F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
February 22, 2007
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
PAUL BUTT, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 05-2175
BANK OF AM ERICA, N.A.,
Defendant-Appellee.
A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T HE D ISTRICT OF NEW M EXICO
(D .C . N O. C V-03-95 W PJ/FLG )
M artin E. Threet, (Joey B. W right, with him on the brief) M artin E. Threet &
Associates, Albuquerque, New M exico, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Joseph W . Halpern (Bradford C. Berge and Trent A. Howell, Holland & Hart,
LLP, Santa Fe, New M exico, with him on the briefs), Holland & Hart LLP,
Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before HA RTZ, O’BRIEN, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Paul Butt, Jr., contends that Defendant Bank of America, N.A., has
breached its fiduciary duty to him as trustee of a trust created in 1948 to
administer a New M exico oil and gas lease. The district court dismissed M r.
Butt’s complaint, finding that the B ank never assumed trusteeship and therefore
had no fiduciary duty. W e find that the trust did not survive the death of its
original trustee, and thus agree with the district court’s conclusion that the Bank
does not serve, and never has served, as trustee on M r. Butt’s behalf. W e reverse,
however, the district court’s judgment that it need not conclusively find whether
the Bank acted adversely to M r. Butt’s interest in specific transactions. As to
those specific transactions, which we outline below, we remand for consideration
of M r. B utt’s request for an accounting and imposition of a constructive trust.
I. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief H istory of Oil and G as Lease No. A-4096
On April 21, 1931, the State of New M exico issued Oil and Gas Lease No.
A-4096 (the “Lease”) to C. Frederick Luthy for the purposes of exploring for,
developing, and producing oil and gas in lands located in Lea County. According
to the parties, New M exico law permitted legal title for the Lease to issue only in
one person’s name, but per a prior agreement, each of three men held a one-third
interest in it: M r. Luthy, Paul Butt, Sr., and E.T. Buckley. Over the years, those
one-third interests were devised, inherited, and sold such that Paul Butt, Jr., (“M r.
Butt”) now owns his father’s third, three different parties own equal portions of
M r. Luthy’s original third, and two different parties own equal portions of M r.
Buckley’s original third. Because of New M exico’s single lease-holder policy,
however, Bank of A merica, N.A.— the trustee of M r. Luthy’s testamentary
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trust— holds actual title to the Lease, which apparently still bears M r. Luthy’s
name. 1 The dispute we encounter is between M r. Butt and the Bank over the
Bank’s role as title holder of the Lease following M r. Luthy’s death.
On April 19, 1948, M r. Luthy executed a “Declaration of Trust,” which
identified the Lease as the corpus and named him as trustee. Under the terms of
the document, M r. Luthy was to have absolute control over the Lease and was to
periodically disburse profits to the beneficiaries. The document did not identify a
successor trustee or establish any means for appointing one. 2
1
Bank of America, N.A. is the successor-in-interest to Albuquerque
National Bank and a series of other banks that served as M r. Luthy’s executor and
testamentary trustee over the years. For ease of reference, we will generally refer
to a lone entity, “the Bank.”
M r. Luthy’s original one-third interest is now held in equal one-ninth
shares by M r. Luthy’s three children— Cheryl Potenziani, the Cyrene Inman Trust,
and Pennies from Heaven, L.L.C. (Fred Luthy, Jr.). See App. Vol. I, at 141–42.
George Kaseman purchased M r. Buckley’s interest following the latter’s
death in 1936. M r. Kaseman met his demise soon thereafter in an explosion at a
well on Lease property, and the interest passed to his estate and then to a
testamentary trust in 1938, for which Albuquerque National Bank served as
trustee. In 1957, Defiance Coal Company, a shell corporation for a multitude of
Kaseman heirs, purchased the interest. Defiance sold its interest, in equal parts,
to Branex Resources, Inc., and Oscura Resources, Inc., on December 1, 2000. See
id. at 141, 152; App. Vol. III, at 596, 601.
2
In part, the Declaration of Trust stated:
That W hereas, on the 21st day of April, 1931, the
State of New M exico granted to me an Oil and Gas
Lease No. A-4096 . . . [and]
W hereas, the consideration for said lease was
furnished and paid by myself and Paul Butt, with E.T.
Buckley being carried for a one-third interest for work
(continued...)
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Paul Butt, Sr., passed on in 1953, whereupon Appellant Paul Butt, Jr.,
acquired his interest in the Lease. On December 7, 1954, M r. Luthy, M r. Butt,
and the president of Defiance Coal signed an affidavit setting forth historical facts
relating to the acquisition and management of the Lease. In the affidavit, the
2
(...continued)
which he was to handle in connection with sale or
development of the lease; and it was agreed between
Paul Butt, E.T. Buckley and myself that I was to have
complete control and final decision in all matters
pertaining to the handling of said lease.
W hereas, E.T. Buckley died before performing
any services, and G.A. Kaseman later purchased the one-
third interest of E.T. Buckley from the remarried widow
of E.T. Buckley . . .; and
W hereas, said lease was made to me, as trustee,
for the equal benefit of the three (3) of us furnishing the
consideration as aforesaid, subject to original agreement
that, as title holder, I was to have complete control and
final decision in all matters pertaining to the handling of
said lease. . . .
Now , Therefore, in consideration of the premises,
I hereby acknowledge and declare that I stand seized of
said several rights, titles and interests, in trust for said
Paul Butt, his heirs and assigns, to the extent of one-
third (1/3) thereof, for myself, my heirs and assigns, to
the extent of one-third (1/3) thereof, and for
Albuquerque National Trust and Savings Bank, Trustee
under the Last Will and Testament of George A.
Kaseman, Deceased, its successors and assigns, to the
extent of one-third (1/3) thereof, and I hereby agree to
convey the respective interests at the request and cost of
said respective beneficiaries to such person or person
and at such time or times as they shall respectively
direct or appoint.
App. Vol. I, at 119–22.
