F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
March 1, 2007
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 05-4260
v.
C HRISTO PH ER JA M ESO N ,
Defendant - Appellant.
A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T HE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(D.C. No. 2:04-CR-693-TS)
Trina A. Higgins, Assistant United States Attorney (and Brett L. Tolman, United
States Attorney, on the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff - Appellee.
Kent R. Hart (and Steven B. Killpack, Federal Defender, Utah Federal Public
Defender’s Office, on the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for D efendant - Appellant.
Before KELLY, A LA R C ÓN , * and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
*
The Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón, Senior Circuit Judge, United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Defendant-Appellant Christopher Jameson appeals from his conviction,
after a jury trial, for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He was sentenced to forty-one months of imprisonment
followed by thirty-six months of supervised release. On appeal, M r. Jameson
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence linking him to the firearm, the
adequacy of a jury instruction concerning constructive possession, and the denial
of his motion for mistrial based on the introduction of certain statements linking
him to a bayonet. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Background
In the early morning hours of August 27, 2004, Sergeant Vaughn Allen of
the Salt Lake County Sheriff’s Department was on patrol in Salt Lake County,
Utah. He observed a maroon colored Dodge Stratus pull out of an apartment
complex and turn eastbound onto a main thoroughfare. The officer noticed that
the car’s taillights were not working, and he initiated a traffic stop. The car
pulled into a gas station and stopped in a well-lit area.
W hen the officer turned his spotlight onto the car, he saw that there were
four occupants. He observed a male occupant in the front passenger seat lean
forward and appear to rummage through the glove compartment. He also
observed a male occupant in the rear passenger-side seat drop his shoulder and
lean forward, as if he were retrieving or concealing something on the floor. The
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officer later determined that the m an in the front passenger seat was Terry
Pasw aters and that the man in the rear passenger-side seat was M r. Jameson. M r.
Jameson’s brother, Cody Jameson, occupied the rear driver’s-side seat while
Sarah M aciano, the owner of the car, was the driver.
Sergeant Allen approached the vehicle from the driver’s side and pointed
his flashlight into the car to look for weapons in plain view. He noticed food and
other debris on the floor. Because of M r. Paswaters’ movement toward the glove
box and M r. Jameson’s movement toward the floor, the officer testified that he
was concerned about the occupants hiding drugs or drug paraphernalia, and also
about the possibility (attendant to every stop) that the occupants might be armed.
III R. at 17-18. But, despite shining his flashlight into the car to look for such
items, he initially saw none. Id. at 22.
Sergeant Allen then asked M s. M aciano for her driver’s license,
registration, and insurance card. She responded that her license was suspended.
Sergeant A llen then removed M s. M aciano from the car and issued her a citation.
During this time, the other occupants remained in the car. Deputy Bryan M arshall
soon arrived to assist with the traffic stop. Because M s. M aciano did not have a
valid driver’s license, the officers planned to impound the car unless one of the
other occupants could legally drive. Upon inquiry, however, the officers learned
that none of the other occupants were licensed to drive.
Deputy M arshall then questioned each of the occupants to determine their
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identities. He first questioned M r. Paswaters and Cody Jameson. After
conveying the names of both men to dispatch, Deputy M arshall learned that each
had outstanding warrants for his arrest. Accordingly, Deputy M arshall placed
both M r. Pasw aters and Cody Jameson under arrest.
Deputy M arshall then questioned M r. Jameson, who indicated that his name
was “Adam Gibbons,” and provided a birth date. W hen Deputy M arshall tried to
verify this information with dispatch, he learned that the physical description of
“A dam Gibbons” w as inconsistent with M r. Jameson’s physical appearance. M r.
Jameson then indicated that his real name w as “Christopher Gibbons,” but, again,
the physical description for “Christopher G ibbons” w as inconsistent with M r.
Jameson’s physical appearance. Deputy M arshall then placed M r. Jameson under
arrest.
Sergeant Allen then conducted a search of the car to inventory its contents.
During the search, he discovered a World W ar II-era bayonet sitting on the back
seat. As he reached for the bayonet, he noticed a small, unloaded .22 caliber
pistol and a key chain on the floor in front of where M r. Jameson had been sitting.
Sergeant Allen testified that the pistol lay exactly where M r. Jameson’s feet
would have been before he exited the car. A subsequent examination of the pistol
failed to recover any fingerprints, nor were investigators able to determine who
owned or used the pistol.
Prior to trial, the government served notice of its intent to introduce Fed. R.
