F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
November 9, 2006
PUBLISH
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AM ERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 05-3173
v.
STEPHAN T. BISHOP,
Defendant-Appellant.
A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T HE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. No. 04-CR-20118-01-JW L)
Terra D. M orehead, Assistant United States A ttorney, Kansas City, Kansas (Eric
F. M elgren, United States Attorney, with her on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee
United States of America.
James T. George, Lawrence, Kansas, for D efendant-Appellant Stephan T. Bishop.
Before H E N RY, A ND ER SO N, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
H ENRY, Circuit Judge.
Stephan T. Bishop appeals his convictions related to possession of a
firearm and ammunition by a felon, and witness intimidation. He argues (1) that
the admission of certain evidence, coupled with the jury instructions regarding the
felon in possession charge, constructively amended the indictment against him in
violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments; (2) that we should reverse his
convictions related to witness intimidation because the district court should have
suppressed certain email evidence due to the government’s misconduct and
alleged violation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and (3) that his 78-
month sentence is unreasonable. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291, we conclude that any constructive amendment of the indictment constituted
harmless error, that the district court was w ithin its discretion to admit the email
evidence, and that M r. Bishop’s sentence is reasonable. W e therefore affirm his
convictions and sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
In April 2004, a police officer noticed M r. Bishop and his girlfriend, Emily
Black, acting suspiciously at a gas station that was often used for drug
transactions. The officer approached them, and asked to pat down M r. Bishop.
M r. Bishop agreed, and the search revealed a knife on his person. During the
encounter, the officer also observed several disposable syringes in M s. Black’s
purse and smelled marijuana coming from M s. Black’s vehicle, which was parked
at the gas station. The officer decided to search the car, and found a Hi-Point 9
mm pistol with ammunition in it under the front passenger seat. W hen he
searched M r. Bishop’s person again, the police officer discovered a .38 caliber
2
bullet in M r. Bishop’s pocket.
Sometime after his arrest, in June through August 2004, M r. Bishop began
sending emails to M s. Black, threatening her and her family if she testified
against him. He attempted to convince her to tell the police or the jury that the
firearm found in her car belonged to her. As trial neared, M r. Bishop’s emails
became increasingly vulgar and threatening. He also made threatening phone
calls to M s. Black, which she retained and recorded.
In an indictment returned in September 2004, a grand jury charged M r.
Bishop with seven counts: Count one, being a felon in possession of a firearm, in
violation of 18 U .S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2); Counts two through four, witness
intimidation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1); and Counts five through
seven, using the threat of physical force to intimidate a witness, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1512(a)(2)(A) & (B)(i), (b)(1).
W ith respect to Count one, the indictment stated:
On or about April 3, 2004, in the District of Kansas, the
defendant, Stephan T. Bishop, a [person convicted of various felonies
punishable by terms of prison exceeding one year] . . . did unlaw fully
and knowingly possess in and affecting comm erce and receive any
ammunition and firearm which has been shipped or transported in
interstate commerce, that is a Hi-Point 9 mm pistol, serial number
P117787, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections
922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2).
Rec. vol. I, doc. 13, at 1. The indictment did not specifically mention the .38
caliber bullet.
3
During trial, the government introduced evidence to support a conviction
under Count one. It introduced not only the Hi-Point 9 mm pistol, but also the
.38 caliber bullet that police had found in M r. Bishop’s pocket at the time of his
arrest. M r. Bishop objected to the admission of the bullet, arguing that the
language of the indictment limited the Count one charge to possession of the Hi-
Point 9 mm pistol. The district court overruled the objection, and admitted the
.38 caliber bullet into evidence. M r. Bishop later objected to the jury
instructions, which permitted the jury to find him guilty of Count one if it
concluded that he had possessed either the pistol or the bullet. Rec. vol. I, doc.
49, at 15. The district court also overruled that objection.
During trial, M s. Black testified against M r. Bishop. At the end of the first
day of trial, the government had finished its direct examination of M s. Black, and
M r. Bishop’s counsel had begun cross examination of her. That afternoon, while
court was in recess for the day, M s. Black provided the government with three
additional emails, which she had not previously disclosed, that contained threats
from M r. B ishop.
