Oliveros v. Mitchell

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
May 17, 2006
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT

LOUREN OLIVEROS, as personal
representative of the Estate of
Jeremy Blouin, deceased,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 05-2163

V IN CE M ITC HELL; G LEN N
M EA RLS; C ITY O F FA RM IN GTON,

Defendants-Appellees.

A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T HE D ISTRICT OF NEW M EXICO
(D.C. No. CIV-04-51 LH /RH S)

Submitted on the briefs: *

Paul J. Kennedy, M ary C. Han, Adam S. Baker, K ennedy & Han, P.C.,
Albuquerque, New M exico, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Lisa M ann, Erin E. Langenwalter, M odrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk,
Albuquerque, New M exico, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before T YM KOV IC H, M cKA Y, and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.

*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
T YM K O VIC H, Circuit Judge.

During his arrest by Farmington, New M exico, police officers on

December 18, 2002, Jeremy Blouin was shot in the hip when a police handgun

discharged. Blouin disappeared in a swimming mishap six months after the

incident and is presumed dead. Louren Oliveros, Blouin’s personal

representative, subsequently sued the City of Farmington and the two police

officers based on the shooting. Oliveros claims that the defendants violated

Blouin’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and committed assault, battery,

and negligence in the course of arresting Blouin in 2002. Her claims arise under

42 U .S.C . § 1983 and state tort law.

The district court denied Oliveros’s motion for partial summary judgment

and granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The court held

that her intentional tort claims did not survive Blouin’s unrelated death and that

no waiver of governmental immunity applied under the New M exico Tort Claims

Act, thereby necessitating dismissal of the negligence claim. Oliveros appeals

from that order. She also asks this court to certify to the New M exico Supreme

Court the question of whether under New M exico law, intentional tort claims

survive the unrelated death of the would-be plaintiff.

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 W e exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For the reasons

discussed below, we deny Oliveros’s motion for certification and affirm the

district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants.

I. Background

On D ecember 18, 2002, defendants Vince M itchell and Glenn M earls,

Farmington police officers, engaged in a high-speed chase of a vehicle driven by

Blouin. After Blouin’s car came to a stop, while defendants were handcuffing

and arresting him, M itchell’s firearm discharged into Blouin’s hip. M itchell

claims that the shooting was accidental. Oliveros does not concede that the

shooting was an accident, but argues that if it was, it was caused by defendants’

negligence.

Six months after the incident in question, Blouin disappeared while

swimming in a lake near Farmington and is presumed dead. The parties agree

that Blouin’s apparent drowning was completely unrelated to the police shooting.

Oliveros filed this action as the personal representative of Blouin’s estate.

Her complaint states three causes of action. First, she claims that M itchell’s use

of deadly force against Blouin was an unreasonable seizure in violation of the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Second, she claims that in arresting Blouin,

both M itchell and M earls used excessive force also in violation of the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments. Her third count charges M itchell and M earls w ith

assault and battery and with breaching their duty of care to Blouin “by recklessly,

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grossly negligently, and negligently operating their police units, weapons,

and other public equipment.” A plt. App. at 16. Oliveros claims that the City

of Farmington is liable for the police officers’ acts based on the theory of

respondeat superior.

II. Intentional Tort Claims Under New M exico Law

The district court dismissed Oliveros’s intentional tort claims holding that

under the common law, such claims did not survive Blouin’s unrelated death. She

disagrees, arguing that New M exico’s highest court would likely hold that

intentional tort claims survive the unrelated death of the would-be plaintiff

because such a holding would be consistent with State law governing negligence

claims.

On appeal, Oliveros asks us to certify the following question to the New

M exico Supreme Court:

W hether intentional tort claims brought under the New M exico Tort
Claims Act survive the would-be plaintiff’s unrelated death for
purposes of a law suit filed by the personal representative of his
estate.

