FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 28, 2006
PUBLISH
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
MARCIE FUERSCHBACH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 04-2117
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO.; CITY
OF ALBUQUERQUE; DUANE
HOPPE; ELDON MARTINEZ;
MICHAEL SANTIAGO; and TINA
MARIE TAPIA,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico
(D.C. No. CIV-03-540 RHS/LFG)
Thomas P. Gulley, Jontz Dawe Gulley & Crown, P.C., Albuquerque, New Mexico
for the Plaintiff–Appellant.
Jeffrey L. Baker (L. Helen Bennett, The Baker Law Firm, Albuquerque, New
Mexico; and Duane C. Gilkey and George C. Kraehe, Gilkey & Stephenson, P.A.
with him on the briefs), The Baker Law Firm, Albuquerque, New Mexico for the
Defendant–Appellees.
Before LUCERO, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
McCONNELL, Circuit Judge.
LUCERO, Circuit Judge.
Several supervisors at Southwest Airlines convinced two Albuquerque
police officers to stage an arrest of Marcie Fuerschbach, a Southwest Airlines
employee, as part of an elaborate prank that included actual handcuffing and
apparent arrest. This was a “joke gone bad,” and turned out to be anything but
funny, as Fuerschbach allegedly suffered serious psychological injuries as a result
of the prank. She sued the officers and the City of Albuquerque under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging violations of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Fuerschbach also asserted claims for various state torts against the officers, the
city, her supervisors, and Southwest Airlines. The district court found that the
officers were shielded from the constitutional claims by qualified immunity, and
granted summary judgment to all defendants on all other claims. We conclude
that Fuerschbach’s allegations are sufficient to survive the assertion of qualified
immunity. Whether the characterization of the incident as a prank permits the
officers to escape liability is a question for the jury to resolve. As such, we
REVERSE the grant of qualified immunity to the officers. We also REVERSE
the grant of summary judgment to the officers and the city on several state claims.
In all other respects, we AFFIRM the judgment of the court below.
I
Marcie Fuerschbach worked as a customer service representative for
Southwest Airlines (“Southwest”), serving travelers at Southwest’s main ticket
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counter in Albuquerque’s Sunport airport. 1 Southwest prides itself on being a
“fun-loving, spirited company.” This lighthearted image extends from marketing
and customer relations into the company’s corporate culture. As part of this fun-
loving atmosphere, newly hired employees who have successfully completed an
initial probationary period often find themselves subject to a prank
commemorating the occasion. In one instance, an employee was led onto an
airplane, the doors were sealed, and the employee was flown to Dallas. Another
employee was dressed in a hula skirt and made to perform a hula dance for
customers. Aware of this tradition, Fuerschbach knew it was possible that her
colleagues would play a prank on her at the end of her probationary period.
Fuerschbach’s supervisor, Tina Marie Tapia, and other customer service
supervisors had discussed various pranks to commemorate Fuerschbach’s
successful completion of probation. Because Tapia had once been subjected to a
similar prank, and had thought the experience amusing, she suggested a mock
arrest. The others agreed. On the day of the incident, one of the supervisors
called the Albuquerque police department and requested that officers come to the
Southwest counter. 2 When Officers Duane Hoppe and Eldon Martinez arrived at
1
In reciting the facts of this case, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, as is appropriate when reviewing a grant of
summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
2
Apparently the officers took some time to arrive and the supervisors grew
impatient. Noticing a group of Boy Scouts standing in line, they discussed
(continued...)
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the ticket counter, the supervisors told them of the plan to arrest Fuerschbach as a
celebratory prank. The officers, who were employed by the City of
Albuquerque’s City Aviation Department and detailed to the Sunport, asked if
Fuerschbach “would be okay with it,” and Tapia assured them that she would.
With the assistance of the supervisors, the officers developed and executed the
plan for staging the arrest.
Fuerschbach was working at a ticket counter crowded with customers when
the two uniformed and armed police officers approached her. One of the officers
ordered Fuerschbach to go with him to answer some questions, and proceeded to
escort her to the end of the ticket counter. Once there, the other officer informed
Fuerschbach that during the course of performing her background check, the City
Aviation Department discovered an outstanding warrant for her arrest. The
officers asked Fuerschbach if she had ever been arrested before, and she replied
that she had not. When she began to explain that there must have been some
mistake, and that there were no outstanding warrants, the officers interrupted her
and demanded that she take off her badges and turn them in. Fuerschbach
complied and handed her badges to Tapia, who was standing close by. Hoppe and
Martinez then asked if Fuerschbach had anyone to “bail her out,” and she
2
(...continued)
dispensing with the arrest prank and instead merely having the Boy Scouts
serenade Fuerschbach. Tapia testified in her deposition that she refused to put the
kibosh on the arrest plan, stating: “I felt at the time that I wanted something way
more special than just having Boy Scouts sing to her.”
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responded tearfully that she hoped Tapia would. After asking for a tissue to dry
her tears, Fuerschbach asked if the arrest were a joke. Both officers refused to
respond. Instead, Hoppe asked if Fuerschbach had any unpaid traffic citations.
The officers then placed Fuerschbach’s hands behind her back and
handcuffed her tightly. A crowd of employees and customers formed to watch the
unfolding arrest. One of the officers said to Fuerschbach, “[w]e don’t want to
embarrass you anymore so we’ll take you to the elevator so we don’t have to walk
in front of all those people.” Fuerschbach continued to cry. The officers led
Fuerschbach in handcuffs fifteen feet to the elevator, at which point someone
jumped out and yelled, “congratulations for being off probation.” The officers
removed the handcuffs and people began to clap. Fuerschbach, however,
continued to cry. Later that day, she was found in the break room weeping and
was sent home. As a result of her distress, Fuerschbach began seeing a
psychologist for treatment. The psychologist diagnosed Fuerschbach as suffering
from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”).