The government did not immediately provide these emails to M r. Bishop’s
attorney or to the court. Instead, during its redirect examination of M s. Black on
the second day of trial, the government simultaneously provided copies of the
emails to the court and to M r. Bishop’s attorney, and attempted to admit them into
evidence. M r. Bishop objected to the admission of one of the three emails,
4
arguing that the government had violated Rule 16(c) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure by delaying its disclosure. The district court overruled the
objection, but granted a brief continuance at the conclusion of the government’s
redirect examination of M s. Black so that M r. Bishop’s attorney could review the
emails and prepare for his re-cross examination.
The jury convicted M r. Bishop on all seven counts. The Pre-Sentence
Report (“PSR”) placed M r. Bishop’s base offense level for the Count one
conviction at 20, because M r. Bishop had previously been convicted of at least
one felony that was classified as a crime of violence. Rec. vol. IV, at 10, ¶ 29
(Pre-Sentence Report, dated M ar. 10, 2005); see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4). For his
conviction on C ounts tw o through seven, the PSR recommended adding two
offense levels for obstruction of justice, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, adjusting
the total offense level to 22. Id. ¶ 33. W ith respect to M r. Bishop’s criminal
history category, the PSR recommended that he receive three criminal history
points because he had served a sentence of more than one year and one day for a
prior conviction, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a), and an additional two points because
he had committed the instant offenses less than two years after release from
imprisonment on that prior conviction. W ith a total of five criminal history
points, the PSR set M r. Bishop’s criminal history category at III. See Rec. vol.
IV, at 13 ¶ 43. Given a criminal history category of III, and a total adjusted
offense level of 22, the PSR determined that the range for imprisonment was 51 to
5
63 months.
M r. Bishop objected to the additional two criminal history points that the
PSR recommended because he committed the instant offense within two years of
his release from prison. M r. Bishop had been in prison since 1985, having been
convicted of aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnaping, and
rape. In 2003, his rape conviction was reversed due to the discovery of
exculpatory DNA, and he was released from prison. The Kansas Department of
Corrections, through a pre-sentence investigator, informed the district court that
M r. Bishop would have been released in 1995 if he had not been convicted of the
rape. Rec. vol. III, at 509-10. 1 Because M r. Bishop should have been released in
1995, but for the rape conviction that was overturned, the district court sustained
M r. Bishop’s objection and did not apply the extra two criminal history points
that the PSR recommended.
The district court re-calculated his criminal history category as II. W ith the
1
There is no indication that M r. Bishop was improperly convicted of the
very serious aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and the aggravated
kidnaping offenses arising out of the same incidents as the overturned rape
conviction. The PSR describes the incident as follows: M r. Bishop and two other
people broke into a residence where a man and a woman were sleeping. The
victims were tied up using duct tape, and the w oman was raped. W hen M r.
Bishop and the two other people left, they took two children with them who were
in the legal custody of the man living in the residence. The woman who was
raped identified M r. Bishop as her assailant, but DNA evidence later revealed that
her identification was incorrect, suggesting that one of his companions was the
rapist. Rec. vol. IV, at 11-12.
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adjusted offense level remaining at 22 and a criminal history category of II, the
Guidelines sentencing range was 46 to 57 months. Recognizing, however, that
United States v. Booker, 542 U.S. 220 (2005) rendered the Sentencing Guidelines
advisory and required that district courts impose reasonable sentences, the district
court “determined that a reasonable sentence in this case is 78 months.” Rec. vol.
III, at 529.
M r. Bishop timely filed notice of appeal. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we affirm the district court’s
decisions and M r. Bishop’s sentence.
II. DISCUSSION
M r. Bishop presents three arguments on appeal: (1) that the admission of
the bullet into evidence, and the jury instructions permitting conviction of Count
one based on possession of the bullet, constructively amended the indictment, in
violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments; (2) that the district court erred by
admitting an additional email to M s. Black because his counsel did not receive a
copy of it until the day the government sought to admit it; and (3) that his 78-
month sentence is unreasonable. W e review each argument below.