4
Evid. 404(b) evidence implicating M r. Jameson in a car theft that occurred on the
evening prior to his arrest. The government alleged that the key chain found next
to the pistol belonged to a car that M r. Jameson had stolen. The government also
alleged that the bayonet belonged to the owner of the stolen car and that a
backpack, also found in the back of the Dodge Stratus, contained an owner’s
manual from the stolen car. M r. Jameson filed a motion in limine seeking to
exclude the government’s Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence of the car theft. The
district court ruled the evidence was inadmissible based on its slight probative
value and strong danger of unfair prejudice.
At trial, Sergeant Allen testified to the pertinent facts. W hen asked on
cross-examination how he found the gun, Sergeant Allen responded that he saw
the gun as he reached inside the car to retrieve the bayonet. Defense counsel did
not object to this testimony. Later in the trial, when Deputy M arshall was asked
on cross-examination who removed M r. Jameson from the car, he responded that
Sergeant Allen had, and that after he removed M r. Jameson, he determined he was
“sitting on a bayonet.” IV R. Doc. at 71. Defense counsel objected and requested
that Deputy M arshall’s testimony be stricken. The district court sustained the
objection.
Defense counsel next requested a mistrial based on both Sergeant Allen and
Deputy M arshall’s references to the bayonet. The district court responded that it
never understood the motion in limine as addressing evidence concerning the
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mere existence of the stolen items in the Dodge Stratus, but rather only evidence
tying M r. Jameson to the car theft. Furthermore, the district court held that
defense counsel had invited the references to the bayonet and that, regardless, the
references were inconsequential.
At the jury instruction conference, the government urged an instruction on
constructive possession in joint occupancy cases that equated constructive
possession with knowledge and access to the firearm. Defense counsel objected,
and sought language from a proposed pattern instruction defining actual and
constructive possession. The district court ultimately adopted the government’s
proposed instruction. The instruction provided in pertinent part:
The law recognizes two types of possession: actual possession and
constructive possession. A person who knowingly has direct
physical control over an object or thing, at a given time, is then in
actual possession of it.
A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both
the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and
control over an object, either directly or through another person or
persons, is then in constructive possession of it.
M ore than one person can be in possession of an object if each knows
of its presence and has the power and intention to control it.
A defendant has joint possession of an object when two or more
persons share actual or constructive possession of it. However,
merely being present with others who have possession of the object
does not constitute possession.
W here a defendant jointly occupies the place where the object is
found (such as a room or a car) constructive possession may be
shown by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence, which
6
establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had
knowledge that the firearm was contained in the place and the
defendant had the ability to access the firearm.
I R. Doc. 55 at 23 (Instruction 19).
Discussion
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury’s verdict is a legal issue that
we review de novo. United States v. Lewis, 240 F.3d 866, 870 (10th Cir. 2001).
W e ask “whether taking the evidence–both direct and circumstantial, together
with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom–in the light most favorable
to the government, a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” U nited States v. Hanzlicek, 187 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir.
1999). Nevertheless, we will not “uphold a conviction obtained by piling
inference upon inference.” U nited States v. Anderson, 189 F.3d 1201, 1205 (10th
Cir. 1999). Instead, there must be some substantial evidence supporting a
conviction that does more than raise a mere suspicion of guilt. Id.
To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government had to
prove: (1) that M r. Jameson had previously been convicted of a felony, (2) that he
thereafter knowingly possessed a firearm, and (3) that such possession was in or
affected interstate commerce. United States v. M ichel, 446 F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th
Cir. 2006). On appeal, M r. Jameson challenges only the sufficiency of the
7
evidence with respect to his knowing possession.
As we have repeatedly held, possession can be actual or constructive. Id.
Actual possession exists when a person has direct physical control over a firearm
at a given time. See United States v. M unoz, 150 F.3d 401, 416 (5th Cir. 1998);
see also United States v. Bowen, 437 F.3d 1009, 1017 (10th Cir. 2006).
Constructive possession exists when a person “knowingly holds the power and
ability to exercise dominion and control over [a firearm].” United States v.
Lopez, 372 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2004). W hen a defendant has exclusive
possession of the premises on which a firearm is found, knowledge, dominion,
and control can be properly inferred because of the exclusive possession alone.
United States v. Avery, 295 F.3d 1158, 1177 (10th Cir. 2002). However, when
“two or more people occupy a given space . . . the government is required to meet
a higher burden in proving constructive possession.” M ichel, 446 F.3d at 1128.
In other words, in joint occupancy cases, knowledge, dominion, and control may
not be inferred simply by the defendant’s proximity to a firearm. Instead, the
government must “present evidence to show some connection or nexus between
the defendant and the firearm.” Id.
