F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PU BL ISH
May 30, 2006
UNITED STATES COURT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 05-2089
R AFA EL ISA A C-SIG A LA ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New M exico
(D.C. No. CR-03-1598-RB)
Scott M . Davidson, Albuquerque, New M exico, for D efendant-Appellant.
Terri J. Abernathy, Assistant United States Attorney (David C. Iglesias, United
States Attorney with her on the brief), Las Cruces, New M exico, for Plaintiff-
Appellee.
Before L UC ER O, A ND ER SO N, and TYM KOVICH, Circuit Judges.
L UC ER O, Circuit Judge.
This case asks whether a conviction for conspiring to smuggle narcotics
and aiding and abetting the distribution of narcotics must be overturned when
there is substantial evidence that the defendant drove a scout vehicle for a drug
smuggler but where there is only circumstantial evidence that he knew the
specific contents of the smuggler’s van. Because we conclude that the evidence
reasonably supports the jury’s conclusion that the defendant knowingly advanced
the essential objectives of the conspiracy, we exercise jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and A FFIR M .
I
In the early morning hours of December 5, 2002, a white van hauling an
empty flat bed trailer approached an immigration checkpoint near Alamagordo,
New M exico. Behind the w heel sat M ario M eija-N unez; Pedro A guilar-Guerra
was at his side in the passenger seat. The Border Patrol Agent on duty, M ark
Bazill, asked M eija-Nunez for identification, and the occupants retrieved
immigration documents. W hile Agent Bazill reviewed the documents, M eija-
Nunez volunteered that he and Aguilar-Guerra were car haulers traveling to
Ruidoso, New M exico, where they intended to pick up cars for resale in M exico.
This surprised Agent Bazill, because, during his six years on the border patrol, he
had never encountered car haulers destined for Ruidoso. In his experience, car
haulers usually travel to places where car auctions are held such as D enver,
Kansas, and M ichigan.
Agent Bazill asked for permission to search the van and M eija-Nunez
assented. W hile examining the roof of the van, Agent Bazill noticed fresh tool
marks on the screws of the center panel. Because these marks indicated recent
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tampering with the roof panel, Agent Bazill suspected that the ceiling of the van
was concealing narcotics. He referred the van to the secondary inspection area at
the checkpoint, and the van was taken off the highway.
During the secondary inspection of the white van, Agent Bazill interviewed
the two men. M eija-Nunez repeated that he and his companion were on their way
to Ruidoso to collect previously purchased vehicles. W hen asked what vehicles
they had purchased, M eija-Nunez answered “a Dodge van.” M eanwhile, after
dogs alerted to the smell of contraband coming from the van, two agents drilled
into its ceiling and uncovered 96.4 net pounds (43 kilograms) of marijuana.
M eija-Nunez and Aguilar-Guerra were placed under arrest, and their personal
belongings were inventoried. A two-way hand held radio was recovered from
M eija-N unez’s jacket pocket.
About ten minutes later, while the white van was in the secondary
inspection area, a blue van driven by Rafael Isaac-Sigala approached the
checkpoint. Another Border Patrol Agent, David Blasquez, was now monitoring
the checkpoint in Agent Bazill’s absence. At the time the blue van approached,
Agent Bazill had not yet spoken with Agent Blasquez about the marijuana
discovered in the white van. Agent Blasquez proceeded to interview Isaac-Sigala,
who also stated that he was en route to Ruidoso to purchase vehicles. Like Agent
Bazill, Agent Blasquez considered this small town an unusual destination for car
haulers.
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Noticing that the blue van displayed a temporary registration tag, Agent
Blasquez asked where Isaac-Sigala worked. Isaac-Sigala responded by producing
an identification card from Cereceres Auto Sales in El Paso, Texas. Agent
Blasquez referred the blue van to secondary inspection, and after a canine
examining the van did not alert, Isaac-Sigala drove away from the checkpoint.