A. Constructive Amendment of the Indictment
Count one of the indictment charged M r. Bishop with “unlawfully and
knowingly possess[ing] in and affecting comm erce and receiv[ing] any
7
ammunition and firearm which has been shipped or transported in interstate
commerce, that is a H i-Point 9 mm pistol, serial number P117787.” Rec. vol. I,
doc. 13, at 1. M r. Bishop contends that the phrase “that is a Hi-Point 9 mm
pistol, serial number P117787” limited the indictment, charging him only with
violating §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2) by possession of the particularly-described
firearm. According to M r. Bishop, the district court constructively amended the
indictment against him by admitting the bullet into evidence and instructing the
jury that he could be convicted of Count one for possession of only the bullet. W e
review de novo a district court’s determination regarding whether its proceedings
constructively amended an indictment. United States v. Tieu, 279 F.3d 917, 920
(10th Cir. 2002). However, we may review M r. Bishop’s constructive amendment
claim for harmless error. Id. at 921.
The Constitution prohibits constructive amendment of an indictment. The
prohibition is derived from the Fifth Amendment, which provides that “[n]o
person shall be held to answer for . . . [an] infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,” U.S. C ONST . amend. V, and from the
Sixth Amendment, which guarantees that a defendant have notice of the charges
against him, Tieu, 229 F.3d at 921. Constructive amendment occurs when
proceedings in district court, such as the evidence admitted or the instructions
provided to a jury, “broaden[] the basis for a defendant’s conviction beyond acts
charged in the indictment.” Id. To violate the Fifth and Sixth amendments, the
8
proceedings “must modify an essential element of the defense or raise the
possibility that the defendant was convicted of an offense other than that charged
in the indictment.” Id.
M r. Bishop relies primarily on a case from the Seventh Circuit, United
States v. Leichtnam, 948 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1991), to support his argument that
the jury instructions and admission of the .38 caliber bullet into evidence
constructively amended the indictment. In Leichtnam, the indictment charged that
the defendant “did knowingly use and carry a firearm, to wit: a M ossberg rifle . . .
.” Id. at 374. Yet, at trial, the government introduced two other guns, in addition
to the M ossberg, into evidence, and the jury instructions stated that the jury need
only find that the defendant had used and carried any one of the three firearms,
not specifically the M ossberg. Id. at 374-75.
The Seventh Circuit held that the jury instructions, coupled with the
admission of the additional guns into evidence, constructively amended the
indictment, explaining that an indictment “may not be broadened, so as to present
the trial jury with more or different offenses than the grand jury charged.” Id. at
377. If an indictment charges particulars, the jury instructions and evidence
introduced at trial must comport with those particulars. See id. at 380 (“the
indictment specified a single, narrow basis for conviction”). The court provided
an example that we also find illustrative: if an indictment charges a RICO
violation because of an enterprise with a particularly-named family, the jury
9
cannot find the defendant guilty of enterprise with any group of people – the
particular family itself “become[s] an essential element of the charge.” Id. at 378
(citing United States v. Weissman, 899 F.2d 1111 (11th Cir. 1990)). Applying
this principle to the M ossberg rifle issue, the court held that the indictment’s
identification of the firearm as a M ossberg rifle narrowed the indictment, making
that M ossberg rifle an essential element of the indictment. Because the other tw o
guns were admitted into evidence, and because the jury instructions permitted the
jury to find the defendant guilty based on ownership either of the M ossberg or
one of the two other guns, the indictment against the defendant was constructively
amended. Id. at 379-81.
The court additionally commented:
Obviously, the government could easily have drawn up [the
defendant’s] indictment to charge him simply with having used or
carried “a firearm.” But it did not do so, and the description it gave of
the gun in the indictm ent, “to wit a M ossberg rifle M odel 250CA with
no serial number,” was not m erely surplusage. . . . By the way the
governm ent chose to frame [the defendant’s] indictment, it made the
M ossberg an essential part of the charge and limited the bases for
possible conviction to the M ossberg.
Id. at 379. Thus, the constructive amendment arose because of the government’s
choice to word the indictment narrowly. See id. at 380 (reiterating that the AUSA
could have “drafted a broader, less specific indictment”).