To be clear, when the government seeks to convict a defendant under
§ 922(g)(1), and the firearm was found in an area occupied by two or more
persons, it must prove either (1) actual possession, or (2) constructive possession
by w ay of demonstrating a nexus between the defendant and the firearm. Of
8
course, what constitutes a sufficient nexus is the next issue. In this regard, our
precedent is, admittedly, cryptic.
W e have held that “knowledge and access are required to prove that [a]
defendant knowingly held the power to exercise dominion and control over [a]
firearm.” United States v. Colonna, 360 F.3d 1169, 1179 (10th Cir. 2004). Stated
another way, “where the defendant in a joint occupancy situation has knowledge
of and access to the weapons, there is a sufficient nexus to infer dominion and
control.” Id. Thus, if there is sufficient evidence to infer that a defendant had
knowledge of and access to a firearm, there is also sufficient evidence to infer
that he had dominion and control over the firearm, and, consequently, that he
constructively possessed the firearm. Proximity alone, however, is insufficient to
establish knowledge and access to (and dominion and control over) a firearm in a
joint occupancy case. See United States v. Hishaw, 235 F.3d 565, 572 (10th Cir.
2000) (citing United States v. Reece, 86 F.3d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 1996)). But
when combined with other evidence in the case linking the defendant to the
firearm, proximity is material and probative evidence that may be considered in
deciding whether a defendant had knowledge of and access to (and dominion and
control over) the contraband. See United States v. Ortiz-Ortiz, 57 F.3d 892, 895
(10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Espinosa, 771 F.2d 1382, 1397 (10th Cir.
1985).
Thus, the rule is as follow s: (1) proximity alone may not establish
9
knowledge and access in a joint occupancy case, (2) neither may proximity alone
support a finding of dominion and control in a joint occupancy case, (3) evidence
of knowledge and access gives rise to a permissive inference of dominion and
control, (4) evidence of knowledge and access may be proved by direct evidence,
or inferred from circumstantial evidence, so long as the circumstantial evidence
includes something other than mere proximity, (5) proximity may be considered
with other evidence in the case to support an inference of knowledge and access,
and dominion and control over the firearm. This is the practical effect of our
requirement that there be a “nexus” between a defendant and a firearm in a
constructive possession, joint-occupancy case.
In this case, the government could have proven the “knowingly possessed”
element of § 922(g)(1) in one of two ways. First, it could have shown that M r.
Jameson actually possessed the pistol–that he had direct, physical control over it.
Alternatively, it could have shown constructive possession–that he had knowledge
of and access to, and thus dominion and control over, the pistol, so long as the
constructive possession was supported by more than M r. Jameson’s mere
proximity to the pistol. Upon review of the evidence, we conclude that there was
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find either actual or constructive
possession.
Sergeant Allen testified that, as he approached the car, he saw M r. Jameson
lean forward, as though he “was trying to retrieve something from or conceal
10
something underneath the seat in front of him.” III. R. at 17. Sergeant Allen also
testified that he didn’t see the pistol initially because it was underneath M r.
Jameson’s foot. Id. at 43. Sergeant Allen eventually found the pistol in the exact
spot where M r. Jameson’s foot had been. Id. at 43-44. He testified that it was
obvious where the pistol was located and that, after M r. Jameson left the vehicle,
the pistol was not concealed by anything. Id. at 23. Although M r. Jameson
argues that the car was not well lit when Sergeant Allen inspected it, and that the
floor was cluttered with garbage such that the pistol was not clearly visible,
Sergeant Allen was adamant in his testimony. W e may not upset the jury’s
credibility determination on appeal. See United States v. Silvers, 84 F.3d 1317,
1328 (10th Cir. 1996).
From this evidence, a reasonable juror could infer that M r. Jameson had
actual physical control of the pistol when the car was pulled over and that he was
trying to hide it underneath the seat or under his foot as Sergeant Allen
approached. Similarly, a reasonable juror could easily have inferred that M r.
Jameson had knowledge of and access to the pistol and consequently, dominion
and control, satisfying all the elements of constructive possession. This is not a
case, as M r. Jameson suggests, where “the Government only showed that [he] was
present inside a car w ith three others where a gun was found.” Aplt. Br. at 17-18.
Instead, this is a case where M r. Jameson’s proximity to the pistol was coupled
with M r. Jameson’s furtive movements, see Bowen, 437 F.3d at 1014-16, his
11
inferred physical contact with the pistol (his foot was on top of it), and the
pistol’s being in plain view and easily retrievable to a passenger in M r. Jameson’s
seat, see United States v. Gorman, 312 F.3d 1159, 1164 (10th Cir. 2002).
