F IL E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
March 16, 2007
U N IT E D ST A T E S C O U R T O F A PP E A L S
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
T E N T H C IR C U IT
R USSELL E. FR EEM A N ,
Petitioner-A ppellant,
v. No. 06-1394
GARY W ATKINS, Fremont
Correctional Facility W arden,
GLORIA M ASTERSO N, Fremont
Correctional Facility Associate
W arden, M ICHAEL CLARK, Fremont
Correctional Facility Corrections
Officer, Rec, LISA LEHN, Fremont
Correctional Facility Lieutenant,
CHARLES TAPPE, Fremont
Correctional Facility Hearing Officer,
BRIAN BRADEN, Fremont
Correctional Facility Life Safety
C oordinator, C HU CK D O N LEY,
Fremont Correctional Facility Captain,
M ARIA BORK, Fremont Correctional
Facility Corrections Officer, DONNIE
M cCLURE, Fremont Correctional
Facility Corrections O fficer, D ARRYL
DIRECTO, Fremont Correctional
Facility Lieutenant, B ETTY RIGGIN,
Frem ont Correctional Facility
Lieutenant, JOH N C ARRO LL,
Fremont Correctional Facility Case
M anager III, RO BERT LEW IS,
Fremont Correctional Facility Case
M anager, LARRY REID, Colorado
State Penitentiary W arden, CATHIE
SLACK, Colorado State Penitentiary
Associate W arden, JOE ORTIZ,
Colorado Departm ent of Corrections
Executive D irector, LIEU TEN ANT
DEPPE, Frem ont Correctional Facility
Lieutenant, CA THIE HO LST,
Departm ent of Correction Law
Librarian, CH AR LES GIGA NTE,
Fremont Correctional Facility Captain,
ROBERT ALLEN, Fremont
Correctional Facility Associate
W arden, ANGEL M EDINA, Colorado
State Penitentiary Security M ajor, and
A N Y A ND A LL O TH ER JO H N
DOES, severally and jointly in their
official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
A PPE A L FR O M T H E U N IT ED ST A T ES D IST R IC T C O U R T
FO R T H E D IST R IC T O F C O L O R A D O
(D .C . N O . 06-CV -405-Z )
Russell E. Freeman, appearing pro se.
Before T A C H A , Chief Judge, H A R T Z , and T Y M K O V IC H , Circuit Judges. *
T Y M K O V IC H , Circuit Judge.
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this three-
judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of
material assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a);
10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral
argument.
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Russell E. Freeman, a Colorado state prisoner, files this pro se appeal of
the district court’s dism issal of his civil rights case. In his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
complaint, Freeman asserted six violations of his constitutional rights: (1) denial
of due process in connection with three disciplinary convictions, (2) cruel and
unusual punishm ent based on the conditions of his confinement, (3) retaliation by
the defendants, (4) unequal treatm ent based on his ethnic origin, (5) deprivation
of personal property, and (6) denial of access to courts.
A m agistrate judge ordered Freeman to file an am ended com plaint alleging
specific facts (1) supporting the claim s he is asserting, (2) demonstrating how
each defendant personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations, and
(3) clarifying how he has exhausted the adm inistrative rem edies for each claim .
Although Freem an’s am ended com plaint sufficiently com plied with the m agistrate
judge’s first two requirements, he failed to demonstrate that he exhausted
administrative remedies for all of his claim s. The district court found that
Freeman properly exhausted remedies on his first claim — the validity of
disciplinary convictions, but failed to do so on his rem aining five claim s.
Because Freeman failed to comply with our “total exhaustion” requirement for
prisoner § 1983 claim s, the district court then dism issed the complaint and the
entire action without prejudice.
Freeman appeals the district court’s determ ination. As he proceeds pro se,
we construe his pleadings liberally. Cummings v. Evans, 161 F.3d 610, 613 (10th
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Cir. 1998). In this appeal, Freeman argues that the district court erred in (1)
applying the total exhaustion requirement to his § 1983 action; (2) raising the
exhaustion requirement sua sponte, holding that it is not an affirm ative defense,
and placing the burden of establishing it on Freeman; (3) divesting itself of
subject m atter jurisdiction based on the failure to exhaust; (4) finding that
Freeman did not exhaust his available remedies; and (5) denying his m otion for
leave in form a pauperis (IFP).
Under the prior precedent of this circuit, Freeman’s claim s would have
been unavailing. In Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1190 (10th Cir.
2004), we construed the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to append a “total
exhaustion” requirement to § 1983 actions. Section 1997e(a) of Title 42 provides
that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42
U.S.C. § 1983] . . . until such adm inistrative rem edies as are available are
exhausted.” W e interpreted this to require a prisoner to exhaust rem edies on all
his claim s or face dism issal. Thus, if a prisoner subm its a complaint containing
one or m ore unexhausted claim s, the district court m ust generally dism iss the
entire action without prejudice. Id.
Next, in Steele v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204, 1209 (10th Cir.