M r. Bishop’s case is slightly different from Leichtnam because the
indictment against him mirrored statutory language by referring to “any
10
ammunition and firearm which has been shipped or transported in interstate
commerce,” Rec. vol. I, doc. 13, at 1 (emphasis added), before listing the specific
firearm, rather than simply “a firearm,” as in Leichnam, 948 F.2d at 921. The
government argues that the inclusion of the broad term “any ammunition” means
that it could prove M r. Bishop had violated §§ 922(g) and 924(a)(2) either by
proving he possessed the Hi-Point pistol or proving he possessed any ammunition.
W e disagree.
Even though the indictment in question used the language “any ammunition
and firearm which has been shipped or transported in interstate commerce,” it
explicitly modified that terminology with the phrase “that is, a Hi-Point 9mm
pistol.” As in Leichtnam, the government could have left the indictment language
broad, but here choose to “limit[] the bases for possible conviction” to a specific
firearm. 948 F.2d at 379. The indictment’s use of the phrase “any ammunition
and firearm which has been shipped or transported in interstate commerce” is
merely a generic recitation of statutory language, rather than “a broader, less
specific indictment,” id. at 380, given that immediately following that phrase, the
indictment states “that is, a Hi-Point 9mm pistol.” 2
2
Section 922(g) makes it unlaw ful for certain felons “to ship or transport in
interstate . . . commerce, or possess in or affecting comm erce, any firearm or
amm unition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or
transported in interstate . . . commerce.” The indictment here uses all the relevant
statutory terms: “Stephan T. Bishop . . . did unlaw fully and knowingly possess in
(continued...)
11
Additionally, we do not believe that the phrase “that is, a Hi-Point 9mm
pistol” refers only to the word “firearm.” Instead, the phrase “Hi-point 9mm
pistol” qualifies the entire phrase immediately preceding it, “any ammunition and
firearm which has been shipped or transported in interstate commerce.” The
doctrine of the last antecedent, used by courts when interpreting statutes, informs
our decision. “The doctrine of the last antecedent teaches that qualifying words,
phrases, and clauses are to be applied to the words or phrase immediately
preceding and not to others more remote.” United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429,
436 (3d Cir. 2003). Here, the phrase “that is, a Hi-Point 9mm pistol” must
qualify the entire phrase immediately preceding it, “any ammunition and firearm
which has been shipped or transported in interstate commerce.” W e therefore
hold that the admission of the .38 caliber bullet and the jury instructions
constructively amended the indictment against M r. Bishop.
The government urges that, even if the indictment was constructively
amended, any error is harmless. It directs us to the verdict form, which required
the jury to indicate (1) whether it unanimously agreed that M r. Bishop was guilty
of possessing the .38 caliber bullet, and (2) whether it unanimously agreed that
M r. B ishop was guilty of possessing the Hi-Point 9mm pistol. See Rec. vol. 1,
2
(...continued)
and affecting commerce and receive any ammunition and firearm which has been
shipped or transported in interstate commerce . . . .” Rec. vol. I, doc. 13, at 1.
12
doc. 51, at 1. The jury found M r. Bishop guilty of possessing both the Hi-Point
9mm pistol and the .38 caliber bullet. Id. Thus, even if the bullet had never been
part of the evidence admitted at trial and the jury had never been instructed
regarding the bullet, we can definitively conclude that the jury would have
convicted M r. Bishop on the same count merely due to his possession of the
pistol.
Additionally, we note that M r. Bishop’s sentence was not enhanced in any
way because the jury convicted him of possessing both the bullet and the firearm.
Rec. vol. IV, at 10, ¶ 29 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1); see Tieu, 279 F.3d at 921
(explaining, where a defendant contended his indictment charged him only with
possessing a firearm and not possessing ammunition, that even if the district court
erred by submitting the issue of possession of ammunition to the jury, “the error
was rendered harmless when the district court dismissed the ammunition charge
[in post-trial proceedings]. The special verdict form required the jury to
unanimously determine whether Defendant knowingly possessed a firearm and the
jury returned a guilty verdict on this charge.”). Thus, we conclude that the
constructive amendment of the indictment constituted harmless error.
B. Admission of Email Evidence
Mr. Bishop next presents two arguments that the court’s admission of an email he
wrote to Ms. Black requires that he be re-tried for Counts two through seven. First, he
13
argues that the government violated Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
by not promptly disclosing this evidence, and that because of this violation, the district
court should not have admitted the email into evidence. Second, Mr. Bishop contends
that the district court should have found that the government engaged in prosecutorial
misconduct. We examine each alleged point of error in turn.