Claiming a violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights,
Fuerschbach sued Hoppe, Martinez, and the City of Albuquerque under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. In the same action she sued Southwest, Tapia, and Michael Santiago, a
Southwest manager, for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Claims of
conspiracy, false imprisonment, false arrest, assault and battery, and defamation
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were asserted against all defendants, along with a claim for punitive damages. 3
Following discovery and extensive briefing, the district court first granted
summary judgment to the officers and the City of Albuquerque. Although finding
that Fuerschbach’s constitutional rights were violated, the district court found that
her rights were not clearly established. On that basis, the court afforded Hoppe
and Martinez qualified immunity and dismissed the § 1983 claims asserted against
them. Because Fuerschbach “has offered nothing that would indicate that any of
the challenged actions were authorized or ratified by the City of Albuquerque,”
the court granted summary judgment on the § 1983 claims asserted against the
city. Concluding that all the state law claims lacked merit, the court granted
summary judgment to the officers and the city and dismissed all claims with
prejudice. In a separate order, the court granted Southwest, Santiago, and Tapia’s
motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the New Mexico
Workers Compensation Act barred all claims against Southwest and dismissed the
claims asserted against the airline. After reviewing each of the state law claims
asserted against Santiago and Tapia, the court determined that the defendants
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fuerschbach appeals.
3
The parties filed a stipulated motion to dismiss the defamation claim,
which the district court granted.
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II
We review de novo a district court’s ruling on qualified immunity. Farmer
v. Perrill, 288 F.3d 1254, 1259 (10th Cir. 2002). To determine whether qualified
immunity shields a public official from the burdens of litigation, we conduct a
two-part inquiry. We first ascertain whether the plaintiff’s allegations, if true,
amount to a constitutional violation. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002).
If so, the defendant “may nevertheless be shielded from liability for civil damages
if [his] actions did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id. at 739 (citation omitted).
A
Fuerschbach alleges that Officers Hoppe and Martinez violated her Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Fourth Amendment provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” U.S.
Const. amend. iv. To determine whether an officer violated the Fourth
Amendment, courts must ascertain whether an alleged incident constitutes a
seizure and, if so, whether such seizure was unreasonable.
Fuerschbach’s allegations, if true, establish that she was seized. A seizure
occurs for Fourth Amendment purposes when “a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave.” Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567,
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573 (1988). The factors identified in United States v. Hill, 199 F.3d 1143 (10th
Cir. 1999), guide our determination of whether a person was, in fact, seized.
These factors include:
1) the threatening presence of several officers; 2) the
brandishing of a weapon by an officer; 3) some physical
touching by an officer; 4) use of aggressive language or tone
of voice indicating that compliance with an officer’s request is
compulsory; 5) prolonged retention of a person’s personal
effects . . . ; 6) a request to accompany the officer to the
station; 7) interaction in a nonpublic place or a small, enclosed
place; 8) and absence of other members of the public.
Hill, 199 F.3d at 1147-48 . None of these factors are dispositive, nor should they
be treated as exclusive, and “it may be that the strong presence of two or three
factors demonstrates that a reasonable person would have believed that he was not
free to terminate an encounter with government officials.” Jones v. Hunt, 410
F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th Cir. 2005). Fuerschbach alleges that she was confronted
by two uniformed and armed police officers, told of an outstanding arrest warrant,
ordered to accompany the officers, and finally handcuffed and led forcibly toward
an exit. Using the Hill factors to guide our determination, we have little trouble
concluding that a reasonable person would not have felt free to terminate the
encounter with the law enforcement officers under these circumstances.
Unique to this case is that the seizure arose in the context of a workplace
prank. Given this factual context, a jury could be presented with evidence at trial
leading it to conclude that a reasonable person would have felt free to leave.
-8-
When reviewing an assertion of qualified immunity, however, we are bound to
take the plaintiff’s allegations as true. Pelzer, 536 U.S. at 736. Fuerschbach’s
allegations establish that she thought the arrest was “real,” that she did not
consent to the seizure, that the officers designed the arrest to look “real,” that the
arrest appeared “real,” and that the officers refused to respond when asked if it
were a joke. These allegations, if true, amount to a seizure for qualified
immunity purposes. Nevertheless, there remains a disputed issue of material fact
for the jury to resolve as to whether, given that the arrest occurred in the context
of a workplace prank, a reasonable person in Fuerschbach’s position would have
felt free to leave. Therefore, our determination that Fuerschbach has satisfied the
first prong of the qualified immunity analysis does not preclude a jury finding for
the officers on the § 1983 claim.
