F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
June 20, 2006
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
NAN CY BEAR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 05-3183
JAM ES A . PA TTON, in his official
capacity as Judge of the D istrict Court
of Brown County, Kansas,
Defendant-Appellee.
A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T HE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D .C . No. 04-CV-4081-JAR)
Submitted on the briefs:
Nancy Bear, Pro Se, Appellant.
Phill Kline, Attorney General, Steve Phillips, Assistant Attorney General, Office
of the Attorney General, Topeka, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before LUCERO , ANDERSO N, and BRO RBY, Circuit Judges.
BRO RBY, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Nancy Bear appeals from the district court’s order dismissing her
civil action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) (together, Rooker-Feldman). W e have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate the district court’s judgment and
remand for further proceedings. *
I. Background
Nancy Bear is an enrolled member of the Kickapoo Tribe and lives on the
Tribe’s reservation in Kansas. She filed this action seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against defendant James A. Patton in his official capacity as
Judge of the District Court of Brown County, Kansas. Judge Patton presided over
civil action No. 02-C-61, Kathy Ann Bradley, et al. v. Nancy Sue Bear, et al. The
plaintiffs in that state action brought two claims against Bear. Count I requested
a decree dissolving a partnership of which Bear was a member and an accounting
that would divide the partnership assets. Count II sought a partition of property
owned by the partnership. On December 10, 2003, after a trial to court, Judge
Patton filed a journal entry in w hich he ordered that “[p]ursuant to K.S.A.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
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[§] 60-254(b) final judgment should be entered on Count II of plaintiffs’ Petition
(For Partition).” 1 R., doc. 3, unlabeled ex. at 103. In the journal entry, Judge
Patton ordered a partition of certain real estate and personal property owned by
the partnership. On June 15, 2004, a sheriff’s sale was held and the property sold.
See id. at 182-86. Also on that date, Bear filed a motion to dismiss the case,
arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the real estate and
personal property at issue because it was on Indian land.
On July 9, 2004, Bear filed her complaint in this action, requesting a
variety of declaratory relief, including that Judge “Patton’s assumption of
jurisdiction over Plaintiff Bear’s deeded lands on the Kickapoo Reservation
violated federal law and his order to liquidate said lands issued in said case is . . .
null and void.” Id., doc. 1 at 9. She also seeks injunctive relief prohibiting Judge
1
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-254(b) reads as follows:
(b) Judgm ent upon m ultiple claims. W hen more than one claim for
relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party claim or, when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one
or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an
express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon
an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of
such determination and direction, any order or other form of
decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall
not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the
order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
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Patton from issuing or enforcing any further orders, judgments, or decrees
regarding her or any of her deeded lands on the Kickapoo Reservation.
Judge Patton, who had not yet ruled on Bear’s motion to dismiss, stayed the
case before him sua sponte pending the resolution of this action. He filed a
motion to dismiss that the district court granted based on lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 2 The court concluded that “the
relief Bear requests . . . is not separable from and collateral to [the state-court
case], for Bear in essence seeks an order from this Court vacating Judge Patton’s
decisions. Therefore, Bear’s claim is inextricably intertwined with the state
court’s decision, and this Court cannot exercise jurisdiction.” Id., doc. 10 at 4
(footnote omitted). This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
W e review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Kiowa Indian Tribe of Okla. v Hoover, 150 F.3d
1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 1998). Because Bear appears pro se, we review her
pleadings and other papers liberally and hold them to a less stringent standard
2
As discussed more fully below, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests
federal district courts of subject matter jurisdiction over claims that seek, in
substance, appellate review of final state-court judgments.
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than those drafted by attorneys. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972);
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1991). 3
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), “[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the
highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court by writ of certiorari.” The Rooker-Feldman doctrine arose out of
this statute, and provides that only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear
appeals from final state court judgments. See G uttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027,
1031 (10th Cir. 2006). Federal district courts do not have jurisdiction to review
state court judgments or claims inextricably intertwined with them. Id.
At the time the district court dismissed Bear’s action, the law of this circuit
was that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied to “all state-court decisions— final
or otherw ise.” Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 475 (10th Cir.
2002). However, just one week prior to the district court’s dismissal of this case,
the Supreme Court held that “[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to
. . . cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by
state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings comm enced
3
Judge Patton suggests that we should not grant Bear the deference
ordinarily afforded to pro se litigants because, upon information and belief, he
asserts that she received assistance from her attorneys in drafting her appellate
brief. Although her brief appears to be consistent with briefs traditionally
associated with attorneys and she was represented by counsel in the district court,
we are obliged to construe her brief liberally in the absence of evidence that it
was prepared with the assistance of an attorney.
