Lippoldt v. Cole

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PU BL ISH
November 7, 2006
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT

DONNA LIPPOLDT, individually;
OPERATION SA VE AM ERICA, an
unincorporated association; PH ILIP
BENHAM , individually,

Plaintiffs-Appellants and
Cross-Appellees,
v. Nos. 04-3156, 04-3168, 04-3322
STEPHEN COLE, Deputy Chief, in
his official and individual capacity as
an agent/employee of the city of
W ichita, Kansas; BETH
HARLENSK E, in her official and
individual capacity as an
agent/employee of the city of W ichita,
Kansas; CITY OF W ICHITA, a
political subdivision of the State of
Kansas,

Defendants-Appellees and
Cross-A ppellants.

A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T HE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. No. 01-CV-1226-JTM )

Frederick H . N elson, A merican Liberties Institute, Orlando, Florida (Richard A .
M acias, W ichita, Kansas, with him on the briefs), for Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-
Appellees.
Jay C. Hinkel, Assistant City Attorney (Gary E. Rebenstorf, City Attorney, with
him on the briefs), City of W ichita, W ichita, Kansas, for Defendants-
Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

Before BRISCO E, M cW ILLIAM S, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.

BR ISC OE, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs appeal (04-3156) and defendants cross-appeal (04-3168) the

district court’s orders concerning the constitutionality of the City of W ichita’s

(“City”) denial of plaintiffs’ ten parade permits, and a municipal court bond

order. Lippoldt v. City of W ichita, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (D. Kan. M ay 28,

2003); Lippoldt v. Cole, 311 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (D . Kan. M ar. 31, 2004).

Plaintiffs’ counsel also appeal (04-3322) the district court’s decision denying

most of their requested attorney fees.

W e exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. W e affirm the

district court’s decision in case number 04-3156. W e affirm in part and reverse in

part the district court’s decision in case number 04-3168, and remand to the

district court with direction to dismiss the claims of Operation Save America

(“OSA”). Last, in case number 04-3322, we affirm in part and reverse in part,

and remand to the district court to address anew counsels’ request for fees and

costs.

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 I.

This suit concerns the City’s response to the Summer of M ercy Renewal,

plaintiffs’ planned anti-abortion protests in July 2001, which commemorated the

ten-year anniversary of similar protests in 1991. Plaintiffs Donna Lippoldt, OSA ,

and Philip Benham challenge the City’s denial of their parade permits and the

municipal court’s bond order. OSA is an unincorporated association consisting of

a group of volunteers who oppose abortion. Benham is OSA ’s Director, and

Lippoldt volunteers for OSA -W ichita. The named defendants include the City, as

well as Stephen Cole, D eputy Chief of Police for the City, and Elizabeth

Harlenske, an Assistant City Attorney.

A. Denial of OSA’s application for parade perm its

As part of the Summer of M ercy Renewal, on July 6, 2001, Lippoldt

applied for eleven parade permits on OSA’s behalf. Lippoldt requested permits

for two parades per day from July 17, 2001, through July 21, 2001, with a

proposed route that included Bleckley Street and East Kellogg Drive, where Dr.

George Tiller’s abortion clinic is located. 1 Lippoldt requested an additional

parade permit for a parade in the downtown area.

Under the City’s parade ordinance, the City Treasurer “shall issue” a

parade permit, unless one of six enumerated exceptions applies. W ichita City

1
Dr. Tiller is an abortion provider, and his W ichita clinic has long been a
target for anti-abortion protests.

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Code § 3.13.050 (emphasis added). The parties agree that none of the exceptions

listed in Section 3.13.050 provide grounds for denying plaintiffs’ parade permits.

Deputy Chief of Police Cole review ed plaintiffs’ parade applications. Cole

explained, “it was my belief that the situation that we w ere dealing with out there

warranted a denial, and I asked the law department for an opinion on that and for

assistance.” App. Vol. IV, at 600. Assistant City Attorney Harlenske researched

the law regarding applications for parade permits and drafted a letter denying

plaintiffs’ applications. After the City Attorney revised it, Harlenske read the

final version of the letter aloud to the police chief over the phone. W ith the

police chief’s approval, Cole signed the denial letter in his name on behalf of the

police chief. Cole did not suggest any alternative to plaintiffs for accommodating

the parades for a shorter period of time at the Bleckley street location because

“that location was not an acceptable location.” App. Vol. IV, at 586.

On July 10, 2001, one day before the City issued its decision on the

plaintiffs’ parade applications, the police chief signed a temporary regulation

closing Bleckley Street to all vehicles, except those of residents or people

conducting business in the area. The City closed Bleckley Street as part of a plan

known as O peration Safe Protest, which the City had developed specifically in

anticipation of the Summer of M ercy Renewal.

On July 11, 2001, the C ity issued one parade permit to O SA for a

downtown parade, but denied O SA’s ten applications for parade permits near Dr.

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Tiller’s clinic. D efendants denied plaintiffs’ parade applications for two reasons:

(1) Bleckley Street was closed; and (2) the parades would interfere with local

businesses in violation of W ichita City Code § 5.66.0557. Defendants claimed

that once Bleckley Street was closed, it was no longer a street that fell within the

parade ordinance. As to interference with businesses, Harlenske acknowledged

that the parade ordinance did not allow the City to deny a parade permit merely

because the planned parade would interfere with business. See W ichita City Code

§ 3.13.050. Deputy Chief Cole has approved other parades, knowing that the

parades would interfere with local businesses.

B. M unicipal court bond order

Plaintiffs also challenge a municipal court bond order. The bond order was

effective from July 13, 2001, through July 22, 2001, during the Summer of M ercy

Renew al. The municipal court order set bond amounts for specific offenses,

including assault, battery, disorderly conduct, unlawful assembly, or rioting near

Dr. Tiller’s clinic. The order set different bond amounts for first arrests and

subsequent arrests, and for residents and non-residents of Sedgwick County

(w here W ichita, Kansas is located).

C. Procedural history

On July 13, 2001, plaintiffs filed suit against the City, Deputy Chief Cole,

and Assistant City Attorney Harlenske pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985,

alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

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Constitution and state constitutional claims. In their complaint, plaintiffs

requested declaratory relief, compensatory damages, injunctive relief, and

attorney fees.

On July 16, 2001, the district court granted plaintiffs’ request for a

temporary restraining order so that plaintiffs could hold parades during the

Summer of M ercy Renewal. Plaintiffs held parades from July 17, 2001, through

July 21, 2001, in downtow n and along the B leckley Street route past Dr. Tiller’s

clinic.