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parties identified the Luthy-Butt-Defiance entity as a “syndicate” and agreed that
they had delegated “full and complete power of disposition” regarding the Lease
to M r. Luthy. App. Vol. I, at 124–29. The law firm that represented the entity at
the time treated it as a joint venture and as a partnership for tax purposes.
M r. Luthy died on January 11, 1963. His will named A lbuquerque National
Bank as executor of his estate and as trustee of his testamentary trust. One of the
assets included in M r. Luthy’s estate was his one-third interest in the Lease. The
Bank, in its capacity as M r. Luthy’s testamentary trustee, pays annual rents due
under the Lease and generally obtains reimbursement from the other interest
holders. 3
The evidence presented to the district court revealed a series of transactions
that the parties engaged in with respect to the Lease over the years. The district
court’s order identified these transactions by reference to tract numbers, which
correspond to the “line” numbers on the original Lease. See Dist. Ct. M em. Dec.
6; App. Vol. I, at 115–18. 4 For ease of reference, we adopt the same
designations.
3
At one time, the Bank also served as agent for Defiance Coal and thus
may have paid annual rents and dues in that capacity as well. App. Vol. III at
242–44.
4
The district court issued two opinions in this case, one pertaining to the
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and one following trial. The former,
which refer to as “Dist. Ct. Order,” is found at App. Vol. I, at 51–65. The latter,
which refer to as “Dist. Ct. M em. Dec.,” is found at App. Vol. I, at 84–102.
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1. The Humble Oil Assignment: Tracts 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, and 20
On M ay 15, 1963, the B ank, M r. Luthy’s widow, Defiance Coal, and M r.
Butt sent a letter to Humble Oil & Refining Company offering to sell mineral
interests in six tracts covered by the Lease. The offer letter stated that “the Estate
of C. Frederick Luthy, now deceased, has the entire official title to said land but
that the leasehold interest is actually owned one-third by Paul Butt Jr., one-third
by Defiance Coal Company, and one-third by the Estate of C. Frederick Luthy,
deceased.” App. Vol. II, at 442. The letter also indicated that, in return for the
assignment, the Luthy and Defiance interests would receive production payments
while the Butt interest reserved an overriding royalty interest. Humble O il
accepted the offer on M ay 21, 1963.
On June 19, 1963, Humble Oil obtained a title opinion letter from the law
firm of H ervey, Dow & Hinkle. The authoring attorney advised that “since M r.
Luthy is now deceased his power of control and sale has now ceased and it is not
vested in his heirs or devisees.” Id. at 449. Instead, the one-third interests were
“titles in real property and not merely contract rights to profits.” Id. In
subsequent correspondence, the attorney further opined:
I suppose that the trust which M r. Luthy had in mind when he made
his Affidavit of December 7, 1954 . . . and the unrecorded trust dated
April 19, 1948 terminated when he died[, and that it] may be that
upon the death of M r. Luthy this became a dry trust and the legal
title would go over to the beneficiaries under the Statutes of Uses . . .
.
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Id. at 479.
On O ctober 8, 1963, M r. Butt, by separate instrument, conveyed his interest
in the six tracts to Humble Oil in exchange for $31,964.80.
2. The Rankin Farm out: Tract 3
A few months prior to his death, M r. Luthy executed a farmout agreement
with M ann Rankin for a single tract covered by the Lease. On November 9, 1962,
M r. Rankin’s law firm sent him a letter questioning M r. Luthy’s “authority . . . as
trustee or agent” for M r. Butt and Defiance and advising M r. Rankin to either
have the latter two parties ratify the farmout agreement or acknowledge the power
of M r. Luthy to act on their behalf with respect to the Lease. Id. at 351–52. As
noted above, M r. Luthy perished in January 1963, in the midst of these dealings.
On October 31, 1964, M r. Rankin executed an “Assignment of Overriding
Royalty Interest,” which acknowledged that he had been assigned the leasehold as
to Tract 3 on October 22, 1964. In consideration of that assignment, M r. Rankin
conveyed a ten percent overriding royalty interest and specified that the
conveyance was a one-third interest to each of M r. Butt, Defiance Coal, and the
Bank as executor of M r. Luthy’s estate.
3. The Turner Farmout: Tracts 6 and 7
In M ay 1962, M r. Luthy offered to assign two tracts covered by the Lease
to Charles R. Turner, w ith drilling to commence on or before June 15, 1962.
After M r. Luthy’s death, the Bank, M rs. Luthy, M r. Butt, and Defiance Coal
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reaffirmed the offer— with a later drilling date— in a letter signed by each of
them. Turner accepted the offer.
Two other transactions related to this farmout occurred over the next year,
each with the individual written assent of the Bank, M rs. Luthy, M r. Butt, and
Defiance Coal. In February 1963, the parties executed a letter amending the
farmout per M r. Turner’s request. In July 1963, the parties executed a new offer
to M r. Turner, w hich he accepted.
Two years later, the parties engaged in further dealings with M r. Turner. In
September 1965, M r. Turner wrote a letter to a trust officer at the Bank in which
he reported that he had “discussed a trade with M r. Paul Butt, on acreage owned
by the Luthy Group.” Id. at 387. On October 28, 1965, the Bank, in its capacity
as executor and testamentary trustee of the Luthy estate, independently assigned
the entire interest in Tracts 6 and 7 to M r. Turner; in return, M r. Turner assigned
an overriding royalty to the Bank equal to 1/8 of all production. This transaction
ignored the beneficial interest holders but, on M ay 25, 1970, they ratified it by
signing a “Ratification and Amendment to Agreement” stating, in part:
W hereas, prior to [the] Assignment to Turner, the Bank owned
official legal record title to [the Lease], but the equitable or
beneficial title to [the Lease] was actually owned an [sic] undivided
1/3 interest each by said Bank, Defiance, and Butt, and said M apel
(formerly Cyrene Luthy) as her community property owned ½ of the
1/3 beneficial interest of the Bank, and said Defiance, Butt and
M apel did not sign or ratify said Assignment by the Bank to Turner
and they now desire to correct said matter . . . .