Shortly after Isaac-Sigala drove away, Agent Blasquez spoke to M eija-
Nunez and Aguilar-Guerra. W hen he learned that they were also going to
Ruidoso on a car haul, Agent Blasquez radioed an agent on patrol duty that night,
Agent Javier Ramirez, and asked him to intercept the blue van. Agent Ramirez
discovered the blue van approximately 20 miles north of the checkpoint, traveling
south, towards the checkpoint, instead of north, towards Ruidoso.
Agent Ramirez stopped the blue van, and asked Isaac-Sigala if he was
headed towards Ruidoso. Isaac-Sigala replied that he was lost. Explaining that
he would like to question Isaac-Sigala about a vehicle that was being held at the
checkpoint, Agent Ramirez asked Isaac-Sigala for permission to search the blue
van and to follow Agent Ramirez back to the checkpoint. Isaac-Sigala assented to
both requests. In the course of searching the van for weapons, Agent Ramirez
recovered a two-way hand held radio.
During Agent Ramirez’s search of the van, another Border Patrol Agent,
Julio Baray, spoke with Isaac-Sigala. Agent Baray explained that another van
was being held at the immigration checkpoint and its driver had told agents that
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he was heading to Ruidoso to purchase vehicles. Agent Baray then asked if Isaac-
Sigala was traveling with anybody else. Isaac-Sigala stated that he was not.
Agent Baray asked Isaac-Sigala specifically whether he was following the other
van. Isaac-Sigala denied doing so.
Once Isaac-Sigala had been escorted back to the checkpoint, Agent Ramirez
informed Agent Bazil that he had found a two-way radio inside Isaac-Sigala’s
van. The agents observed that the radio found in M eija-Nunez’s van was the
same make and model as the one recovered from Isaac-Sigala’s van. After
switching on the radios and speaking to one another, the agents confirmed that the
radios were set to the same frequency as well. W hen Agent Baray showed Isaac-
Sigala the white van M eija-Nunez had been driving and asked if he had been
following it, Isaac-Sigala again denied traveling with any other vehicle and
claimed that he did not know the driver of the white van.
Further evidence that the two vans were working together was discovered
shortly thereafter. In the center console of the white van, another border patrol
agent, Agent Claude Claflin, discovered a bill of sale for the blue van that Isaac-
Sigala was driving. A temporary tag affixed to the trailer that the white van was
towing displayed the name “Cereceres Auto Sales.” An Alamagordo police
officer later assigned to handle the forfeiture of both vehicles determined that
Isaac-Sigala’s blue van was also registered to Cereceres Auto Sales. This same
officer attempted to reach Cereceres by mail, and when his notice of forfeiture
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was returned, he traveled to the address on record and found no business by that
name at that location.
A federal grand jury in the District of New M exico returned a two-count
indictment against Isaac-Sigala. Count 1 charged him with conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute less than 50 kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D ), and 21 U.S.C. § 846. Count 2
charged possession with intent to distribute less than 50 kilograms of marijuana,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D), and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2. Aguilar-Guerra and M eija-Nunez were named as co-defendants and charged
with the same two counts.
Isaac-Sigala and Aguilar-Guerra proceeded to trial; M eija-Nunez remained
a fugitive. At the close of trial, the jury convicted Isaac-Sigala of both counts
and acquitted Aguilar-Guerra on both counts. The district court later sentenced
Isaac-Sigala to concurrent 33-month sentences. Isaac-Sigala appeals.
II
Isaac-Sigala argues that insufficient evidence supports both his convictions
for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute. W e review challenges to
the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States v. Voss, 82 F.3d 1521,
1524-25 (10th Cir. 1996). In doing so, we consider only “whether, taking the
evidence – both direct and circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences
to be drawn therefrom – in the light most favorable to the government, a
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reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
(quotations omitted). A conviction should be reversed only if “no reasonable
juror could have reached the disputed verdict.” United States v. Carter, 130 F.3d
1432, 1439 (10th Cir. 1997). “The evidence necessary to support a verdict need
not conclusively exclude every other reasonable hypothesis and need not negate
all possibilities except guilt. Instead, the evidence only has to reasonably support
the jury’s finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. W ilson,
182 F.3d 737, 742 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
However, “[a] jury will not be allowed to engage in a degree of speculation and
conjecture that renders its finding a guess or mere possibility.” United States v.