After the parades were held, the parties pursued discovery and filed various

motions. On M ay 28, 2003, the district court granted in part and denied in part

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the district court

determined that OSA , as an unincorporated association, was a “person” under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and, therefore, was entitled to seek relief under the same. The

district court further held that plaintiffs had standing to challenge the parade

ordinance, which it held to be constitutional on its face, but lacked standing to

challenge the municipal court bond order. The district court also dismissed the

City as a party to the litigation based upon plaintiffs’ failure to present evidence

that the City had a permanent and well-settled practice of denying parade permits.

Thereafter, the district court held a bench trial on M ay 28-29, 2003, to

resolve plaintiffs’ remaining claims. Ultimately, the district court concluded that

defendants had no basis for denying plaintiffs’ parade applications under the

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City’s parade ordinance. The district court also concluded that defendants

Harlenske and Cole violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, but it denied

plaintiffs’ requests for compensatory damages and a permanent injunction. The

district court awarded nominal damages to plaintiffs in the amount of $1.00.

In considering plaintiffs’ motion for attorney fees, the district court granted

the motion in part and denied it in part. Specifically, the district court found that

plaintiffs had prevailed in the first part of the litigation when the court issued the

temporary restraining order on July 16, 2001, but that they had only formally

prevailed at trial. The district court aw arded attorney fees only for hours

expended to obtain the temporary restraining order, and it also reduced counsels’

requested rate.

II.

The parties raise five issues: (1) statutory interpretation of “person” in

Section 1983; (2) standing; (3) causation as to H arlenske and Cole; (4) damages;

and (5) attorney fees. W e raise the issue of mootness sua sponte.

“In an appeal from a bench trial, we review the district court’s factual

findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” Keys Youth Servs.,

Inc. v. City of Olathe, 248 F.3d 1267, 1274 (10th Cir. 2001); Sanpete W ater

Conservancy Dist. v. Carbon W ater Conservancy Dist., 226 F.3d 1170, 1177-78

(10th Cir. 2000).

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 A. Unincorporated association as a Section 1983 plaintiff

In their cross-appeal, defendants claim that OSA , as an unincorporated

association, is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. W e agree.

As an initial matter, we note that, notwithstanding plaintiffs’ arguments to

the contrary, this is a matter of first impression. None of our cases specifically

address whether an unincorporated association is a “person” for the purposes of

Section 1983. Likewise, the cases cited by the district court and plaintiffs simply

permit, with little or no analysis, unincorporated associations to bring suit under

Section 1983. Consequently, such cases have limited bearing on our analysis.

W e review issues of statutory interpretation de novo, Hill v. SmithKline

Beecham C orp., 393 F.3d 1111, 1117 (10th Cir. 2004), and begin with the

language of the statute itself, United States Dept. of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S.

491, 500 (1993). In relevant part, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the U nited States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and law s, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). OSA , therefore, can only be a Section 1983

plaintiff if it is a “person” within the jurisdiction of the United States.

W hile Section 1983 itself is silent as to this issue, the Supreme Court,

beginning with M onell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436

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U.S. 658 (1978), has had a number of occasions to consider whether a particular

entity is a “person” under Section 1983. See, e.g, M onell, 436 U.S. at 690

(holding that municipalities are subject to suit as “persons” under Section 1983);

W ill v. M ichigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that a

State is not a “person” amenable to suit under Section 1983); Ngiraingas v.

Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 192 (1990) (holding that neither the Territory of Guam

nor an officer thereof acting in his official capacity is a “person” under Section

1983); Inyo County, Cal. v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Colony, 538

U.S. 701, 711-12 (2003) (holding that a Tribe is not a “person” who may sue

under Section 1983 to vindicate its rights as a sovereign). Consequently, we are

not without guidance in this area.

To determine whether an entity “constitutes a ‘person’ within the meaning

of § 1983, we examine the statute’s language and purpose,” Ngiraingas, 495 U.S.

at 186, while keeping in mind “the ‘legislative environment’ in w hich the w ord

[person] appears,” Inyo County Cal., 538 U.S. at 711 (citations omitted).

Essentially, this requires that we seek an “indicia of congressional intent at the

time the statute was enacted.” Ngiraingas, 495 U.S. at 187. In M onell, the

Supreme Court considered three factors in holding that Congress intended that

municipalities be considered “persons” potentially liable under Section 1983: (1)

legislative history, (2) the general treatment of corporations in 1871, and (3) the

Act of Feb. 25, 1871, § 2, 16 Stat. 431 (the “Dictionary Act of 1871"). See

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M onell, 436 U.S. at 686-89; see also Ngiraingas, 495 U.S. at 192 n.11

(characterizing M onell as turning on “the legislative history[,] . . . the general

treatment of corporations (including municipal corporations) . . . and on the 1871

version of the Dictionary Act”).

Although M onell dealt only with municipal liability under Section 1983, w e

have relied upon it to conclude that a municipality may also bring suit under

Section 1983. Rural W ater Dist. No. 1, Ellsworth County, Kan. v. City of

W ilson, Kan., 243 F.3d 1263, 1274 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[I]n light of M onell, it

would be a strained analysis to hold, as a matter of statutory construction, that a

municipal corporation was a ‘person’ within one clause of section 1983, but not a

‘person’ within another clause of the same statute.”) (quoting South M acomb

Disposal A uth. v. Township of W ashington, 790 F.2d 500, 503 (6th Cir. 1986)).

W hile there is no per se rule of statutory interpretation that identical words used

in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning, there is

a presumption that this is so. See United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball

Co., 532 U.S. 200, 214 (2001). As such, M onell also guides our determination of

whether an unincorporated association is a “person” and, thus, a proper claimant

under Section 1983.

In light of M onell and its progeny, therefore, we consider (1) the legislative

history of Section 1983, (2) the general understanding, as of 1871, regarding the

legal personality of unincorporated associations, and (3) the Dictionary Act of

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1871. First, there is no indication within the legislative history of Section 1983

that Congress considered the term “persons” to include unincorporated

associations. Rather, the history cited in M onell illustrates that municipalities,

unlike unincorporated associations, were targeted as entities to whom Section 1 of

the 1871 Civil Rights Act, and therefore Section 1983, applied. See M onell, 436

U.S. at 686-87 (“[Representative] Bingham’s further remarks clearly indicate his

view that . . . takings by cities . . . would be redressable under § 1 of the bill.”).