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Now, therefore, . . . Defiance, Butt and M apel hereby adopt,
ratify and confirm said Assignment dated October 28, 1965 . . . and
do hereby convey all of their title in said lease as to said land to
Charles R. Turner . . . .
Id. at 395. In addition, the document assigned to each of the beneficial ow ners a
1/16 share of the overriding royalty interests in production occurring on the
tracts.
4. The M achris Assignment: Tract 1
On October 6, 1954, Fred and Cyrene Luthy assigned to M .A. M achris the
interest in Tract 1 of the Lease; in return, M achris and his wife assigned to M r.
Luthy a 15% overriding royalty interest in production on the tract. On M ay 24,
1963, Cities Service Oil Company— a buyer from M achris of gas produced from
Tract 1— prepared a “Division Order” for signature by the Bank indicating that
the Bank was the owner of a 15% overriding royalty interest in Tract 1. 5 The
record copy of the order does not contain a signature for the Bank. Similarly, on
M ay 27, 1963, W arren Petroleum C orporation— another M achris buyer— prepared
a “Division Order” for signature by the Bank indicating that the Bank was the
owner of a 15% overriding royalty interest in the tract. Again, the record copy of
the order does not contain a signature for the Bank.
5. The Pauley Petroleum Assignment: Tract 10
5
A division order is an agreement that spells out the terms of the royalty
payments by an oil company to the owner of an interest in a well.
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In O ctober 1965, the B ank, in its capacity as executor and testamentary
trustee of Luthy’s estate, assigned the entire interest in Tract 10 to Pauley
Petroleum C ompany. In return, Pauley Petroleum assigned a 1/8 overriding
royalty interest in production from the tract to the Bank as executor and
testamentary trustee of the Luthy estate. Neither assignment mentioned the other
beneficial interest holders in the Lease. The record does not contain any further
evidence of activity with regard to Tract 10 until 1994, when M r. Butt executed a
term assignment of his interest in the tract to Logro Corporation, with a
reservation of an overriding royalty interest.
6. The Shell Oil Assignment: Tract 22
On June 17, 1971, the Bank wrote a letter to Shell Oil Company regarding
Tract 22 of the Lease. In the letter, the Bank explained that it had not executed a
requested transfer order pertaining to the tract because the order assumed that the
Luthy estate “owned a 1/21 interest of the 7/8 working interest of the State A Lea
County, New M exico lease.” Id. at 506. The Bank explained that the “Luthy
Estate in reality owned only a 1/3 interest in the 1/21 of the 7/8 working interest.
M r. Luthy was an equal partner in the Luthy-Butt-Defiance partnership. Thus, his
interest was only 1/3 rather than the whole thereof.” Id. In M arch of the
following year, Shell executed a division order that reflected the separate interests
of the beneficial interest holders in Tract 22. Each owner, including M r. Butt,
signed the order.
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In M ay 1972, M r. Butt communicated directly with Shell regarding his
interest in Tract 22 and requested that the company send future checks and
correspondence regarding the tract directly to him. Shell agreed, and the record
demonstrates that the company sent IRS Form 1099 (reflecting royalty payments)
directly to M r. Butt for tax year 1972.
7. Other Transactions by M r. Butt
M r. Butt also approved a series of other transactions w ith regard to his
interest in the Lease. On December 8, 1981, he assigned his interest in Tract 9 to
HNG Oil Company. On January 3, 1992, M r. Butt conveyed his interest in Tract
22 to the Permian Basin Acquisition Fund. On October 11, 1994, M r. Butt
assigned his interest in Tract 10 to Logro Corporation and granted an extension of
that assignment on October 6, 1997. On January 10, 1998, M r. Butt assigned his
interest in Tract 2 to the Rio Pecos Corporation.
B. The Law suit
In late 2002, M r. Butt sued the Bank in New M exico state court. His
complaint took the form of a Petition for Accounting and Other Relief, and
alleged that he was a beneficial owner of the Lease, which was held in trust by
the Bank. M r. Butt requested a full accounting of all royalty income and other
profits paid to the Bank, and requested that the Bank remit to him any payments
due, including interest.
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After the Bank removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds, M r.
Butt filed an amended complaint in which he enunciated two distinct
claims— breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. The Bank moved for
summary judgment, contending that M r. Butt’s claims are time barred by the
statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches. The Bank also argued that no
fiduciary relationship existed between it and M r. Butt and, even if there were such
a relationship, no breach occurred. Lastly, the B ank argued that summary
judgment was appropriate on the contract claim because no contract existed; even
if one did exist, it w as void; and if it w ere not void, no breach occurred.
On July 12, 2004, the district court granted in part and denied in part the
Bank’s motion for summary judgment. W ith respect to the statute of limitations
argument, the Court held that the clock in New M exico does not begin to tick
until a claimant has discovered or should have discovered his right of action. The
court found that, in this case, a genuine question of fact existed as to this issue.
W ith respect to the laches argument, the court also found a disputed issue of
material fact— again, whether and when M r. Butt had notice of the conduct giving
rise to the complaint. W ith respect to whether a trust relationship existed
between the Bank and M r. Butt, the court found that a genuine dispute existed as
to whether the Bank undertook the role of trustee for the benefit of M r. Butt and
thus denied summary judgment on this ground as well. The court granted
summary judgement, however, as to the contract claim. The court found that
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because the basis of M r. Butt’s claim is an alleged oral promise made by M r.
Luthy to protect and manage M r. Butt’s interest in the Lease, the claim was
barred by the New M exico Statute of Frauds.
The district court ordered a bifurcated trial for the remaining fiduciary duty
claim: a bench trial to determine whether a trust relationship existed, and, if
necessary, a jury trial to determine whether a breach of duty occurred. Following
the bench trial, the court issued a detailed order dismissing with prejudice M r.