B
Limited by our duty to take all of Fuerschbach’s allegations as true, we
conclude that the officers’ alleged seizure of Fuerschbach was unreasonable. A
search or seizure generally requires either a warrant or probable cause. Jones,
410 F.3d at 1227. In limited circumstances, the Supreme Court has carved out
narrow exceptions to this general rule. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-
41 (1985) (“Ordinarily, a search . . . must be based upon ‘probable cause’ to
believe that a violation of the law has occurred. [However,] we have in a number
of cases recognized the legality of searches and seizures based on suspicions that,
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although ‘reasonable,’ do not rise to the level of probable cause.”). Examples of
such exceptions to the warrant or probable cause requirement include Terry stops,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968), incidents presenting exigent circumstances,
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004), and situations where school officials
detain and question a child for the purpose of maintaining or restoring order in a
school. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
In the present case, Officers Hoppe and Martinez not only lacked a warrant
or probable cause for seizing Fuerschbach, they lacked any legal basis for doing
so. Indeed the conduct alleged in this case would violate the most minimal
Fourth Amendment standard, namely that a search or seizure be “justified at its
inception” and “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. A seizure lacking any
legal justification is not justified at its inception. As we held in Jones, “[w]here
no legitimate basis exists for detaining [an individual], a seizure is plainly
unreasonable.” Jones, 410 F.3d at 1228. Even the officers acknowledge that “it
might have been manifestly unreasonable and unrelated to any legitimate law
enforcement purpose for the Officers to place a random citizen under arrest for no
reason whatsoever.” Appellees City of Albuquerque, Eldon Martinez, and Duane
Hoppe’s Opening Br. at 18. As no legitimate basis existed for seizing
Fuerschbach, her alleged seizure was unreasonable.
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The officers, however, ask us to create an exception to the warrant or
probable cause requirement for pranks. Whenever the Court has relaxed the
warrant or probable cause requirement, it has done so in furtherance of unique
public safety concerns, and only after a careful balancing of the individual
interests at stake. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (“the
permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.”). A false arrest intended as a prank furthers
no unique public safety interests, such as those that have justified exceptions to
the warrant or probable cause requirement in the past. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20;
Groh, 540 U.S. at 559; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. No court has ruled that an
otherwise unreasonable seizure becomes reasonable when the officers intend it as
a prank. We will not do so here. When law enforcement officers acting under
color of state law seize non-consenting private citizens, they must act in
furtherance of legitimate law enforcement interests and on the basis of sufficient
facts.
Analogous tort law supports this view. See Memphis Community School
Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986) (“We have repeatedly noted that 42
U.S.C. § 1983 creates a species of tort liability.”); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477, 483 (1994) (“[W]e look first to the common law of torts.”) Carey v. Piphus,
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435 U.S. 247, 257-258 (1978). In discussing intentional torts, the Restatement
provides:
[T]he fact that the defendant who intentionally inflicts bodily harm
upon another does so as a practical joke, does not render him immune
from liability so long as the other has not consented. This is true
although the actor erroneously believes that the other will regard it as
a joke, or that the other has, in fact, consented to it. One who plays
dangerous practical jokes on others takes the risk that his victims
may not appreciate the humor of his conduct and may not take it in
good part.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13, cmt. c; see also W. Prosser & W. Keeton,
The Law of Torts § 8, at 36-37 (5th ed. 1984) (“The defendant may be liable
although intending nothing more than a good-natured practical joke, or honestly
believing that the act would not injure the plaintiff, or even though seeking the
plaintiff’s own good.”). Numerous state court decisions apply this principle. See,
e.g., Caudle v. Betts, 512 So. 2d 389, 391 (La. 1987); Andrews v. Peters, 330 S.E.
2d 638 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); Pachucki v. Republic Ins. Co., 278 N.W. 2d 898
(Wis. 1979). Thus, the common law of torts instructs that an intentional
tortfeasor is held to the applicable standard of care, notwithstanding the
characterization of the tort as a prank, or even a good faith but incorrect belief
that the tort victim will enjoy the joke. Similarly, a law enforcement officer
undertaking to seize a non-consenting private citizen will be held to the governing
Fourth Amendment standard; an intent to commit a practical joke will not render
the officer immune from liability.
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It remains for the jury to decide whether Fuerschbach was in fact
unreasonably seized. Moreover, even if a jury were to find that the officers
violated Fuerschbach’s Fourth Amendment rights, any damages award could
account for the joking nature of the encounter. Nevertheless, Fuerschbach’s
allegations, if true, establish that Hoppe and Martinez seized her without any
legitimate justification. Therefore, Fuerschbach’s Fourth Amendment claim
survives the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis.
C
Because Fuerschbach’s allegations demonstrate that the officers violated
clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known, her claims clear the second hurdle of the qualified immunity analysis as
well. The pivotal inquiry is whether “it would be clear to a reasonable officer
that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). We conclude that it would have been clear to a
reasonable officer in Hoppe and Martinez’s shoes that seizing a private citizen
without any legitimate basis was unlawful. Nor would an officer’s perception of
the seizure as a prank have made the legal standard less clear.
The rule that arrests must be supported by a warrant or probable cause is
well established. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979).
Even if we were to interpret this incident as a seizure not requiring a warrant or
probable cause, the officers actions nevertheless violated Fuerschbach’s clearly
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established constitutional rights. In Jones we determined that the defendant
violated clearly established constitutional rights because the defendant “was on
notice that the Fourth Amendment’s requirements applied to him, that a seizure
would occur within the meaning of that Amendment if at any point the person
believed that she was not free to terminate an encounter with him, that the ‘free to
leave’ determination would be informed by the Hill factors, and that any seizure
[must at least] be justified at its inception.” Jones, 410 F.3d at 1230 (social
worker who seized a child at a public school with no lawful basis for doing so
violated clearly established rights). Under that standard, Hoppe and Martinez’s
actions, if true, violated Fuerschbach’s clearly established rights. As city police
officers, Hoppe and Martinez were on notice that the Fourth Amendment’s
requirements applied to them. See, e.g., Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510 (1994).