1. Alleged Rule 16 Violation
To sanction a party for failing to comply with the requirements of Rule 16, a
district court may “order that party to permit the discovery or inspection[,] . . . grant a
continuance[,] prohibit that party from introducing the undisclosed evidence[,] or enter
any other order that is just under the circumstances.” F ED. R. C RIM. P. 16(d)(2). We will
not disturb a district court’s decision to apply, or not to apply, a particular sanction absent
an abuse of discretion. United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1261-62 (10th Cir.
1999).
Mr. Bishop contends that the government did not comply with Rule 16(c) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that “[a] party who discovers
additional evidence or material before or during trial must promptly disclose its existence
to the other party or the court if (1) the evidence or material is subject to discovery or
inspection under this rule; and (2) the other party previously requested, or the court
ordered, its production.” F ED. R. C RIM. P. 16(c).
Here, Ms. Black had testified on direct examination that Mr. Bishop sent her
14
emails that threatened to hurt her if she testified that the gun was his, and that tried to
convince her to take the blame for the gun. During cross-examination on the same day as
direct examination, Mr. Bishop’s attorney asked questions about Ms. Black’s relationship
with Mr. Bishop to show that any threats contained in the emails were not linked to her
potential testimony against Mr. Bishop, but rather were made in response to their recent
break-up. Following this cross examination and after court had recessed for the day, Ms.
Black provided the government with three additional, previously undisclosed emails to
rebut Mr. Bishop’s attorney’s cross examination.
When Mr. Bishop’s counsel continued his cross examination on the following day,
the government had not yet provided him the additional emails. Rather, the government
waited until its redirect examination, when it simultaneously sought to admit the emails
and provided them to Mr. Bishop’s counsel. Mr. Bishop objected to the admission of one
of the emails at trial (after the other two emails had been admitted without objection), but
the district court overruled this objection. Mr. Bishop then asked for a recess to review
the emails prior to his re-cross examination, and the district court granted this request.
Following the recess, Mr. Bishop’s attorney indicated that he was ready to proceed with
re-cross examination. He did not request additional time to review the new email
evidence.
Although, as the district court implied, it may have been better practice for the
government to provide the emails immediately when trial began on the second day, we
15
see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to grant a short continuance
rather than exclude the email. Even assuming that the government’s failure to disclose
the email at the beginning of the second day of trial constituted a violation of Rule 16,
“Rule 16(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures gives the district court broad
discretion in imposing sanctions on a party who fails to comply with [the Rule].” United
States v. Wicker, 848 F.2d 1059, 1060 (10th Cir. 1988). A court may grant a continuance,
refuse to admit the non-compliant evidence, or “enter any other order that is just under the
circumstances.” F ED. R. C RIM. P. 16(d)(2)(D). “Despite this broad grant of power, the
district court’s exercise of discretion should be guided by several factors; and if a sanction
is imposed, it should be the least severe sanction that will accomplish prompt and full
compliance with the court’s discovery orders.” Wicker, 848 F.2d at 1060 (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted). “It would be a rare case where, absent bad faith,
a district court should exclude evidence rather than continue the proceedings.”
Golyansky, 291 F.3d 1245, 1249 (10th Cir. 2002).
Nothing in the record indicates that the continuance the district court granted Mr.
Bishop was not sufficient to cure any prejudice that may have resulted from the
government’s failure to provide his counsel with the email as soon as trial resumed.
Additionally, Mr. Bishop never argued before the district court or on appeal that the
government acted in bad faith. Finally, Mr. Bishop’s counsel made no indication at trial
that the time allotted for continuance was insufficient for him to review the email with his
16
client and formulate a strategy for re-cross examination of Ms. Black. We therefore hold
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exclude the email in
question and, instead, providing time for Mr. Bishop’s counsel to review the new
evidence and incorporate it into his re-cross examination.
2. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct
We also review a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial due to
prosecutorial misconduct only for an abuse of discretion. “We engage in a two-step
process in reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct. First, we determine if the
conduct was improper. Second, we determine if any improper conduct warrants reversal.”