Butt’s remaining claim. In the order, the court set out, as factual findings, the
history of the Lease recounted above. The court also found, with respect to the
Humble Oil Assignment, that M r. Butt exercised independent control over the
assignment of his interests in Tracts 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, and 20. W ith respect to
the Rankin Farmout, the court found that M r. Butt was directly assigned 1/3 of the
total overriding royalty interest. W ith respect to the Turner Farmout, the court
found that M r. Butt independently engaged in negotiations. W ith respect to the
Turner Farmout, the M achris A ssignment, and the Pauley Petroleum Assignment,
the court found that the Bank may have acted adversely to M r. Butt’s interests,
but that determinative findings w ere unnecessary given the court’s ultimate
disposition of the case. And with respect to the Shell Oil Assignment, the court
found that M r. Butt was recognized in 1972 as legal owner of 1/3 of the interest
owned by the Luthy-Butt-Defiance venture and that royalty payments were made
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directly to M r. Butt, the taxes for which he has been directly responsible. 6
M oreover, the court characterized M r. Butt’s assignments to the HNG Oil
Company, the Permian Basin Acquisition Fund, the Logro Corporation, and the
Rio Pecos Corporation as “independent transactions.” The court also found no
evidence that the B ank was ever appointed to serve as trustee for the Lease or M r.
Butt, noting that the 1948 Declaration of Trust did not name a successor trustee,
that the B ank was never designated to serve in any fiduciary capacity for M r.
Butt, and that the Bank never affirmatively agreed to serve as trustee for M r. Butt.
Turning to the legal questions in the case, the court applied the New
M exico Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”), N.M . Stat. Ann. §§ 46A-1-101 through
46A-11-1104, a comprehensive statute enacted in 2003 and made retroactive by
its own terms. The court held that, under the UTC, the death of a trustee results
in a vacancy that must be filled, either by a successor designated in the trust, by a
replacement unanimously appointed by the trust beneficiaries, or by an appointee
6
After reciting the facts of the Shell Oil Assignment, the district court
order states, in full: “The Court finds, based on all of the evidence submitted with
respect to Tracts 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, and 20, that Paul Butt, Jr. w as recognized in
1972 as legal owner of 1/3 of the interest owned by the Luthy-Butt-Defiance
venture. Royalty payments have been made directly to Paul Butt, Jr., and he has
been responsible for the payment of taxes on these royalties.” Dist. Ct. M em.
Dec. 14. The reference to “Tracts 12, 13, 14, 18, 19 and 20,” is misplaced since
those tracts w ere at issue in the Humble A ssignment, not the Shell Assignment,
which concerned Tract 22. W e assume the district court meant to refer to Tract
22.
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of the court. The district court assumed, without deciding, that M r. Luthy, while
alive, served as trustee for the Lease. The court further assumed that the trust did
not fail upon his death and was thus absent a trustee upon that instance. Finding
that the trust made no provision for a successor trustee and that neither the
beneficiaries nor a court ever appointed a successor trustee, 7 the district court
held that the Bank never served as trustee for the Lease and that “[n]o special
relationship giving rise to a fiduciary duty existed at any time between [the Bank]
and Paul Butt Jr.” D ist. Ct. M em. Dec. 17–18. The court thus dismissed M r.
Butt’s action.
M r. Butt timely appealed.
II. D ISC USSIO N
It is important to distinguish between two different possible claims
regarding a trust in this case. In accordance with state law requiring that legal
title to an oil and gas lease issue only in one person’s name, 8 the title to Lease
No. A-4096 was issued in the name of M r. C. Frederick Luthy. So far as appears
from the record, the Lease still bears M r. Luthy’s name. App. Vol. I, at 142. To
7
The court also held that while performing the duties of a trustee or
accepting delivery of trust property can serve as acceptance of the role of trustee,
this only occurs when the person or entity doing so has been designated as
trustee. Because the latter status was never conferred upon the Bank,
performance or acceptance of property could not serve to make the Bank trustee.
8
Because the parties agreed that this was the law in New M exico in 1931,
the district court assumed this to be correct without deciding the issue. Dist. Ct.
Order 2. W e do the same.
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maintain the Lease, annual taxes and rentals must be paid to the State. It is
undisputed that the Bank has performed these functions over the years.
In addition, as a result of an express “original agreement” among the three
owners of the Lease, M r. Luthy was given “complete control and final decision in
all matters pertaining to the handling of said lease.” Id. at 119. This agreement
was formally memorialized in a Declaration of Trust executed in 1948.
W e do not understand the parties to be arguing, and in any event would not
conclude, that record title holder of an oil and gas lease under New M exico law is
a trustee for the actual owners in the sense relevant to this case. If it were not for
the “original agreement” and the later Declaration of Trust, M r. Luthy would not
have had unilateral authority to engage in financial transactions and sign deals
with regard to the Lease, and would have had no concomitant fiduciary duties to
the other interest holders. The real question in this case pertains to the express
trust, and specifically whether the Bank is a successor trustee to M r. Luthy. The
district court held that it is not.