The “free to leave” standard was clearly established. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486
U.S. 567, 573 (1988). So were the standards announced in Hill, 199 F.3d at 1147-
48 (decided in 1999), and in Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 (decided in 1968). The
plaintiff’s allegations, if true, demonstrate that the defendants violated a clearly
established constitutional right because the “conduct as alleged constituted a
seizure under Hill and was unreasonable under Terry.” Jones, 410 F.3d at 1230.
In Jones we held that “[t]he tests enunciated in Hill and Terry are . . .
specific,” and therefore our rejection of qualified immunity in that case was
“based on clearly and narrowly articulated Fourth Amendment principles.” Jones,
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410 F.3d at 1230. In other words, Terry’s holding that any seizure must at the
very least be “justified at its inception,” Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, placed all law
enforcement officers on notice that seizures without any legal justification would
violate the Fourth Amendment. Fuerschbach’s right to be free from seizures
lacking any legal basis was well known to Officers Hoppe and Martinez at the
time of the incident. We therefore conclude that “it would be clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. 4
Fuerschbach’s allegations, if true, establish that Officers Hoppe and
Martinez violated her clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from
4
The officers argue that they had no notice that a prank, which they
thought the victim would enjoy, implicated constitutional concerns. It is true that
no Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case has applied the Fourth Amendment where
law enforcement officers inform a private citizen that outstanding warrants exist
for the person’s arrest, and then seize and handcuff the individual, all for the sake
of amusement. Nevertheless, the officers are not entitled to qualified immunity
simply because no previous court has rejected a prank exception to the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., Jones, 410 F.3d at 1230 (“officials committing
outrageous, yet sui generis, constitutional violations ought not to shield their
behavior behind qualified immunity simply because another official has not
previously had the audacity to commit a similar transgression”). A defendant
does not gain qualified immunity by asserting a novel exception to a longstanding
constitutional rule and then arguing that no case has declined to apply the
exception. This is particularly true where, as here, analogous tort law, extant at
the time of the incident, has refused to adopt the asserted exception. See Murrell
v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1251 (10th Cir. 1999) (government officials
must make “reasonable applications of the prevailing law to their own
circumstances.”).
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unreasonable seizures. 5 Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order
dismissing Fuerschbach’s § 1983 claims against the officers on the basis of
qualified immunity. 6
III
In addition to her claim for relief under § 1983, Fuerschbach asserts several
state tort claims against Officers Hoppe and Martinez. Specifically, Fuerschbach
alleges that the officers committed false imprisonment, false arrest, assault and
battery, and civil conspiracy. Finding that the officers were entitled to judgment
5
The officers claim that any injury Fuerschbach suffered was de minimis.
They have pointed to no authority, however, establishing that injuries arising
from Fourth Amendment violations must be more than de minimis to permit
recovery under § 1983. Nor have the officers persuaded us that suffering PTSD is
a de minimis injury. Referring to Fuerschbach’s reaction as “histrionic,”
“overwrought,” and “hysterical” does not aid the officers in that regard, but does
constitute a lack of decorum by counsel. Because Fuerschbach has presented
uncontroverted evidence that she has been diagnosed with PTSD, she has
demonstrated for summary judgment purposes that her injuries are more than de
minimis. We therefore need not decide whether de minimis injuries resulting
from unreasonable seizures are compensable under § 1983.
6
Fuerschbach’s complaint seeks relief for violations of her Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted qualified immunity to
the officers on both claims. To the extent that Fuerschbach alleges Fourteenth
Amendment injury simply because the Fourth Amendment is applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, her claimed Fourteenth Amendment
injury survives the assertion of qualified immunity and the district court is
reversed. However, because Fuerschbach presents no case on appeal showing that
Officers Hoppe and Martinez violated clearly established Fourteenth Amendment
rights, she has waived any appeal of the dismissal of independent Fourteenth
Amendment claims.
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as a matter of law on all counts, the district court granted the officers’ motion for
summary judgment.
“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, using
the same standards applied by the district court.” Baca v. Sklar, 398 F.3d 1210,
1216 (10th Cir. 2005). Viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn
from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we will
affirm a grant of summary judgment only where “the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Because genuine issues of material fact exist as to Fuerschbach’s false
imprisonment, false arrest, and assault and battery claims, we reverse the district
court’s grant of summary judgment on these counts. However, because
Fuerschbach has failed to provide any argument to support her appeal of the
dismissal of her civil conspiracy claim, the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on that count must be affirmed. 7
7
Fuerschbach also appeals the district court’s dismissal of her claim for
punitive damages. In § 1983 matters, punitive damages will be awarded only
when “the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent,
or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected
rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). Punitive damages in
state tort suits are available “when the defendant acts with reckless disregard for
the rights of the plaintiff – i.e., when the defendant knows of potential harm to
the interests of the plaintiff but nonetheless utterly fails to exercise care to avoid
(continued...)
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A
“Under New Mexico law, ‘false imprisonment consists of intentionally
confining or restraining another person without his consent and with knowledge
that he has no lawful authority to do so.’” Romero v. Sanchez, 895 P.2d 212, 215
(N.M. 1995) (quoting N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-4-3). False arrest or unlawful
detention occurs when the “facts available to [a] detaining officer would [not]
warrant [a] person of reasonable caution to believe detention appropriate.”
Sanchez, 895 P.2d at 215 (“Unlawful detention has similar requirements” to false
imprisonment). A defendant possessed of a good faith and reasonable belief in
the lawfulness of the action is not liable for false imprisonment or false arrest.