United States v. Gordon, 173 F.3d 761, 769 (10th Cir. 1999). In the second step, “we
consider the curative acts of the district court, the extent of the misconduct, and the role
of the misconduct within the case as a whole.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Bishop essentially argues that the government’s failure to produce the emails
as soon as trial resumed constituted prosecutorial misconduct and that the incriminating
nature of the email evidence requires us to grant a new trial. We do not agree. First,
assuming without deciding that the government should not have delayed in producing the
emails, we do not believe any misconduct that occurred was egregious or extensive, or
played a significant role in the case. The district court found that “[w]hile the
government did not disclose the new emails to the defendant before the beginning of the
second day of trial, the emails were produced to defendant approximately twenty minutes
17
into the proceedings.” Rec. vol. I, doc. 62, at 10 (Dist. Ct. Order, dated Apr. 4, 2005).
Additionally, Mr. Bishop does not assert that the curative measure taken by the district
court – the recess granted to enable Mr. Bishop’s trial counsel to review the emails and
prepare his re-cross examination – was insufficient to cure any prejudice resulting from
the alleged misconduct. Finally, we reiterate that Mr. Bishop’s trial counsel did not
request extra time to review the emails, nor does he assert on appeal that the district court
did not provide him with sufficient time in recess to review the new evidence. We
therefore hold that any alleged misconduct does not warrant a new trial.
C. Reasonableness of Sentence
Mr. Bishop’s final argument is that his 78-month sentence is unreasonable because
it is “some 20 months longer than the maximum guideline sentence.” Aplt’s Br. at 11.
He also contends that the district court impermissibly considered the set-aside rape
conviction when sentencing him, even though DNA evidence proved that Mr. Bishop did
not commit the rape. He requests that we remand his case for re-sentencing before a
different judge.
We review a district court’s post-Booker sentencing decision for reasonableness,
using the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) as our guide. United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261-262 (2005). Our circuit has established a two-step process for
determining whether a sentence is reasonable. First, we determine whether the district
court properly calculated the sentence under the Guidelines. United States v. Chavez-
18
Diaz, 444 F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th Cir. 2006). Second, if we conclude that the district court
has properly calculated the Guidelines’ range, we then review the sentence for
reasonableness. Id.
Here, Mr. Bishop does not challenge the district court’s calculation of the
sentencing range under the Guidelines. Rather, he challenges the court’s decision to
sentence him to 78 months’ imprisonment, when the sentencing range recommended by
the Guidelines was 46 to 57 months. We recently considered whether “a sentence that is
extremely light when compared to the applicable advisory guidelines range was
reasonable.” United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 590 (10th Cir. 2006). This case
presents the other side of that same coin: whether a sentence that is higher than the
maximum Guidelines’ range is reasonable.
In Cage, we held that the district court’s sentence of six days was unreasonable
when the Guidelines recommended a sentence of at least 46 months. We held that such
“an extraordinary departure must be supported by extraordinary circumstances,” id. at
594 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted), and required that “an extreme
divergence . . . should be considered reasonable only under dramatic facts,” id. The
district court had provided many reasons under § 3553(a) for imposing a six-day
sentence, including especially the defendant’s familial situation and her status as a single
mother whose child has medical problems. We reasoned that an extreme variance must
be justified by § 3553 factors that are particular and individualized, not those that may be
19
common to many defendants. We explained that although “[w]e are not insensitive to the
problems of incarcerating a single mother . . . [h]er situation is, unfortunately, not very
uncommon.” Id. at 596. “Although these facts may justify some discrepancy from the
advisory guidelines range, they simply are not dramatic enough to warrant such an
extreme downward variance.” Id.; see also United States v. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d 127, 133
(2d Cir. 2006) (“[O]n appellate review, we will view as inherently suspect a non-
Guidelines sentence that rests primarily upon factors that are not unique or personal to a
particular defendant, but instead, reflects attributes common to all defendants.”).
Our decision in Cage also outlined our responsibilities on appellate review of a
sentence that varies from the advisory Guidelines range. We had previously explained
that the concept of reasonableness “necessarily encompasses . . . the method by which the
sentence was calculated.” United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th Cir. 2006).