M r. Butt argues that the district court applied the wrong law in this case
and, consequently, erred in determining that the Bank does not serve as trustee of
the Lease property for his benefit. He maintains that under the properly
applicable law— New M exico trust law as it existed either at the time of the
formation of the trust or at the time of M r. Luthy’s death— the Bank automatically
acceded to trusteeship upon M r. Luthy’s death. In the alternative, M r. Butt argues
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that the Bank acted against his interest in the Lease and therefore holds profits
from those actions in a constructive trust. 9
A. Is the Bank a T rustee Under New M exico Law ?
1. Application of the Uniform Trust Code
W hen exercising diversity jurisdiction, we apply state law with the
objective of obtaining the result that would be reached in state court. Perlmutter
v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 4 F.3d 864, 869 (10th Cir. 1993). The district court correctly
turned its attention to New M exico’s Uniform Trust Code, N.M . Stat. Ann. §§
46A-1-101 through 46A-11-1104, which went into effect during the pendency of
this action. 2003 N.M . Laws, ch. 122, § 1-101. The UTC “applies to all trusts
created before, on or after its effective date,” N.M . Stat. Ann. § 46A-11-
1104(A )(1), and “to judicial proceedings concerning trusts commenced before its
effective date, unless the court finds that application of a particular provision of
the [UTC] would . . . prejudice the rights of the parties, in which case the
particular provision of the [UTC] does not apply and the superseded law applies,”
id. § 46A-11-1104(A)(3). Except to the extent the UTC or other New M exico
9
In his jurisdictional statement, M r. Butt asserts that he appeals the rulings
on both his contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims. He presents legal
argument, however, only as to the fiduciary duty claim. Accordingly, M r. Butt
has waived the breach of contract issue. See Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 975
F.2d 1555, 1558 n.1 (10th Cir. 1992); Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, Okla., 896
F.2d 1228, 1231 (10th Cir. 1990).
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statutes modify it, “[t]he common law of trusts and principles of equity
supplement the [UTC].” Id. § 46A-1-106.
W e assume, as did the district court, that the 1948 D eclaration of Trust
created a valid trust with M r. Luthy as the trustee and Paul Butt, Sr., as one of the
beneficiaries. W hen M r. Butt the elder passed on, M r. Butt the younger inherited
his beneficial interest. If we were also to assume, as the did the district court,
that the trust did not fail upon M r. Luthy’s death, then upon that instance “a
vacancy in the trusteeship occur[red].” Id. 46A-7-704(A)(5) (“A vacancy in a
trusteeship occurs if: . . . a trustee dies.”). The UTC provides that “[a] vacancy in
a trusteeship must be filled if the trust has no remaining trustee,” id. 46A-7-
704(B), “in the following order of priority: (1) by a person designated in the
terms of the trust to act as successor trustee; (2) by a person appointed by
unanimous agreement of the qualified beneficiaries; or (3) by a person appointed
by the court,” id. at 46A-7-704(C)(1)–(3). The district court found that none of
these methods of appointment occurred at any time following M r. Luthy’s death
and therefore held that the Bank never assumed trusteeship and had no fiduciary
duty to M r. Butt.
Carrying forward the assumption that the trust survived M r. Luthy’s death,
nothing in the record conflicts with the district court’s ultimate factual finding: at
no time were any of the proper means of appointing a successor trustee under the
UTC pursued by any party to this relationship. M r. Butt is surely correct,
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however, that if under New M exico law in 1948 (when the trust was created) or
1963 (w hen M r. Luthy died) the Bank would have automatically acceded to
trusteeship, then the district court’s legal conclusion was erroneous. The UTC,
after all, explicitly states that where its application would prejudice the parties,
superceded law applies. Id. § 46A-11-1104(A)(3). And if prior law would have
rendered the Bank a fiduciary of M r. Butt, then the UTC’s nullification of that
status w ould certainly be prejudicial to the trust beneficiaries. But M r. Butt fails
to direct to us to any law, extant at the time of the formation of the trust or M r.
Luthy’s death, that supports his assertions. Instead, he reproduces a hodgepodge
of provisions from New M exico’s 1953 code, none of which shed even the
faintest light on the questions in this case. 10 Nor has our independent review of
New M exico law uncovered any statutory or case law that is contrary to the
10
M r. Butt reproduces the definitional sections of the Fiduciary Obligations
and Investments Act, N.M . Stat. Ann. §§ 33-1-1 to 33-1-20 (1953), the U niform
Trustees Accounting Act, N.M . Stat. Ann. §§ 33-2-1 to 33-2-24 (1953), and the
Uniform Trusts Act, N.M . Stat. Ann. §§ 33-3-1 to 33-3-22 (1953). The Fiduciary
Obligations and Investment Act defines “fiduciary” as including “a trustee.”
N.M . Stat. Ann. § 33-1-1(1). The Uniform Trustees Accounting Act and the
Uniform Trusts Act define “trustee” as including “successor . . . trustee[s].” Id.
§§ 33-2-1 and 33-3-1(2). From these bare-bones provisions, M r. Butt divines a
“framew ork of legislative enactments [that] created a succession as a matter of
law,” and, therefore, “when M r. Luthy died, his successor in interest, i.e., the
Albuquerque National Bank became a successor trustee.” Appellant’s Opening
Br. at 19. Such a reading is unavailing. Nothing in the cited acts touches upon
the methods by which a trustee is appointed or by which a successor trustee
accedes to trusteeship. The mere fact that the acts contain the word “trustee” and
“successor trustee” does not establish “a framework” under w hich executors in
New M exico automatically accede to any trusteeship held by a decedent.
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provisions of the UTC. Indeed, it appears that the UTC, rather than contracting
the methods by which a successor trustee may be appointed, expanded the options
available under prior law. Compare Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 108 (1959)
(providing for appointment of a new trustee “by a proper court” or “by the person,
if any, who by the terms of the trust is authorized to appoint a trustee”), 11 with
N.M . Stat. Ann. § 46A-7-704(C) (providing for appointment of a new trustee to a
vacant trusteeship by the court, by “a person designated in the terms of the trust
to act as successor trustee,” or by “a person appointed by unanimous agreement of
the qualified beneficiaries”). Consequently, we find no merit to M r. Butt’s
argument that trust law from years gone by renders his fiduciary duty claim any
more sound that it appears under the UTC.
But even accepting that the Bank never acceded to trusteeship, the district
court’s analytical stopping point is a curious one. If the trust marched on into the
future but no trustee administered it, what then was the status of the trust these
past forty-four years? The UTC provides no answ er to this question, nor, it
appears, does New M exico case law. A generally accepted common law
11
W e note that New M exico courts often turn to the Restatement (Second)
of Trusts for guidance. See, e.g., Aragon v. Rio Costilla Coop. Livestock Ass’n,
812 P.2d 1300, 1302 (N.M . 1991) (relying on the Restatement’s definition of
“express trust”); Forest G uardians v. Powell, 24 P.3d 803, 808 (N.M . Ct. App.
