F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PU BL ISH
March 27, 2007
UNITED STATES COURT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
JERA M Y M AR TINEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 06-2069
THEODORE CARR, a public
employee with the New M exico
Department of Public Safety,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New M exico
(D.C. No. CIV-04-01047 M V/RH S)
Jerry A. W alz, W alz and Associates, Cedar Crest, New M exico, for D efendant-
Appellant.
M arcel Krzystek, Killmer & Lane, Denver Colorado, (Joseph P. Kennedy,
Kennedy & Oliver, Albuquerque, New M exico, on the brief)
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before BRISCO E, EBEL, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
G O R SU CH, Circuit Judge.
Jeramy M artinez seeks damages from New M exico State Police Officer
Theodore Carr pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Officer Carr
unreasonably seized him in violation of the Fourth Amendment by issuing him a
criminal citation and threatening jail if he declined to sign the citation. Before
the district court, Officer Carr claimed qualified immunity and moved for
summary judgment. The district court denied summary judgment, and Officer
Carr now appeals to us. W e conclude that the actions of Officer Carr did not
constitute a seizure for purposes of the Fourth A mendment and, therefore, reverse
the district court and remand w ith directions to enter judgment in favor of Officer
Carr.
I
View ing the facts in the light most favorable to M r. M artinez, as we must,
they reveal that on September 15, 2001, M r. M artinez attended the New M exico
State Fair with friends and family. W hile there, M r. M artinez saw various police
officers, not including Officer Carr, walking in his direction and noticed one of
the officers looking at him. M r. M artinez asked an officer if there was a problem
and a verbal exchange ensued. Ultimately, this exchange resulted in the officer
threatening to ban M r. M artinez from the fair as w ell as a physical altercation in
which law enforcement officers “grabbed” and detained M r. M artinez for several
minutes. At some point during this encounter, Officer Carr, on patrol elsew here
at the fair, received a radio message calling him to the scene. W hen Officer Carr
arrived, he noticed several fellow officers surrounding M r. M artinez, including
one who had M r. M artinez’s arm secured in a wrist lock behind his back.
-2-
Shortly after his arrival on the scene, Officer Carr followed M r. M artinez
and the other officers to “Station A,” the central headquarters for law enforcement
at the fairground. Prior to and during this trip, Officer Carr contends that he
never had any physical contact with M r. M artinez (something M r. M artinez does
not dispute). W hen the group arrived at the police station, M r. M artinez was
asked to take a seat, which he did. After a few minutes, Officer Carr issued M r.
M artinez a criminal misdemeanor citation for “resisting, evading or obstructing an
officer,” in violation of N.M . Stat. Ann. § 30-22-1. The factual basis recited in
the citation alleged: “Subject told us what the f*** are the police doing here?
Subject asked to leave – refused and escorted off the premises.” In issuing the
citation, Officer Carr told M r. M artinez “he had two choices: sign the citation or
go to jail.” A nd, indeed, N.M . Stat. Ann. § 31-1-6 provides, in relevant part:
A. A law enforcement officer w ho arrests a person without a
warrant for a petty misdemeanor . . . may offer the person
arrested the option of accepting a citation to appear in lieu of
taking him to jail.
B. . . . The law enforcement officer shall explain the
person’s rights not to sign a citation, the effect of not signing
the citation, the effect of signing the citation and the effect of
failing to appear at the time and place stated on the citation.
* * *
C. The person’s signature on the citation constitutes a
promise to appear at the time and place stated in the citation.
-3-
Although M r. M artinez disputed the factual allegations recited in the citation, he
signed the document and was escorted off the fairground by officers other than
Officer C arr.
On August 10, 2004, M r. M artinez filed a complaint against O fficer Carr in
New M exico state court asserting wrongful arrest and false imprisonment,
malicious use of process, and the violation of his Fourth A mendment right against
being seized unreasonably. The case was later removed to the United States
District Court for the D istrict of New M exico w here the first two counts were
dism issed by a stipulated order, leaving only the Fourth Amendment claim. On
June 27, 2005, Officer Carr moved for summary judgment on several grounds,
including qualified immunity. The district court denied this relief, concluding as
a matter of law that, on the facts alleged, Officer Carr seized M r. M artinez when
he handed M r. M artinez the citation and told him he had the choice to sign the
citation or go to jail. The district court further found this seizure to be unlawful
and ruled that Officer Carr w as not entitled to qualified immunity from suit
because his conduct violated a “clearly established” constitutional right under
existing law. It is this determination that Officer Carr appeals to us.
