Salazar v. Barnhart

UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS

FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT

JULIE A. SALAZAR,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 05-2005
(D.C. No. CIV-03-1235-RLP)
JO A NN E B. BA RN HA RT,
C OM M ISSIO N ER OF SO CIA L
SEC URITY ,

Defendant-Appellee.

OR DER
Filed October 5, 2006

Before KELLY, B AL DOC K , and M U RPH Y, Circuit Judges.

Appellant’s motion to publish the order and judgment filed in this matter on

August 23, 2006, is GRANTED. The published opinion is filed nunc pro tunc to

August 23, 2006, and a copy is attached.

Entered for the Court
ELISABETH A. SHUM AKER, Clerk

By:
Deputy Clerk
 F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
October 5, 2006
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT

JULIE A. SALAZAR,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 05-2005

JO A NN E B. BA RN HA RT,
Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T HE D ISTRICT OF NEW M EXICO
(D.C. No. CIV-03-1235-RL P)

Patricia Glazek, Santa Fe, New M exico, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Eric B. Tucker, Assistant Regional Counsel (David C. Iglesias, United States
Attorney, Cynthia L. W eisman, Assistant United States Attorney, Tina M .
W addell, Regional Chief Counsel, Region VI, and M ichael M cGaughran, Deputy
Regional Chief Counsel, with him on the brief), Office of the General Counsel,
Social Security Administration, Dallas, Texas, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before KELLY, B AL DOC K , and M U RPH Y, Circuit Judges.

M U RPH Y, Circuit Judge.
 Julie A. Salazar appeals from an opinion and order entered by a United

States M agistrate Judge 1 that affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security (Commissioner) denying her application for Supplemental Security

Income (SSI) benefits. W e reverse and remand for an aw ard of benefits.

Background

On M arch 2, 2001, M s. Salazar filed an application for SSI benefits on the

basis of mental impairments. Her application was administratively denied

initially and on reconsideration. She then requested and appeared with a

non-attorney representative for a hearing before an administrative law judge

(A LJ) on February 25, 2003.

At the time of her hearing, M s. Salazar was thirty-five years old. She was

the divorced mother of three children, none of whom lived with her, and

essentially homeless. Her longest period of employment had been for about one

year as an attendant at a pizza shop. The medical records at the time of

M s. Salazar’s hearing contained diagnoses of borderline personality disorder,

major depressive disorder, drug and alcohol addiction (DAA), and an unhealed

broken left arm. There was also documentation concerning numerous suicide

gestures.

1
The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge.

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 In a decision dated April 14, 2003, the A LJ denied M s. Salazar’s request

for benefits. Basically, he found that if she stopped using drugs and alcohol she

would not be disabled. After the Appeals Council denied her request for review,

she filed an action in federal district court. The magistrate judge entered an

opinion and order that affirmed the Commissioner’s denial of benefits. Salazar v.

Barnhart, 344 F. Supp. 2d 723 (D.N.M . 2004). This appeal followed.

M edical Record

The earliest medical report in the record is from January 24, 2000, when

M s. Salazar w as seen by a clinical therapist at the H ealth Centers of Northern

New M exico (HCNNM ). She told him that she had “been depressed and cutting”

herself since October 1999. Aplt. App., Vol. II, at 204.

On February 20, 2000, M s. Salazar was treated at St. Vincent Hospital on

her way to jail. The emergency room physician noted that she was “at [another

hospital] throughout the night after an altercation,” and that she “was quite

intoxicated.” Id. at 136.

On M arch 1, 2000, M s. Salazar met with Julie W alker, a psychiatrist at

HCNNM . She told Dr. W alker that she was “very depressed” following several

days of sobriety. Id. at 198. She talked about her suicide attempts and described

the “compulsion” and “sense of relief” she felt w hen she cut herself. Id.

Dr. W alker diagnosed her with major depressive disorder, borderline personality

disorder, and polysubstance dependency.

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 The police brought M s. Salazar to Espanola Hospital on M arch 12, 2000,

after they found her running in traffic. The following day, M s. Salazar was

evaluated by a counselor from HCNNM . On the basis of the evaluation, the

emergency room physician, Joe Glass, noted in his discharge summary that her

suicide gestures w ere secondary to her DAA.