2001) (discussing the Restatement’s provisions concerning charitable trusts); In
re Estate of Boyer, 868 P.2d 1299, 1304 (N.M . Ct. App. 1994) (finding the
Restatement’s reasoning “persuasive”). Thus, where no New M exico statute or
case is on point, we likewise turn to the Restatement for guidance.
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principle, which supplements the UTC, see N.M . Stat. Ann. § 46A-1-106,
instructs that “[u]pon the death of a sole trustee who has devised or bequeathed
the trust property, the title to the trust property passes subject to the trust to the
devisee or legatee, unless it is otherwise provided by the terms of the trust.”
Restatem ent (Second) of Trusts § 105; see also George Gleason Bogert et al.,
Bogert’s Trusts and Trustees § 529 (rev. 2d ed. 2005) (collecting cases). But the
devisee “is not permitted to administer the trust unless by the terms of the trust he
is so authorized,” and if “he is not so authorized, a new trustee will be
appointed.” Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 105 cmt. a. Perhaps the Bank, as
testamentary trustee of the Luthy estate, obtained title to the trust property but not
authority to administer the trust. This is a puzzle, like a car without a driver. W e
believe the simpler and more straightforward way to analyze this case is to
conclude that the trust terminated at M r. Luthy’s death.
2. The Trustee Power Was Personal to M r. Luthy.
Although, as a general rule, trusts do not fail upon the death of a trustee,
“[a] settlor may manifest an intention . . . that the trust continue only for as long
as a particular person serves as trustee. In [this] case[], the rule that a court will
appoint a substitute or successor trustee does not apply.” Restatement (Third) of
Trusts § 31 cmt. b (2003); see also In re Doe’s W ill, 285 N .W . 764, 766 (W is.
1939) (“If upon such construction of the instrument it appears that a power lodged
with the trustees in connection with the trust is a special confidence reposed in
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this particular trustee or set of trustees, or is to be exercised only upon his or their
personal judgment or discretion, such power can only be exercised by the
designated trustee and will not pass to a substituted trustee.” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)); Bogert et al., supra, § 529 (“The death of a sole or
surviving trustee does not terminate the trust, unless the settlor has manifested an
intention that the trust shall be personal to the particular trustee . . . .” (emphasis
added)). 12
After trial, the district court issued a detailed set of factual findings, none
of which are challenged on appeal. Based on these findings, we conclude that
when M r. Luthy declared the trust, the powers of trusteeship were meant to be
personal to him. In the trust instrument itself, M r. Luthy stated that the three
12
Although we cannot find a New M exico case stating this widely-accepted
and long-established common law rule, citations from other jurisdictions abound
and we have no trouble concluding that the New M exico Supreme Court would
adopt this rule if faced with the question. See, e.g., South End Bank & Trust Co.
v. Hurwitz, 21 A.2d 407, 408 (Conn. 1941); Stephens v. First Nat’l Bank of
Atlanta, 150 S.E.2d 865, 867 (Ga. 1966) (citing Gilmore v. Gilmore, 41 S.E.2d
229, 233 (Ga. 1947)); Yates v. Yates, 99 N.E. 360, 363 (Ill. 1912) (citing French
v. N. Trust Co., 64 N.E. 105, 108 (Ill. 1902)); Bray v. Old Nat. Bank in
Evansville, 48 N.E.2d 846, 850 (Ind. Ct. App. 1943); Anderson v. Ratliff, 178
S.W .2d 946, 948 (Ky. Ct. App. 1944) (citing Penn v. Pa. Co. for Insurances on
Lives and Granting Annuities, 171 S.W .2d 437, 441 (K y. Ct. App. 1943)); In re
Warner’s Will, 61 N.W .2d 840, 842–43 (M inn. 1953); Duncan v. Elkins, 45 A.2d
297, 298 (N.H. 1946); In re Walker, 53 N.E.2d 378 (N .Y. 1943); Pippin v.
Barker, 64 S.E.2d 830, 831 (N.C. 1951) (citing Welch v. Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co., 38 S.E.2d 197, 201–02 (N.C. 1946)); Staley v. Kreinbihl, 89 N.E.2d 593, 599
(O hio 1949); Rogers v. Rea, 120 N.E. 828, 828–29 (O hio 1918); Schloss v. R.I.
Hosp. Trust Co., 10 A.2d 344, 345 (R.I. 1940); In re Houghton’s Estate, 105 A.2d
257, 260 (Vt. 1954); In re Doe’s W ill, 285 N.W . 764, 766 (W is. 1939).
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original parties to the Lease operation “agreed that I was to have complete control
and final decision in all matters pertaining to the handling of said lease.” App.
Vol. I, at 119. No provision was made for successor trustees and the emphasis
throughout the instrument is on M r. Luthy’s personal and complete control over
the handling of the Lease. See Dist. Ct. M em. Dec. 4; Rogers, 120 N.E. at 828
(finding that language in a will “makes the judgment and discretion of [the named
trustee] absolutely essential to the creation of the trust,” and noting that “[t]his is
self-evident when it is noted that [the testatrix] makes no provision whatsoever
for any failure by death or otherwise of the trustee to act”); Schloss, 10 A.2d at
345 (finding that a settlor created a trust “to secure for himself the counsel and
guidance of his brother” as trustee and finding “nothing in [the trust] instrument
which even tends to indicate that, in the event of [the trustee’s] death or
disability, any other person was to succeed him as trustee”). M r. Luthy was not
charged with mere ministerial matters as trustee, but rather with exercising his
particular business judgment in initiating, negotiating, and finalizing a wide array
of complex oil and gas transactions under the Lease. See French v. N. Trust Co.,
64 N.E. 105, 108 (Ill. 1902) (“As a general rule, where a power is discretionary,
and of a kind that indicates personal confidence in the one selected to exercise it,
a court of equity will not assume to exercise the discretion, and the power will not
pass to a successor appointed by the court . . . . If the power is ministerial . . .