Jones, 49 F.3d 628, 632 (10th Cir. 1995).
A
To obtain a conviction for conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, the
government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) there was an
agreement to violate the law; (2) the defendant knew the essential objectives of
the conspiracy; (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily took part in the
conspiracy; and (4) the coconspirators were interdependent. United States v.
Riggins, 15 F.3d 992, 994 (10th Cir. 1994). To establish possession under an
aiding and abetting theory, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant: (1) “willfully associate[d] with the criminal venture,” and (2)
“aid[ed] such venture through affirmative action.” United States v. Delgado-
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Uribe, 363 F.3d 1077, 1084 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal citations and quotations
omitted). “Participation in the criminal venture may be established by
circumstantial evidence and the level of participation may be of ‘relatively slight
moment.’” United States v. Anderson, 189 F.3d 1201, 1207 (10th Cir. 1999)
(internal citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Leos-Quijada, 107 F.3d 786,
794 (10th Cir. 1997)). “The evidence that supports a conviction for conspiracy
can also be used to support a conviction for aiding and abetting in the possession
of illegal narcotics with intent to distribute.” United States v. Carter, 130 F.3d
1432, 1441 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
The government argued at trial that Isaac-Sigala conspired with M eija-
Nunez to smuggle marijuana by acting as a “scout vehicle.” According to Agent
Bazill’s testimony, a scout vehicle is a vehicle that travels in tandem w ith a “load
vehicle,” i.e., the vehicle carrying narcotics. Depending on the situation, a scout
vehicle may travel either ahead of or behind the load vehicle. If the scout vehicle
is traveling in front of the load vehicle, it may watch for speed traps or serve as a
distraction at a checkpoint. A scout vehicle traveling behind a load vehicle may
assist the load vehicle with any mechanical problem or may inform the owners of
the narcotics if the load vehicle is intercepted by law enforcement. W ithout
notification that the narcotics have been intercepted, the purchasers of the
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narcotics are vulnerable to being arrested following a “controlled delivery” of the
seized narcotics by undercover law enforcement. 1
There is no doubt that Isaac-Sigala action’s were consistent with a scout for
a drug smuggling operation; the only question before us is whether the jury
properly rejected other explanations for his behavior w hen it found him guilty.
The following facts are especially relevant for our inquiry. W hen Isaac-Sigala
entered the checkpoint after M eija-N unez, he claimed he was going to Ruidoso to
pick up cars. That was exactly the explanation offered by M eija-Nunez only ten
minutes earlier. Yet, when Isaac-Sigala was discovered a short time later, he was
traveling south, away from Ruidoso, and back toward the checkpoint. Although
Isaac-Sigala then claimed he was lost, he had earlier told the agent at the
checkpoint that he traveled to Ruidoso regularly to purchase vehicles. Isaac-
Sigala also denied any connection to the load vehicle when he was brought back
to the checkpoint, despite the facts that each van was registered to the same
fictitious auto dealership, that the white van contained the bill of sale for the blue
van, and that each contained identical two-way radios tuned to the same
frequency.
1
Agent Bazill testified that a “controlled delivery” occurs when a driver of
a load vehicle is arrested and agrees to cooperate with law enforcement. Law
enforcement then delivers the load vehicle as planned and arrests the individuals
who arrive to take possession of the narcotics.
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From these facts, a reasonable jury could have concluded that: (1) Isaac-
Sigala falsely denied any connection to the load vehicle; (2) Isaac-Sigala lied to
border patrol agents about the purpose and destination of the trip; (3) Isaac-Sigala
and M eija-Nunez had jointly manufactured their cover story; and (4) Isaac-
Sigala’s conduct was consistent with that of a scout vehicle driver for a narcotics
smuggling operation.