On M arch 16, 2000, M s. Salazar saw Dr. W alker, who again reconfirmed

her diagnoses, including borderline personality disorder. On M arch 20, 2000,

when M s. Salazar returned to see Dr. W alker, she told her that she “fe[lt] she

[was] slipping back in to depression,” and explained that she “[found] it difficult

to get out of bed in [the morning].” Id. at 183. M s. Salazar said that she had not

been abusing alcohol or drugs recently, and Dr. W alker noted the same diagnoses.

On the evening of M arch 20, 2000, M s. Salazar was taken to a detention

center after she was picked up by the police on a warrant for failing to appear for

a traffic violation. The next day, a police officer filled out a certification for an

emergency mental health evaluation because M s. Salazar w as threatening suicide.

She was visited by a counselor from HCNNM , whose mental health evaluation

offered diagnoses of major depression, polysubstance abuse, and borderline

personality disorder.

On April 16, 2000, the police brought M s. Salazar to Espanola Hospital

after they found her crawling down the street. M urray Ryan, an internal medicine

specialist, was on duty in the emergency room. He noted her problems as

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“[c]hronic severe drug and alcohol abuse,” “[a]cute drug and alcohol toxicity,”

[and] “marked psycho social problems.” Id. at 308. Dr. Ryan based his findings,

in part, on a conversation with M s. Salazar’s father’s girlfriend, who told him that

M s. Salazar was an alcoholic, did drugs, and had refused help. Dr. Ryan

indicated that his plan was to “detox her, sober her up, [and] see what we can do

about her drug and alcohol problems.” Id. at 307.

The police brought M s. Salazar to Espanola Hospital on April 27, 2000,

after they found her wandering the streets. They said she was filthy, disheveled,

and intoxicated. The emergency room physician, M iguel Dozier, described her as

“very unfortunate . . . with borderline personality disorder who also has a strong

substance abuse problem.” Id. at 290. His discharge impression was “multiple

drug abuse, danger to self, [and] borderline personality disorder.” Id. As part of

this same incident, she was admitted to the intensive care unit, where her

physician, M ark Dickinson, noted that “[t]his is a 32 year old female with a long

history of psychiatric problems and substance abuse. . . . She has a history of

self destructive behavior and was admitted because of great risk to herself. . . .

The parents say that she is always depressed.” Id. at 287.

On M ay 27, 2000, M s. Salazar w as brought by the police to Espanola

Hospital after she was found jumping into a river. Her feet were also injured

from her attempts to brand them with a hot coat hanger. Dr. Dozier was the

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emergency room physician on duty, and he again noted his impressions of

polysubstance abuse and borderline personality disorder.

M s. Salazar went to see Dr. Ryan on M ay 31, 2000, for a checkup

following her release from the hospital. The notes in his file state that she was

“doing pretty well.” Id. at 319. At another unidentified time, M s. Salazar was

seen again by Dr. Ryan, who noted that she was “doing great,” [f]antastically

better.” Id.

But on July 16, 2000, M s. Salazar was again brought to Espanola H ospital,

this time by emergency health personnel who found her outside a home wearing

nothing but her underwear. She was intoxicated, had cactus spines in her thigh,

and reported being sexually assaulted.

On September 6, 2000, M s. Salazar, who was being held in jail on a

contempt charge, was allowed go see Dr. Ryan. He said that she was “[l]ooking

great,” and he arranged for her to have her medications in jail. Id. at 318.

However, M s. Salazar was again admitted to Espanola Hospital on October

26, 2000, where she was treated for multiple self-inflicted lacerations of her left

arm. Her medical history listed “self-mutilation [and] alcohol.” Id. at 249.

The emergency room physician noted that she had been “depressed” and using

alcohol. Id. Following her release from the hospital, M s. Salazar saw Dr. Ryan

on October 31, 2000. He said that she was “doing well,” although she had

“[s]lashed her arms again.” Id. at 316.

