F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 8, 2007
PUBLISH
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Clerk of Court
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT
K EN N ETH L. SM ITH ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 04-1468
U N ITED STA TES C OU RT O F
APPEALS, FOR TH E TENTH
CIRCUIT; THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL
FOR THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF A PPEALS FOR TH E TENTH
CIRCUIT; EDW ARD W .
NOTTINGHAM , District Judge, in
his personal capacity only;
HON ORABLE M ARY BECK
BRISCOE, in personal capacity only;
H O N O RA BLE STEPH EN H .
ANDERSON, in personal capacity
only; HO NO RA BLE JAM ES E.
BA RRETT; HO NO RA BLE
H. JEFFR EY BAYLESS, in personal
capacity and in his representative
capacity as the chief judge of the
District Court, City and County
of Denver; KEN SALAZAR,
Honorable, in his personal capacity
only, and John Does 1-99,
Defendants-Appellees.
_____________________________
K EN N ETH L. SM ITH ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 04-1470
v.
M ARY J. M ULLARKEY; REBECCA
LOV E KO UR LIS; M ICH AEL L.
BENDER; GREGORY J. HOBBS, JR.;
ALEX J. M ARTINEZ; NATHAN B.
COATS; NANCY E. RICE, Hons. in
their official capacities as Justices
of the Colorado Supreme Court,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. Nos. 04-RB-1222(OES) and 04-RB-1223 (OES))
Submitted on the Briefs: *
Kenneth L. Smith, pro se
John W . Suthers, Attorney General; and Friedrick C. Haines, First Assistant
Attorney General, State of C olorado, Denver Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before H OL LOW A Y, SE YM OUR, and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.
SE YM O UR, Circuit Judge.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cases are
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
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Kenneth L. Smith appeals the district court’s dismissal of two separate
lawsuits stemming from the denial of his application for admission to the
Colorado bar. The present litigation focuses on asserted deficiencies he alleges
existed in the judicial process provided to him in his previous legal challenges.
In particular, M r. Smith objects to the resolution of cases by non-precedential
unpublished decisions, a practice permitted by procedural rules issued and
enforced by the C olorado courts and by this circuit. 1 As explained below, we
agree with the district court that neither of the cases under review can properly
proceed in federal district court. W e therefore affirm.
1
Because the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, several circuit judges, and a
district judge in the circuit are named defendants in the action challenging this
court’s publication practice, plaintiff has moved for recusal of all Tenth Circuit
judges and designation of a hearing panel from another circuit. Given “there are
no pertinent, particularized allegations of bias,” w e apply our general rule that,
notwithstanding the inclusion of Tenth Circuit judges in the caption, “neither this
court nor this panel . . . is disqualified from hearing and resolving this case.”
Switzer v. Coan, 261 F.3d 985, 987 n.1 (10th Cir. 2001) (brackets, quotation
marks and citations omitted). Indeed, it seems peculiarly unfitting for one
circuit’s procedural rules and practices to be governed by judges from another
circuit. Such matters are, of course, subject to the judgment of the Supreme
Court, which has w ide-ranging authority through both case-specific review and its
general supervisory power “to intervene to protect the integrity of the federal
system.” 32 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Courts § 473 (discussing authority regarding
Supreme Court’s supervisory power).
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I
Background
M r. Smith graduated from law school, passed the state bar examination, and
passed the professional ethics examination, all prerequisites to obtaining a license
to practice law in Colorado. W hen he was ordered to submit to a mental status
examination by the Board of Law Examiners’ H earing Panel, however, he refused.
Primarily because M r. Smith refused to submit to that examination, the Hearing
Panel recommended to the Colorado Supreme Court that his application be
denied. After consideration of the record, including M r. Smith’s application, the
Hearing Panel’s report and recommendation, M r. Smith’s exceptions to that
report, and the responses filed by the Board of Law Examiners, the Colorado
Supreme Court denied the application for admission to the State Bar. M r. Smith
then filed an action in federal district court challenging the admission process on
constitutional grounds. That action was dismissed pursuant to the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 2 On appeal, this court affirmed in an unpublished
Order and Judgment, see Smith v. M ullarkey, No. 02-1481, 2003 W L 21350579
(10th Cir. June 11, 2003), and denied M r. Smith’s request for a rehearing.
2
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds that under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the only
federal court with jurisdiction to review state court judgments is the Supreme
Court. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005)
(discussing Dist. of Columbia Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983),
and Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-16 (1923)).
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M r. Smith unsuccessfully sought a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition from the
Supreme Court.