See State v. Johnson, 930 P.2d 1148, 1154 (N.M. 1996); Perea v. Stout, 613 P.2d
1034, 1039 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). The district court found that the officers had a
good faith and reasonable belief that their actions were lawful because they only
“briefly restrain[ed] Plaintiff as part of a prank at the request of SWA.”
Neither the brevity of the seizure nor its characterization as a prank enable
the officers to prevail on summary judgment. False imprisonment may arise out
of a brief encounter. See, e.g., State v. Corneau, 781 P.2d 1159, 1164 (N.M. Ct.
7
(...continued)
the harm.” Paiz v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 880 P.2d 300, 308 (N.M.
1994) (quotations omitted). Upon review of the record, we agree with the district
court that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Fuerschbach, a
reasonable jury could not return an award of punitive damages against any of the
defendants.
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App. 1989) (“The restraint need be for only a brief time.”). Moreover, a good
faith belief in the lawfulness of the action ordinarily requires probable cause to
arrest. See Johnson, 930 P.2d at 1154 (“a common-law defense to a civil
wrongful arrest or a false imprisonment suit also requires only that the officer
prove that he or she acted in good faith and with probable cause and therefore
lawfully under the circumstances”) (emphasis added) (citing with approval Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925) (cited for proposition that “in cases
where seizure is impossible except without warrant, the seizing officer acts
unlawfully and at his peril unless he can show the court probable cause”)). The
defendant officers lacked probable cause, and indeed did not even suspect
Fuerschbach of wrongdoing. Although they seized Fuerschbach at the invitation
of her employer, and did so in the context of a prank, they nonetheless had no
lawful authority to inform her that she was under arrest, restrain her in handcuffs,
and direct her movement. See Diaz v. Lockheed Elecs., 618 P.2d 372, 374 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1980) (“False imprisonment involves the unlawful interference with the
personal liberty or freedom of locomotion of another. There is no need that the
plaintiffs have been held in jail or custody.”). Given the well established
jurisprudence that a good faith defense to false imprisonment and false arrest
ordinarily requires a showing of probable cause, it was error to award the officers
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summary judgment under the facts of this case. 8 We therefore reverse the district
court’s decision. 9
B
Fuerschbach’s claim of assault and battery by Hoppe and Martinez survives
summary judgment as well. For there to be an assault, there must have been an
“act, threat or menacing conduct which causes another person to reasonably
8
There remains a triable issue of whether Fuerschbach knew the encounter
was part of a prank and consented to participate in it. See Romero, 895 P.2d at
215 (false imprisonment requires absence of consent); Restatement (Second) of
Torts, § 41 (“The custody is complete if the person against whom and in whose
presence the authority is asserted believes it to be valid, or is in doubt as to its
validity, and submits to it.”). However, summary judgment was clearly
inappropriate.
9
New Mexico has applied different standards in criminal false
imprisonment cases and civil false imprisonment cases. Compare Stout, 613 P.2d
at 1039 (applying in civil case the standard “that good faith and reasonable belief
in the lawfulness of the action taken are defenses to a false arrest claim”) with
State v. Barrera, 54 P.3d 548, 550 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (requiring as an element
in criminal case that defendant have “knowledge that he has no lawful authority
to” intentionally confine or restrain the victim) (emphasis added). Yet, both the
New Mexico courts and this court have applied the criminal standard in civil
cases. See, e.g., Romero, 895 P.2d at 215-16 (relying on the criminal statute and
holdings in both civil and criminal cases in adjudicating qualified immunity
defense); Diaz, 618 P.2d at 376 (Sutin, J., concurring) (“The Penal Code
definition governs in civil as well as criminal actions. Under this statute,
defendants are liable if two events occur: (1) defendants intentionally confined or
restrained plaintiffs without their consent and (2) defendants knew that they had
no lawful authority to do so.”) (quotation omitted); Scull v. New Mexico, 236
F.3d 588, 599 (10th Cir. 2000) (when evaluating civil false imprisonment claim
under New Mexico law, applying criminal standard that defendants “knew that
they had no lawful authority to” intentionally confine or restrain the victim).
Fuerschbach’s false imprisonment claim survives summary judgment under either
standard.
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believe that he is in danger of receiving an immediate battery.” N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 30-3-1(B). Battery occurs when an individual “acts intending to cause a
harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an
imminent apprehension of such a contact, and . . . an offensive contact with the
person of the other directly or indirectly results.” State v. Ortega, 827 P.2d 152,
155 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Restatement (Second) Torts § 18). The district
court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding that the
officers did not intend to cause an offensive contact, but rather that “the officers
were courteous and professional,” and that in any event, placing an individual in
handcuffs is not an offensive contact.
Any bodily contact is offensive “if it offends a reasonable sense of personal
dignity.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 19. Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to Fuerschbach, a jury could conclude that the officers’ actions
offended a reasonable sense of personal dignity. See Ortega, 827 P.2d at 155
(citing with approval Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 629
(Tex. 1967) (intentionally grabbing a plaintiff’s plate constitutes battery because
“[t]he intentional snatching of an object from one’s hand is clearly an offensive
invasion of his person”) and Morgan v. Loyacomo, 1 So.2d 510, 511 (1941)
(intentionally seizing a package from under a plaintiff’s arm constitutes battery)).