In fact, comments made by several members of Congress indicate a restricted

view of who could qualify as a proper Section 1983 plaintiff. See M onell, 436

U.S. at 683 (“[Section 1] . . . provides a civil remedy . . . to all people where,

under color of State law, they or any of them may be deprived of rights to which

they are entitled under the Constitution by reason and virtue of their national

citizenship.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App.

68 (1871)) (Rep. Shellabarger); id. at 685 n.45 (“Representative Bingham, the

author of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . declared the bill’s purpose to be

‘the enforcement . . . of the Constitution on behalf of every individual citizen of

the Republic . . . to the extent of the rights guarantied to him by the

Constitution.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.,

App. 81 (1871)).

Next, there was no general understanding in 1871, when the precursor to

Section 1983 was passed, that unincorporated associations should be treated as

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natural persons. Instead, the common law essentially held that unincorporated

associations lacked the capacity to sue or be sued. See United M ine W orkers of

Am. v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 385 (1922) (“Undoubtedly at common

law an unincorporated association of persons . . . could only sue or be sued in the

names of its members, and their liability had to be enforced against each

member.”); see also M offat Tunnel League v. United States, 289 U.S. 113, 118

(1933) (“These [unincorporated association plaintiffs] are not corporations, quasi

corporations, or organized pursuant to, or recognized by, any law. Neither is a

person in law, and, unless authorized by statute, they have no capacity to sue.”);

cf. W ill, 491 U.S. at 67 (“[I]n enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to

override well-established immunities or defenses under the common law. One

important assumption underlying the Court’s decisions in this area is that

members of the 42d Congress were familiar with common-law principles . . . and

that they likely intended these common-law principles to remain, absent specific

provisions to the contrary.”) (citations omitted).

Thus, unlike corporations, it was not well-established, when Section 1 of

the Civil Rights Act was enacted, that unincorporated associations should be

treated as natural persons. See, e.g., United States v. Amedy, 24 U.S. (11 W heat.)

392, 412 (1826) (“That corporations are, in law, for civil purposes, deemed

persons, is unquestionable.”); Louisville, C. & C.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2

How.) 497, 558 (1844) (“[A] corporation created by and doing business in a

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particular state, is to be deemed to all intents and purposes as a person, . . .

capable of being treated as a citizen of that state, as much as a natural person.”);

M onell, 436 U.S. at 688 n.50 (quoting the statement of a sponsor of Section 1 that

“counties, cities, and corporations of all sorts . . . have become thoroughly

established to be an individual or person or entity of the personal existence, of

which . . . the United States Constitution does take note and endow with faculty to

sue and be sued in the courts of the United States”) (emphasis added). In fact,

unincorporated associations lacked the capacity to bring suit when Section 1 of

the Civil Rights Act was enacted.

Last, the language of the Dictionary Act of 1871 also shows that

unincorporated associations were not intended to be “persons” for Section 1983

purposes. As the Supreme Court has previously noted, the Dictionary Act of

1871, as it read when Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act was enacted, stated that

“in all acts hereafter passed . . . the word ‘person’ may extend and be applied to

bodies politic and corporate.” W ill, 491 U.S. at 69 n.8 (citations omitted). The

Supreme Court has further observed that “an examination of the authorities of the

era suggests that the phrase [‘bodies politic and corporate’] was used to mean

corporations, both private and public (municipal).” Id. at 69 (emphasis added).

Because an unincorporated association is, by definition, not a corporation, it is

therefore also not a “body politic or corporate.” Thus, while the Dictionary Act of

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1871 extended the meaning of “person” to include corporations and

municipalities, it did not do the same for unincorporated associations.

W e do not read the current enactment of the Dictionary Act in 1 U.S.C. § 1

to require a contrary result. That text clearly states, and has since 1948, see Pub.

L. No. 80-772, § 6, 62 Stat. 683, 859 (1948), that the w ord “person” “include[s]

corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint

stock companies, as well as individuals,” 1 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added).

Nonetheless, the current text of the Dictionary Act does not control, because,

beginning with M onell, in each instance where the Supreme Court has addressed

whether a particular entity is a “person” for the purposes of suing or being sued

under Section 1983, it has principally considered the Dictionary Act of 1871.

See, e.g, M onell, 436 U.S. at 719 (noting that “the ‘usual’ meaning of the w ord

‘person’ would extend to municipal corporations is also evidenced by [the

Dictionary Act of 1871] which had been passed only months before the Civil

Rights Act was passed”); W ill, 491 U.S. at 66-69 (noting that the Dictionary Act

of 1871 did not “counsel a contrary conclusion” that a state was not a “person”

amenable to suit under Section 1983 and focusing on “deciphering congressional

intent as to the scope of § 1983”); Ngiraingas, 495 U.S. at 187 (noting that “[w]e

seek . . . indicia of congressional intent at the time the statute was enacted” and

that a “review of § 1983’s history uncovers no sign that Congress was thinking of

Territories when it enacted the statute over a century ago in 1871”); Inyo County,

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Cal., 538 U .S. at 714 n.1 (“The D ictionary Act [of 1871], which was passed just

two months before § 1983 and was designed to supply rules of construction for all

legislation, provided that ‘the word ‘person’ may extend and be applied to bodies

politic and corporate . . . .’”). In other words, in attempting to discern the

meaning of “person” as used in Section 1983, we look not to how the w ords are

defined now, but rather at how they were defined at the time the statute was

enacted.

This approach is also consistent with the Supreme Court’s general use of

the Dictionary Act as a tool of statutory construction. See, e.g., Rowland v.

California M en’s Colony, Unit II M en’s Advisory, 506 U.S. 194, 204 (1993)

(using expanded definition of “person” from the 1948 version of the D ictionary

Act in addressing whether an association is a “person” for the purposes of 28

U.S.C. § 1915, because the former was enacted prior to the latter); cf. United

States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 123 n.2 (1958) (“It is significant that

the definition of ‘whoever’ in 1 U.S.C. § 1 was first enacted into law as part of

the very same statute which enacted into positive law the revised Criminal Code.

The connection between 1 U.S.C. § 1 and the Criminal Code, which includes [the

statute at issue], is thus more than a token one, the very same statute which

creates the crime admonishing ‘w hoever’ is to be liberally interpreted.”).

