Mink v. Dominguez

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
April 16, 2007
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT

TH O MA S M IN K ; TH E H O WLING
PIG, an unincorporated association,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. No. 04-1496

JOHN W . SU THERS, in his official
capacity as Attorney General of the
State of Colorado, KENNETH R.
BUCK, District Attorney for
Colorado’s 19th Judicial District;
SUSAN KNOX, a Chief Deputy
District Attorney working for
Colorado’s 19th Judicial District
Attorney’s Office, in her individual
capacity,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

STUDENT PRESS LAW CENTER;
SILH A CEN TER FO R TH E STUDY
OF M ED IA ETH ICS; W ORLD PRESS
FREEDO M CO M M ITTEE;
ASSOCIATED PRESS;
B LO O M BER G N EWS; C OLO RADO
PRESS ASSOC IATION ; DO W JON ES
& C O MPA N Y , IN C.; M ED IA LAW
R ESO U RC E C EN TER ; TH E
R EPO RTER S C OM M ITTEE FOR
FREED OM OF TH E PRESS;
COLORADO DISTRICT
ATTO RN EYS’ CO UN CIL,
 Amicus Curiae.

A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T HE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. NO . 04-B-23 (CBS))

A. Bruce Jones, Holland & Hart LLP, Denver, Colorado (M arcy G. Glenn and
Valerie L. Simons, Holland & Hart, Denver, Colorado, and M ark Silverstein,
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Colorado, Denver, Colorado, with
him on the briefs) for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

W illiam V . Allen, Assistant Attorney General, Litigation Section, Office of the
Colorado Attorney General, for Defendant-Appellee John W . Suthers, and David
R. Brougham (Gillian Dale with him on the brief), Hall & Evans, L.L.C., Denver
Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee Susan Knox.

S. M ark Goodman and Adam G oldstein, Student Press Law Center, Arlington,
Virginia, and Jane E. Kirtley, Silha Center for the Study of M edia Ethics and
Law, M inneapolis, M innesota, on the brief for Amici Curiae Student Press Law
C enter and Silha C enter for the Study of M edia Ethics and Law.

Kevin M . Goldberg, Cohn and M arks LLP, W ashington, District of Columbia, on
the brief for Amicus Curiae World Press Freedom Committee.

Thomas B. Kelley and Steven D. Zansberg, Faegre & Benson LLP, Denver,
Colorado, on the brief for Amici Curiae A ssociated Press, Bloomberg N ews,
Colorado Press Association, Dow Jones & Company, Inc., M edia Law Resource
Center, and The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.

M iles M adorin, Staff Attorney, Colorado District Attorneys’ Council, Denver,
Colorado, on the brief for Amicus Curiae Colorado District Attorneys’ C ouncil.

Before O’BRIEN, EBEL, and TYM KOVICH, Circuit Judges.

T YM K O VIC H, Circuit Judge.

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 I. Introduction

Colorado law makes it “criminal libel” to knowingly publish any statement

tending to “impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation or expose the

natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby to expose him to public hatred,

contempt, or ridicule.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-13-105. W hile a student at the

University of Northern Colorado (UNC), Thomas M ink created and published an

internet-based journal called The Howling Pig. Several issues of the journal

included M ink’s pseudonymous column by “Junius Puke,” which parodied the

views of a real UNC professor named Junius Peake, and whose on-line

photograph bore a strong resemblance to the real professor.

Professor Peake complained to the Greeley Police Department who

commenced an investigation of M ink for potential violations of Colorado’s

criminal libel statute. The police, in conjunction with the local district attorney’s

office, sought and obtained a search warrant, which they executed at M ink’s

residence, seizing his personal computer and other w ritten materials.

M ink sued for prospective relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and

for violations of the Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa. The district

court entered a temporary restraining order against the district attorney’s office,

but dismissed the case in its entirety after the office disavowed an intent to

prosecute M ink. The district court concluded that: (1) M ink’s request for

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declaratory judgment failed for lack of standing, (2) the statutory privacy claim

failed to state a claim for relief, and (3) the damages claim against the assistant

district attorney arising from the search was barred by absolute prosecutorial

immunity.

Having jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm both the

dismissal of M ink’s facial challenge to the Colorado criminal libel statute because

he lacks standing and his claim is moot, and the dismissal of his statutory

damages claim for failure to state a claim. But we reverse the district court’s

dismissal of the damages claim arising from the search because we conclude it is

not barred by absolute immunity. Accordingly, we remand to the district court

for further proceedings on the question of qualified immunity.

II. Background

Thomas M ink began releasing issues of The Howling Pig, a student-run,

internet-based journal, during his fall 2003 semester as a student at the University

of Northern Colorado. The journal, which was created, maintained, and published

from the home computer M ink shared with his mother, addressed current events

involving the local UNC community. Among other things, it featured a regular

column from the editor, a fictional character named “Junius Puke.” The column

displayed obviously doctored photographs of an actual UNC professor, Junius

Peak, wearing dark sunglasses and a Hitler-like mustache. The purpose of the

column, according to M ink, was to “spoof[] and parod[y] Professor Peake by

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addressing subjects on which the real professor would be unlikely to write, or

through the assertion of views diametrically opposed to those of Professor

Peake.” Aplt. A pp. at 80–81.

After learning of the parody, Professor Peake contacted the local district

attorney and sw ore out a complaint, alleging he was a victim of criminal libel.

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-13-105. In response to the complaint, a Greeley Police

Department detective opened an investigation. The detective reviewed copies of

The Howling Pig and concluded that its editor was M ink. Based on this

information, the detective prepared a search warrant affidavit according to

procedures required by Colorado law. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-3-301; Colo. R.