-4-
II
A district court’s denial of a defendant’s summary judgment motion based
on qualified immunity is an immediately appealable collateral order when, as
here, the matter at issue concerns whether the alleged facts demonstrate a
violation of clearly established law. Gross v. Pirtle, 245 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th
Cir. 2001) (citing M itchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527-28 (1985)). W e review
de novo denials of summary judgment involving qualified immunity but, when a
defendant raises qualified immunity as a defense, the plaintiff must meet a “heavy
two-part burden.” Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534-35 (10th Cir. 1995).
First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant violated one of his
or her constitutional or statutory rights. Second, the plaintiff must show that the
infringed right at issue was clearly established at the time of the allegedly
unlawful activity such that a reasonable law enforcement officer would have
known that his or her challenged conduct w as illegal. See Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 201 (2001). In order for the law to be considered clearly established at
the second step of the Saucier analysis, we have explained that “‘there must be a
Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established
weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the
plaintiff maintains.’” Albright, 51 F.3d at 1535 (quoting M edina v. City and
County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992)). “In short, although w e
will review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the
-5-
record must clearly demonstrate the plaintiff has satisfied his heavy two-part
burden; otherwise, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.” Gross, 245
F.3d at 1156 (internal citation omitted).
In this case, we are able to resolve M r. M artinez’s claim at the first step of
Saucier and thus need not reach the second. It is undisputed that law enforcement
officers seized M r. M artinez, but it is also undisputed that Officer Carr himself
effectuated neither M r. M artinez’s initial detention and the subsequent wrist lock,
nor M r. M artinez’s eventual trip to the police post. Indeed, it appears to us from
the record of this case that M r. M artinez may have intended to sue the officers
responsible for these activities and mistakenly believed Officer Carr’s
participation to have been more substantial than it w as. See App. at 77 (District
Court Order at 4). As it happens, however, we have before us only Officer Carr,
and it is elemental to our system of law that we generally avoid deciding the
potential liability of those who are not parties before us w ith an opportunity to
appear and be heard. See, e.g., In re Special Grand Jury 89-2, 450 F.3d 1159,
1170 (10th Cir. 2006) (“‘[W ]hat makes [for] a proper judicial resolution of a
‘case or controversy’ rather than an advisory opinion[ ]is in the settling of some
dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff.’”
(quoting H ew itt v. H elm s, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987)). W e are therefore
constrained to assess the strengths and weaknesses of M r. M artinez’s unlawful
seizure claim based on Officer Carr’s actions alone.
-6-
But what exactly are those actions? The parties agree that it was not
Officer Carr who confronted M r. M artinez, stopped him, seized his arm, “locked”
his wrist behind his back, and forced him to the police station. During oral
argument, M r. M artinez clarified his view that Officer Carr remains responsible,
and legally liable, for issuing a citation M r. M artinez had to sign (and thereby
promise to appear for trial at a later date) on threat of arrest if he declined to do
so. Thus, this case presents the pure legal question whether the issuance of a
misdemeanor citation requiring appearance at trial in lieu of arrest constitutes a
“seizure” for Fourth A mendment purposes.
In approaching this question, and at the risk of stating the obvious, it seems
of immediate significance to us that Officer Carr gave M r. M artinez the choice of
accepting the citation or being arrested – something very nearly the opposite of a
seizure, which is commonly understood as circumstances w hen “‘a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave.’” Jones v. Hunt, 410
F.3d 1221, 1225-26 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting M ichigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S.
567, 573 (1988)). In fact, it seems that the issuance of the citation resulted in M r.
M artinez being released from the detention to which he previously had been
subjected. After all, the upshot of the officer’s actions was that the defendant was
given the freedom to choose not to be arrested and instead leave without any
-7-
restrictions on his movement prior to trial. 1 To be sure, the citation indicated that
M r. M artinez was subject to arrest if he failed to appear in court at the prescribed
time and date, and such an arrest might well constitute a new and qualitatively
different seizure, see, e.g., DePiero v. City of M acedonia, 180 F.3d 770, 789 (6th
Cir. 1999), but that is not our case and a question we need not face, as nothing of
the sort took place here.
To us, M r. M artinez’s case appears something approaching the inverse of
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998). There, a police officer stopped a motorist,
issued a traffic citation, and then conducted a full search of the car during which
he found a bag of marijuana. The defendant argued that the search was unlawful
while the state contended that the search was something akin to a search incident
to an arrest given the officer’s issuance of a traffic citation pursuant to which, as
here, the recipient promised by his signature to appear in court at a later date in
return for foregoing an immediate trip to jail. 2 The Supreme Court rejected the
1
M r. M artinez’s deposition testimony illustrates this very point – there,
M r. M artinez indicated that he decided to sign the citation not because of any
police pressure but because he was accompanying his girlfriend’s son, who was
on his first trip alone with M r. M artinez, and so he wanted to “get that situation
over w ith as soon as possible.” App. at 20 (D ep. of M artinez at 13).