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 Shortly after M s. Salazar was released from two months in jail for

contempt, she went to Amity (a substance abuse facility) for an evaluation. She

admitted having a “difficult time with her employment obligations due to the use

of alcohol and cocaine.” 2 Id. at 147. She reported having been charged three

times for disorderly conduct, twice for assault, and one occasion each for

contempt and public intoxication. M s. Salazar also described a lifetime of

problem s of “serious depression[,] serious anxiety or tension[,] trouble

understanding, concentrating or remembering [and] trouble controlling violent

behavior,” id. at 151-52, and told Amity that she “uses alcohol or cocaine as a

way of self-medicating” when she is depressed. Id. at 152. She expressed “an

extreme need for treatment” for her psychiatric problems. Id. Amity referred her

for a psychological evaluation.

On November 7, 2000, M s. Salazar went to see Dr. Ryan to get the stitches

in her arm removed. After speaking at length about her alcohol and drug use, he

noted: “I don’t know of anything else we can do. She is pretty well involved

with resources and if she stays off alcohol she does pretty well.” Id. at 315.

On December 4, 2000, M s. Salazar w ent to see John Lang, a Ph.D. in

psychology, for the evaluation recommended by Amity. Dr. Lang interviewed her

2
The ALJ found that M s. Salazar reported that “the primary reason she could
not maintain employment was the abuse of alcohol and cocaine.” Aplt. A pp.,
Vol. II, at 30. W hat she actually said was that her DAA made her employment
obligations more “difficult.” Id. at 147.

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and also administered a battery of tests. He noted his impression that she “appears

to be trying very hard.” Id. at 360. She w as unable to complete several tests,

however, because she was distracted and impatient. She reported “high levels of

guilt, feelings of persecution, self-blame, loss of interest, weight loss, and suicidal

ideation.” Id. Dr. Lang diagnosed her w ith “M ajor depression, recurrent, severe

with suicidal ideation[;] . . . Polysubstance dependence[;] . . . Cocaine dependence

(in remission)[;] . . . and Personality disorder N OS [not otherwise specified] with

symptoms of dependent and borderline.” Id. at 361.

On December 18, 2000, an intoxicated M s. Salazar w ent to Espanola

Hospital for self-inflicted lacerations to her hand. The emergency room physician

requested that she be seen by a counselor in jail. M s. Salazar told the counselor

that she “got depressed [and] cut [herself] to release the pain.” Id. at 173.

M s. Salazar’s brother called the police on December 22, 2000, after she

slashed her forearm. She tested positive for alcohol and cocaine when she arrived

at Espanola Hospital. The emergency room physician, Robert Kilgo, noted that

she was well known to the hospital secondary to alcohol abuse and self-abusive

behavior secondary to her personality disorder. Id. at 234. Dr. Kilgo’s discharge

impression was “alcohol abuse and personality disorder.” Id.

M s. Salazar filed her application for SSI benefits on M arch 2, 2001,

claiming mental impairments as her disability.

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 On M arch 24, 2001, M s. Salazar w as treated at Espanola Hospital for a

broken left arm that resulted from her jumping from a fast-moving vehicle while

she was intoxicated. X-rays showed that she had a “comminuted fracture of the

proximal shaft of the ulna,” which probably “extends into the articular surface of

the proximal ulna.” Id. at 225. There was also a “comminuted fracture of the

proximal radius with angulation.” Id. She went to see Dr. Ryan on April 6, 2001,

about getting her broken arm fixed; his notes state that they could not help her get

her arm fixed unless she had some money.

On April 23, 2001, M s. Salazar called Dr. Ryan’s office asking for a note to

excuse her from a court appearance and community service because she could not

work with a broken arm. The problems continued when she went to the hospital

on M ay 12, 2001, after a fall that re-injured her broken arm. X-rays confirmed

that her arm was still broken and showed a “[s]everely comminuted, angulated,

and deformed fracture of the proximal left humerus and radius.” Id. at 208.

On M ay 25, 2001, M s. Salazar went to see Dr. Ryan again about her broken

arm “when she perfectly well knows.” Id. at 310. It was his impression that she

“is almost using [her arm] to shield her from any judge and so on.” 3 Id.

