Tribe requests that the Court
and the parties treat this motion as a notice of appeal, and advise the
Tribe and Defendants of their obligation to proceed before the
Circuit Court, tolling all filing requirements until such order is made.
This motion is filed within the thirty day period for taking appeal,
and therefore notice of appeal is timely if the Court determines that
the Collateral Order doctrine applies.
ROA, Vol. II at 619. The Tribe argues its motion to certify is the functional
equivalent of a notice of appeal.
“An appeal must not be dismissed for informality of form or title of the
notice of appeal.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(4). A filing that is “technically at
variance with the letter of [Rule 3]” satisfies the rule if it is the “functional
equivalent of what the rule requires.” Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992)
Cir. 1999).
3
The time period to file a notice of appeal began after the district court’s
denial of the motion for reconsideration, not its denial of the motion to dismiss.
When a party timely files a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the time to file an appeal runs from the
entry of the order disposing of the Rule 59 motion. Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(4)(A)(iv). The Tribe’s motion for reconsideration was a Rule 59(e) motion
because it was filed within ten days of the district court’s judgment on the Tribe’s
motion to dismiss. Price v. Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1167 n.9 (10th Cir. 2005) (a
motion for reconsideration filed within ten days of a district court’s entry of
judgment is treated as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment). Thus,
the time period for the Tribe’s appeal did not begin to run until the district court
entered its order denying reconsideration.
-7-
(quotation omitted). A document is the functional equivalent of a notice of
appeal if it contains the three elements of notice required by Rule 3(c). See
United States v. Smith, 182 F.3d 733, 735 (10th Cir. 1999). Rule 3(c) requires
that a notice of appeal specify (1) the party taking the appeal, (2) the order being
appealed, and (3) the name of the court to which the appeal is taken. Fed. R.
App. P. 3(c)(1). The purpose of Rule 3(c)’s requirements is to provide all parties
and the court with sufficient notice of a litigant’s intent to seek appellate review.
Barry, 502 U.S. at 248.
The Tribe’s motion to certify met all the requirements of Rule 3(c) and put
Defendants and the district court on notice of its intent to appeal. The Tribe’s
motion stated the Tribe was seeking certification to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals to appeal the district court’s order denying dismissal based on tribal
sovereign immunity. The motion also provided that if certification was
unnecessary because of the collateral order doctrine, the motion to certify was to
be treated as a notice of appeal. Because the Tribe’s motion to certify is the
functional equivalent of a notice of appeal and was timely pursuant to Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a)(1), we have jurisdiction to consider the merits of the Tribe’s appeal. 4
4
For purposes of deciding the jurisdictional issue in this case, we have
assumed Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to orders,
like the order denying tribal sovereign immunity at issue here, that are
immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Rule 58(a)(1) of the
(continued...)
-8-
B. Tribal Sovereign Immunity
The Tribe argues Defendants’ counterclaims are barred by tribal sovereign
immunity. Specifically, the Tribe contends the doctrine of equitable recoupment
does not permit claims against a tribe, like the Quapaw Tribe, that has not waived
its immunity from suit by legislative enactment. Questions of tribal sovereign
4
(...continued)
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a judgment to be set forth on a separate
document, except in limited circumstances not applicable here. When a separate
document is required under Rule 58, the time period for filing a notice of appeal
begins when the judgment is set forth on a separate document or, if the district
court fails to issue a separate document, 150 days after the entry of the order in
the civil docket. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b)(2). The district court did not issue a
separate judgment in this case, and the court’s order denying dismissal does not
satisfy the requirements of Rule 58. See Clough v. Rush, 959 F.2d 182, 185 (10th
Cir. 1992) (concluding fifteen-page order containing detailed legal analysis did
not satisfy separate document requirement). The Advisory Committee Notes to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, suggest that the separate
document requirement does not apply to orders appealable under the collateral
order doctrine. The Committee Notes state “[i]n theory, . . . the separate
document requirement continues to apply to an interlocutory order that is
appealable as a final decision under collateral-order doctrine.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 58
advisory committee’s note (2002 Amendments). The Committee Notes continue,
however, by observing that “[a]ppeal time should start to run when the collateral
order is entered without regard to creation of a separate document and without
awaiting expiration of the 150 days provided by Rule 58(b)(2).” Id. Thus, we
have analyzed the jurisdictional issue in this case on the assumption that the
district court entered an order or judgment for purposes of Rule 4(a) when it
issued its order denying dismissal. The time period to file a notice of appeal then
began to run upon issuance of the order denying the Rule 59 motion to reconsider.