“W hether to certify a question of state law to the state supreme court is within the

discretion of the federal court.” Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 843 F.2d 406, 407

(10th Cir. 1988). W here the “state’s highest court has not addressed the issue

presented, the federal court must determine what decision the state court would

make if faced with the same facts and issue.” Id. W e agree with the district court

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that any claims arising out of defendants’ alleged intentional misconduct did not

survive Blouin’s death. And since this conclusion is mandated by applicable New

M exico law, we see no need to certify the question to the New M exico Supreme

Court.

“Under the common law, personal tort actions died with the person of

either the plaintiff or the defendant.” Rodgers v. Ferguson, 556 P.2d 844, 846

(N .M . Ct. App. 1976); 558 P.2d 619; accord Cain v. Bowlby, 114 F.2d 519, 521

(10th Cir. 1940). New M exico’s survival statute alleviates the harshness of the

common law rule by carving out certain causes of action. It provides:

In addition to the causes of action which survive at common law,
causes of action for mesne profits, or for an injury to real or personal
estate, or for any deceit or fraud, shall also survive, and the action
may be brought, notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or
liable to the same. The cause of action for wrongful death and the
cause of action for personal injuries, shall survive the death of the
party responsible therefor.

N.M . Stat. § 37-2-1 (1978) (emphasis added). Thus, the statute contemplates that

the death of the defendant/tortfeasor would not extinguish a personal injury

action. The statute, however, does not identify personal injury actions among the

claims that survive the “death of the person entitled,” i.e., the would-be plaintiff.

The New M exico Court of Appeals has characterized this statutory scheme

as recognizing a different outcome w ith respect to the survival of a personal

injury claim when the injured person, rather than the tortfeasor, dies before filing

suit. Rodgers, 556 P.2d at 848-49. The claims in Rodgers stemmed from a car

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accident involving the defendants and Joseph W heaton, who subsequently died

from causes unrelated to the accident. After W heaton’s death, his estate sued the

defendants for negligence. Since the facts did not fit within N ew M exico’s

survival or abatement statutes, the court looked to the common law to determine

whether the plaintiff’s negligence claim survived W heaton’s unrelated death.

Departing from the common law, the court held that it did. Id. at 847. In doing

so, however, the court drew an important distinction between intentional tort and

negligence claims, stating:

[H]istorical application of the non-survival rule was to violent and
intentional torts. It did not develop in connection with the type of
tort in this case— negligence— because the tort of negligence did not
evolve until approximately 1825.

Id. The court concluded that “[a]bsent specific justification, the [common law

non-survival] rule should not apply to torts w hich did not exist when the rule

developed.” Id. Thus, in addition to the causes of action listed in the survival

statute, under Rodgers, personal injury claims arising from negligence survive the

death of the would-be plaintiff. Importantly, the Rodgers court made clear that it

was “express[ing] no opinion as to the non-survival of other actions under the

comm on law,” id. at 850, and it reaffirmed that the common law determines

the survivability of claims not enumerated in New M exico’s survival statute,

see id. at 849.

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 New M exico’s highest court has not yet addressed the survivability of

intentional tort claims in light of the survival statute and the exception for

negligence claims carved out in Rodgers. Accordingly, we must attempt to

resolve the issue as the New M exico Supreme Court would. Arm ijo, 843 F.2d at

407. In our view, New M exico courts would apply the common law rule and

conclude that intentional tort claims do not survive the injured party’s unrelated

death. Although Rodgers departed from the common law, it specifically did so

only in the context of negligence claims. It was careful to base its holding on the

differing historical antecedents between negligence and intentional conduct, and

provides a clear analytical distinction between the causes of action. Based on the

court’s careful analysis, we are confident the New M exico Supreme Court would

interpret the survival statute as not applying to intentional tort claims. This

conclusion is also consistent with our previous decision addressing New M exico’s

survival statute and the common law rule. See Gruschus v. Curtis Publ’g Co.,

342 F.2d 775, 776 (10th Cir. 1965) (upholding dismissal of defamation claim

because it was not listed in survival statute).