Isaac-Sigala explicitly concedes inferences (1) - (3) above. Nevertheless,
he argues that the jury could not have reasonably drawn the next logical inference
– that he was the driver of a scout vehicle assisting M eija-Nunez with smuggling
marijuana – because the jury improperly rejected “equally plausible,” innocent
explanations for his conduct. 2 Isaac-Sigala is fundamentally mistaken about the
proof necessary to support a conspiracy conviction for narcotics smuggling.
The principal authority Isaac-Sigala relies upon for the exculpatory effect
of “equally plausible” inferences in a conspiracy charge is United States v. Jones,
49 F.3d at 632. In Jones, two defendants were charged with possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute, and of carrying and using a firearm
during a drug trafficking crime, after a highway patrol officer discovered
narcotics and a firearm hidden in the trunk of their rental car. The government
2
These “innocent” explanations include: Isaac-Sigala wished to “conceal
the details of [his and M eija-N unez’s] car hauling business . . . because they were
involved in tampering with motor vehicle identification numbers, or mis-
representation of motor vehicle titles, or smuggling motor vehicles into M exico,
or laundering money via the used car dealership in El Paso . . . .”
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argued that the defendants knew their rental car was carrying narcotics on the
strength of a third passenger’s testimony. The third passenger testified that she
“saw neither a gun nor a package of any kind remotely resembling the package of
crack cocaine.” Rather, she merely stated that she saw the two men linger around
the trunk for a short time. Id. at 631. W e reversed the conviction in part because
we observed that it was an “equally plausible” inference that the contraband was
in the car w hen it was rented. W e continued:
The only reasonable inference which is logically probable on the
state of the evidence is that M r. Brown [a co-defendant] was looking
for something under the dash and hood. W hat he was seeking, again,
is pure speculation. Thus, the inference he was attempting to hide
something, let alone that he was trying to hide a gun and drugs,
simply does not logically flow from the established facts.
Id. (emphasis in original).
No equivalent leaps of logic are necessary to connect Isaac-Sigala to the
drug trafficking in this case. By Isaac-Sigala’s own concessions, he and M eija-
Nunez were working together to conceal illicit behavior when they were traveling
into the United States from M exico, and each tried to conceal their true plan by
repeatedly insisting that they were merely car haulers on their way to Ruidoso.
The only inference the jury must draw to connect Isaac-Sigala to the narcotics
trafficking is that he knew the object of his smuggling was the marijuana
concealed in his co-conspirator’s vehicle. Given Agent Bazill’s testimony
explaining how scout vehicles frequently cooperate w ith load vehicles to smuggle
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marijuana into the United States and the manifold circumstantial evidence linking
Isaac-Sigala to M eija-Nunez, we cannot say that the jury’s verdict finding Isaac-
Sigala knew M eija-Nunez’s van concealed marijuana was outside “the bounds of
reason.” U nited States v. Ramirez, 63 F.3d 937, 945 (10th Cir. 1995) (“we will
accept the jury’s resolution of the evidence as long as it is within the bounds of
reason”); see also U nited States v. Hanzlicek, 187 F.3d 1228, 1232 (10th Cir.
1999) (the “elements [of conspiracy] may be proven by direct or circumstantial
evidence”).