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). Were we to apply Rule 58, however, the outcome
would be the same and this court would have appellate jurisdiction.
-9-
immunity are reviewed de novo. E.F.W. v. St. Stephen’s Indian High Sch., 264
F.3d 1297, 1303 (10th Cir. 2001).
It is well established that Indian tribes possess the common-law immunity
from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers. Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). This immunity includes exemption from suit
without congressional authorization or waiver by the tribe. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe v. Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324, 1344 (10th Cir. 1982). Generally, tribal
sovereign immunity is deemed to be coextensive with the immunity of the United
States. Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe of the Mescalero Reservation, 673
F.2d 315, 319–20 (10th Cir. 1982).
The Supreme Court has recognized that when the United States brings suit,
it impliedly waives its immunity as to all claims asserted by the defendant in
recoupment. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 260–63 (1935). Claims in
recoupment arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, seek the same kind of
relief as the plaintiff, and do not seek an amount in excess of that sought by the
plaintiff. Hulsey, 22 F.3d at 1487. The waiver of sovereign immunity is
predicated on the rationale that “recoupment is in the nature of a defense arising
out of some feature of the transaction upon which the [sovereign’s] action is
grounded.” Bull, 295 U.S. at 262. In Jicarilla, we extended application of the
recoupment doctrine to Indian tribes; thus, when a tribe files suit it waives its
-10-
immunity as to counterclaims of the defendant that sound in recoupment. 687
F.2d at 1344; see also Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Val-U Const. Co., 50 F.3d 560, 562
(8th Cir. 1995).
The Tribe urges us to reconsider our precedent applying the doctrine of
recoupment as a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity in light of United States v.
Dalm, 494 U.S. 596 (1990). The Tribe argues the Supreme Court severely limited
the applicability of the recoupment doctrine in Dalm by holding the doctrine
cannot be used to permit a claim against the United States that is otherwise barred
by the statute of limitations. Id. at 608. Dalm, however, is contextually
inapplicable. In Dalm, the plaintiff filed a claim against the United States for a
tax refund, and the district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction because the
claim was outside the applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 608–09 (noting “the
United States . . . is immune from suit, save as it consents to be sued . . . and the
terms of its consent . . . define [the] court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit”)
(quotations omitted). The plaintiff argued her claim was timely under the
doctrine of equitable recoupment. Id. at 600. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s
argument, distinguishing her case from Bull, where the Court held a claim for
recoupment could be asserted notwithstanding the statute of limitations. Id. at
604–08. The Court noted that the recoupment claim in Bull was asserted by a
defendant as a defense to an income tax deficiency claim by the government; the
-11-
Court had jurisdiction because the government’s original claim was properly
within the jurisdiction of the Court. Id. at 606. The plaintiff in Dalm, on the
other hand, initiated the suit against the government, and because of the statute of
limitations, there was no jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 609–10.
Thus, the plaintiff’s claim was barred even though she characterized it as a claim
in recoupment. Unlike the plaintiff in Dalm, Defendants here assert recoupment
claims in response to the Tribe’s original suit. Thus, Dalm is in apposite, and
Bull and Jicarilla control. 5
The Tribe also misunderstands the scope of the waiver of immunity under
the doctrine of recoupment. The Tribe contends the United States only waives
immunity when claims asserted in recoupment are of the same kind as claims for
5
The Supreme Court’s decision in Oklahoma Tax Commission v.