Crim. Proc. 41(b), (c). These procedures allow a detective to submit an affidavit

to the office of the district attorney for legal review. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 20-1-

106.1. Consequently, a deputy district attorney, appellee Susan Knox, reviewed

and approved the search warrant affidavit, which was then presented to and

approved by a magistrate judge.

W ith the search warrant in hand, Greeley police searched the home w here

M ink lived with his mother on December 12, 2003. The police confiscated

M ink’s personal computer and additional written materials referencing The

Howling Pig. According to M ink, during the search one of the detectives told

him he was in “big trouble” and led him to believe a criminal complaint had been

filed. M ink also claims that a detective warned him that resuming publication of

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The Howling Pig would only “make things worse for [him].” Aplt. App. at

82–83.

Following the search, M ink obtained counsel who contacted the Greeley

police on December 23, 2003. According to M ink’s counsel, the investigating

officer disclosed his plans to recommend that criminal libel charges be filed

against M ink. That same day, M ink’s counsel informed a lawyer in the district

attorney’s office that he believed the criminal libel law could not be applied

constitutionally against M ink for statements made in The Howling Pig. On

December 30, 2003, M ink’s counsel faxed a letter to the district attorney

demanding the immediate return of materials seized from M ink’s home and

explaining M ink’s position that prosecuting him under the criminal libel statute

would be unconstitutional. The letter requested a reply by January 2, 2004, but

the district attorney apparently never responded.

On January 8, 2004, M ink filed suit in federal district court seeking

prospective declaratory relief that the Colorado criminal libel statute was

unconstitutional under the First Amendment and also requesting damages for the

search and seizure conducted pursuant to the statute. W ith respect to the first

claim, the complaint alleged M ink faced “an imminent threat of being charged

with a violation of Colorado’s Criminal Libel Statute,” Aplt. App. at 10, and that

the “criminal investigation, the threatened prosecution, and the search and seizure

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have chilled M r. M ink from exercising his right to freedom of expression and his

right to freedom of speech.” Aplt. A pp. at 15.

M ink also requested a temporary restraining order. On January 9, 2004, the

district court ordered:

that the District Attorney for the 19th Judicial D istrict shall not initiate
the prosecution of Thomas M ink under Colorado’s Criminal Libel
Statute, C.R.S. § 18-13-105, and the City of Greeley shall, forthwith,
return to the Plaintiffs the computer, and all contents thereof, seized
following the search of Plaintiffs’ home in Ault, Colorado.

Dist. Ct. O rder, Jan. 9, 2004, at 1.

The district court subsequently held a status conference during which it

learned the district attorney would not be filing charges against M ink. In

addition, the district attorney issued a written “No File” decision, concluding the

statements contained in The Howling Pig could not be prosecuted under the

statute. Thereafter, pursuant to an agreement of the parties, the court issued an

order vacating its temporary restraining order.

M ink filed an amended complaint on February 19, 2004 on behalf of

himself and The Howling Pig. The amended complaint repeated his allegations

that the Colorado criminal libel statute was unconstitutional, and also named the

Colorado Attorney General and the local district attorney as defendants in their

official capacities for purposes of seeking prospective relief. M ink also realleged

violations of his statutory and constitutional rights based on the search of his

residence. He further claimed he had published two new issues of The Howling

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Pig since the filing of the complaint which contained statements that might be

construed as violations of Colorado’s criminal libel statute, and said he planned to

continue publishing such statements in the future. In addition, he named Susan

Knox, the deputy district attorney who reviewed and approved the search warrant

affidavit, in her individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Privacy

Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa. 1

The district attorney answered the amended complaint on April 9, 2004,

admitting most of its allegations. After the defendants filed dispositive motions,

the district court dismissed M ink’s suit in its entirety because (1) he lacked

standing to challenge the constitutionality of the criminal libel statute, (2) he

failed to properly state a statutory claim for relief under the Privacy Protection

Act, and (3) his constitutional claims against the deputy district attorney were

barred by absolute immunity.

III. Discussion

This appeal raises three issues: first, whether w e have jurisdiction to

consider M ink’s facial constitutional challenge to the criminal libel statute in

light of the district attorney’s disavowal of an intent to prosecute; second,

whether M ink’s claim for damages under the federal Privacy Protection Act states

a cause of action against public officials who did not participate in the search of

1
By this time, M ink had dropped his claims against the Greeley police
department and the individual detective named in the original complaint.

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M ink’s residence; and third, whether M ink’s claims for damages against the

attorney who review ed the search warrant are barred by the doctrine of absolute

prosecutorial immunity.

W e accept all well-pleaded facts as true for purposes of resolving an appeal

from a motion to dismiss. 2 Ruiz v. M cDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1181 (10th Cir.

2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 999 (2003). W e view the facts as alleged in the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and we will uphold the

dismissal only if it appears beyond doubt that they can prove no set of facts which

would entitle them to relief. Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d

1082, 1088–89 (10th Cir. 2006).

A. Facial Challenge to Colorado’s Criminal Libel Statute

1. Summary of Constitutional Claims

Before turning to the threshold jurisdictional issues, we provide a brief

summary of M ink’s constitutional argument. This background bears on both the

underlying procedural posture of the case, as well as the claims asserted against

the prosecutor who review ed the affidavit in support of the search warrant.

M ink requests a declaration that the Colorado criminal libel statute is

facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment. His amended complaint

names the Colorado Attorney General and the District A ttorney as defendants.

2
M ink also appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for partial
summary judgment. Because w e affirm the dismissal of his claim for declaratory
relief, we do not reach this issue.