Sergeant Allen’s testimony that the parking lot was clearly lit adds credibility to
his other testimony and thus strengthens the inferences a reasonable juror could
draw from it. These facts allow for a reasonable inference of actual possession or
constructive possession, and they certainly demonstrate a nexus between M r.
Jameson and the pistol. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to show that
M r. Jameson knowingly possessed the pistol.
II. The Jury Instruction Regarding Constructive Possession
M r. Jameson argues that the district court “erred when [it] refused to
instruct the jury that[,] in joint possession cases[,] some nexus or connection must
link [] M r. Jameson to the gun to convict him.” Aplt. Br. at 22. It goes without
saying that district courts have a duty to instruct the jury correctly on the law.
United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1377 (10th Cir. 1997). W e review
a district court’s denial of an objection to jury instructions de novo. United
States v. Lawrence, 405 F.3d 888, 896-97 (10th Cir. 2005). In conducting our
review, we consider the jury instructions as a whole “to determine whether the
jury may have been misled, upholding the judgment in [the] absence of
substantial doubt that the jury was fairly guided.” United States v. M agleby, 241
F.3d 1306, 1309-10 (10th Cir. 2001).
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M r. Jameson complains that the district court did not offer an explicit
instruction on the nexus requirement. He argues that, based on the instruction
given, the jury might have impermissibly used M r. Jameson’s proximity to the
pistol, and nothing more, to establish knowledge and access.
Initially, we note that the instruction given in this case differs on this point
from the instruction on constructive possession requested by M r. Jameson, which
states in pertinent part:
In the situation where the object is found in a place (such as a room
or car) occupied by more than one person, you may not infer control
over the object based solely on joint occupancy. M ere control over
the place in w hich the object is found is not sufficient to establish
constructive possession. Instead, in this situation, the government
must prove some connection between the particular defendant and the
object.
I R. Doc. 41 at 2 (Instruction 1); see also Tenth Circuit Criminal Pattern
Instruction 1.31.
On this point, the instruction offered by M r. Jameson was preferable to that
used by the district court because it expressly stated that mere control over the
area near the firearm (in other words, proximity) is insufficient, by itself, to
establish constructive possession. 1 The instruction used by the district court
1
W e do not mean to suggest that the pattern instruction offered by M r.
Jameson will be preferable or appropriate in every conceivable case. Nor should
courts necessarily craft an instruction relying on language taken from appellate
cases. Instead, the particular form of words required for any particular instruction
in any particular case may vary depending on the particular facts, but, in every
(continued...)
13
invites the argument that proximity might be used as the only circumstantial
evidence proving knowledge and access. An instruction on constructive
possession should eliminate that possibility by instructing on the nexus
requirement.
Nevertheless, the instruction given by the district court stated: “However,
merely being present with others who have possession of the object does not
constitute possession.” I R. Doc. 55 at 23 (Instruction 19). It further stated: “In
addition, momentary or transitory control of an object, without criminal intent, is
not possession. You should not find that the defendant possessed the object if he
possessed it only momentarily, and either did not know that he possessed it or
lacked criminal intent to possess it.” 2 Id. at 23-24. These additional statements
adequately informed the jury that mere proximity is not sufficient to establish
constructive possession.
M oreover, in U nited States v. Ledford, 443 F.3d 702 (10th Cir. 2005), w e
approved the use of a very similar instruction to that used by the district court in
this case. In Ledford, the district court instructed the jury: “To prove constructive
1
(...continued)
case, the instruction as a whole must convey the correct statement of the
applicable law. See W ebb v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 155 F.3d 1230, 1248 (10th
Cir. 1998).
2
As stated in Colonna, 360 F.3d at 1179, intent to possess is not required
by § 922(g). “It is not necessary to show that the defendant intended to exercise
that dominion or control . . . .” Id.
14
possession the government must prove that the defendant had knowledge of and
access to the firearm.” Id. at 714. W e held that a specific nexus instruction was
unnecessary where the evidence clearly showed that the defendant had knowledge
of and access to a firearm. Id. at 717. W e cautioned, however, that there could
be a future case where “the specific facts require a harder look at the nexus
requirement.” Id.
This is not that case. Here, a significant quantum of evidence, aside from
his presence in the vehicle and proximity to the pistol, showed that M r. Jameson
had actual and/or constructive possession. That evidence includes his furtive
movements, the inference that his foot was in physical contact with the pistol
(covering it up), and the fact that the pistol was in plain view and easily
accessible to him. Based on our conclusion in Ledford, the district court’s
additional instructions indicating that proximity is not sufficient to infer
constructive possession, and the significant evidence of actual and constructive
possession aside from proximity, we conclude that the jury instruction on
constructive possession was adequate.