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although there may be some measure of discretion involved, the court will compel
the performance of the power, or execute it in the place of the trustee.”).
W e recognize that “the mere fact that a power is conferred upon the trustee
by name is not sufficient in itself to indicate that the power does not devolve upon
successor trustees.” In re City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 64 N.Y.S.2d 523, 525
(N.Y. Surr. 1946) (citing In re Walker, 53 N.E.2d 378). “[W]hether the testator
intended a discretionary trust power to be ex officio or to be a purely personal
power limited to the original trustees is to be ascertained by construing the
language of the will as a whole in the light of all the surrounding circumstances.”
In re Warner’s Will, 61 N.W .2d at 843; see also Welch, 38 S.E.2d at 201
(“W hether the powers are personal in character is to be ascertained from a
consideration of the will as a whole, and from the nature and objects of the trust
created thereby, in the light of surrounding circumstances.”); In re Houghton’s
Estate, 105 A.2d at 260 (“Practically, the question reduces itself to determining
whether such powers are in point of fact personal or ex officio, and this, at least in
the absence of statute, depends upon the intention of the . . . settlor, to be
gathered from the terms of the instrument creating the trust and from the
surrounding circumstances.”). Here, the surrounding circumstances and
subsequent history of dealings among the parties with an interest in the Lease
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confirms our reading of the trust instrument as conveying powers personal to M r.
Luthy. 13
First, in an affidavit signed in 1954, six years after the Declaration of
Trust, each of the interest holders in the Lease agreed that:
the remaining state oil and gas leases acquired by the syndicate
before mentioned are still and always have been held in the name of
Fred Luthy, with full and complete power of disposition of the same,
and the beneficial ow ners entitled to profits from said state leases are
presently Fredy Luthy, Defiance Coal Company, and Paul Butt Jr.,
and that all of the holders of the beneficial interests in said oil and
gas leases and properties have always conceded and now concede
that Fred Luthy has the full and complete power of disposition of
said leases and interests thereunder, and that no purchaser or person
dealing with Fred Luthy is required to look to the holders of the
beneficial interests or the disposition of the proceeds therefrom.
App. Vol. I, at 126; see also Dist. Ct. M em. Dec. 5. As in the trust instrument,
the emphasis in the affidavit is on Fred Luthy’s personal control over the Lease
and no provision is made for the continuance of the trust after his demise. As the
trial testimony demonstrates, M r. Luthy and the original parties to the Lease
enjoyed a close business relationship, and the facts suggest that M r. Luthy’s
associates placed particular faith in his abilities.
13
W e recognize that subsequent history cannot alter the critical factor in
interpreting a trust instrument— the settlor’s intent at the time of the trust’s
creation— but such history can shed light on what that intent was, especially
where that history consists of the actions of original parties to the trust who
enjoyed a perspective much sharper than ours concerning the distant events in this
case.
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Second, following M r. Luthy’s death, the parties’ relationship to each other
and to the trust changed dramatically. The Bank— M r. Luthy’s successor in
interest— did not assert, and was not recognized as having, the unilateral authority
over business dealings regarding the Lease that was exercised by M r. Luthy.
Instead, with regard to multiple transactions, each interest holder in the Lease was
asked to give specific approval. For example, just four months after M r. Luthy’s
death, each interest holder jointly signed a letter offering the Humble O il &
Refining Company mineral interests in Tract 6. If the Bank were meant to
continue as trustee with full authority to deal with the Lease, there would have
been no reason to obtain the signatures of all the interest holders. M oreover,
there would have been no reason to explain in the offer letter that “the leasehold
interest is actually owned one-third by Paul Butt Jr., one-third by Defiance Coal
Company, and one-third by the Estate of Fred Luthy, deceased.” Dist. Ct. M em.
Dec. 7; App. Vol. II, at 442. Indeed, in the opinion of Humble Oil’s attorney,
who enjoyed a vantage point much closer than the one we find ourselves in today,
upon M r. Luthy’s death “his power of control and sale . . . ceased and [was] not
vested in his heirs or devisees.” Dist. Ct. M em. Dec. 7; App. Vol. II, at 449.
Additionally, some nine months after M r. Luthy’s death, M r. Butt independently,
and by separate instrument, conveyed his interest in six tracts to Humble Oil.
Dist. Ct. M em. Dec. 8. If the Trust was still extant at that point, such an action
on M r. Butt’s part would have been unnecessary and improper.
-26-
Equally convincing is the shift in practices that occurred after M r. Luthy’s
death with respect to the R ankin and Turner Farmouts. Before his death, M r.
Luthy was independently dealing, on behalf of all parties, with M ann Rankin
about the assignment of a single tract under the Lease. Id. The dealings with M r.
Rankin continued after M r. Luthy’s death, but the Bank did not step into M r.
Luthy’s shoes. Instead, M r. Rankin explicitly stated that he was assigning an
overriding royalty interest to each of the interest holders in the Lease. Id. at 9. If
the Bank served as trustee for each of these interest holders, in the same capacity
as M r. Luthy served before his death, there would have been no reason to make
this specification. The royalty interest would have just been assigned to the Bank
and, in its capacity as trustee, it would have distributed the royalties to the
beneficiaries as they accrued.
Similarly, before his death, M r. Luthy offered to assign two tracts to
Charles R. Turner. Id. After M r. Luthy’s death, the dealings with M r. Turner
continued but, again, the Bank did not step into M r. Luthy’s role as the sole entity
making offers on behalf of the Lease. Instead, each interest holder reaffirmed the
offer in a joint letter. Id. M oreover, M r. Butt independently discussed
transactions with M r. Turner, id. at 10–11, a scenario that would not have
occurred while M r. Luthy was alive and serving as sole trustee for the Lease.