A jury could find that placing a person’s hands in position to be handcuffed,
handcuffing the individual, and then leading the individual to walk fifteen feet
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offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity. See, e.g., Love v. Port Clinton,
524 N.E.2d 166, 167 (Ohio 1988) (“The acts of ‘subduing’ and ‘handcuffing’ are
undoubtedly offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity.”).
Moreover, the officers’ demeanor is not probative of their intent to cause an
offensive contact. 10 Nor is the officers’ intent merely to pull a prank on
Fuerschbach an excuse. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 20, cmt. a, illus. 1
(“A, intending merely to frighten B, throws a bucketful of water at him. The
water unexpectedly splashes in B’s face. A is subject to liability to B.”). The
record reveals that the officers intended to touch Fuerschbach’s arms, to place her
arms in position to be handcuffed, and to then handcuff her tightly, thus intending
to cause an offensive contact. See Love, 524 N.E.2d at 167 (“The contact
involved is plainly intentional; one cannot accidentally handcuff or subdue
another.”). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Fuerschbach, the
officers intended to cause an offensive contact with Fuerschbach’s person and did
cause an offensive contact. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to the officers on Fuerschbach’s assault and battery claim.
10
Because New Mexico has not adopted a specific civil jury instruction for
assault and battery, the officers urge us to apply the elements of criminal battery,
which include touching “when done in a rude, insolent or angry manner.” N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 30-3-4. It would be incorrect to do so. In disposing of an appeal in a
criminal battery case, the New Mexico Court of Appeals relied upon the elements
of civil battery discussed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Ortega, 827 P.2d
155. Because the court explicitly applied the elements of civil battery in a
criminal case, we have little trouble applying those same elements in a civil case.
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C
Fuerschbach’s appeal of her civil conspiracy claim is limited to two
sentences, which make no argument, cite to no authority, and direct us to no
evidence supporting an appeal of this issue. We therefore determine that she has
waived the issue. See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th
Cir. 1998) (“Arguments inadequately briefed in the opening brief are waived”);
Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994) (deciding that where
appellant “fail[ed] to frame and develop an issue,” there was insufficient basis for
appellate review); United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990)
(applying “settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner,
unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived”).
D
The district court granted the City of Albuquerque’s motion for summary
judgment on all state tort claims because the court found that Officers Hoppe and
Martinez committed no tort against Fuerschbach. The city’s only argument on
appeal is that because its employees committed no tort, it is not liable for any
harm to Fuerschbach. Because we reverse the grant of summary judgment to the
officers on Fuerschbach’s false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery
claims, and remand for further proceedings, the city is potentially liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior. Silva v. State, 745 P.2d 380, 385 (N.M. 1987).
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We therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment to the City of Albuquerque
on the false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery claims.
We affirm, however, the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
city on Fuerschbach’s § 1983 claims. “[A] municipality cannot be held liable
under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Rather, a municipality can be sued directly under
§ 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where “the action that is
alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that
body’s officers.” Id. at 690. Additionally, a city faces liability under § 1983 if a
deprivation of constitutional rights is caused by a municipal “custom.” See Bd. of
County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Marshall v. Columbia Lea
Reg’l Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157, 1177 (10th Cir. 2003) (“‘custom’ has come to mean
an act that, although not formally approved by an appropriate decision maker, has
such widespread practice as to have the force of law.”). It is not clear whether
Fuerschbach intends to appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
the city on her § 1983 claims. Assuming that she does appeal the ruling, we agree
with the district court that the allegedly unconstitutional seizure in this case
neither implemented nor executed an official policy, ordinance, regulation, or
decision by the city. Moreover, the record reveals that the officers were not
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acting pursuant to any municipal custom. The City of Albuquerque is therefore
entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claims.
IV
Fuerschbach seeks damages for false arrest, false imprisonment, assault and
battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy against
her supervisors Tina Marie Tapia and Michael Santiago, and against her
employer, Southwest Airlines. The district court granted summary judgment to
the defendants on all claims, finding that Fuerschbach’s sole recourse for
compensation is the New Mexico Workers Compensation Act (“WCA”). Because
we agree that the WCA precludes Fuerschbach’s tort claims, we affirm the grant
of summary judgment in favor of Tapia, Santiago, and Southwest. 11
The WCA provides the exclusive remedy for workplace injuries where, at
the time of the incident, (1) the employer has complied with the relevant
insurance provisions; (2) the employee is performing service arising out of and in
the course of his employment, and (3) the injury is proximately caused by an
accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 52-1-9. The parties’ dispute is limited to the third prong and involves whether
the mock arrest arose out of employment and whether Fuerschbach’s injury was
proximately caused by an accident. If the WCA covers Fuerschbach’s injuries, it
11
Appeal of Fuerschbach’s civil conspiracy claim is deemed waived for the
reasons discussed in § III.C supra.
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precludes her from suing both Southwest and her supervisors in tort. See N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 52-1-8 (“Any employer who has complied with the provisions of the
Worker’s Compensation Act relating to insurance or any of the employees of the
employer . . . shall not be subject to any other liability whatsoever for the death
of or personal injury to any employee, except as provided in the Worker’s
Compensation Act”); Matkins v. Zero Refrigerated Lines, 93 N.M. 511, 517
(N.M. Ct. App. 1979) (“Under [the WCA], an employee of an employer who has
complied with the requirements of the Act is not subject to liability under the
common law for the injury or death of a coemployee.”). Consequently, whether
the WCA applies to the plaintiff’s injuries presents a threshold legal question.