In Cage, we elaborated, stating that “[r]easonableness has both procedural and
substantive components.” 451 F.3d at 591. “[W]e reject[ed] the concept that we, as
judges, should determine ‘reasonableness’ under § 3553(a) without reference to the fact
that the Guidelines represent a critical advisory aspect of the § 3553(a) factors.” Id. at
594. Thus, where a sentence that varies from the Guidelines has no connection to the
guideposts created by the Sentencing Commission (such as criminal history points,
offense characteristics, offense levels, etc.), we look to whether the district court
employed another reasonable methodology in calculating the sentence. On the other
20
hand, if a sentence that varies from the advisory Guidelines range is nevertheless tethered
to the Guidelines themselves, we will likely consider this a reasonable methodology.
Additionally in Cage, we explained that the extremity of the variance between the
actual sentence imposed and the applicable Guidelines range should determine the
amount of scrutiny we give to the district court’s substantive sentence. In considering the
“discrepancy between the advisory guidelines range and the actual sentence,” the
“comparative difference” should guide our review. Id. If the difference between the
advisory guidelines range and the actual sentence is not extreme, “but still outside the
guidelines range, the district court’s decision would not have been presumptively
reasonable but an appropriate justification would suffice for this court to determine that it
is reasonable.” Id. “How compelling that justification must be is proportional to the
extent of the difference between the advisory range and the sentence imposed.” United
States v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 423, 426-27 (7th Cir. 2005); see also United States v.
Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[W]hen the variance is a substantial one, .
. . we must more carefully scrutinize the reasoning offered by the district court in support
of the sentence.”), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 2054 (2006); accord United States v. Smith, 445
F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2006);
United States v. McMannus, 436 F.3d 871, 874 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Dean,
414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005); but cf. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at 134 (“[W]e have yet to
21
adopt this standard as a rule in [the Second] circuit, and [we] do not do so here . . . .”).
The comparative difference between Mr. Bishop’s sentence of 78 months and the
advisory range maximum of 57 months is a 37% increase. This is a significant increase
that requires sufficient explanation and justification. Because the district court carefully
examined Mr. Bishop’s individualized circumstances using the § 3553 factors, and
increased the sentence by linking the variance to the Guidelines themselves, we hold that
Mr. Bishop’s 78-month sentence was reasonable.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court explained its rationale behind the
sentence it imposed by reference to the sentencing factors set forth in § 3553(a). Noting
that a sentence should take into account “the nature and circumstances of the offense,”
and “reflect the seriousness of the offense, . . . promote respect for the law, and . . .
provide just punishment for the offense,” see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A); Rec. vol. III,
at 533, the court stated that it thought the total offense level of 22 did not adequately meet
the goals of the Guidelines. It provided two distinct reasons for this, both connected to
the fact that Mr. Bishop received only a two-level increase from his base offense level for
obstruction of justice related to his convictions on Counts two through six.
First, Mr. Bishop received the same two-offense-level increase for convictions
related to six counts of witness intimidation as he would have if he had only been
convicted of one count. “[H]e would have gotten those same two levels had there been
just one even half-hearted attempt . . . to try to get Emily Black not to testify . . . . Yet
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here what we saw was six counts that escalated in not only their rhetoric but in their
threats of violence . . . .” Rec. vol. III, at 534.
Second, the two-level increase did not reflect Mr. Bishop’s obstruction of justice
with respect to his untruthful testimony. The district court explicitly found that Mr.
Bishop “knowingly and willfully lied to the jury and to the court about the circumstances
surrounding [his possession of] the gun,” id. at 535, and that Mr. Bishop should be held
culpable for this conduct. Mr. Bishop does not challenge this finding on appeal. See
United States v. Gillespie, 452 F.3d 1183, 1190 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006) (explaining that,
even though an obstruction of justice enhancement was not considered by the jury and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, where the defendant “was sentenced after Booker and
the District Court treated the Guidelines as advisory . . . there is no Sixth Amendment
violation”).
The district court also closely considered “the history and characteristics of the
defendant,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), and the need “to afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct [and] to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,” id. §
3553(a)(2)(B)&(C). The district court was troubled by the indications that Mr. Bishop
had engaged in other low-level criminal conduct since his release from prison in 2003,
which led it to find that probation and leniency had little deterrent effect on Mr. Bishop.