3
The ALJ seized on this comment from Dr. Ryan about her broken arm for
his finding that M s. Salazar had a “history of ‘using’ her addict status as a tool to
avoid legal consequences of her actions.” Aplt. App., Vol. II, at 30. This
mischaracterizes the comment. Dr. Ryan’s comm ent did not suggest that she was
using her “addict status” to avoid anything, a key difference in the context of the
(continued...)

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 M s. Salazar missed her October 12, 2001, appointment with a physician

retained by the Social Security Administration (SSA ) to conduct a consultative

psychiatric examination. M s. Salazar later said that she missed the appointment

because she was “out of it” and “very depressed [and] suicidal.” Id. at 141.

For approximately forty days prior to November 29, 2001, M s. Salazar was

an inpatient at Amistad, another substance abuse facility, where she did not drink

alcohol or do drugs. Nonetheless, at the conclusion of this forty-day period of

abstinence, Amistad referred M s. Salazar to St. Vincent Hospital for “increasing

depression, hopelessness, and suicidal ideation.” Id. at 332. Laboratory tests at

the hospital confirmed that her toxicology was negative for drugs and alcohol.

The admitting physician at St. Vincent’s, Daniel Collins, noted M s. Salazar’s chief

complaint as: “I’m very suicidal. I’m homeless. I have multiple stressors, and

I’m depressed.” Id. Dr. Collins diagnosed her with major depression, recurrent;

polysubstance abuse, in remission, mostly alcohol and cocaine; and post traumatic

stress disorder, in partial remission, but deferred any diagnosis of a personality

disorder. W ith regard to her physical condition, Dr. Collins noted that “[s]he did

break her left arm some time ago which needs probable followup with an

orthopedic surgeon because it has not been set properly. She says she did not have

the money to go see an orthopedic surgeon to correctly fix her broken left arm.

3
(...continued)
ALJ’s findings.

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The left arm is now healed. She says it sometimes pops out at the elbow when she

moves it around.” Id. at 333. X-rays, however, revealed an “old chronic ulnar

fracture” and a “[f]racture of the distal radius with lucency and defect which

suggest more likely a subacute fracture[,] [n]onunion[,] [and] [d]istortion as well.”

Id. at 325.

On December 4, 2001, M s. Salazar was discharged from St. Vincent

Hospital after a five-day stay and receiving antipsychotic medication. The

discharging physician, W illiam Hiltz, deferred any diagnosis of a personality

disorder and stated that her prognosis was “[f]airly good, particularly if [she]

maintains her clean and sober status.” Id. at 326.

Following the initial denial of her application for SSI benefits, M s. Salazar

filed for reconsideration on December 18, 2001, complaining of problems with her

broken arm and adding that she was being treated for mental problems by a

physician, Robert Franklin.

On July 2, 2002, the SSA ’s psychological reviewer declined to complete a

Psychiatric Review Technique form, stating that because M s. Salazar failed to

attend the consultative psychiatric examination in October 2001, there was

insufficient evidence to determine w hether she had a mental disorder.

The final medical record concerns the period of January 30 through

February 4, 2003, when M s. Salazar was hospitalized at the Las Vegas M edical

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Center for depression. It appears that she brought some, but not all, of the records

from this hospitalization and her treatment with Dr. Franklin to the hearing.

Five-Step Sequential Evaluation

In determining disability, the Commissioner generally uses a five-step

sequential evaluation process. See W illiams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52

(10th Cir. 1988). Here, the ALJ followed the sequential-evaluation process and

found that M s. Salazar met steps one and two. At step three, the ALJ found that

she had an impairment that met one of the Commissioner’s listed impairments

(mood disorder under Listing § 12.04), but that this impairment was “secondary to

chronic polysubstance abuse” and that “without the effects of drug and alcohol

abuse, [she] w ould not be disabled.” A plt. App., Vol. II, at 29-30. At step four,

the ALJ concluded that if she “stopped the abuse of drugs and alcohol, she would

recover to a condition of only minimal limitation,” and thus retained the residual

functional capacity (RFC) for light exertional work and could perform her past

relevant w ork. Id. at 32. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that M s. Salazar was

not disabled.