A
Ordinarily, to show that an injury “arises out of employment,” a party must
show that the claimed injury “resulted from a risk incident to [the] work itself or
increased by the circumstances of the employment.” Cox v. Chino Mines/Phelps
Dodge, 850 P.2d 1038, 1040 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (quotation omitted). Although
enduring a mock arrest, being waylaid on an airplane and shipped to Dallas, or
being conscripted to perform a hula dance for weary travelers may not appear to
be a risk incident to employment as an airline ticket agent, courts have
acknowledged that acts of “horseplay” may very well arise out of one’s
employment.
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In the earliest workmen’s compensation cases, injuries stemming from
pranks or horseplay were deemed incompensable. 1A Arthur Larson, Workmen’s
Compensation Law § 23.10, at 5-181 (1990) (“[j]ust as malicious assaults by
co-employees were ruled out as intentional and personal, so sportive assaults were
treated as something foreign to the inherent risks of the employment”). In 1920,
then-Judge Cardozo led the New York Court of Appeals in a different direction.
Determining whether a particular injury caused by horseplay in a factory was one
“arising out of and in the course of employment,” the court reasoned that “[t]he
risks of injury incurred in the crowded contacts of the factory through the acts of
fellow workmen are not measured by the tendency of such acts to serve the
master’s business. Many things that have no such tendency are done by workmen
every day.” Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 128 N.E. 711, 712 (1920).
Cardozo famously commented:
Whatever men and boys will do, when gathered together in such
surroundings, at all events if it is something reasonably to be
expected, was one of the perils of his service. . . . [I]t was ‘but
natural to expect them to deport themselves as young men and boys,
replete with the activities of life and health. For workmen of that
age or even of maturer years to indulge in a moment’s diversion from
work to joke with or play a prank upon a fellow workman, is a matter
of common knowledge to every one who employs labor.’ The
claimant was injured, not merely while he was in a factory, but
because he was in a factory, in touch with associations and
conditions inseparable from factory life. The risks of such
associations and conditions were risks of the employment.
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Id. at 711 (quoting Hulley v. Moosbruger, 93 A. 79, 79 (N.J. 1915)). “[T]his
view eventually won the ascendancy in non-participating victim cases.” Larson
§ 23.10, at 5-182.
New Mexico has followed New York’s lead, in part because “[t]he sheer
number of workers’ compensation cases that involve horseplay, and the variety of
factual circumstances surrounding the injuries, indicate that horseplay occurs on a
daily basis throughout the workplace.” Woods v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836
P.2d 81, 84-85 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992). In New Mexico, an incident constitutes
compensable horseplay either “if horseplay was a regular incident of
employment” or if “horseplay was not a substantial deviation from employment,
which the judge would find after considering the extent of the deviation, the
completeness of the deviation, the extent to which horseplay was an accepted part
of the employment, and the extent to which the nature of the employment may
include some horseplay.” Cox, 850 P.2d at 1041. The record clearly
demonstrates that horseplay, in the form of pranks, was a regular incident of
employment at Southwest. Beginning with its training program, Southwest
emphasizes to new employees that it is a “different kind of company, fun-loving,
that puts a lot of emphasis on fun and spirit.” In keeping with that culture,
employees completing their probationary period, or having received a promotion,
routinely are subject to a prank. These pranks are often elaborate and may
involve some degree of embarrassment. In short, enduring a prank as a Southwest
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employee “is something reasonably to be expected . . . .” Leonbruno, 128 N.E. at
711.
Fuerschbach, however, argues that the incident giving rise to this case was
so egregious that it cannot be considered horseplay. Although we agree that
Tapia and Santiago’s request of Officers Hoppe and Martinez was ill-considered,
the horseplay jurisprudence is broad enough to encompass it. See Woods, 836
P.2d at 85 (“The breadth of the New Mexico view . . . would certainly
accommodate an award of compensation under many horseplay circumstances”).
Analogous cases from other jurisdictions show that diverse and even more
repugnant workplace incidents have properly been considered compensable. See,
e.g., Nelson v. Winnebago Indus., 619 N.W.2d 385 (Iowa 2000) (suit claiming
false imprisonment and battery, where plaintiff was duct taped from head to toe
“like a mummy” in a prank to commemorate his transfer); Diaz v. Newark
Industrial Spraying, Inc., 174 A.2d 478 (N.J. 1961) (co-employee threw bucket of
lacquer thinner on plaintiff; thinner was immediately ignited by nearby flame
causing serious injuries); Tilly v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 324 P.2d 432 (Wash.
1958) (employee died of cerebral hemorrhage after being chased and held by co-
employees); Johnson v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co., 161 So.
667, 668 (La. Ct. App. 1935) (night watchman died of heart attack after
pranksters disarmed him and carried him across a bridge, telling him that they
were liberating prisoners held at the parish jail. Court ruled that it makes no
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difference “that the whole matter was a joke. It was real to deceased. The
scheme was concocted with the idea of severely frightening him.”). Without
approving of Tapia and Santiago’s judgment in recruiting Officers Hoppe and
Martinez to engage in a mock arrest, we are persuaded that their actions amount
to horseplay for purposes of this analysis. Therefore, we agree with the district
court that Fuerschbach’s injuries arose out of employment.
B
The WCA applies only to injuries “proximately caused by an accident.”
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 52-1-9. Fuerschbach argues that the incident giving rise to this
litigation was not an accident, and therefore her employer and co-employees are
exposed to tort liability.