Additionally, at least one other circuit has held that the current version of the

Dictionary Act only applies prospectively. See Yousuf v. Samantar, 451 F.3d

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248, 254 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that the current definition of “person” in the

Dictionary Act “does not apply to a Rule promulgated before the current version

of the Act was passed”). As the expanded definition of “person” in the current

text of 1 U.S.C. § 1 was added more than seventy years after the enactment of

Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act, it is not an indicia of Congress’ intent to deem

an unincorporated association a “person” under Section 1983. In sum, none of the

aforementioned factors, legislative history, general understanding, or the

Dictionary Act of 1871, suggest Congress’ intent to entitle unincorporated

associations to seek redress under Section 1983.

The district court, in contrast, did not rely on any of these factors in

reaching the opposite conclusion. Instead, in addition to case law which did not

adequately address the issue, the district court relied heavily upon analogy to

other entities permitted to sue under Section 1983, such as corporations, Indian

tribes and unions. W e conclude that these analogies are ultimately unconvincing,

particularly in light of our analysis of the abovementioned M onell factors.

Specifically, both non-profit and for-profit corporations clearly fall into the

category of “bodies corporate” within the meaning of the 1871 Dictionary Act

and, thus, could properly be considered persons under Section 1983. See W ill,

491 U.S. at 69 n.8. The analogy between tribes and unincorporated associations

is also dubious, having been called into question by the Supreme Court’s recent

decision holding that a tribe does not qualify as a “person” who may sue under

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Section 1983 to vindicate its rights as a sovereign. See Inyo County, Cal., 538

U.S. at 711-12. As for labor unions, it is true that they have been permitted to

bring suit under Section 1983. Allee v. M edrano, 416 U.S. 802, 819 n.13 (1974)

(noting that “[u]nions may sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as persons deprived of

their rights secured by the Constitution and laws”). However, this is likely based

on the similarities between unions and corporations, rather than an implicit

recognition of the right of unincorporated associations to sue under Section 1983.

See United M ine W orkers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 386

(1922) (holding that labor union could be sued for antitrust violations and

describing the “affirmative legal recognition of their existence and usefulness and

provisions for their protection”).

W e conclude, therefore, that the Dictionary Act of 1871, the common

understanding regarding unincorporated associations in 1871, and the legislative

history of Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 fail to indicate a

congressional intent to include unincorporated associations within the ambit of

the term “person” as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As such, we reverse the

district court’s ruling that OSA is a “person” entitled to bring a claim under

Section 1983, and we remand with direction to dismiss OSA’s claims.

B. Standing and m ootness

Both plaintiffs and defendants raise standing issues. Defendants contend

that plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the parade ordinance. Plaintiffs argue

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that the district court erred in concluding they did not have standing to challenge

the municipal court order.

W hether a plaintiff has standing is a legal question, which we review de

novo. W ard v. Utah, 321 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 2003). To show Article III

standing, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) “injury in fact” that is

“concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or

hypothetical”; (2) traceability; and (3) redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of

W ildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). Plaintiffs have the burden to demonstrate standing for each form of

relief sought. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S.

167, 185 (2000); Tandy v. City of W ichita, 380 F.3d 1277, 1284 (10th Cir. 2004).

Although we first determine whether a plaintiff has standing as of the time the

action is brought, Utah Ass’n of Counties v. Bush, 455 F.3d 1094, 1099) 10th Cir.

2006); Tandy, 380 F.3d at 1284, the plaintiff must continue to have standing

throughout the litigation. “[A] plaintiff must maintain standing at all times

throughout the litigation for a court to retain jurisdiction.” Phelps v. Hamilton,

122 F.3d 1309, 1315 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); Yellow

Cab Coop. Ass’n v. M etro Taxi (In re Yellow Cab Coop. Ass’n), 132 F.3d 591,

594 (10th Cir. 1997).

Although the parties do not raise mootness as an issue on appeal, given the

progression of events since this litigation was filed, we must also consider

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whether the case is moot. See Citizens for Responsible Gov’t State Political

Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000). “[A]n actual

controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the

complaint is filed.” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67

(1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[P]ast exposure to alleged illegal

conduct does not establish a present live controversy if unaccompanied by any

continuing present effects.” M cClendon v. City of Albuquerque, 100 F.3d 863,

867 (10th Cir. 1996).

The district court held that plaintiffs had standing to challenge the parade

ordinance, but it did not analyze standing for each form of relief sought.

Applying de novo review , we ask whether plaintiffs have standing to pursue their

claims for compensatory damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief, and

further, w hether their claims are now moot.

1. Parade ordinance

a. Compensatory damages

W e conclude that Lippoldt and Benham have standing to seek

compensatory damages for the denial of the parade permits.

Defendants contend that the individual plaintiffs lack standing because they

did not apply for the parade permits. W e disagree. Although the permits were in

OSA’s name, Lippoldt and Benham participated in the parades as OSA

volunteers. They suffered injury by the alleged abridgement of their First

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Amendment rights when the City denied the parade permits. A favorable decision

in this case would redress their injury by ordering the defendants to allow the

parades and compensating them for any damages sustained. Lippoldt and Benham

have standing to seek damages for the denial of the parade permits.

M oreover, plaintiffs’ claim for compensatory damages is not moot. Even

though the district court granted the temporary restraining order and the plaintiffs

held the parades, plaintiffs may still contest the district court’s denial of

compensatory damages. “[B]y definition claims for past damages cannot be

deemed moot.” See Taxpayers for the A nimas-La Plata Referendum v. Animas-

La Plata W ater C onservancy D ist., 739 F.2d 1472, 1479 (10th Cir. 1984). At

trial, the district court awarded only nominal damages, and plaintiffs argue on

appeal that they should have received compensatory damages. Under these

circumstances, plaintiffs’ claim for compensatory damages remains a live case or

controversy on appeal. Plaintiffs’ claim for past damages is not moot.

b. Declaratory relief

Similarly, plaintiffs have standing to seek declaratory relief. A claim for

“declaratory judgment is generally prospective,” but we treat declaratory relief as

retrospective “to the extent that it is intertwined with a claim for monetary

damages that requires us to declare whether a past constitutional violation

occurred.” PETA v. Rasmussen, 298 F.3d 1198, 1202 n.2 (10th Cir. 2002);

Faustin v. City & County of Denver, 268 F.3d 942, 948 (10th Cir. 2001).

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M oreover, plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief is not moot where the district

court must determine whether a past constitutional violation occurred which will

in turn affect the parties’ current rights or future behavior. Green v. Branson, 108

F.3d 1296, 1299-1300 (10th Cir. 1997).