2
Compare Iowa Code Ann. § 805.1(1) (“[A] a peace officer having
grounds to make an arrest may issue a citation in lieu of making an arrest without
a warrant or, if a warrantless arrest has been made, a citation may be issued in
lieu of continued custody.”), and § 805.3 (“Before the cited person is released,
the person shall sign the citation, . . . [w hich] signature shall also serve as a
written promise to appear in court at the time and place specified.”), with N.M .
(continued...)
-8-
state’s argument that the issuance of a citation transformed a routine traffic stop
into something of a significantly graver magnitude and held that, even after the
issuance of a citation, “[a] routine traffic stop . . . is more analogous to a so-
called ‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest.” Id. at 117 (internal quotations
omitted). See also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 414 (2005) (“There is no
occasion to consider authority incident to arrest, however, for the police did
nothing more than detain Caballes long enough to check his record and write a
ticket.” (internal citation omitted)). By parallel reasoning, the fact that M r.
M artinez could have been arrested does not convert the issuance of a citation into
an arrest and neither does the fact that he had to sign the citation in order to avoid
arrest. As in Knowles, Officer Carr did not qualitatively alter the nature of
M r. M artinez’s preexisting detention simply by issuing a citation, even under
threat of jail if the citation was not accepted. 3
The result M r. M artinez seeks might also create a perverse, albeit
unintended, side-effect. The statute under which Officer Carr proceeded afforded
2
(...continued)
Stat. Ann. §§ 31-1-6(A), (C) (“A law enforcement officer who arrests a person
without a warrant for a petty misdemeanor . . . may offer the person arrested the
option of accepting a citation to appear in lieu of taking him to jail. . . . The
person’s signature on the citation constitutes a promise to appear at the time and
place stated in the citation.”).
3
The specific question Knowles decided, whether and what authority
officers should have to conduct a “search-incident-to-traffic-citation,” remains the
subject of some interest and discussion. See 3 W ayne R. LaFave, Search &
Seizure § 5.2(h), at 125, et seq. (4th ed. 2004) (hereinafter “LaFave”).
-9-
him the choice to effect an immediate arrest or issue a citation. See N.M . Stat.
Ann. § 31-1-6(A) (“A law enforcement officer who arrests a person without a
warrant for a petty misdemeanor . . . may offer the person arrested the option of
accepting a citation to appear in lieu of taking him to jail.”). The Supreme Court
has instructed that, under such statutory rubrics, law enforcement officers are
entitled to substantial discretion in choosing which alternative to pursue. See
generally Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). Holding that both
alternatives constitute “seizures” for Fourth A mendment purposes (and are, thus,
subject to all the review and restrictions that flow from such a conclusion) w ould
surely disincentivize the use of citations, at least to a certain degree, 4 a result
inconsistent with the desire to mitigate intrusiveness on private citizens and
recent efforts to encourage the use of citation in lieu of arrest procedure. 5
4
In a similar vein, Professor LaFave has argued that Atwater may
incentivize arrests given the “odd[ity]” that “the search conducted in Knowles
becomes permissible” if the officer merely uses his or her discretion to opt for an
arrest rather issuing a citation and then performs a search incident to arrest. See
LaFave § 5.1(i) at 91, et seq.
5
See, e.g., ABA Criminal Justice Section Standards §§ 10-1.3, 10-2.1;
LaFave § 5.1(i) at 76 (discussing efforts to encourage the citation/summons
alternative to arrest for minor crimes). The practice of employing citations in lieu
of arrest is a relatively recent innovation aimed at ameliorating the common law
tradition in which the ability to obtain pretrial release after arrest was far from
certain. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Constitutes An “Arrest” W ithin the
M eaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 129 (2003); Donald B.
Verrilli, Jr., Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bail: Historical
Perspectives, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 328 (1982).
-10-
Indeed, if the issuance of a citation to M r. M artinez did somehow constitute
a new or qualitatively different seizure, it would follow that traffic citations,
which function in many states in exactly the same way as the citation issued to
M r. M artinez, would also trigger Fourth Amendment seizure analysis. So might
testimonial subpoenas that compel attendance at trial or deposition on penalty of
potential jail time. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45; Fed. R. Crim. P. 17. The practice of
personal recognizance bonds, allowing individuals the choice to leave jail in
return for a promise to appear in court at a fixed time and date without any further
restrictions on their liberty, would also seem to be subject to Fourth Amendment
scrutiny. W e might even be forced to ask whether the practice of compelling
citizens to appear for jury duty might constitute a “seizure.”