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and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon M obil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The Court further
explained that, in both Rooker and Feldman, “the losing party in state court filed
suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended.” Id. at 291 (emphasis
added). A ccordingly, Exxon M obil reverses our holding in Kenmen that
Rooker-Feldman applies to “all state-court decisions— final or otherwise.” See
Guttman, 446 F.3d at 1031. 4
W e recently agreed with several of our sister circuits that “after the state
proceedings ended” means that “Rooker-Feldman applies only to suits filed after
state proceedings are final.” Id. at 1032 (citing Federacion de M aestros de
Puerto Rico v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de Puerto Rico, 410 F.3d 17,
24-25 (1st Cir. 2005); Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 89
(2d Cir. 2005); Dornheim v. Sholes, 430 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2005);
M othershed v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602, 604 n.1 (9th Cir.
2005)). In Guttman, we also cited with approval the First Circuit’s explanation of
several situations in which a state-court judgment could be considered final for
Rooker-Feldman purposes, one of which is relevant here: “‘if the state action has
4
W e note that Rooker-Feldman does not apply in the habeas context because
Congress has authorized federal district courts to review state prisoners’ petitions.
See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 292 n.8 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)).
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reached a point where neither party seeks further action.’” Guttman, 446 F.3d at
1032 n.2 (quoting Federacion, 410 F.3d at 24).
The present case requires us to go one step further than was necessary in
Guttman and hold that “if a lower state court issues a judgment and the losing
party allows the time for appeal to expire, then the state proceedings have ended.”
Federacion, 410 F.3d at 24. Accordingly, Rooker-Feldman applies as to that
judgment and any claims inextricably intertwined with it. Under this view of
Rooker-Feldman, the relevant inquiry in this case is whether, at the time the
federal action was filed, the judgment on Count II that Judge Patton issued
pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-254(b) was final and appealable under Kansas
law and, if so, whether Bear’s time for taking an appeal had run.
Although the state proceedings have not “ended” in a general sense because
the accounting and distribution of the proceeds of the sheriff’s sale remain, a final
judgment on Count II that was no longer appealable would have invoked
Rooker-Feldman’s jurisdictional bar for two reasons. First, the purpose of the bar
is to prevent a state court litigant from circumventing the appellate structure
established by 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416 (explaining that,
after the period for appeal to the Supreme Court lapses, “an aggrieved litigant
cannot be permitted to do indirectly what he no longer can do directly” by filing
an action in a federal district court). M erely allowing to elapse the time for an
appeal from a final, appealable judgment on one of multiple claims, then filing an
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action in a federal district court attacking the state court’s jurisdiction to enter
that judgment, would do just that.
The second reason a final judgment on Count II would have invoked the
Rooker-Feldman bar is that Bear’s request for prospective declaratory and
injunctive relief is inextricably intertwined with it. A federal claim is
inextricably intertwined with a state-court judgment if that judgment “caused,
actually and proximately, the injury for which the federal-court plaintiff seeks
redress.” Kenmen Eng’g, 314 F.3d at 476 (footnote omitted), abrogated on other
grounds by Exxon M obil, 544 U.S. 280. As noted above, in the C ount II
judgment, Judge Patton concluded that the partnership assets should be
partitioned and ordered the sheriff’s sale. Thus, the judgment is the cause of the
prospective injury Bear seeks to enjoin— an accounting and division of
partnership assets under Count I— and the prospective relief she seeks in her
federal claim is, therefore, inextricably intertwined with it. Absent the adverse
judgment on Count II, Bear would have no basis, and perhaps no reason, to
challenge prospectively Judge Patton’s jurisdiction to enter orders on Count I.
W e decline to address in the first instance whether the Count II judgment
was final under Kansas law when Bear filed this action. The district court is in a
better position to accept argument from the parties, make factual findings or take
evidence if necessary, and resolve the issue. Furthermore, if the district court
determines that the judgment was not final and, therefore, that Rooker-Feldman
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does not apply, it can consider the alternate bases for dismissal urged by Judge
Patton, namely, abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and the
discretion a district court has to decline to exercise jurisdiction under the
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). 5
III. Conclusion
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the district court is VA CA TED
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
5
Although we do not reach the issue of Younger abstention, we note that it
appears one of its essential predicates, the presence of an ongoing proceeding,
may be absent here. See Southwest Air Ambulance, Inc. v. City of Las Cruces,
268 F.3d 1162, 1178 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding Younger abstention inappropriate
where a municipal court stayed a criminal proceeding sua sponte in favor of
federal resolution of the issues).
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