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 Colorado’s criminal libel statute provides:

(1) A person who shall knowingly publish or disseminate, either by
written instrument, sign, pictures, or the like, any statement or object
tending to blacken the m em ory of one who is dead, or to impeach the
honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation or expose the natural defects of
one who is alive, and thereby to expose him to public hatred, contempt,
or ridicule, commits criminal libel.

(2) It shall be an affirmative defense that the publication was true,
except libels tending to blacken the memory of the dead and libels
tending to expose the natural defects of the living.

(3) Criminal libel is a class 6 felony.

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-13-105.

M ink’s primary contention is that the Colorado criminal libel statute is

overbroad because it implicates conduct that is constitutionally protected. In

support of his argument, M ink points to United States Supreme Court case law

requiring a party bringing a libel action to prove (1) fault of the speaker and (2)

falsity of the statement. Specifically, the Supreme Court has held false statem ents

on matters of public concern regarding public figures are protected unless they

are made with “actual malice”— i.e., with knowledge the statements are false or

with reckless disregard as to whether they are false or not. New York Times Co.

v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). False statements on matters of public

concern regarding private figures are protected unless they are made negligently.

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351, 352 (1974). In public concern

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cases, the party bringing the action also bears the burden of proving the falsity of

the statement. Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986).

M ink alleges The Howling Pig was devoted to matters of public concern to

the UNC community, such as lack of faculty diversity and free speech on campus.

Further, he alleges Professor Peake often voiced his views publicly and has

therefore arguably rendered himself a public figure for First Amendment

purposes. M ink does not, however, bring an “as applied” challenge to the statute.

Instead, he argues the statute is unconstitutional on its face because it punishes

libelous statements with no fault requirement and without placing the burden of

proving falsity on the prosecutor.

M ink further contends the Colorado Supreme Court’s subsequent

interpretation of the statute does not cure the constitutional infirmities. The

United States Supreme Court has long respected the ability of state high courts to

narrow overbroad statutes so as to solve constitutional problems. Osborne v.

Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 119 (1990). In 1991, the Colorado Supreme Court narrowed

the potential scope of the criminal libel law in People v. Ryan, 806 P.2d 935

(Colo. 1991):

From the United States Supreme C ourt’s pronouncements concerning
libel we discern a precise category of protected conduct that falls
outside of the legitimate sw eep of section 18-13-105. That category
consists of libelous statements about public officials or public figures
involving matters of public concern. This category of constitutionally
protected conduct gives us a clear line by which to distinguish the
statute’s constitutional and unconstitutional applications. W e therefore

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 hold that section 18-13-105 is invalid only insofar as it reaches
constitutionally protected statem ents about public officials or public
figures on m atters of public concern. Our partial invalidation, however,
affects only the application of subsection (1) of the statute. Truth shall
remain an affirmative defense pursuant to section 18- 13-105(2) . . . and
article II, section 10, of the Colorado Constitution.

Id. at 940–41(footnotes omitted).

According to M ink, Ryan did not limit the statute’s applicability with

regard to statements made about private individuals on matters of public concern,

and thus the law continues to run afoul of the First Amendment. He claims these

statements are still punishable under Colorado law, even when made non-

negligently and even when the party bringing the action has not proven their

falsity. 3

W ith that backdrop, we turn to the procedural posture of M ink’s

constitutional claim in light of the district attorney’s disavowal of an intent to

prosecute him under the statute.

2. Jurisdiction— Standing and M ootness

To pursue a case in federal court, a plaintiff must satisfy the twin

requirements of standing and mootness. Winsness v. Yocom, 433 F.3d 727, 731

(10th Cir. 2006). W ithout a live, concrete controversy, we lack jurisdiction to

3
That the plaintiff must prove falsity flows from Ryan’s constitutional
analysis. M oreover, the Colorado Supreme Court had previously ruled that truth
is a defense under the statute. Gomba v. M cLaughlin, 504 P.2d 337 (Colo. 1972);
see also Diversified M anagement v. Denver Post, 653 P.2d 1103 (Colo. 1982)
(discussing speech protections for matters of public concern).

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consider claims no matter how meritorious. Because we conclude M ink faces “no

credible threat of prosecution” under the criminal libel statute, he lacks standing

to pursue his claims for prospective relief. 4 For the same reasons, we also

conclude his claim is moot. Therefore, we cannot reach the merits of his

constitutional challenge to the statute.

a. Standing. To establish standing, M ink must show (1) he has

suffered an injury in fact, (2) traceable to the defendants, (3) that can be redressed

by a favorable decision of this Court. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 560 (1992); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S.

1, 11 (2004). A plaintiff’s injury must be “actual or imminent, not conjectural or

hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.

In freedom of expression cases, injury in fact can be shown by alleging (1)

“an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a

constitutional interest, but proscribed by statute,” and (2) “a credible threat of

future prosecution.” Ward v. Utah, 321 F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 2003).

“Allegations of possible future injury do not satisfy the injury in fact requirement,

though a plaintiff need not expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be

entitled to challenge a statute that he claims deters the exercise of his

constitutional rights.” Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d at

4
The deputy district attorney has not challenged M ink’s standing to pursue
the statutory and common law damages claims.

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1087–88 (internal quotations omitted). But the “mere presence on the statute

books of an unconstitutional statute, in the absence of enforcement or credible

threat of enforcement, does not entitle anyone to sue, even if they allege an

inhibiting effect on constitutionally protected conduct prohibited by the statute.”

Winsness, 433 F.3d at 732.