Potawatomi Indian Tribe also does not affect the applicability of the recoupment
doctrine to Indian tribes. 498 U.S. 505 (1991). In Potawatomi, the Tribe sought
to enjoin the state of Oklahoma from assessing taxes on cigarette sales within its
reservation. Id. at 507. Oklahoma counterclaimed, seeking, inter alia, money
damages for past unpaid taxes. Id. The Court held Oklahoma’s counterclaims
were barred by tribal sovereign immunity. Id. at 509–10. Oklahoma’s
counterclaims, however, did not sound in recoupment because they sought money
damages while the Tribe sought only an injunction. Thus, the Court concluded,
“the Tribe did not waive its sovereign immunity merely by filing an action for
injunctive relief.” Id. at 510. Because Oklahoma’s counterclaims were not
recoupment claims, Potawatomi says nothing about the applicability of the
recoupment doctrine as a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity when the
defendant’s counterclaims do sound in recoupment.
-12-
which Congress has previously abrogated sovereign immunity. 6 Thus, the Tribe
argues, tribal sovereign immunity should only be waived for claims in recoupment
that are of the same kind as claims for which the Tribe has legislatively waived
immunity or Congress has abrogated tribal immunity. Waiver under the doctrine
of recoupment, however, does not require prior waiver by the sovereign or an
independent congressional abrogation of immunity. If the defendant’s
counterclaims are already permitted under an independent congressional
abrogation of immunity, there would be no need for implied waiver under the
recoupment doctrine. Therefore, in Jacarilla, we stated,
when the sovereign sues it waives immunity as to claims of the
defendant which assert matters in recoupment—arising out of the
same transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the
government’s suit, and to the extent of defeating the government’s
6
In support of this argument, the Tribe cites to our decision in United States
v. 2,116 Boxes of Boned Beef, 726 F.2d 1481 (10th Cir. 1984). This case,
however, does not support the proposition that the United States only waives
immunity as to claims in recoupment that are of the same kind as claims for which
Congress has previously abrogated immunity. In Boned Beef, the United States
initiated a seizure action and the defendant counterclaimed for money damages.
Id. at 1490. The counterclaims did not sound in recoupment because they did not
seek the same type of relief as the government’s original action. Id. Therefore,
we concluded the defendant’s counterclaims were not permitted under the
recoupment doctrine. Id. We went on to determine whether Congress had
abrogated sovereign immunity for the type of claims asserted by the defendant as
an independent ground for permitting defendant’s counterclaims. Our
determination of whether an independent congressional abrogation of immunity
existed was only necessary because we had already determined the defendant’s
counterclaims could not otherwise be asserted under the recoupment doctrine. Id.
at 1490–91.
-13-
claim but not to the extent of a judgment against the government
which is affirmative in the sense of involving relief different in kind
or nature to that sought by the government or in the sense of
exceeding the amount of the government’s claims.
687 F.2d at 1344 (quotation omitted and emphasis added). The scope of the
waiver under the doctrine of recoupment, thus, is limited only by the requirements
for a recoupment claim, i.e. that the claim arise from the same transaction as the
plaintiff’s claim, seek the same relief as the plaintiff’s claim, and seek an amount
not in excess of the plaintiff’s claim. Therefore, the district court did not err in
concluding the Tribe waived its immunity as to any of Defendants’ counterclaims
sounding in recoupment.
C. Defendants’ Counterclaims for Contribution and Indemnity
As an alternative ground for dismissal, the Tribe argues Defendants’
counterclaims for common law contribution and indemnity do not sound in
recoupment. To constitute a claim in recoupment, a defendant’s claim must (1)
arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff’s suit; (2) seek relief
of the same kind or nature as the plaintiff’s suit; and (3) seek an amount not in
excess of the plaintiff’s claim. Hulsey, 22 F.3d at 1487.