W e find it noteworthy that every court of appeals to address these related
questions has rejected Fourth Amendment claims like M r. M artinez’s. In
DePiero, 180 F.3d at 789, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the issuance of a
traffic ticket requiring the defendant’s appearance at trial does not constitute a
“seizure,” at least until such time as the recipient of the ticket fails to appear in
court and a bench warrant is issued for his or her arrest. The Third Circuit, in
DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 603 (3d Cir. 2005), similarly
held that, with respect to a court order requiring plaintiffs to appear at pretrial
proceedings and trial, “there could be no seizure significant enough to constitute a
Fourth Amendment violation” because the plaintiffs “were only issued a
-11-
summons; they were never arrested; they never posted bail; they were free to
travel; and they did not have to report to Pretrial Services. Their liberty was
restricted only during the M unicipal Court trials and the Fourth Amendment does
not extend beyond the period of pretrial restrictions.”
Likewise, the plaintiff in Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1194
(9th Cir. 2003), was charged with a misdemeanor and, in lieu of jail, was allowed
to sign a personal recognizance agreement pursuant to which she agreed to appear
in court at the times and places ordered by the court and not to leave the state of
California without first obtaining court permission; the Ninth Circuit held that
these requirements were “no more burdensome than the promise to appear a
motorist makes w hen issued a traffic citation” and did not constitute a Fourth
Amendment seizure. Along the same lines, the First Circuit in Britton v.
M aloney, 196 F.3d 24, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1999), reasoned that “Terry cannot be read
to mean that the issuance of a summons (any more than a testimonial subpoena or
a call to jury duty) would constitute a seizure simply because it threatens a citizen
with the possibility of confinement if he fails to appear in court.” See also
Technical Ordnance, Inc. v. United States, 244 F.3d 641, 651 (8th Cir. 2001)
(“This circuit has never held that pretrial restrictions such as [being forced to post
bond, appear before court, and answer charges] constitute a Fourth Amendment
seizure.”); LaFave § 5.1(i) at 77 (the “[r]esort to the citation alternative is not in
-12-
and of itself an arrest or, for that matter, any variety of Fourth Amendment
seizure.”). 6
By contrast, the authority to which we have been directed on the other side
of the ledger does not squarely address the question we face here, but instead
involves governmental conduct imposing qualitatively more significant
deprivations of liberty than the issuance of a misdemeanor citation. M r. M artinez
points us to Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1998). But the
Third Circuit itself later distinguished Gallo in DiBella, discussed above, on the
very ground that Gallo involved an arrest and release conditioned on significant
pretrial restrictions while DiBella involved only (much as here) an order requiring
attendance at future court proceedings. See DiBella, 407 F.3d at 603 (“If Gallo
was a ‘close question;’ here [where plaintiffs were only issued a summons
compelling attendance at court proceedings] there could be no seizure significant
enough to constitute a Fourth A mendment violation . . . .”). M r. M artinez also
stresses Rohman v. New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA), 215 F.3d 208 (2d
Cir. 2000), but that case, too, involved an individual who was arrested and held
6
Relying on the First Circuit’s decision in Britton, we have previously, in
an unpublished decision, addressed the question whether the issuance of a
summons, the functional equivalent of Officer Carr’s citation in this case,
constitutes a Fourth A mendment seizure; we concluded that it did not: “Because
[plaintiffs] have not shown they sustained any other deprivations of liberty in
connection with their receipt of the summonses, they have failed to show they
were seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Lewis v. Rock, 48 Fed.
Appx. 291, 294 (10th Cir. Oct. 3, 2002) (unpub.).
-13-
overnight before being released. Finally, M r. M artinez cites to M urphy v. Lynn,
118 F.3d 938, 946 (2d Cir. 1997), a case in which the plaintiff was incarcerated
overnight and denied the right to travel outside the state without prior permission
from the court. 7 See also Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856, 860-61 (5th Cir. 1999) (the
plaintiff was fingerprinted and photographed and likewise forbidden from leaving
the state without leave of court), overruled on other grounds by Castellano v.
Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939 (5th Cir. 2003). Such circumstances again present
significant additional restrictions on a defendant’s liberty not present in our case
and we thus see no necessary inconsistency between, on the one hand, our holding
(and those of so many of our sister circuits) that the mere issuance of a citation
requiring presence at future legal proceedings does not qualify as a constitutional
“seizure” and, on the other hand, the results and reasoning in the cases cited to us
by M r. M artinez.
***
W e conclude that the issuance of a citation, even under threat of jail if not
accepted, does not rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment seizure; accordingly,
the judgment of the district court must be reversed and judgment in favor of
Officer C arr is required. So ordered.
7
The Second Circuit has emphasized that the question whether a mere
pre-arraignment summons, without a contemporaneous deprivation of liberty,
constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure is not controlled by its prior precedents
like M urphy. Dorman v. Castro, 347 F.3d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 2003).
-14-