Standard of Review

W e review the A LJ’s decision “to determine w hether the factual findings are

supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the correct legal

standards were applied.” Ham lin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir.

2004) (quotation omitted). “[B]ecause our review is based on the record taken as a

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whole, we will meticulously examine the record in order to determine if the

evidence supporting the agency’s decision is substantial,” but we “neither reweigh

the evidence nor substitute our discretion for that of the Commissioner.” Id.

(quotation and brackets omitted).

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. “However, a decision is not based

on substantial evidence if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record or if

there is a mere scintilla of evidence supporting it.” Id. (quotation and brackets

omitted).

Borderline Personality Disorder

M s. Salazar argues, and we agree, that the ALJ misapplied the law when he

failed to consider her borderline personality disorder in his disability

determination. It is beyond dispute that an ALJ is required to consider all of the

claimant’s medically determinable impairments, singly and in combination; the

statute and regulations require nothing less. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B);

20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a), 416.923, 416.945. Further, the failure to consider all of

the impairments is reversible error. Langley v. Barnhart, 373 F.3d 1116, 1123-24

(10th Cir. 2004).

The Commissioner argues that the ALJ did not need to consider

M s. Salazar’s borderline personality disorder because the references in the record

to this condition are “minimal” and “not the result of thorough examinations.”

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Aplee. Br. at 10. To the contrary, the opinions of the psychiatrist, Julie W alker,

and the psychologist, John Lang, both of whom diagnosed M s. Salazar with a

personality disorder, are the most thorough examinations in the record. Also, the

references to this disorder are not minimal; instead, they appear repeatedly and

consistently throughout the record, and include the reports from several emergency

room physicians and counselors, as noted above.

Alternatively, the Commissioner asserts that the ALJ did in fact consider this

impairment because he stated that he considered “all the evidence of record.” Id.

at 9. This assertion is untenable. Indeed, personality disorders are set forth

separately in the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. I,

Listing § 12.08. The ALJ never mentions this Listing in his decision.

W hat is particularly troublesome about the ALJ’s failure to consider

M s. Salazar’s borderline personality disorder is that it may account for her abuse of

drugs and alcohol, as well as her suicidal conduct and self-mutilation. Borderline

personality disorder is marked by at least five of the follow ing symptoms:

(1) [I]mpulsiveness in, inter alia, substance abuse; (2) instability of
mood, interpersonal relationships and self-image; (3) sieges of
depression, irritability and anxiety; (4) lack of anger control and
recurrent physical fights; (5) threats of suicide and attempts at
self-mutilation; (6) uncertainty about career or long-term goals; and
(7) persistent feeling of boredom or emptiness.

M cGoffin v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 1248, 1250 n.2 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing

2 J.E. Schmidt, Attorneys’ Dictionary of M edicine (LexisNexis)).

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 Specifically with respect to substance abuse, suicidal conduct, and

self-mutilation, individuals with borderline personality disorder display:

[I]mpulsivity in at least two areas that are potentially self damaging
. . . . They may gamble, spend money irresponsibly, binge eat, abuse
substances, engage in unsafe sex, or drive recklessly. Individuals w ith
Borderline Personality Disorder display recurrent suicidal behavior,
gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating behavior . . . . Completed
suicide occurs in 8% – 10% of such individuals, and self-mutilative
acts (e.g., cutting or burning) and suicide threats and attempts are very
common.

American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical M anual of M ental

Disorders (Text Revision 4th ed. 2000) at 707. (DSM -IV.) M oreover,

“[b]orderline [p]ersonality [d]isorder often co-occurs with M ood Disorders [such

as depression], and when criteria for both are met, both may be diagnosed.” Id.

at 709 (emphasis in original).

The A LJ’s failure to consider M s. Salazar’s borderline personality disorder,

singly and in combination with her other impairments, requires that w e reverse.

Langley, 373 F.3d at 1123-24.

Lack of Substantial Evidence

M s. Salazar next argues that the A LJ’s determination that her DAA is a

contributing factor material to her disability is not supported by substantial

evidence. Again, we agree.