2003), we parted com pany with those circuits interpreting § 1997e(a)’s
exhaustion requirem ent as an affirm ative defense. See, e.g., W yatt v. Terhune,
315 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003). Rather, we concluded that § 1997e(a)
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charged prisoners with the burden of pleading exhaustion and a com plaint “that
fails to allege the requisite exhaustion of rem edies is tantam ount to one that fails
to state a claim upon which relief m ay be granted.” Steele, 355 F.3d at 1210.
Consequently, prisoners m ust “either attach copies of administrative proceedings
or describe their disposition with specificity.” Id. at 1211. Failure to so plead or
demonstrate exhaustion would foreclose litigation of the claim s. The purpose of
these two practices w as to reduce the burden of prisoner litigation on the courts
and was consistent with the PLRA’s m andate to judicially screen frivolous
prisoner suits.
Nevertheless, during the pendency of Freem an’s appeal, the Suprem e Court
handed down a decision which effectively overruled both Ross and Steele. In
Jones v. Bock, W arden, 127 S. Ct. 910 (2007), the Court resolved the circuit splits
surrounding these two issues and (1) found “that the failure to exhaust is an
affirmative defense under the PLRA, and that inmates are not required to
specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints,” id. at 921, and (2)
specifically abrogated the “total exhaustion” requirement, id. at 923–26.
In concluding that exhaustion is an affirmative defense to be asserted and
pleaded by defendants, the Court noted that under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure practice a complaint requires only a “short and plain statement of the
claim,” Rule 8(a), and exhaustion is usually treated as an affirmative defense,
Rule 8(c). Id. at 919. The Court reasoned that, without specific leave from the
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PLRA, “courts should not depart from the usual practice under the Federal Rules
on the basis of perceived policy concerns.” Id.
The Court also disagreed with our interpretation of § 1997e(a)’s “no action
shall be brought” in Ross. W hile w e construed “no action” to mean a prisoner’s
entire case should be dismissed if it contained any unexhausted claim, the C ourt
found this to be only “boilerplate language.” Id. at 924. Instead, it found that
“statutory references to an ‘action’ have not typically been read to mean that
every claim included in the action must meet the pertinent requirement before the
‘action’ may proceed.” Id. Furthermore, the Court dismissed our policy argument
that total exhaustion furthers the PLRA’s screening purpose. See Ross, 365 F.3d
at 1190. On the contrary, the Court felt the rule could lead prisoners into filing
separate suits with varying claims to avoid the harsh results of the “total
exhaustion” requirement. Jones, 127 S. Ct. at 925–26. Accordingly, the C ourt
mandated, “if a complaint contains both good and bad claims, . . . court[s]
proceed[] with the good and leave[] the bad.” Id. at 924.
Since Jones overrules Steele and Ross, we have no choice but to reverse the
district court’s order dismissing Freeman’s action. See Acquilar-Avellaveda v.
Terrell, No. 06-3334, 2007 W L 646150 at *2 (10th Cir. M ar. 5, 2007) (“Steele is
no longer good law.”). Freeman no longer has the duty of pleading exhaustion,
and therefore it is no longer appropriate for the district court to require an
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affirmative showing of exhaustion at this stage of the case. As Jones makes clear,
exhaustion is an affirmative defense and defendants now have the burden of
asserting the failure to exhaust in their response pleadings.
As we found in Acquilar-Avellaveda, this holding does not wholly foreclose
the district court’s ability to raise sua sponte the exhaustion requirement. If it is
clear on the face of Freeman’s complaint that he had not exhausted his
administrative remedies, then the district court properly may raise the exhaustion
question sua sponte, consistent with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) and 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915 and 1915A, and seek additional information from Freeman. Acquilar-
Avellaveda, 2007 W L 646150 at *2. Nevertheless, we caution that “only in rare
cases w ill a district court be able to conclude from the face of the complaint that a
prisoner has not exhausted his administrative remedies and that he is w ithout a
valid excuse.” Id. Our decision today does not reach whether Freeman’s
complaint is susceptible to a sua sponte order to present information on
exhaustion.
Since we vacate the district court’s findings on the issue of exhaustion in
their entirety, we need not consider Freeman’s other exhaustion-related claims.
Finally, Freeman claims the district court failed to supply the reasons for
denying his IFP motion in violation of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
24(a)(2). Rule 24(a)(2) states, “[i]f the district court denies the motion [to
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proceed in forma pauperis], it must state its reasons in writing.” In its order
denying Freeman’s IFP motion, the district court held that Freeman’s “appeal is
not taken in good faith because Plaintiff has not shown the existence of a
reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues
raised on appeal.” W hile we would ordinarily find such an explanation sufficient
to satisfy Rule 24(a)(2), in this case, we grant Freeman’s renewed IFP motion
because the district court’s conclusion likely rested on our now-superceded
precedent.
Consistent with the reasons set forth above, we VACATE the district
court’s decision and REM AND for further proceedings in accordance with Jones
v. Bock. W e further GRANT Freeman’s renewed IFP motion and remind him that
he is obligated to make partial payments on the filing fee until the entire fee has
been paid.
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