M ost significantly, when the Bank did act independently in assigning the entire
interest in a tract to M r. Turner (thereby ignoring the other interest holders), it
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felt compelled to have all the interest holders ratify the transaction. Id. If the
Bank enjoyed the powers and rights that M r. Luthy had enjoyed as trustee during
his lifetime, such a ratification would have been unnecessary and inconsistent
with the terms of the trust, and the role of a trustee.
The dealings surrounding the Shell Oil Assignment also confirm that the
parties understood the trust to be at an end after M r. Luthy’s death. Notably, the
Bank refused to take individual action on a requested transfer order because, as
the Bank explained, the oil company had erroneously assumed that the Bank
owned the entire interest. Instead, the Bank cautioned that it was merely an
“equal partner.” Id. at 13; see also App. Vol. II, at 506.
In sum, throughout the post-Luthy period— throughout all of these
dealings— M r. Butt never objected to being treated in his individual capacity as
an owner of the Lease. Indeed, in M ay 1972 he requested that Shell deal with
him individually rather than through the B ank, Dist. Ct. M em. Dec. 14, the very
entity he now contends was serving as his trustee at the time. If M r. Butt believes
the trust survived M r. Luthy’s death, it is a realization that he has come to rather
late in the game.
W e recognize that, aside from the Humble Oil Assignment, the record does
show that the B ank may have assigned more than its own one-third interest in tw o
transactions, the M achris Assignment and the Pauley Petroleum Assignment.
W hile these transactions may be evidence of mistake or overreaching on the part
-28-
of the Bank— a matter we deal with below— they do not prove that the Bank was
serving as trustee for the Lease. The existence of a few ultra vires transactions
by the Bank after M r. Luthy’s death does not cut against our reading of the trust
instrument as conveying powers personal to M r. Luthy that ceased upon his death.
W e also recognize that, at trial, M r. Butt testified that, for each of the post-
Luthy transactions to which he gave his individual approval, “[e]verything went
through the bank. . . . The bank would hammer out all the details, w ould
negotiate the terms, and I would simply go along with it. . . . [T]he bank would
initiate all the paperwork, do all the . . . negotiations and then just give it to me to
sign.” App. Vol. III, at 670. This does not prove that the Bank served as a
trustee. It proves only that Butt understood that his interests and those of the
Bank’s beneficiaries were aligned and that he chose to defer to the Bank’s
professional expertise. An individual who exercises his property rights by
signing legal instruments cannot impose fiduciary duties on another by trusting it
and choosing to “go along w ith” its actions.
B. Should the D istrict Court H ave Im posed a Constructive Trust?
M r. Butt maintains that even if the Bank does not serve as trustee of an
express trust, it may yet hold profits from the Lease that belong to him. He notes
that the district court acknowledged this possibility but declined to make
determinative findings given its ultimate disposition of the case. M r. Butt seeks a
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remand for an accounting and the imposition of a constructive trust over any
monies that are found rightfully to belong to him.
Although somewhat inartfully drawn, M r. Butt’s filings before the district
court are sufficient to preserve this issue. The overriding theory of M r. Butt’s
complaint is that the Bank acted with respect to the Lease in a way hostile to his
interests and thereby procured profits that rightfully belong to him. M oreover, in
his pre-trial filing before the district court, M r. Butt specifically noted that the
Bank may have acted adversely to his interest w ith regard to the Turner Farmout,
the M achris Assignment, and the Pauley Petroleum Assignment. See App. Vol. I,
at 78–79, 81. He repeated this assertion at trial as well. See App. Vol. III, at
878.
Under New M exico law, “[a] constructive trust . . . is imposed to prevent
the unjust enrichment that would result if the person having the property were
permitted to retain it. The circumstances w here a court might impose such a trust
are varied. They may involve fraud, constructive fraud, duress, undue influence,
breach of a fiduciary duty, or similar wrongful conduct.” Aragon, 812 P.2d at
1304. Because M r. Luthy’s name is the only one that appears on the Lease, the
Bank, as his testamentary trustee, was in a position to act on behalf of the entire
Lease without the consent of the other owners. Such conduct would, of course, be
wrongful and warrant the imposition of a constructive trust on any resulting
profits that were not shared with the other beneficial owners.
-30-
The district court found that the B ank may have acted adversely to M r.
Butt’s rights w ith respect to three transactions: the Turner Farmout, the M achris
Assignment, and the Pauley Petroleum A ssignment. W ith respect to the Turner
Farmout, the district court found that “the Ratification and Amendment to
Agreement cured any problem with the original farmout agreement entered into
by [the Bank].” Dist. Ct. M em. Dec. 11. W e agree with that assessment. Thus,
we are left with the Bank’s potentially wrongful actions surrounding the Pauley
Petroleum and M achris A ssignments. And it is with regard to those two
assignments that we reverse the district court and require a limited remand.
On remand, the district court should address whether M r. Butt has a valid
claim for an accounting with regard to these transactions, including whether any
such claim is time barred. If his claim is valid, and if the accounting reveals
wrongly withheld profits, then imposition of a constructive trust may be
warranted. The remand is limited to these two transactions because, having had
the benefit of full discovery and a bench trial in this case, M r. Butt has failed to
bring to the attention of the district court or this Court any other potentially
problematic transactions. 14
14
The trial court noted that M r. Butt had ample opportunity for discovery in
this case, and M r. Butt’s counsel conceded as much at trial. See App. Vol. III, at
877 (“[U]nder Rule 26 scope of discovery, you had the ability to inspect [Bank
documents] if you wished. And if you were denied access to it, certainly Judge
Garcia would have ordered it. And if he hadn’t, I would have, had the matter
been brought to me.”).
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III. C ON CLU SIO N
Consistent with these conclusions, we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in
part. The case is remanded to the district court to proceed in accordance with the
specific instructions above.
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