“[W]hen an employer willfully or intentionally injures a worker, that
employer, like a worker who commits the same misconduct, loses the rights
afforded by the [Workers Compensation] Act.” Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino,
Inc., 34 P.3d 1148, 1150 (N.M. 2001). Actual intent to injure is not required;
willfulness suffices and occurs when “(1) the worker or employer engages in an
intentional act or omission, without just cause or excuse, that is reasonably
expected to result in the injury suffered by the worker; (2) the worker or employer
expects the injury to occur, or has utterly disregarded the consequences of the
intentional act or omission; and (3) the intentional act or omission proximately
causes the worker’s injury.” Id. Dispute between the parties centers on the
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second prong, which turns on “an examination of the subjective state of mind of”
the supervisors. Id. at 1156. “If the worker or employer decided to engage in the
act or omission without ever considering its consequences, this prong is satisfied.
If, on the other hand, the worker or employer did consider the consequences of
the act or omission, this prong will be satisfied only when the worker or employer
expected the injury to occur.” Id.
Although they grossly miscalculated Fuerschbach’s reaction to the mock
arrest, Tapia and Santiago did consider the consequences of their actions.
Therefore, Fuerschbach can prevail only by showing that her supervisors expected
the alleged injury – in this case, psychological injury – to occur. Even viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to Fuerschbach, there is no question that
Tapia and Santiago expected all involved, including Fuerschbach, to be amused
by the prank. The record demonstrates that Tapia and Santiago considered the
consequences of the mock arrest and in no way expected Fuerschbach to suffer
psychological injury.
C
In a final attempt at avoiding the WCA’s bar to her state tort claims,
Fuerschbach argues that because “there is no provision in the WCA that allows a
claimant to recover for the intentional torts of assault, battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest or intentional infliction of emotional distress,” the
WCA cannot apply to her claims. Appellant’s Br. at 46. Fuerschbach cites to no
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authority for the proposition that the WCA covers only injuries arising from
specifically named torts, and we have found no authority that agrees with her. It
is true that “the WCA will preclude other claims only if the injury falls within the
scope of the WCA.” Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 976 P.2d 999, 1004 (N.M.
1999). For instance, injuries caused by sexual harassment, id., sex
discrimination, Sabella v. Manor Care, 915 P.2d 901 (N.M. 1996), intentional
spoliation of evidence, Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 905 P.2d 185 (N.M. 1995),
and retaliatory discharge, Michaels v. Anglo-American Auto Auctions, Inc., 869
P.2d 279 (N.M. 1994), do not fall within the WCA’s purview, and the New
Mexico Supreme Court has held that suits for those torts are not barred by the
WCA.
New Mexico courts have not ruled the WCA inapplicable to injuries arising
from assault or battery. New Mexico jurisprudence does, however, apply the
WCA to injuries stemming from horseplay, and “[i]t is hard to imagine a form of
horseplay that causes injury that is not either an assault or a battery.” Park Oil
Co. v. Parham, 336 S.E. 2d 531, 534 (Va. Ct. App. 1985). Nor have New Mexico
courts ruled that injuries arising from false imprisonment, false arrest, or
intentional infliction of emotional distress fall outside the WCA’s scope, and
Fuerschbach has provided us with no reason to so conclude. Rather, New
Mexico’s approach to WCA applicability demonstrates that the injuries alleged in
this case fall squarely within the WCA’s coverage.
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In Manor Care, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that the WCA applies
to physical and psychological injuries stemming from a supervisor’s sexual
assault on an employee. The WCA does not apply, however, to claims of sex
discrimination and retaliation. What distinguishes injuries arising from sexual
assault from claims arising from sex discrimination, is that the “the essence of the
[former] is personal injury,” which is the peculiar type of injury covered by the
WCA. Manor Care, 915 P.2d at 905-06. In the present case, Fuerschbach seeks
recovery for psychological injury stemming from assault, battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest and intentional infliction of emotional distress. This is
similar to the psychological injury resulting from sexual assault in Manor Care,
and distinguishable from non-personal injuries such as sex discrimination,
retaliation, and intentional spoliation of evidence. See, e.g., Nelson, 619 N.W. 2d
at 389 (“mere labeling of a claim for injuries as false imprisonment or battery
because in some circumstances those torts may be compensable without a physical
injury cannot avoid the exclusivity of workers’ compensation if the gist of the
claim is for [personal] injury”); Larson § 68.34(a), at 13-180 (“if the essence of
the action is recovery for physical injury or death, including in ‘physical’ the
kinds of mental or nervous injury that cause disability, the action should be
barred even if it can be cast in the form of a normally non-physical tort.”).
Fuerschbach’s alleged injuries fall within the scope of the WCA. Because
her injuries stem from an act of horseplay, we conclude that they arose from her
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employment with Southwest. Additionally, her supervisors neither intentionally
nor willfully injured her. Therefore, the WCA’s exclusivity provision bars all
Fuerschbach’s tort claims against Southwest, Tapia, and Santiago.
V
We REVERSE the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Officers
Hoppe and Martinez on Fuerschbach’s § 1983 claim for violation of her Fourth
Amendment rights. We REVERSE the grant of summary judgment to the
officers on Fuerschbach’s state tort claims of false imprisonment, false arrest, and
assault and battery and REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment
to the City of Albuquerque on these claims as well. We AFFIRM the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to all defendants on Fuerschbach’s civil
conspiracy claim and her claim for punitive damages and AFFIRM the grant of
summary judgment to Southwest Airlines, Tapia, and Santiago on Fuerschbach’s
assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims. We REMAND this case to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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