To satisfy the injury in fact requirement, the plaintiff must demonstrate that

expressive activities will be inhibited by “an objectively justified fear of real

consequences, which can be satisfied by showing a credible threat of prosecution

or other consequences following from the statute’s enforcement.” Id. W hile

“past wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat

of repeated injury,” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496 (1974), they do not

confer standing to pursue prospective relief without some credible threat of future

injury. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108 (1983). “[A]ssurances from

prosecutors that they do not intend to bring charges are sufficient to defeat

standing, even when the individual plaintiff had actually been charged or directly

threatened with prosecution for the same conduct in the past.” Winsness, 433

F.3d at 731 (quoting D.L.S. v. Utah, 374 F.3d 971, 975 (10th Cir. 2004)).

But standing is determined at the time the action is brought, Friends of the

Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000), and we

generally look to when the complaint was first filed, not to subsequent events.

Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1153 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal

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citations omitted). In this case, however, the standing inquiry is complicated by

the unique timeline of events. M ink’s original and amended complaint both

allege that as of January 8, 2004, M ink “face[d] an imminent threat of being

charged with a violation of Colorado’s Criminal Libel Statute.” Aplt. A pp. at 77.

Before answ ering the complaint, the district attorney’s office concluded it could

not prosecute the case and issued a “No File” decision on January 20, 2004. M ink

filed an amended complaint on February 19, 2004. Although an investigation was

pending at the time the complaint was filed, the threat of prosecution was still

speculative at that time. M oreover, by the time he filed the amended complaint,

even the investigation had entirely dissipated. W e look to the amended complaint

in assessing a plaintiff's claims, including the allegations in support of standing.

And since an amended complaint “supercedes an original complaint and renders

the original complaint without legal effect,” In re Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 209 F.3d

1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 2000); 3 M oore’s Federal Practice, § 15.17[3] (M atthew

Bender 3d ed.), the justiciability of M ink’s constitutional claim is further cast in

doubt.

Given this procedural posture, our cases suggest several outcomes:

(1) In Faustin v. City & County of Denver, 268 F.3d 942 (10th Cir. 2001),

we held the disavowal of an intent to prosecute under a statute prior to the filing

of a complaint defeated standing.

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 (2) In D.L.S. v. Utah, 374 F.3d 971 (10th Cir. 2004), we held the disavowal

of an intent to enforce a criminal sodomy statute against the plaintiff after the

complaint was filed, even if it might be enforced against another class of persons,

was enough to defeat standing. 5

(3) Finally, in Winsness v. Yocom, 433 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2006), we found

lack of standing in two situations where the plaintiff sought prospective relief

from prosecution under a statute: (a) where the plaintiff “received assurances

from the District Attorney that the flag-abuse statute [would] not be enforced

against him” though the assurances came “after [the plaintiff] filed his lawsuit,”

id. at 733; and (b) where the plaintiff was already cited for flag-abuse, but the

prosecutor quickly dropped the charges and disavowed an intent to prosecute

before the plaintiff filed his suit.

Each of these cases concluded the plaintiff lacked standing because he

could not establish a “credible fear of prosecution” under the challenged statute.

M ink’s facts differ only slightly from these precedents. Uniquely, the disavowal

of prosecution in this case came between the time the lawsuit was filed and the

filing of the amended complaint. At the time the original complaint was filed,

moreover, police had conducted a search of M ink’s residence, seized his computer

and papers, and were retaining them pending further investigation. Attempts by

5
The only distinction between D.L.S. and the present case is that the
D.L.S. plaintiff was not exposed to prior threat of prosecution.

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M ink’s counsel to dissuade the district attorney from charging him had yet to bear

fruit. Thus, when he brought the suit M ink appeared to have a legitimate basis

for alleging a credible fear of future prosecution.

N onetheless, w e conclude M ink lacks standing under our case law. First,

based on his review of controlling Supreme Court precedents, the district attorney

disclaimed an intent to prosecute immediately after the law suit was filed. In both

D.L.S. and Winsness, the prosecutor’s quick disavowal of an intent to prosecute

demonstrated a lack of injury in fact. 6 No charges were ever filed against M ink

and the district attorney publicly announced he w ould not prosecute well before

his office filed an answer or motion to dismiss. W here a plaintiff only seeks

prospective relief, standing is defeated when there is evidence the government

will not enforce the challenged statute against the plaintiff. See, e.g., Harmon v.

City of Kansas City, 197 F.3d 321, 327 (8th Cir. 1999) (plaintiffs lost standing to

seek an injunction when city conceded all of their activities w ere constitutionally

protected and were not prohibited by the ordinance).

Second, it is significant M ink filed an amended complaint after the district

attorney disclosed his intent not to prosecute. The sequence of events confirms

M ink had no “injury in fact” for prospective relief when he filed his amended

6
Similarly, the city attorney in Faustin apparently concluded prior to the
filing of the complaint that the statute could not be applied to the plaintiff,
although that conclusion was not disclosed until after the case commenced.

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complaint. 7 Any threat against M ink at that time was “hypothetical,” not “actual

and imminent.”

Finally, although the “No File” letter conceivably might not bind other

district attorneys, we have held the “possibility” of future enforcement need not

be “reduced to zero” to defeat standing. Winsness, 433 F.3d at 733. It is “not

necessary for defendants [] to refute and eliminate all possible risk that the statute

might be enforced” to demonstrate a lack of a case or controversy. Id. Since this

case commenced, moreover, the office of both the Attorney General and the

District Attorney has changed hands with no change in the government’s position

that the statute will not be enforced against M ink. 8

M ink, however, suggests the district attorney fumbled away its disavowal

by admitting in the answer to the amended complaint that M ink faced an

imminent threat of prosecution. In the context of the procedural posture of this

case and especially in light of the district attorney’s “No File” letter, this

oversight is of no significance. It is obvious no charges against M ink would be

pursued, and, as we have explained, “[n]othing in our case law prevents

7
See In re Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 209 F.3d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 2000).
8
Both the current Attorney General and District Attorney, and their
predecessors, firmly rejected any intent to prosecute M ink under the statute
before the district court, in their submissions to us, and in oral argument. W e
take them at their word.