Just as plaintiffs have standing to seek damages, they have standing to seek

declaratory relief, and their claim is not moot. Throughout the entire litigation,

the parties have disagreed whether the defendants violated the First Amendment

in denying plaintiffs’ parade permits, and plaintiffs sought damages for the City’s

denial of the parade permits. At the bench trial, the district court had to

determine whether a past constitutional violation occurred when defendants

denied the parade permits. Even on appeal, a live controversy remains. Plaintiffs

challenge the district court’s denial of compensatory damages. Defendants

challenge the district court’s determination that Cole and Harlenske are liable

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, plaintiffs have standing to seek declaratory

relief concerning denial of their parade permits in July 2001, and their claim is

not moot.

c. Injunctive relief

Although plaintiffs have standing to seek compensatory damages and

declaratory relief, they have no standing to seek a permanent injunction. See

Faustin, 268 F.3d at 948 (holding that plaintiffs had standing to seek declaratory

relief and nominal damages, but lacked standing to pursue injunctive relief).

-21-
 Plaintiffs “seeking prospective relief must show more than past harm or

speculative future harm.” Riggs v. City of Albuquerque, 916 F.2d 582, 586 (10th

Cir. 1998). In Tandy v. City of W ichita, we concluded that the plaintiff had

standing to seek prospective relief by alleging an intent to use the city’s fixed-

route bus “‘several times per year’” because this suggested a “concrete, present

plan” to use it each year. 380 F.3d at 1284. “A claimed injury that is contingent

upon speculation or conjecture is beyond the bounds of a federal court’s

jurisdiction.” Id. at 1283-84.

Although plaintiffs had standing to seek a permanent injunction on the day

that they filed the complaint, circumstances changed when the district court

granted plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order on July 16, 2001, and

ordered the City to allow the parades. Once plaintiffs held the parades in July

2001, they lacked standing to seek a permanent injunction because plaintiffs

cannot demonstrate injury in fact.

Further, plaintiffs have failed to allege a concrete, present plan to apply for

another parade permit in the future. Of the plaintiffs, Lippoldt has the strongest

argument that she intends to apply for another parade permit, but she did not

specify a concrete plan to do so. She lives in W ichita, and she even applied for a

parade permit in October 2001, which the City granted. Aside from past harm,

Lippoldt alleges only speculative future harm, which is insufficient for standing

to seek injunctive relief. See Riggs, 916 F.2d at 586. Lippoldt testified that it is

-22-
“very likely” that both OSA -W ichita and she personally will apply for parade

permits in the future. App. Vol. V at 724-725. As to whether she had specific

plans for filing a parade permit in W ichita, Lippoldt responded “[n]ot dates but

there has been talk of plans.” Id. at 725. In responding to a question whether she

had any current plans to submit parade permit requests, she responded “[y]es,

probably. H asn’t been confirmed but there’s talk of another one. I mean, we

don’t have a date. . . . W e are talking about it but we have not chosen a date.”

Id. at 725. Lippoldt’s averred intent does not confer standing to seek injunctive

relief because she has not alleged a concrete, present plan to apply for another

parade permit.

Lippoldt alleges precisely the sort of speculative future harm that did not

confer standing in Lujan v. Defenders of W ildlife. In Lujan, the Supreme Court

held that the plaintiff lacked standing to seek prospective relief because plaintiff

alleged that “‘I intend to go back to Sri Lanka,’” but admitted that she had “no

current plans” by testifying that “‘I don’t know [when] . . . . Not next year, I will

say. In the future.’” 504 U.S. at 564. Lippoldt’s allegations are equally

deficient. Like Lippoldt, Benham also lacks standing to seek injunctive relief

because he fails to allege a concrete future injury. Benham stated that neither he

nor O SA intended to parade in W ichita in the future.

Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate standing to seek prospective relief, including a

permanent injunction, since they held the parades in the Summer of M ercy

-23-
Renewal and have not alleged a concrete plan to hold a parade in W ichita in the

future. 2 Because plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive relief, we do not

consider their claim that the district court erred in denying their request for

injunctive relief.

2. M unicipal court bond order

Plaintiffs maintain that the district court erred in concluding that they

lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the bond order. Even if

plaintiffs had standing to challenge the bond order, their challenge is moot

because they were not arrested during the parades in July 2001, and the bond

order expired by its own terms on July 22, 2001.

W e may affirm the district court “on any grounds for which there is a

record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by

the district court.” Griess v. Colorado, 841 F.2d 1042, 1047 (10th Cir. 1988)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiffs’ challenge to the bond order is moot because any relief they seek

would have no legal effect. Plaintiffs presented no evidence that the City has

threatened to renew the bond order. The bond order was in effect from July 13,

2001, through July 22, 2001. Neither of the named plaintiffs w ere arrested while

2
To the extent that plaintiffs seek prospective relief in their claim for
declaratory judgment, plaintiffs’ request is moot for the same reasons that their
claim for injunctive relief is moot.

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the bond order was in place. Plaintiffs have not presented evidence that any OSA

volunteers w ere subjected to the bond order. M oreover, the exception to

mootness does not apply because plaintiffs have failed to show a “reasonable

expectation” that the controversy regarding the bond order will recur. Honig v.

Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 319-20 (1988). Even if plaintiffs had standing to challenge

the order at the outset of this litigation, the controversy regarding the bond order

became moot when the order expired on July 22, 2001.

C. Causation under Section 1983

Defendants argue that the district court erred by concluding that Harlenske

and Cole caused plaintiffs’ deprivation of their First Amendment rights. W e

disagree.

Section 1983 requires plaintiffs to show causation, imposing liability on a

defendant who “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . to the

deprivation of any rights . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. W e have explained Section

1983’s causation requirement: “[A] defendant may not be held liable under §

1983 unless he or she subjected a citizen to the deprivation, or caused a citizen to

be subjected to the deprivation.” Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d

504, 518 (10th Cir. 1988). “A plaintiff must allege factual causation -- i.e. ‘but

for’ causation -- in order to state a claim under § 1983.” Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d

897, 911 (10th Cir. 2000). W here multiple “forces are actively operating,” as in

this case, plaintiffs may demonstrate that each defendant is a concurrent cause by

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showing that his or her conduct was a “substantial factor in bringing [the injury]

about.” Northington v. M arin, 102 F.3d 1564, 1568-69 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal

quotation marks omitted). In a case of concurrent causation, the burden of proof

shifts to the defendants in that “a tortfeasor who cannot prove the extent to which

the harm resulted from other concurrent causes is liable for the whole harm”

because multiple tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable. Id. at 1568.