Oliveros argues that a case subsequent to Rodgers, Padilla v. Estate of

Griego, 830 P.2d 1348 (N.M . Ct. App. 1992), suggests that New M exico courts

would reach a different result. W e disagree. In Padilla, the court interpreted the

survival statute in a case involving the death of the tortfeasor, not the victim, a

situation specifically contemplated by the statute. Under the express language of

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the statute, the court had no choice but to uphold the claims. Id. at 1352. Since

this case involves the death of the alleged victim, Padilla lends no support to

Oliveros’s argument.

Finally, raising the issue for the first time on appeal, Oliveros argues that

New M exico’s survival statute frustrates the policies underlying § 1983 and is

thus inconsistent with federal law and the Constitution. Since she failed to make

this argument in the district court, we conclude that the argument has been waived

and decline to consider it. 1 See Rosewood Servs., Inc. v. Sunflower Diversified

Servs., Inc., 413 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 2005).

Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Oliveros’s tort claims did

not survive Blouin’s death.

III. Summary Judgment

“W e review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, using

the same standards applied by the district court.” Baca v. Sklar, 398 F.3d 1210,

1216 (10th C ir. 2005). V iew ing the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn

from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we will

1
W e note, however, that New M exico’s abatement statute affords broad
protection to pending claims in the event of a party’s death and, in fact, would
have saved the § 1983 claims in this case had Blouin filed them before he died.
See N.M . Stat. § 37-2-4 (1978). W e would have difficulty concluding that New
M exico’s survivorship laws undermine the goals of § 1983 just because they
result in the dismissal of the § 1983 claims in this case. See Robertson v.
Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) (“A state statute cannot be considered
‘inconsistent’ with federal law merely because the statute causes the plaintiff to
lose the litigation.”).

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affirm a grant of summary judgment only where “the pleadings, depositions,

answ ers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,

if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

A. The Intentional Tort C laims

The district court dismissed plaintiff’s § 1983 claims pursuant to the

common law non-survival rule because it found those claims most analogous to

intentional tort causes of action. W e agree with that conclusion. Plaintiff’s

§ 1983 claims are premised on defendants’ excessive use of force and

unreasonable seizure of Blouin in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

The Supreme Court has held that such claims are necessarily predicated on

intentional conduct. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (holding

that a Fourth Amendment violation entails “governmental termination of freedom

of movement through means intentionally applied”) (emphasis in original).

As discussed above, Oliveros’s claims premised on intentional misconduct

did not survive Blouin’s unrelated death. Accordingly, we affirm the district

court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants on Oliveros’s § 1983 claims.

For the same reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the state law assault and battery

claims.

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 B. The Negligence Claim

The New M exico Tort Claims Act, N.M . Stat. § 41-4-1 through § 41-4-27

(1978), “shields government entities and public employees from tort liability

unless immunity is specifically waived by the Act.” Archibeque v. M oya,

866 P.2d 344, 346 (N.M . 1993). Section 41-4-12 of the Act provides a waiver of

immunity for certain torts committed by law enforcement officers and for

negligence that causes a specified tort. 2 See Methola v. County of Eddy, 622 P.2d

234, 238 (N.M . 1980); Caillouette v. Hercules, Inc., 827 P.2d 1306, 1311

(N.M . Ct. App. 1992). In this case, the district court concluded that the

defendants’ immunity was not waived pursuant to § 41-4-12, because Oliveros did

not allege one of the predicate torts enumerated in that section. W e agree with

the district court’s analysis. The law is clear that immunity is not waived under

§ 41-4-12 for “negligence standing alone.” Caillouette, 827 P.2d at 1311 (relying

on Bober v. New M exico State Fair, 808 P.2d 614 (N.M . 1991)). Since Oliveros’s

2
Section 41-4-12 provides:

The immunity granted pursuant to Subsection A of Section 41-4-4
NM SA 1978 does not apply to liability for personal injury, bodily
injury, wrongful death or property damage resulting from assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, libel, slander, defamation of character, violation of
property rights or deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities
secured by the constitution and laws of the United States or New
M exico when caused by law enforcement officers w hile acting within
the scope of their duties.