III. The M otion for a M istrial
M r. Jameson argues that the testimony concerning the existence of the
bayonet was so damaging that it required the district court to grant a mistrial. W e
review a district court’s decision not to grant a mistrial for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Kravchuk, 335 F.3d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 2003). W e also
15
review a district court’s decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion.
United States v. DeLuna, 10 F.3d 1529, 1531 (10th Cir. 1993).
M r. Jameson devotes a significant portion of his brief to arguing that the
statements concerning the bayonet were not relevant (Fed. R. Evid. 401), unduly
prejudicial (Fed. R. Evid. 403), and inadmissible as evidence of prior bad acts
(Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)). By making these arguments, M r. Jameson essentially asks
us to conduct two inquiries: (1) whether the district court abused its discretion by
admitting the statements, and (2) whether the statements should have resulted in a
mistrial. However, defense counsel failed to offer a contemporaneous objection
to Sergeant Allen’s statement, and M r. Jameson does not argue plain error on
appeal, so we need not review the district court’s decision to admit that statem ent.
Similarly, the district court sustained defense counsel’s objection to Deputy
M arshall’s statement and ordered the statement stricken from the record. So we
are only left with determining whether the two statements satisfy the substantive
standard for a mistrial, and we need not engage in an analysis of whether the
statements were inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
To establish his entitlement to a mistrial, M r. Jameson must show that the
two statements concerning the bayonet impaired his fundamental right to a fair
and impartial trial. United States v. Caballero, 277 F.3d 1235, 1242 (10th Cir.
2002). M r. Jameson’s chief argument in this respect is that the references to the
bayonet impugned his character. He argues the statements “prejudiced the jury
16
into believing that [he] had a propensity to possess weapons or to commit
violence.” Aplt. Br. at 42. In support of his argument, M r. Jameson cites a case
from the D.C. Circuit in which the court held that admitting testimony of the
presence of a knife in a felon in possession case was in error under Fed. R. Evid.
404(b). See U nited States v. King, 254 F.3d 1098, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 3
Again, however, we are not concerned with the district court’s decision to admit
the statements under the rules of evidence. W e are only concerned with the
statements’ effect on M r. Jameson’s right to a fair trial.
M r. Jameson also argues that the statements may have misled the jury such
that it “may have been confused about whether M r. Jameson should be convicted
for possessing the bayonet.” A plt. Br. at 42. W e struggle to see how the jury
could have drawn such an inference based on the two momentary and passing
references to a bayonet, especially when the prosecutor failed to otherwise
mention the bayonet in her opening or closing argument. The fact that the
references to the bayonet were in passing, and merely reflected on its presence in
the back seat of the car, demonstrate that the statements did not in any way
implicate M r. Jameson in the earlier car theft, or any other crime for that matter.
Furthermore, the references to the bayonet were simply part of Sergeant Allen and
3
M r. Jameson fails to mention that the court in King refused to reverse the
defendant’s conviction because it determined that admitting the statements
regarding the knife was harmless error. Id. at 1101.
17
Deputy M arshall’s narrative of how they discovered the pistol. It is also
notew orthy that the statements were prompted by defense counsel’s own
questions on cross-examination, not by the prosecutor’s questions on direct
examination.
W e find useful the analysis in United States v. Short, 947 F.2d 1445 (10th
Cir. 1991). In that case, the prosecutor wrongly elicited testimony about the
defendant’s prior convictions. Id. at 1453. W e found the error did not
substantially influence the outcome of the trial because: (1) there was only one
brief reference to the conviction in the entire trial, (2) the government did not put
the statement to other use, (3) defense counsel did not request a limiting
instruction, and (4) there was ample evidence to convict the defendant
notwithstanding the improper testimony. Id. at 1455. W hile defense counsel in
this case did request a mistrial after Deputy M arshall’s statement, and thus sought
to rem edy the supposed damage done to M r. Jameson’s case, the other facts w e
considered dispositive in Short are present here. There were only two brief,
passing references to the bayonet. The prosecutor did not otherwise comment on
the bayonet (indeed the bayonet was only mentioned while defense counsel was
conducting cross-examination). And, finally, as already discussed, there was
sufficient evidence to find that M r. Jameson actually or constructively possessed
the pistol, and that he was guilty of being a felon in possession, regardless of the
statem ents concerning the bayonet. Consequently, we conclude that the two
18
statements did not substantially affect M r. Jameson’s right to a fair trial and that a
mistrial was not warranted.
A FFIR ME D.
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