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government actors from responsibly retreating from an ill-advised prosecution, in

response to controlling Supreme Court authority.” Winsness, 433 F.3d at 736.

The government should be encouraged, not dissuaded, from assuring

citizens that it will not pursue prosecutions based on statutes that cannot be

constitutionally enforced. Given the realities of a public law office, it is not

surprising the ultimate legal conclusion here— the case could not be

prosecuted— would be made at the highest policy levels. By jumping the gun and

filing a complaint for prospective relief, a plaintiff cannot retain standing where

the prosecutor immediately concludes the statute cannot be constitutionally

enforced.

Based on the representations of the public officials charged with enforcing

the statute against M ink, we agree with the district court that “no credible threat

of prosecution” existed when M ink filed his amended complaint. Thus, he lacks

standing to seek prospective relief.

b. M ootness. Even if we were to assume a credible threat of

prosecution existed before the law suit was filed, we also conclude M ink’s claim

for prospective relief is moot. “[I]t is not enough that a dispute was very much

alive w hen suit was filed, or when review was obtained,” a live controversy must

remain throughout the litigation. Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472,

477–78 (1990). Article III of the Constitution limits us to live controversies that

exist at all stages of litigation, including appellate review. M oongate Water Co.

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v. Dona Ana M ut. Domestic W ater Consumers Ass’n, 420 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th

Cir. 2005). W hen “intervening acts destroy a party’s legally cognizable interest”

in the lawsuit, the federal courts are deprived of jurisdiction. Id.

M erely stopping the complained of conduct ordinarily is not enough,

however, to establish mootness. “For good reason, courts are reluctant to deem a

controversy moot based merely on assurances from the defendants that they will

not engage in unlawful activity again.” Winsness, 433 F.3d at 736 (citing United

States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953) (“[V]oluntary cessation of

allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and

determine the case, [in part because] . . . [t]he defendant is free to return to his

old ways.”)). Instead, a defendant must show “no reasonable expectation that the

wrong will be repeated.” W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633 (internal citations and

quotations omitted). But in many circumstances it is obvious previously

threatened conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur. See, e.g., Tandy v.

City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277, 1291 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding a controversy

moot because a city had provided documents demonstrating it had changed its

practices to comply with federal law and because “[n]othing in the record

suggests [the defendant] intends to resume its discontinued policies . . . .”).

W e recently discussed mootness in a First Amendment declaratory

judgment case challenging Utah’s flag desecration statute. Winsness, 433 F.3d

727. In Winsness, a Salt Lake City resident burned a symbol onto a United States

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flag and hung the flag on his garage. A neighbor reported the incident to police,

and W insness was cited for flag-abuse. The flag was confiscated as evidence.

After the citation was filed, prosecutors concluded the ordinance could not be

constitutionally enforced against W insness and “immediately scuttled” the case.

The district attorney filed an affidavit with the court assuring it that charges

w ould not be pursued. B ased on that record, we concluded that “[e]ven if we

assume that a credible threat of prosecution existed before this lawsuit was filed,

the prosecutors’ affidavits have rendered the controversy moot.” Winsness, 433

F.3d at 736. The government had “foresworn any intention to bring criminal

charges against individuals who alter the flag for expressive purposes” and had

“categorically announc[ed]” the office would “bring no prosecutions under the

statute.” Id. at 736. W e found these assurances established mootness since the

government (1) had quickly repudiated the action initially taken against W insness,

(2) its statements were made in sworn affidavits, and (3) it based its decision on

controlling Supreme Court precedent, making future prosecutions unlikely.

These factors similarly cut against M ink. First, no citation or formal

charges were ever brought against M ink. And prior to the filing of charges the

district attorney preemptively issued a legal opinion that precluded prosecution.

His opinion letter explained the statute could not be constitutionally applied to the

conduct attributed to M ink, and, accordingly, charges w ould not be filed in this

matter.

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 Second, although the “No File” decision was not in the form of an affidavit,

the district attorney took an unequivocal position (1) advising M ink in writing,

and (2) advising the court that M ink would not be prosecuted under the statute

now or in the future. W e find persuasive, as did the district court, the district

attorney’s repudiation of an intent to prosecute, and its representation of the same

to us on appeal.

Finally, the parties concede on appeal that Supreme Court precedent makes

enforcement of the Colorado criminal libel statute unconstitutional under the facts

as alleged here. The parties have conceded Professor Peake is a public figure,

and well established case law requires falsity and actual malice to prove libel.

Gertz, 418 U.S. 323. M oreover, the Colorado Supreme Court has interpreted that

statute to embody these standards. People v. Ryan, 806 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1991).

Accordingly, the district attorney recognized the force of these precedents and his

“No File” decision supports our conclusion that the third Winsness factor has been

met in this case.

Despite these assurances, M ink contends the district attorney’s disavowal is

limited to the specific statements made in the first three issues of The Howling

Pig and does not apply more broadly to the type of statements that sparked this

controversy or to those statements which might appear in future editions of the

publication. In short, he claims that without a ruling that the Colorado criminal

libel law is unconstitutional, he may be subject to prosecution in the future. W e

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find this argument unpersuasive. The analysis provided by the attorney general

and district attorney demonstrate their legal reasons for not enforcing the statute

in this case would carry over to further statements of the type M ink has

subsequently made or intends to make. Although the district attorney’s “No File”

decision was based upon the pending investigation, we see no reason his analysis

would not apply to subsequent statements that are legally indistinguishable.