There are special statutes and regulations governing drug and alcohol cases.

The Contract with America Advancement A ct of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110

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Stat. 848, 852 (enacted M arch 29, 1996) added an extra step to the five-step

sequential evaluation for claimants with DAA. The Act amended the Social

Security Act to provide that “[a]n individual shall not be considered to be disabled

for purposes of this subchapter if alcoholism or drug addiction would (but for this

subparagraph) be a contributing factor material to the Commissioner’s

determination that the individual is disabled.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C); see also

M cGoffin, 288 F.3d at 1251.

The Commissioner’s implementing regulations set forth the analysis to be

followed by an ALJ in a case involving DAA: “If we find that you are disabled and

have medical evidence of your drug addiction or alcoholism, we must determine

whether your drug addiction or alcoholism is a contributing factor material to the

determination of disability.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.935(a). And 20 C.F.R. § 416.935(b)

sets forth the process the Commissioner follows when there is medical evidence of

drug addiction or alcoholism.

Shortly after the law was amended, the Commissioner sent out a teletype on

applying the new law, which speaks to situations where a claimant has one or more

other mental impairments in addition to DAA. It stresses the need for careful

examination of periods of abstinence and also directs that if the effects of a

claimant’s mental impairments cannot be separated from the effects of substance

abuse, the D AA is not a contributing factor material to the disability determination:

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 29. Q. The most complicated and difficult determinations of
materiality will involve individuals with documented substance use
disorders and one or more other mental impairments. In many of these
instances, it will be very difficult to disentangle the restrictions and
limitations imposed by the substance use disorder from those resulting
from the other mental impairment(s). Can any examples be provided
for how to handle the materiality determination in these situations, or
can any guidance be provided for the type of information that should
be used in trying to assess the impact of each impairment?

A. W e know of no research data upon which to reliably predict the
expected improvement in a coexisting mental impairment(s) should
drug/alcohol use stop. The most useful evidence that might be
obtained in such cases is that relating to a period when the individual
was not using drugs/alcohol. Of course, when evaluating this type of
evidence consideration must be given to the length of the period of
abstinence, how recently it occurred, and whether there may have been
any increase in the limitations and restrictions imposed by the other
mental impairments since the last period of abstinence. W hen it is not
possible to separate the mental restrictions and limitations imposed by
DAA and the various other mental disorders shown by the evidence, a
finding of ‘not material’ would be appropriate.

Aplt. Br., Ex. A at 3-4.

W ith regard to the materiality finding, the Commissioner’s teletype further

directs that where a medical or psychological examiner cannot project what

limitations would remain if the claimant stopped using drugs or alcohol, the

disability examiner should find that DAA is not a contributing factor material to the

disability determination:

27. Q. Is it appropriate for an M C/PC [medical
consultant/psychological consultant] to conclude that he/she cannot
project what limitations, if any, would remain if drug/alcohol use
stopped and let the DE [disability examiner] make a determination that
DA A is not material?

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 A. Yes. There will be cases in which the evidence demonstrates
multiple impairments, especially cases involving multiple mental
impairments, where the M C/PC cannot project what limitations w ould
remain if the individuals stopped using drugs/alcohol. In such cases,
the M C/PC should record his/her finding to that effect. Since a finding
that DAA is material will be made only when the evidence establishes
that the individual would not be disabled if he/she stopped using
drugs/alcohol, the DE will find that DAA is not a contributing factor
material to the determination of disability.

Id. at 2.

Although the ALJ cited the drug and alcohol regulations in his decision, he

never mentioned the Commissioner’s teletype. Granted, the failure to specifically

mention the teletype is not fatal. W hat is fatal, however, is that there is not

substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion that M s. Salazar would not be

disabled in the absence of her DAA. Therefore, whether we view the ALJ’s error

as misapplication of the law or the lack of substantial evidence, the result is the

same and the decision must be reversed. See Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1214.

For example, the Commissioner’s teletype instructs that some of the most

useful evidence in DAA cases “is that relating to a period when the individual was

not using drugs/alcohol,” including the “length of the period of abstinence.” A plt.