Defendants’ counterclaims allege that, under the mining leases, Defendants
were required to leave any debris from mining processes, including chat, on the
land mined, where it became the property of the landowner. Because of the lease
-14-
terms, Defendants assert, the Tribe owned and controlled chat deposited on Tribal
land and sold or distributed it in the Tar Creek region for use as road base,
surface material, and railroad ballast. Thus, Defendants claim the Tribe
contributed to any contamination caused by chat. Additionally, Defendants
allege, to the extent the Tribe was a lessor under the mining leases, it was
responsible for the terms of those leases, including, inter alia, provisions for the
disposition of chat. Because the Tribe dictated Defendants’ actions through lease
terms, Defendants assert the Tribe must indemnify Defendants if they are held
liable for contamination caused by disposing of chat in accordance with lease
terms. 7
Defendants’ counterclaims satisfy the first prong of Hulsey’s test for claims
in recoupment because they arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the
Tribe’s claims. Counterclaims arise from the same transaction or occurrence if
they are compulsory counterclaims under Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Hulsey, 22 F.3d at 1487.
7
The Tribe contends it did not own any land on which Defendants’ mining
operations took place or enter into any mining leases with Defendants. This
factual dispute, however, is not relevant to our determination of whether
Defendants’ counterclaims sound in recoupment. Defendants have alleged the
Tribe owned land at the Tar Creek Site, entered into mining leases, and sold and
distributed chat for use in the Tar Creek region. These allegations are sufficient
to survive a motion to dismiss.
-15-
A counterclaim is compulsory if: (1) the issues of fact and law raised
by the principal claim and the counterclaim are largely the same; (2)
res judicata [i.e., claim preclusion] would bar a subsequent suit on
defendant’s claim; (3) the same evidence supports or refutes the
principal claim and the counterclaim; and, (4) there is a logical
relationship between the claim and counterclaim.
Id.
Defendants’ counterclaims are compulsory under Rule 13(a). First, the
issues of fact and law raised by the Tribe’s claims and Defendants’ counterclaims
are largely the same. The common factual issues include the terms of the mining
leases, whether the terms were dictated by DOI or the Tribe, the identity of
parties to the leases, ownership and control of mining debris, and the cause of the
contamination. The legal issues raised by both claims include the rights and
responsibilities of various parties under the mining leases and the identification of
parties legally responsible for the contamination of the Tar Creek site. Second,
claim preclusion would bar a subsequent suit by Defendants against the Tribe
alleging claims similar to those asserted as counterclaims here. 8 Third, the same
evidence will be used to support or refute the Tribe’s claims and Defendants’
counterclaims. Both the Tribe and Defendants will rely on the terms of the
8
Under Tenth Circuit law, claim preclusion prevents a party from raising a
legal claim in a second lawsuit if: (1) both suits involve the same parties or their
privies, (2) the causes of action in both suits arise from the same transaction, and
(3) the first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits. MACTEC, Inc. v.
Gorelick, 427 F.3d 821, 831 (10th Cir. 2005).
-16-
mining leases, evidence of DOI’s or the Tribe’s influence in dictating those terms,
and evidence regarding contamination caused by chat. Finally, there is a logical
relationship between the Tribe’s claims and Defendants’ counterclaims. The
Tribe is attempting to hold Defendants liable for contamination in the Tar Creek
area as a result of Defendants’ and their predecessors’ mining activities.
Defendants argue they are not responsible for contamination caused by chat
because mining leases dictated how Defendants were to dispose of the chat, and
some chat was owned and controlled by the Tribe. Thus, the claims of both
parties are logically related. Because Defendants’ counterclaims are compulsory,
they satisfy the first prong of Hulsey. 9
Defendants’ counterclaims also seek the same kind of relief as the Tribe’s
claims. We have interpreted the second requirement of Hulsey “to mean that if
the plaintiff is seeking monetary relief, the defendant’s counterclaims must also
9
The Tribe cites Berger v. City of North Miami in support of its position
that claims regarding contamination of tribal lands differ factually and legally
from counterclaims concerning mining leases. 820 F. Supp. 989 (E.D. Va. 1993).
The facts of Berger, however, are distinguishable from the present case. In
Berger, the defendant’s counterclaims based on a lease agreement were wholly
unrelated to contamination of the Superfund site. Id. at 990–91. The district
court noted in Berger that to be from the same transaction or occurrence as a
CERCLA claim, defendant’s counterclaims would have to involve factual
inquiries into the identity of parties responsible for generation and placement of
hazardous substances on the property and the extent to which various parties
controlled the operation of a landfill on the property. Id. at 993–94. In the
present case, Defendants’ counterclaims relate directly to these issues.