In short, we see no credible threat of prosecution against M ink. The

district attorney did what one would hope from a public official: he “responsibly

retreat[ed] from an ill-advised prosecution, in response to controlling Supreme

Court authority.” Winsness, 433 F.3d at 736. Because standing and mootness are

jurisdictional and non-w aivable, M oongate Water Co., 420 F.3d at 1088, we need

not consider the merits of M ink’s First Amendment challenge to the Colorado

criminal libel statute in this case.

B. Damages Claim under Privacy Protection A ct

M ink also seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of

the Privacy Protection Act. The Act creates a right of action for the improper

seizure of media materials:

Notwithstanding any other law , it shall be unlawful for a government
officer or employee, in connection with the investigation or prosecution
of a criminal offense, to search for or seize any work product materials
possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to
disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar
form of public communication, in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce; but this provision shall not impair or affect the ability of any

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 government officer or employee, pursuant to otherwise applicable law,
to search for or seize such materials, if . . . there is probable cause.

42 U.S.C. § 2000aa.

M ink alleges his statutory rights were violated when Greeley police entered

his home and seized materials relating to The Howling Pig. He does not,

however, name any of the officers who conducted the search. 9 Instead, he seeks a

judgment against the deputy district attorney for her role in reviewing the

affidavit in support of the search warrant, w hich he claims lacked probable cause.

Relying on the text of the statute, w hich makes it unlaw ful “to search for

or seize any work product materials,” the district court dismissed the claim.

Here, M ink did not allege the district attorney directed, controlled or participated

in the search or seizure. Since the statute includes no language covering

predicate acts by other officials, such as the legal review of the warrant

application, the district court concluded no liability attached to the district

attorney.

W e agree. The plain language of the statute precludes liability for a person

who did not engage in a search. In an analytically similar case, Citicasters v.

M cCaskill, 89 F.3d 1350 (8th Cir. 1996), the Eighth Circuit concluded the statute

covered only a defendant who “directed, supervised, or otherwise engaged in the

execution of the warrant to such an extent that a finding can be made that she

9
M ink initially sued both police officials and the City of Greeley but
voluntarily dropped both of those claims.

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‘searched for or seized’ the [materials].” Id. at 1356 (emphasis added). In

Citicasters, the facts centered around the prosecutor’s actions taken after the

search warrant was issued and involved an allegation that the prosecutor actively

assisted in the search. Here, by contrast, M ink has not alleged any conduct that

could be construed as assisting in the warrant’s execution.

Accordingly, we affirm dismissal of this claim against the deputy district

attorney.

C. Damages Claim Against the District Attorney

The most difficult issue in this case is M ink’s claim for damages against

the deputy district attorney based on her review of the application for a search

warrant. The district attorney argues that this conduct is protected by the doctrine

of absolute prosecutorial immunity. The district court agreed, concluding the

prosecutor acted as “an officer of the court” in a “quasi-judicial” capacity to

which absolute immunity applied.

1. Legal Framew ork

Absolute prosecutorial immunity is a complete bar to a suit for damages

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976).

The doctrine evolved from the absolute immunity judges historically enjoyed for

“any judicial act done by them w ithin their jurisdiction.” Bradley v. Fisher, 80

U.S. 335, 351 (1871).

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 Traditionally, the doctrine did not apply to other public officials— such as

police officers, governors, and other executive officials— who were entitled only

to qualified immunity for actions performed in their official capacity. Under the

comm on law, the scope of immunity for prosecutors was limited to suits for

malicious prosecution and defamation, although its reach in § 1983 damages cases

was unclear. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421.

a. Suprem e Court Fram ework. The Supreme Court developed the

modern doctrine of prosecutorial immunity in § 1983 cases in a series of cases

beginning in 1976. In Imbler v. Pachtman, the Court rejected the argument that

limited, or qualified, immunity would be adequate to protect the prosecutor from

the threat of litigation that could shade their otherw ise independent judgment.

M erely providing qualified immunity would “prevent the vigorous and fearless

performance of the prosecutor’s duty that is essential to the proper functioning of

the criminal justice system.” 424 U.S. at 427–28. According to the Court, it was

“better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers [of the court]

than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.”

Id. at 428 (quoting Learned Hand in Gregiore v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d

Cir. 1949)). Thus, prosecutors are absolutely immune for those activities

“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” 424 U.S.

at 430. To apply this standard, the Court crafted a “functional approach” by

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which we examine only the actions taken by the prosecutor “in initiating [] and in

presenting the State’s case” for trial. Id. at 431.

The Supreme Court was careful to note, however, that not every activity of

a prosecutor involves initiating and presenting a case. Absolute immunity does

not extend to “those aspects of the prosecutor’s responsibility that cast him in the

role of an administrator or investigative officer rather than that of advocate.” Id.

at 430–31 (emphasis added):

W e recognize that the duties of the prosecutor in his role as an advocate
for the State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a
prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom . . . . Preparation,
both for the initiation of the criminal process and for a trial, may
require the obtaining, reviewing, and evaluating of evidence. At some
point, and w ith respect to some decisions, the prosecutor no doubt
functions as an adm inistrator rather than as an officer of the court.
Drawing a proper line between these functions may present difficult
questions, but this case does not require us to anticipate them.

Id. at 431 n.33 (emphasis added). Concluding the challenged conduct in Imbler

fell on the advocacy side of the spectrum, the C ourt granted the prosecutors

absolute immunity against the claim that they had procured false testimony during

the course of a criminal trial.

The Supreme Court later extended the doctrine of absolute immunity to

some prosecutorial conduct occurring before trial. In Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478

(1991), a prosecutor was accused of (1) eliciting false testimony in a probable

cause hearing that led to the issuance of a search warrant, and (2) advising police

on inappropriate methods of interrogating a suspect.