Br., Ex. A at 3. In M s. Salazar’s case, however, the ALJ’s finding that her mental

impairments improved after a period of sobriety is based on a mistaken reading of

the evidence. Instead, the record establishes that on November 29, 2001, and after

forty days of sobriety (the longest documented period in the record), Amistad

referred M s. Salazar to St. Vincent Hospital for inpatient psychiatric treatment for

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“increasing depression, hopelessness, and suicidal ideation.” Aplt. A pp., Vol. II,

at 332. M s. Salazar’s Global Assessment of Functioning 4 was 35 on the day of her

admission. Id. at 334.

W hile the ALJ notes this hospitalization in his decision, he mistakenly found

that “[a] fter a period of inpatient detoxification in November and December 2001

with Dr. Collins . . . [she] became more hopeful, less depressed, and her suicidality

evaporated.” Id. at 30 (emphasis added). To the contrary, M s. Salazar was not

referred to St. Vincent Hospital or Dr. Collins for detoxification; instead, after

forty days of sobriety her mental problems alone were so severe that she needed to

be hospitalized. And it was after five days in a structured environment and

receiving antipsychotic medication that her outlook improved. The ALJ was wrong

about this critical evidence and his finding is not supported by the evidence.

Further, the Commissioner’s teletype instructs that where the record is

devoid of any medical or psychological report, opinion, or projection as to the

claimant’s remaining limitations if she stopped using drugs or alcohol, an ALJ

should “find that DAA is not a contributing factor material to the determination of

4
The Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) is a subjective determination
based on a scale of 1-100 of “the clinician’s judgment of the individual’s overall
level of functioning.” DSM -IV at 32. A GAF of 31-40 is extremely low, and
“indicates [s]ome impairment in reality testing or comm unication . . . [or] major
impairment in reality testing or communication . . . [or] major impairment in
reality testing or communication . . . [or] major impairment in several areas, such
as work or school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood.” Id.

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disability.” Aplt. Br., Ex. A at 2. Setting aside the fact that the ALJ erred by

failing to consider all of M s. Salazar’s medically determinable impairments, there

is not substantial evidence to support his conclusion that “without the effects of

drug and alcohol abuse, [she] w ould not be disabled” on the basis of her severe

depression alone. Aplt. A pp, Vol. II, at 30.

Here, the ALJ apparently viewed the anecdotal comments from Dr. Ryan and

the single statement from Dr. Hiltz as substantial evidence that M s. Salazar’s

remaining mental limitations would not be disabling in the absence of her D AA.

But we do not believe that these opinions “will bear the weight placed upon [them]

by the ALJ.” M cGoffin, 288 F.3d at 1253.

In M cGoffin, the claimant had been diagnosed with dysthymic disorder,

polysubstance abuse, and borderline personality disorder. In finding that she was

not disabled, the ALJ relied on the opinion of a consulting physician who examined

her only once while she was living in a controlled residential treatment facility and

not using any drugs or alcohol. W e held that the ALJ improperly relied on the

consulting physician’s report because the examination occurred while the claimant

was highly medicated in a structured environment, and he failed to express any

opinion on her remaining limitations if she stopped using drugs and alcohol.

Comparison of our holding in M cGoffin to the facts of this case establishes

that the opinions of Drs. Ryan and Hiltz do not rise to the level of substantial

evidence. In addition to the problem that Dr. Ryan’s observations are at odds w ith

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the facts and Dr. Hiltz examined M s. Salazar in a sheltered hospital environment

where she was taking antipsychotic medication, neither physician ever assessed

w hether M s. Salazar’s mental disorders were disabling in the absence of her DA A ,

and neither assessed her abilities in an independent work environment as required

by the Commissioner’s teletype. These opinions therefore do not rise to the level

of substantial evidence. See M cGoffin, 288 F.3d at 1253.

Nor are we convinced that the record supports the ALJ’s finding that

M s. Salazar’s suicide gestures are secondary to her DAA. This conclusion hangs

on the slender thread of the discharge summary of an emergency room physician,

and is directly contradicted by the other medical and psychological evidence in the

record. On M arch 12, 2000, the police brought M s. Salazar to Espanola Hospital.