Defendants argue that neither Cole nor Harlenske caused the deprivation because

they were “subordinate to the causative actors” who actually made the decision to

deny the parade permits. 3 Aple. Br. at 50-51.

W e address Harlenske’s conduct first. Defendants argue that the causal

connection between H arlenske’s conduct and the ultimate denial is “too tenuous,

and too heavily interrupted by the acts and decisions of others.” Aple. Br. at 51.

W e disagree. The record supports the district court’s conclusion that Harlenske’s

conduct caused the violation of plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. Her conduct

was a direct cause of the denial of the parade permits, and violation of plaintiffs’

First Amendment rights was foreseeable. Harlenske drafted the letter denying the

parade permits. After the plaintiffs filed their parade applications, she researched

the law on parade applications and learned that the government must have clear

3
Defendants have not appealed the district court’s determination that they
acted unconstitutionally in denying the parade permits. Further, the defendants
do not raise qualified immunity as an issue on appeal.

-26-
guidelines to restrict parades. Despite discovering that denying the parade

permits for the reasons offered by the City was most likely unconstitutional,

Harlenske advised Cole to sign the denial letter. W e agree with the district court

that Harlenske’s conduct was a substantial factor in denying the parade permits

and violating plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.

W e next review the evidence of Cole’s conduct. Defendants maintain that

Cole was “no more than a reluctant scrivener,” whose actual participation in the

permit denial w as negligible because he merely signed the letter on behalf of his

superior, the police chief. Aple. Br. at 52. Defendants contend that Cole did not

make the denial decision, and that he “took pains to divorce himself from the act,

by signing ‘for’ Chief Norman W illiams instead of using his own name.” Aple.

Br. at 52. But Cole admitted that he did not want plaintiffs to parade near

Bleckley Street or D r. Tiller’s clinic, and he agreed with the contents of the letter.

Cole personally participated in the denial of the parade permits. Like Harlenske,

Cole’s conduct was a substantial factor in the denial of plaintiffs’ parade permits.

Defendants fail to show that the district court erred in concluding that Cole’s

conduct caused the deprivation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

Essentially, defendants complain that plaintiffs sued the wrong defendants.

That conduct of other people may have concurrently caused the harm does not

change the outcome as to Harlenske and Cole. See Northington, 102 F.3d at

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1569. Harlenske and Cole failed to show that the harm should be apportioned to

other w rongdoers who are not before the court.

The district court did not err in its conclusion that Harlenske and Cole

caused the deprivation of plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.

D. Denial of compensatory damages

Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in denying their request for

compensatory damages. W e conclude that the district court’s decision awarding

nominal damages of $1.00 is not clearly erroneous.

Because the “amount of damages is a finding of fact,” we review the

district court’s award of damages in a bench trial under the clearly erroneous

standard. Deasay v. United States, 99 F.3d 354, 359 (10th Cir. 1996); Dill v. City

of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1208-09 (10th Cir. 1998).

“The deprivation of constitutional rights, standing alone, does not entitle a

plaintiff to general damages.” Taxpayers for the Animas-La Plata Referendum,

739 F.2d at 1480-81. Plaintiffs must demonstrate “actual injury” to recover

damages under Section 1983 for violation of their constitutional rights. See Dill,

155 F.3d at 1209. In Dill, we reversed a district court’s decision awarding $1.00

in nominal damages, reasoning that the evidence supported an award of

compensatory damages w here plaintiff demonstrated that he lost $2,000 in

overtime and special duty pay from the unconstitutional transfer. Id. at 1209.

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 W hen denying plaintiffs’ claim for compensatory damages in the present

case, the district court found that plaintiffs’ damages claims were “based on

assumptions only.” Lippoldt, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 1273. W e agree.

Plaintiffs failed to present evidence of compensable injury caused by the

denial of the parade permits. Although the City denied plaintiffs’ parade permits,

the district court ordered the C ity to allow the parades, and the district court’s

order w as publicized in the media. Thus, plaintiffs w ere ultimately able to hold

the parades as requested in their applications. Plaintiffs presented no evidence of

damages caused by the initial denial of the parade permits.

Plaintiffs merely speculated about the amount of damages based upon an

alleged potential decrease in offerings received from the July 2001 evening

rallies. Benham claimed that the denial of the parade permits affected public

perception of the Summer of M ercy Renewal events, causing people to not attend

and thereby reducing donations. But the record indicates these offerings were

voluntary and were only collected at the evening rallies and not at the parades.

W e agree with the district court that plaintiffs presented no evidence that the

City’s initial denial of the parade permits somehow decreased voluntary offerings

collected at evening rallies.

Plaintiffs complained about the City’s other conduct apart from the denial

of the parade permits, but this conduct is not relevant to determining whether

plaintiffs demonstrated compensable injury for the denial of parade permits. For

-29-
example, Lippoldt testified that the mayor and police chief asked local churches

to withdraw their participation in the Summer of M ercy Renewal, apparently

because the mayor was concerned that some of OSA ’s volunteers may be

extremists who could harm the pro-life message. Pastor W right of the Central

Christian Church previously had agreed to allow plaintiffs to use church facilities

for the evening rallies, but later reneged after meeting with the mayor. Plaintiffs

may only seek damages for conduct that violated the Constitution. Because

plaintiffs did not demonstrate that the City’s other conduct was a constitutional

violation, they cannot seek damages for it. W hile the district court allowed

plaintiffs to introduce this evidence to show the City’s attitude toward OSA and

the Summer of M ercy Renewal events, it is not probative of the amount of

damages to which plaintiffs are entitled for the denial of the parade permits.

Although the district court found that plaintiffs failed to prove compensable

injury, it aw arded nominal damages in the amount of $1.00. The district court

reasoned that the deprivation of First Amendment rights constitutes injury. W e

agree. “[N]ominal damages, and not damages based on some undefinable value of

infringed rights, are the appropriate means of vindicating rights whose

deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury.” M emphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v.

Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n.11 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted);

M akin v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 183 F.3d 1205, 1214 (10th Cir. 1999); O’Connor

v. City & County of Denver, 894 F.2d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 1995). Plaintiffs

-30-
were unable to prove that the denial of the parade permits caused them to suffer

compensable injury, but they nevertheless sustained injury from the deprivation of

their First A mendment rights. The district court’s finding that plaintiffs should

receive $1.00 in nominal damages was not clearly erroneous.