Rec. vol. III, at 538-39 (“his multiple parole violations, when the authorities had the
opportunity to give him punishment for failing to abide by the rules of society and he saw
that the authorities were willing to do that, that didn’t deter him from here committing the
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offenses [for which he was convicted]”).
Additionally, although the district court had sustained Mr. Bishop’s objection to
the PSR’s calculation of his criminal history points due to the discovery of exculpatory
DNA evidence on the rape conviction, it indicated that the Guidelines gave Mr. Bishop “a
windfall for the decision not to go back and reprosecute [him for his role in the rape] . . . ;
it’s a windfall from the standpoint of looking at his criminal history calculation.” Id. at
540. Mr. Bishop contends that the district court impermissibly considered a criminal
conviction that had been set aside due to factual innocence, and that he should be re-
sentenced before a different judge due solely to this error.
We agree that the district court impliedly expressed a view that Mr. Bishop,
although not the perpetrator of the rape, was somehow criminally culpable for it due to
the “windfall” he received for the rape not counting towards his criminal history points.
The only support for this assumption we can glean from the record is that, during the
sentencing hearing, the government represented that Kansas prosecutors “could have
gone back to trial” and that Mr. Bishop “could have still been convicted under an aider
and abettor theory.” Id. at 507. Although the record is inadequate for us to conclude that
the subsequent re-prosecution would have been effective, when the district court’s
remarks about Mr. Bishop’s criminal history are taken in totality, we believe that the
court was emphasizing the overall seriousness of the crimes that were committed. The
district court expressed additional, valid concerns about the Guidelines understating Mr.
Bishop’s criminal history with respect to the seriousness of his convictions for the
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aggravated kidnaping and burglary charges. Id. at 540 (“the circumstances surrounding
that event were something that actually are not . . . reflected by the . . . convictions which
remain”). Therefore, we do not believe that the district court’s single reference to the
rape conviction renders Mr. Bishop’s sentence unreasonable.
Having enumerated its detailed and particularized reasons under § 3553(a) for
deciding to impose a sentence that exceeded the applicable Guidelines’ range, the district
court then turned to the Guidelines themselves to advise it on how to calculate an
appropriate sentence. “An Offense Level 24 and criminal history category of three gave
an upward – a range of 63 to 78 [months]. So too did a total offense level of 25 and a
criminal history category of two. I felt that . . . this gave the court some real guidance
about where a reasonable sentence should fall.” Id. at 541.
The district court’s approach to fashioning an appropriate sentence was reasoned,
and the ultimate sentence was reasonable. In the facts of this case, the Guidelines do tend
to under-represent Mr. Bishop’s criminal conduct, because as the district court noted, he
would have received the same additional offense levels added to the base offense level
even if he had been convicted of only one count of witness intimidation. Additionally,
the prior felony convictions were for particularly heinous crimes, one of which carried a
life sentence. Cf. United States v. Kendall, 446 F.3d 782, (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that the
defendant’s criminal history was not “the type of extraordinary record to justify an
extraordinary variance” where the defendant had been convicted only of one second-
degree burglary offense, four motor-vehicle offenses, and misdemeanor possession of a
25
controlled substance). Finally, we note that the district court did not abandon the tools
provided by the advisory Guidelines. It carefully considered how the Guidelines would
advise sentencing Mr. Bishop if additional offense levels were added. Circumstances
such as those Mr. Bishop’s case presented justify an upward variance, and the district
court’s methodology and basis for imposing a sentence above the Guidelines range were
sound. The district court did not “effectively ignore[] the advice of the Guidelines,”
Cage, 451 F.3d at 594, nor did it “import [its] own philosophy of sentencing . . . .” Dean,
414 F.3d at 729. Rather, the court used the advisory Guidelines as a tool for fashioning a
reasonable sentence.
III. CONCLUSION
Because we hold that (1) the constructive amendment of the indictment was
harmless error, (2) that the district court was within its discretion to admit the email
evidence, and (3) that Mr. Bishop’s sentence was reasonable, we AFFIRM Mr. Bishop’s
convictions and sentence.
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