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 Regarding the probable cause hearing, the Court concluded absolute

immunity extended to “any hearing before a tribunal which performed a judicial

function” and included the presentation of testimony in support of an application

for a search warrant. Id. at 490 (internal quotations omitted). “The prosecutor’s

actions at issue here— appearing before a judge and presenting evidence in

support of a motion for a search warrant— clearly involve the prosecutor’s role as

advocate for the State, rather than his role as administrator or investigative

officer, the protection for which we reserved judgment in Imbler.” Id. at 491

(internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). 10 The Court went on to observe,

“since the issuance of a warrant is unquestionably a judicial act, appearing at a

probable-cause hearing is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the

criminal process.” Id. at 479 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Burns, however, did not extend absolute immunity to every aspect of the

prosecutor’s legal advice to police. The Supreme Court concluded that advising

police in the investigative phase of a criminal case could be too far removed from

the judicial process to warrant extending immunity on that basis. It thus rejected

the argument that legal advice is categorically “of a judicial nature because the

prosecutor is, like a judge, called upon to render opinions concerning the legality

10
Importantly, the Court read the plaintiff’s claim narrowly and did not
consider the prosecutor’s motivations in seeking the search warrant or his actions
outside the courtroom in relation to his procurement of the warrant. See id. at
487–89 & n.5.

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of conduct.” Id. at 493 (internal quotations omitted). Noting it had previously

rejected the extension of absolute immunity to police officers, the Court found it

“incongruous to allow prosecutors to be absolutely immune from liability for

giving advice to the police, but to allow police officers only qualified immunity

for following [that] advice.” Id. at 495.

The Court also rejected the government’s argument that “giving legal

advice is related to a prosecutor’s role[] in screening cases for prosecution and in

safeguarding the fairness of the criminal judicial process.” Id. As the Court

pointed out, “Almost any action by a prosecutor, including his or her direct

participation in purely investigative activity, could be said to be in some way

related to the ultimate decision whether to prosecute.” Id. “W e do not believe,

however, that advising the police in the investigative phase of a criminal case is

so ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,’ that it

qualifies for absolute immunity.” Id. at 493 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430). 11

To qualify for absolute immunity, then, an action must be “closely

associated with the judicial process.” Id. at 495. Advising police on

interrogation methods or “the existence of probable cause” does not qualify. Id.

at 487.

11
Justice Scalia, in a concurrence, would have gone further. He concluded
that there is “no absolute immunity for procuring a search warrant” since that act
is so far “removed from the judicial phase of criminal proceedings than the act of
a prosecutor in seeking an indictment.” 500 U.S. at 504–05 (quoting M alley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1986)).

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 The Supreme Court refined the investigative/advocacy distinction in

Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993). In that case, the plaintiff accused

prosecutors of fabricating evidence during the preliminary investigation of a

crime. In finding the pretrial investigation was not entitled to absolute immunity,

the Court emphasized, “W e have not retreated . . . from the principle [articulated

in Burns] that acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of

judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an

advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity.” Id.

at 273. But there is “a difference between the advocate’s role in evaluating

evidence and interviewing witnesses as he prepares for trial, on the one hand, and

the detective’s role in searching for the clues and corroboration that might give

him probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested, on the other hand.”

Id. The Court ultimately concluded that, where there is no comm on-law tradition

of immunity for a function, a prosecutor “neither is, nor should consider himself

to be, an advocate before he has probable cause to have anyone arrested.” Id. at

274 & n.5.

The Supreme Court’s final and most recent case on prosecutorial immunity

is similarly instructive. In Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997), a prosecutor

was sued for her (1) preparation and filing of an information and motion for an

arrest warrant, and (2) attestation to the truth of the facts contained in the

accompanying affidavit. The Court found absolute immunity for the first activity

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but not for the second. It concluded the preparation and filing of the information

and motion “was part of the advocate’s function,” id. at 129, since she was acting

as an advocate in “her drafting of the certification, her determination that the

evidence was sufficiently strong to justify a probable-cause finding, her decision

to file charges, and her presentation of the information and the m otion to the court

. . . indeed, even the selection of the particular facts to include in the certification

to provide the evidentiary support for the finding of probable cause.” Id. at 130.

In contrast, attesting to the accuracy of the facts in the affidavit, the

prosecutor w as acting as a complaining witness rather than a lawyer. Id. at 129.

The key, according to the Court, was whether the task “involved the exercise of

professional judgment,” not merely the review of the “truth or falsity of the factual

statements themselves.” Id. at 130.

b. Tenth Circuit Fram ework. W e have applied the above Supreme

Court precedent in a variety of contexts. In Roberts v. Kling, 104 F.3d 316, 319

(10th Cir. 1997), for example, w e found absolute immunity applied to a deputy

district attorney who approved a criminal complaint for prosecution. W e

emphasized, however, that ours is a “continuum based approach” and the “more

distant a function is from the judicial process, the less likely absolute immunity

will attach.” Id. at 318–19 (quoting Gagan v. Norton, 35 F.3d 1473, 1475 (10th

Cir. 1994)). The “determinative factor is ‘advocacy’ because that is the

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prosecutor’s main function and the one most akin to his quasi-judicial role.” 104

F.3d at 319.

But “absolute immunity may attach even to . . . administrative or

investigative activities when these functions are necessary so that a prosecutor

may fulfill his function as an officer of the court.” Pfeiffer v. Hartford Fire Ins.