-17-
seek monetary relief.” Id. There is no requirement that the defendant also seek
injunctive relief merely because the plaintiff is seeking an injunction. In the
present case, the Tribe seeks remediation, an injunction, and monetary damages.
Because Defendants also seek monetary damages, their counterclaims satisfy the
second requirement for a claim in recoupment.
Finally, Defendants’ counterclaims satisfy the third prong of Hulsey
because they do not seek an amount in excess of that sought by the Tribe. Claims
for contribution and indemnity, by their very nature, are limited to the amount of
any judgment in favor of the injured party. Because Defendants’ counterclaims
arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the Tribe’s claims and seek relief
of the same kind or nature, but not in excess of the amount sought by the Tribe,
they are claims in recoupment.
D. Defendants’ Counterclaims under CERCLA
The Tribe also argues Defendants’ counterclaims for contribution under
CERCLA should be dismissed. 10 CERCLA permits a party to seek contribution
from any other “person” who is liable or potentially liable as an owner or operator
10
The Tribe first asserted claims under CERCLA in its first amended
complaint. As a result, Defendants did not file an answer asserting counterclaims
under CERCLA until after the district court had been fully briefed on both the
Tribe’s motion to dismiss and motion to reconsider. Thus, the statutory issue of
whether counterclaims for contribution against an Indian tribe are permitted under
CERCLA has not yet been presented to the district court.
-18-
of a facility from which hazardous substances have been released. 42 U.S.C. §
9613(f)(1). The Tribe contends Defendants’ counterclaims are not permitted
under this provision of CERCLA because the definition of “person” in the statute
does not include Indian tribes. Id. § 9601(21). Because we lack jurisdiction over
this issue, we do not address the Tribe’s argument.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court only has appellate jurisdiction over
“final decisions” of district courts. Although the district court has not issued a
final decision in this case, under the collateral order doctrine, some district court
orders are considered “final” even though they are entered before a case has been
fully resolved. E.g., Osage Tribal Council, 187 F.3d at 1179 (concluding a denial
of tribal sovereign immunity is an immediately appealable collateral order). The
collateral order doctrine does not apply to the Tribe’s assertion that CERCLA
does not permit counterclaims against an Indian tribe, however, because the
Tribe’s argument is based on statutory interpretation, not tribal sovereign
immunity. Thus, this issue is not immediately appealable.
Nevertheless, this court has discretion to exercise pendent appellate
jurisdiction over nonappealable issues once we have asserted jurisdiction over
other appealable issues in the same case. Garrett v. Stratman, 254 F.3d 946, 953
n.9 (10th Cir. 2001). The exercise of pendent jurisdiction, however, “is generally
disfavored.” Moore v. City of Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 929 (10th Cir. 1995). It
-19-
is appropriate to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction only where resolution of
the appealable issue necessarily resolves the nonappealable issue, or where review
of the nonappealable issue is necessary to ensure meaningful review of the
appealable one. Id. at 930. Here, our determination that tribal sovereign
immunity does not bar Defendants’ counterclaims for contribution and indemnity
does not resolve the issue of whether Defendants’ counterclaims under CERCLA
are statutorily barred. Nor is it necessary for us to reach the Tribe’s CERCLA
argument to assess the appropriateness of the district court’s order denying
dismissal of Defendants’ contribution and indemnity counterclaims. Therefore,
we decline to assert pendent appellate jurisdiction over the Tribe’s contention that
Defendants’ CERCLA counterclaims are not authorized by the statute. 11
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this court AFFIRMS the district court’s order
denying the Tribe’s motion to dismiss.
11
The Tribe also asserts Defendants’ counterclaim against the Tribe as joint
tortfeasor for common law contribution is not valid under Oklahoma law because
Oklahoma does not recognize such a claim. Because this issue also does not
involve tribal sovereign immunity, we do not have jurisdiction to address it on
interlocutory appeal.
-20-
-21-