Having concluded that plaintiffs cannot obtain compensatory damages, a

permanent injunction, or prospective declaratory relief, we must also conclude

that, even if we were to assume the dismissal of the City was erroneous, that error

is harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61; 28 U.S.C. § 2111; Fleming Bldg. Co. v. Ne.

Okla. Bldg. & Constr., 532 F.2d 162, 165-66 (10th Cir. 1976). M oreover, since

the district court declared that Assistant City Attorney Harlenske and Deputy

Chief of Police Cole acted unconstitutionally in denying plaintiffs’ parade permits

in July 2001, plaintiffs succeeded in putting the City on notice about its

employees’ conduct, even if the declaration did not directly apply to the City.

Plaintiffs have not shown how the outcome of the case would differ if the City

were a party.

E. Attorney Fees

Plaintiffs challenge the district court’s decision awarding attorney fees,

arguing that the court erred in holding that they were successful only in the first

phase of litigation when they obtained a temporary restraining order. Plaintiffs

also contest the district court’s determination of a reasonable rate.

-31-
 A reasonable fee is the product of a reasonable rate in the relevant

community multiplied by the number of hours reasonably spent on the litigation.

E.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.

424, 433 (1983). W e review the district court’s determination of reasonable

hourly rate and reasonable hours for abuse of discretion. E.g., Jane L. v.

Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1505, 1509 (10th Cir. 1995).

1. Reasonable hours

Plaintiffs argue that the district court abused its discretion in concluding

that plaintiffs achieved success only in the first part of the litigation where they

obtained a temporary restraining order. W e agree.

The district court reduced the lodestar by refusing to award attorney fees

for fees incurred after the temporary restraining order was entered. The district

court concluded that plaintiffs prevailed from the filing of the complaint until

they obtained a temporary restraining order, but that they only formally prevailed

in the rest of the litigation.

To be a prevailing party, the plaintiff “must obtain at least some relief on

the merits of his claim.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992). W here a

plaintiff seeks compensatory damages but recovers only nominal damages, the

plaintiff is a prevailing party, but the district court should determine, in its

discretion, whether the “product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as

a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive amount.” Id. at 114

-32-
(internal quotation marks omitted). The reasonable fee may be “no fee at all”

where plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, but they recover only nominal

damages. Id. at 115. But “‘nominal relief does not necessarily a nominal victory

make.’” Barber v. T.D. W illiamson, Inc., 254 F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th Cir. 2001)

(quoting Farrar, 506 U.S. at 121 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). “Plaintiff[s] can

only obtain an award of attorney’s fees for time spent prosecuting the successful

claim as well as those related to it.” Browder, 427 F.3d at 723; Hensley, 461 U.S.

at 440.

To determine w hether the plaintiff achieved technical success only, we

apply three factors from Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Farrar: (1) the

“difference between the amount recovered and the damages sought;” (2) the

“significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff claims to have prevailed;”

and (3) the “accomplishment of some public goal other than occupying the time

and energy of counsel, court, and client.” Barber, 254 F.3d at 1229-30 (internal

quotation marks omitted) (adopting factors from Farrar, 506 U.S. at 121-22

(O ’Connor, J., concurring)); Brandau v. Kansas, 168 F.3d 1179, 1181-82 (10th

Cir. 1999). W e have interpreted “significance of the legal issue” as examining

the “extent of success.” Barber, 245 F.3d at 1231.

The district court specifically referred to Farrar and concluded that the

plaintiffs’ counsel should be compensated only for reasonable hours expended to

obtain the temporary restraining order:

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 Applying this framew ork, the court finds the plaintiffs should be
compensated for the work reasonably expended in obtaining the
temporary restraining order. The temporary restraining order was
granted on July 16, 2001. At the trial, the plaintiffs requested a large
amount of compensatory damages along with permanent injunctive
relief. The court awarded only nominal damages finding “plaintiffs
fail to prove they are entitled to compensatory damages.” The court
further found the plaintiffs did not present an adequate factual or
legal basis to merit permanent injunctive relief. During the second
and third periods of litigation, the plaintiffs did not achieve results
meriting attorney’s fees, i.e., the plaintiffs only “formally” prevailed.
However, the plaintiffs did achieve more than nominal success in the
first period of the trial and should be compensated accordingly.

Order 07/29/04, Aplt. App. at 288. The district court denied counsel’s request for

attorney fees for all hours worked after July 16, 2001, the date it granted the

temporary restraining order. Frederick Nelson, who was lead counsel for

plaintiffs, requested $236,437.50 in attorney fees and $18,225.91 in costs, and

Donald M cKinney, who was local counsel for plaintiffs, requested $39,255 in

attorney fees and $235.84 in costs. The district court awarded Nelson $12,424.50

in attorney fees and $733.82 in costs, and awarded M cKinney $4,144.59 in fees

and no costs.

Although the district court listed the factors from Farrar, it did not consider

the second or third factors in declaring that plaintiffs only “‘formally’ prevailed”

in the bench trial. W e conclude that the district court abused its discretion in

finding that plaintiffs only formally prevailed without giving any consideration to

the second and third Farrar factors.

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 The district court erred by only considering the first factor from Farrar,

which is the difference between the amount recovered and the damages sought.

In measuring the relief recovered, the district court gave no weight to the

plaintiffs’ victory in obtaining a declaration that the defendants deprived them of

their First A mendment rights. W hile the plaintiffs did not demonstrate

compensable injury and recovered only nominal damages, the district court

declared that Harlenske and Cole were liable under Section 1983 for depriving

plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. Contrary to the district court’s

assumption, obtaining declaratory relief and nominal damages may be sufficient

for plaintiffs to recover fees for hours reasonably expended, depending upon the

application of the other Farrar factors.

But the district court failed to consider the other Farrar factors -- the

significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff has prevailed and the

accom plishment of a public purpose served by the litigation. By ignoring the tw o

other factors, the district court “focus[ed] much of [its] attention on the quantum

of relief actually obtained by Plaintiff[s]” and “miss[ed] the point of Farrar.”

Browden v. City of M oab, 427 F.3d 717, 722 (10th Cir. 2005). By focusing on

plaintiffs’ recovery of nominal damages, the district court failed to consider the

significance of plaintiffs’ victory on their First Amendment claim or the

accomplishment of a public purpose in the litigation.