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state claim is for personal injuries resulting from negligence, she cannot avail

herself of the waiver of immunity provided by § 41-4-12.

Finally, Oliveros argues she is entitled to the waiver of immunity found

under § 41-4-6 of the Act, which waives a public employee’s immunity for

negligence committed in the operation or maintenance of equipment. 3 That

section provides in relevant part:

The immunity granted pursuant to Subsection A of Section 41-4-4
NM SA 1978 does not apply to liability for damages resulting from
bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage caused by the
negligence of public employees w hile acting within the scope of their
duties in the operation or maintenance of any building, public park,
machinery, equipment or furnishings.

It is clear under New M exico law that law enforcement officers may be

sued under § 41-4-6 for negligently operating equipment. Smith v. Vill. of

Ruidoso, 994 P.2d 50, 57 (N.M . Ct. App. 1999). Oliveros’s theory is that officers

M itchell and M earls w aived their immunity pursuant to this section by negligently

operating their police equipment, “to wit a gun and handcuffs.” Aplt. Br. at 10.

W e disagree.

The New M exico Supreme Court has held that § 41-4-6 is designed to

protect the general public. Archibeque, 866 P.2d at 347-48. In Archibeque, the

3
Although the district court did not discuss Oliveros’s argument under this
section of the Tort Claims Act, she made the argument in support of her M otion
for Partial Summary Judgment, thereby preserving the issue for appeal.

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court concluded that an interpretation of the Act that applied to every individual

allegation of government negligence was unsupportable:

Reading Section 41-4-6 to waive immunity every time a public
employee’s negligence creates a risk of harm for a single individual
would subvert the purpose of the Tort Claims Act, which recognizes
that government, acting for the public good, should not have the duty
to do everything that might be done, and limits government liability
accordingly.

Id. at 348 (quotations omitted). As such, a public employee’s immunity is waived

and he is subject to suit only when his conduct puts the general public at risk.

In Archibeque, the plaintiff prisoner charged the defendant prison officer

with negligence after the plaintiff was misclassified and placed in the general

prison population. Finding no waiver of immunity under § 41-4-6, the court held

that although the defendant’s conduct put the plaintiff at risk, plaintiff’s

misclassification did not create a safety risk to the general prison population. Id.

at 348. The court reaffirmed this public endangerment requirement in Espinoza v.

Town of Taos, 905 P.2d 718, 721 (N.M . 1995), a premises liability case, stating

that the critical question in the § 41-4-6 analysis is whether the condition

complained of creates a potential risk to the general public. The Court of Appeals

subsequently interpreted Espinoza as requiring “(1) a condition that (2) creates a

danger to the general public” before immunity will be waived under § 41-4-6.

Baca v. State, 911 P.2d 1199, 1200 (N.M . Ct. App. 1996).

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 W e conclude that the alleged negligence in this case, defendants’ alleged

mishandling of a firearm and handcuffs while apprehending Blouin, did not put

the general public at risk, and therefore, immunity was not waived under

§ 41-4-6. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to O liveros, M earls’

act of slamming into Blouin while M itchell had his gun drawn certainly put

Blouin, and for that matter both officers, at risk. But we fail to see how this

incident created a danger to the general public. The event in question occurred in

the middle of the night and it is clear from the police videotape (Aplt. App.

Vol. 2) that no members of the public were present. Since Oliveros has not

alleged any acts of negligence that endangered the general public, she cannot

avail herself of the immunity waiver provided in § 41-4-6. W e therefore affirm

the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants on the negligence

claim.

IV. Conclusion

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRM ED, and Plaintiff’s M otion

For Certification of Question of State Law to the New M exico Supreme Court is

D EN IED .

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