Co., 929 F.2d 1484, 1490 (10th Cir. 1991). Thus, we have found absolute

prosecutorial immunity for (1) preparation and initiation of charges, id.; (2)

prosecuting civil and administrative enforcement proceedings, Snell v. Tunnell,

920 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1990); and (3) investigating and filing a commitment

proceeding, Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897 (10th Cir. 2000).

c. Sum m ary. As the above cases demonstrate, there is no bright line

between advocacy and investigation. It is clear that a prosecutor’s courtroom

conduct falls on the advocacy side of the line. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274. And it is

equally clear that advocacy is not limited to filing criminal charges or arguing in

the courtroom. Id. at 272. Thus, especially when considering pre-indictment acts,

it is important to consider other factors, such as (1) whether the action is closely

associated with the judicial process, Burns, 500 U .S. at 495, (2) whether it is a

uniquely prosecutorial function, id. at 491 n.7, and (3) whether it requires the

exercise of professional judgment, Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130.

In sum, a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for those actions that

cast him in the role of an advocate initiating and presenting the government’s case.

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Absolute immunity, however, does not extend to those actions that are

investigative or administrative in nature, including the provision of legal advice

outside the setting of a prosecution. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430–31; Burns, 500

U.S. at 486, 493–94.

2. Application

W e now turn to whether absolute immunity applies to the deputy district

attorney’s review of the affidavit in support of the search warrant in M ink’s case.

For the following reasons, we conclude the district attorney was not wearing the

hat of an advocate and, thus, is not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity.

As a preliminary matter, the district attorney does not contend she acted as

an advocate “intimately involved” in a judicial proceeding. Rather, she alleges her

role was limited to review and approval of the search warrant application; she does

not even contend she evaluated whether probable cause existed to arrest or press

charges. At the time she reviewed the affidavit, moreover, police had only the

allegations of Professor Peake and had not yet confirmed the authorship of the

articles contained in The Howling Pig. It is obvious the search of M ink’s

residence was part of a continuing effort to obtain evidence and the attorney’s

review was, at most, legal advice as to the sufficiency of the affidavit. It is also

clear that the district attorney was far from filing charges at the time of the search,

and subsequent events show that the office came to believe the case could not be

prosecuted.

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 Second, the review of the affidavit cannot be said to be a uniquely

prosecutorial role. W hile it is laudable that a legal review occur before the police

proceed to a magistrate for a warrant, the Supreme Court made it clear in Burns

that a legal review for the sufficiency of evidence to support probable cause is not

sufficient to confer absolute immunity. Absolute immunity applies to the

“prosecutor’s role in judicial proceedings, not for every litigation-inducing

conduct.” Burns, 500 U.S. at 494. And while it may at times be difficult to

discern the line between “investigation” and “advocacy,” here we do not even

have a case where the prosecutor was preparing for her “role as advocate for the

State.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 271. No one suggests that the district attorney was

preparing for a judicial proceeding in merely review ing the affidavit.

Finally, although the review of the affidavit can be said to require the

exercise of professional judgment, that is true every time a prosecutor provides

legal advice. Under the Supreme Court’s functional approach, we look to which

role the prosecutor is performing— advocate or investigator. Here, the review of

the affidavit squarely falls on the side of investigatory legal advice, and not

advocacy before a judicial body. The deputy district attorney played no role in

preparing the affidavit, nor was she involved in preparing, analyzing, and

presenting pleadings to a court. If she were, this would be quite a different case.

W e acknowledge this conclusion is complicated by those cases where

prosecutors have been absolutely immunized for drafting, filing, and arguing in

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support of an arrest or search warrant. See Kalina, 522 U .S. at 129–31(arrest

warrant); Burns, 500 U.S. at 487 (search warrant). And the Supreme Court has

explicitly recognized “the issuance of a search warrant is unquestionably a judicial

act.” Burns, 500 U.S. at 492. In those cases, however, the prosecutor was acting

as an advocate— evaluating evidence, preparing pleadings, and appearing in court.

It may be true that a lawyer’s more active involvement in preparing a warrant

application and presenting it in court will confer absolute immunity. But in this

case the prosecutor’s function was not that of an advocate; her function was to

provide legal advice outside the courtroom to aid a nascent investigation. The

“premise of Burns was that, in providing advice to the police, the prosecutor acted

to guide the police, not to prepare his own case.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 285

(K ennedy, J., concurring). H ere, the prosecutor was not preparing her case.

Accordingly, in these circumstances, immunity does not attach.

The district attorney urges us to consider her reliance on Colorado law in

support of a finding of absolute immunity. Colorado law requires district

attorneys to “render, in their quasi-judicial capacity, legal advice to peace officers,

upon the request of such officers or of the court, pertaining to the preparation and

review of affidavits and warrants for arrests, searches, seizures . . .” and confers

“immun[ity] from liability” under state law. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 20-1-106.1. As the

district court correctly noted, however, a state statute— even one requiring

affirmative action— cannot create immunity from a federal civil rights claim where

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the functional analysis suggests otherw ise. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 375–76

(1990). And under the Supreme Court’s functional analysis we look to what the

attorney did— she provided legal advice— and not to what state law requires.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the district court erred in dismissing

M ink's damages claim on the ground that it was barred by the doctrine of absolute

immunity. The deputy district attorney, however, may be entitled to qualified

immunity if she reasonably concluded probable cause existed to support the

warrant application, or that the application of the Supreme Court’s First

Amendment cases to the criminal libel statute was not clearly established under

the circumstances here.

The district court did not address the application of qualified immunity in

these circumstances, and w e decline to do so in the first instance. Accordingly, w e

remand that issue to the district court.

IV. Conclusion

W e A FFIRM the district court’s dismissal of M ink’s claims for declaratory

relief and for damages under the Privacy Protection Act. W e REVERSE the

district court’s decision to dismiss M ink’s claim for damages based on absolute

prosecutorial immunity, and REM AND for consideration of the district attorney’s

claim for qualified immunity.

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