-35-
 W e conclude that the district court abused its discretion in failing to

consider the significance of plaintiffs’ success on their First Amendment claim –

the second Farrar factor. See Bangerter, 61 F.3d at 1511 (reversing a district

court’s determination of limited success where the district court reduced the

lodestar by seventy-five percent without assessing the relative importance of each

claim). In this case, the extent of plaintiffs’ success, which we have interpreted

to be the principal gauge for this element, shows that they did more than formally

prevail at trial. Although plaintiffs brought other claims, their primary claim was

that the defendants violated their First Amendment rights in denying the parade

permits. Plaintiffs succeeded on their First Amendment claim because the district

court declared that Harlenske and Cole were liable under Section 1983 for causing

the deprivation of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Plaintiffs’ other claims were

directly related to their First Amendment claim because they were based on the

same common facts. Since plaintiffs succeeded on their First Amendment claim,

and the First Amendment claim formed the core of their lawsuit, they can recover

fees for reasonable hours expended on claims related to their First Amendment

claim. See Browder, 427 F.3d at 723.

M oreover, the district court abused its discretion in failing to consider the

third factor, w hich weighs in plaintiffs’ favor because they prevailed at trial. W e

have found the third factor from Farrar satisfied where the “plaintiff’s victory

encourages attorneys to represent civil rights litigants, affirms an important right,

-36-
puts the defendant on notice that it needs to improve, and/or provokes a change in

the defendant’s conduct.” B arber, 254 F.3d at 1232-33. In the third factor, we

have not required the judgment to order a policy change. See Koopman v. W ater

Dist. N o. 1, 41 F.3d 1417, 1421 (10th Cir. 1994).

As for the public importance of this litigation, it has implications not just

for OSA ’s members in particular, but also broader implications for other citizens

planning to exercise their First Amendment rights in W ichita by applying for a

parade permit. Although this litigation consumed several years of resources to

recover declaratory relief and $1.00 in nominal damages, defendants argued

vigorously at each phase in the litigation that their decision denying the parade

permits was constitutional. Because of plaintiffs’ litigation, the district court

declared that Harlenske and Cole violated plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights by

denying plaintiffs’ parade permits. Certainly this declaration will encourage

Harlenske, Cole, and other City employees to comply with the First Amendment

in reviewing future applications for parade permits. Plaintiffs need not obtain a

judgment that directs a specific change in City policy for their litigation to have

significant implications for others planning to apply for a parade permit in

W ichita.

Thus, we conclude plaintiffs achieved more than formal success at trial

under the Farrar factors. W e reverse the district court’s determination concerning

-37-
attorney fees, and we remand to the district court to award attorney fees for

reasonable hours expended.

2. Reasonable rate

Counsel argue that the district court abused its discretion in reducing their

rate. To determine w hat constitutes a reasonable rate, the district court considers

the “prevailing market rate in the relevant community.” M alloy v. M onahan, 73

F.3d 1012, 1018 (10th Cir. 1996). Plaintiffs must provide evidence of the

prevailing market rate for similar services by “law yers of reasonably comparable

skill, experience, and reputation” in the relevant community. Blum, 465 U.S. at

895 n.11; Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 157 F.3d 1243, 1255-56 (10th Cir.

1998). “The hourly rate should be based on the law yers’ skill and experience in

civil rights or analogous litigation.” Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 555 (10th

Cir. 1983), overruled in part on other grounds, Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley

Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 725 (1987). If the district court does not

have adequate evidence of prevailing market rates for attorney fees, then it may,

“in its discretion, use other relevant factors, including its own knowledge, to

establish the rate.” Case, 157 F.3d at 1257. A district judge may consider his or

her “own knowledge of prevailing market rates as well as other indicia of a

reasonable market rate.” M etz v. M errill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39

F.3d 1482, 1493 (10th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).

-38-
 The district court relied upon the defendants’ expert and the district court’s

“own knowledge of the prevailing market rate.” Order 07/29/04, Aplt. App. at

291. The district court concluded that Nelson’s requested hourly rate of $325.00

and M cKinney’s requested hourly rate of $250.00 were above the prevailing

market rate for comparable litigation in W ichita, Kansas. The district court found

that a reasonable rate for Nelson was $165.00 per hour. The district court found

that a reasonable rate for M cKinney was $135.00 per hour because he was local

counsel and had less responsibility. It reduced the hourly rate as to the law

student researchers from $85.00 to $35.00 because plaintiffs failed to present

evidence of the prevailing market rates for such research in W ichita.

On appeal, plaintiffs fail to show that the district court abused its discretion

in setting the reasonable rates. The record supports the district court’s findings

that $165.00 was a reasonable hourly rate for Nelson and $135.00 for M cKinney,

given the prevailing market rates in W ichita. For example, plaintiffs’ expert

stated that hourly rates for partners at the largest law firm in Kansas ranged from

$145.00 to $300.00 per hour. Defendants’ expert stated that a reasonable hourly

fee is $160.00 for experienced trial counsel for a constitutional case in W ichita.

Plaintiffs’ counsel argue that their requested rates are reasonable, citing cases

from “around the country” where attorney fees were awarded. App. at 48-49.

Yet none of these cases involve a fee award in the relevant community, which in

this case is W ichita, Kansas. See Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 & n.11.

-39-
 Plaintiffs’ counsel argue that Frederick Nelson is a national expert in civil

rights cases, and that his hourly rate should be a reasonable national rate instead

of the rate of the relevant community of W ichita, Kansas. Aplt. Br. at 9.

Plaintiffs cite Hendrickson v. Branstad, 934 F.2d 158, 164 (8th Cir. 1991), which

upheld a district court’s determination that counsel’s hourly rate “should be

comparable to nationally prominent federal civil rights counsel, rather than local

Iowa counsel, because he is a recognized expert in juvenile law.” Id. Yet

Hendrickson does not require us to reverse the district court’s finding that Nelson

should receive a local rate in this case. Unless the subject of the litigation is “so

unusual or requires such special skills” that only an out-of-state attorney

possesses, “the fee rates of the local area should be applied even when the

lawyers seeking fees are from another area.” Ramos, 713 F.2d at 555; see also

Bangerter, 61 F.3d at 1510. Plaintiffs failed to establish that the subject of the

litigation was so unusual that only an out-of-state attorney could present the case.

W e conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying

reasonable hourly rates from attorneys of equivalent skills in W ichita, Kansas.

III.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment in case number 04-

3156. W e AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part the district court’s judgment in

case number 04-3168, and REM AND to the district court with direction to

dismiss OSA ’s claims. In case number 04-3322, we AFFIRM in part and

-40-
REVERSE in part the judgment of the district court, and REM AND to the district

court to address anew counsels’ request for fees and costs.

-41-