M oreover, Isaac-Sigala’s multiple attempts to conceal his true purpose
further supports the jury’s conclusion. In a series of cases we have held that
“false exculpatory statements made by a defendant are admissible to prove
consciousness of guilt and unlawful intent.” United States v. Tager, 481 F.2d 97,
100 (10th Cir. 1973); see also United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1532 (10th
Cir. 1986) (“[T]he jury could have inferred appellant’s guilty knowledge [that a
controlled substance was hidden in the vehicle he was driving] from the
undisputed testimony that appellant gave the police a false name.”). Here, Isaac-
Sigala made numerous false exculpatory statements: He twice lied about where
he was going and twice lied about traveling with M eija-Nunez. The jury was
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clearly entitled to consider this behavior when determining whether Isaac-Sigala
knew the true purpose of the smuggling operation. 3
Isaac-Sigala also argues that under United States v. Valenzuela, 365 F.3d
892, 898 (10th Cir. 2004), “it is impermissible to infer guilt based on the lead car-
load car modus operandi when the purported lead car is actually behind the load
car . . . .” V alenzuela, however, establishes no such categorical proposition. In
Valenzuela, a Border Patrol agent pulled over and searched a vehicle on the
suspicion that it was “tandem driving” with a second vehicle. He suspected
tandem driving because both vehicles w ere heading towards A rizona and both
3
For these reasons Isaac-Sigala’s citation of United States v. Austin, 786
F.2d 986 (10th Cir. 1986), for the proposition that his conviction must be reversed
because the “evidence shows merely clandestine activity” is unavailing. In
Austin, we reversed a conviction for conspiracy to distribute marijuana where the
defendant – a ranch owner – had sold a portion of his property that was ultimately
used as a landing strip by other conspirators who were smuggling marijuana from
Columbia by airplane. W e concluded the evidence fell short of establishing
Austin knew the essential objectives of the conspiracy because his ranch had been
on sale for some time, he negotiated a reasonable price with the purchasers, the
buyers purchased cattle, and the buyers hired Austin’s son to manage the ranch.
There was no evidence that even suggested Austin knew his ranch was to be used
for a landing strip, let alone, to be used to facilitate narcotics smuggling. Id. at
988-89. Although Austin began to suspect something illegal was happening on
his property when he noticed airplane tracks, we held “mere suspicion is not
enough” because the record “contain[ed] no evidence from which a fact finder
could infer that Austin knew the focus of the conspiracy was the distribution of
marijuana, rather than the distribution of other contraband, or the aiding of illegal
aliens, or other equally speculative illegal conduct, or even clandestine activity
that did not violate the law .” Id. at 989. The record in this case, however,
contains ample basis for a fact-finder to conclude that Isaac-Sigala knew the
focus of the conspiracy was to smuggle the marijuana hidden in M eija-N unez’s
van. M oreover, unlike the defendant in Austin, Isaac-Sigala consistently misled
law enforcement.
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bore A rizona plates. H olding that this behavior was “[h]ardly unusual,” we
affirmed the district court’s grant of a motion to suppress marijuana obtained
from the first stop on the basis that the arresting officers had insufficient probable
cause of “tandem driving” to justify a warrantless arrest. Id. at 898. W e rejected
the government’s theory of “tandem driving” in part because the alleged lead car
was at one time preceding and at another time following the alleged load car. Id.
Contrary to Isaac-Sigala’s reading of the case, the issue in Valenzuela was
whether a stop was reasonable; the issue was not whether a jury empowered to
find facts could conclude that a co-conspirator was aware of the contents of a
smuggling operation based on circumstantial evidence.
B
W e likew ise conclude the evidence was sufficient to support Isaac-Sigala’s
conviction for aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute. In order to
prove that a defendant aided and abetted the commission of a crime, the
government must establish that the defendant willfully associated himself with the
criminal venture and sought to make the venture succeed through some action of
his own. United States v. Leos-Quijada, 107 F.3d 786, 794 (10th Cir. 1997)
(citations omitted). As with conspiracy, “[p]articipation in the criminal venture
may be established by circumstantial evidence,” but unlike conspiracy, “the level
of participation may be of ‘relatively slight moment.’” Id. (quoting United States
v. M cK neely, 69 F.3d 1067, 1072 (10th Cir. 1995)). In this case, Isaac-Sigala’s
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participation in the smuggling operation easily surpasses the minimal requirement
of participation for a “slight moment.” M oreover, the record amply supports the
jury’s conclusion that Isaac-Sigala took some act to facilitate the group’s criminal
purpose. As such, we reject Isaac-Sigala’s challenge to the aiding and abetting
conviction.
III
Because we conclude the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find
Isaac-Sigala conspired to smuggle marijuana and that he aided and abetting the
distribution of marijuana, we A FFIRM .
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