As part of her treatment, the emergency room physician, Joe Glass, requested that

she be seen by a counselor in jail. The counselor noted that “[s]he appears to have

poor self-awareness and poor coping skills in dealing with recurrent major

depression” and that “[k]ey emotionally charged situations such as not being able

to attend her son’s birthday . . . seem to trigger a cycle of abuse of alcohol and

drugs which lead her into suicidal gestures.” Aplt. App., Vol. II, at 192. Based on

the counselor’s report, Dr. Glass stated in his discharge summary: “1. Alcohol and

drug abuse. 2. Suicidal ideation secondary to above.” Id. at 188. However, read

closely, the counselor found that M s. Salazar’s substance abuse and resulting

suicidal behavior stem from her major depression, not her DAA.

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 Regardless of w hether Dr. Glass or the A LJ misinterpreted the counselor’s

comments, the ALJ’s finding that M s. Salazar’s suicide attempts are secondary to

her DAA cannot be sustained for another reason. The ALJ failed to explain why he

ignored the opinions of Drs. Lang and Kilgo, who agreed with the counselor, and

opined that her suicide attempts were secondary to either her major depressive

disorder or her borderline personality disorder. 5

The Commissioner’s regulations provide that she will evaluate every medical

opinion in the record, and unless she gives a treating source’s opinion controlling

weight, she will consider several factors in deciding the weight that should be

given to any medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d). In M s. Salazar’s case, the

ALJ never stated who was her treating physician. Therefore, he was required to

evaluate each medical opinion and accord it the proper weight on the basis of:

(1) the examining relationship; (2) the treatment relationship; (3) the length of the

treatment relationship and the frequency of examinations; (4) the nature and extent

of the treatment relationship: (5) how well the opinion is supported; (6) its

consistency with other evidence; and (7) w hether the opinion is from a specialist.

Id. at (d)(1)-(6); see also Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1215.

5
This type of error extends to many other findings in the ALJ’s decision.
For example, from the standpoint of M s. Salazar’s mental impairments as her
claimed disability, the ALJ never explains why he gave apparent controlling
weight to the opinions of an internal medicine specialist, Dr. Ryan, instead of
Dr. W alker, a psychiatrist, or Dr. Lang, a Ph.D. in psychology.

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 Here, the ALJ did not explain why he gave weight to certain medical

opinions and disregarded others. Nor did he consider the factors listed in the

regulations in assessing the w eight to be accorded the various opinions.

Aw ard of Benefits

M s. Salazar filed for benefits in M arch 2001, and more than five years have

passed since she filed her application. 6 W hether or not to award benefits is a matter

of our discretion. Ragland v. Shalala, 992 F.2d 1056, 1060 (10th Cir. 1993). Some

of the relevant factors we consider are the length of time the matter has been

pending, e.g., Sisco v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 10 F.3d 739,

746 (10th Cir. 1993), and whether or not “given the available evidence, remand for

additional fact-finding would serve [any] useful purpose but would merely delay the

receipt of benefits.” Harris v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 821 F.2d 541, 545

(10th Cir. 1987).

W e find it difficult to imagine that any medical or psychological professional

would be able to prepare a retrospective analysis of M s. Salazar’s mental

impairments in 2001, or the effect of her DAA. This, along with the lack of

evidence that she would not be disabled in the absence of her DAA, leads us to

6
At oral argument, M s. Salazar’s lawyer informed us that she had reapplied
for and was receiving benefits. Therefore, this order and judgm ent concerns a
closed period of time, from her application date to the date she began receiving
benefits.

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conclude that a remand for additional fact finding and a correct application of the

law would serve no useful purpose. W e therefore award benefits. 7

W e REVERSE and REM AND this case to the district court with instructions

to remand to the Commissioner for an immediate award of benefits from M arch 2001

through the date when M s. Salazar began receiving benefits on her reapplication.

7
Because we are reversing and remanding for an award of benefits, we do
not address M s. Salazar’s arguments concerning the ALJ’s failure to develop the
record or to order a consultative physical examination concerning her broken left
arm.

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