In the meantime, M r. Smith challenged the bar admission process in state
court on state and federal (42 U.S.C. § 1983) grounds. The state trial court
summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, citing the state supreme court’s
exclusive authority over matters pertaining to bar admissions. See Colo. Sup. Ct.
Grievance Comm. v. Dist. Ct., 850 P.2d 150, 152 (Colo. 1993) (en banc). The
state trial court did not mention § 1983 or address whether the invoked
jurisdictional limitation was a valid basis for denying enforcement of the federal
rights involved. M r. Smith appealed this decision to the Colorado Court of
Appeals.
He subsequently filed the two actions currently before us. In the first, he
sued the justices of the Colorado Supreme Court, challenging the state court’s use
of non-precedential unpublished decisions to dispose of appeals. He contends this
creates a system “w herein [the C olorado] appellate courts are free to affirm
irregular (and even flagrantly unconstitutional) decisions in unpublished opinions
– while having no effect upon [the state’s] ‘official’ published law.” Rec.
(Appeal No. 04-1470), vol. I, doc. 1 at 2. Specifically, he alleges the state trial
court failed to follow controlling precedent, and the state’s non-publication rules
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enable an affirmance of that decision without legal accountability. 3 He argues the
“continued enforcement and operation of these rules” would deny him various
constitutional protections. Id. at 7.
In a separate action, M r. Smith made similar allegations regarding this
circuit’s use of non-precedential decisions, citing our unpublished resolution of
his first federal suit. See Rec. (A ppeal N o. 04-1468), vol. I, doc. 1 at 2-4, 6-9.
He contends this practice violates the same rights he invoked in his challenge to
the state practice, as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. In addition to seeking relief with respect to this court’s rules, he
requested a writ of mandamus ordering the state trial judge to address the merits
of his challenge to the state bar admission process. W e address each of his claims
in turn.
II
Challenge to State Court Non-Publication Practice
The district court invoked Article III and held that M r. Smith lacked
standing to challenge the state’s non-publication practice. The fundamental
requirements of standing are an injury in fact caused by the conduct complained
3
M r. Smith does not claim the state practice has prevented him from relying
on any unpublished decisions supporting a favorable result in his case, which was
the basis for a similar challenge to a federal non-publication rule in Anastasoff v.
United States, 223 F.3d 898, vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
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of that w ill likely be redressed by a favorable decision in the case. Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The district court concluded
that M r. Smith could not relate the practice he challenges to any cognizable injury
to himself. In its view , M r. Smith “ha[d] alleged nothing more than an interest in
the problem concerning the defendants’ rules and practices [on publication],” and
“[t]hat interest, unaccompanied by a showing that the application of the rule or
practice has somehow personally and actually harmed the plaintiff, cannot alone
constitute the injury-in-fact contemplated by the standing doctrine.” Rec. (Appeal
No. 04-1470), vol. I, doc. 8 at 7.
“Standing is determined as of the time the action is brought.” Nova Health
Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1154 (10th Cir. 2005). M r. Smith had just taken
his state appeal when he filed this action. He was in no position to challenge the
adequacy of state appellate review in cases culminating in unpublished opinions
unless he could show that he would in fact receive such review from the state
court of appeals (and from the state supreme court as well, if it took the case on
certiorari). As we have explained,
an injury in fact must be actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical. Allegations of possible future injury do not satisfy the
requirements of Art[icle] III. A threatened injury must be certainly
impending to constitute injury in fact. An Article III injury must be
more than a possibility. The threat of injury must be both real and
immediate.
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Id. at 1155 (quotation marks, ellipses and citations omitted). M r. Smith cannot
make this required showing because the manner of resolution of his future appeals
is entirely speculative.
M r. Smith advances tw o alternative arguments for standing that we briefly
address. Invoking the First Amendment and citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601 (1973), he insists every citizen has standing to challenge judicial
practices that render the law less certain, based on the chilling effect such
uncertainty has on everyone’s exercise of free speech rights. Broadrick
recognized an exception to the traditional standing requirement of injury personal
to the litigant when the litigant challenges a “statute[] attempting to restrict or
burden the exercise of First Amendment rights,” id. at 611 (emphasis added),
permitting in those circumstances the assertion of a chilling effect on others’
constitutionally protected speech to serve as a redressable injury. But the practice
at issue here is not directed at the exercise of First Amendment rights.
M r. Smith contends the uncertainty produced by the use of non-precedential
decisions could indirectly affect the exercise of First Amendment rights, asserting
one might curtail speech for fear that subsequent litigation will result in an
unpublished decision denying constitutional protection in a manner wildly
inconsistent with what would have otherw ise been decided in a published opinion.
That contention is so speculative and riddled with assumptions that it cannot
serve as the basis for standing even if the consideration of third-person injury
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were permissible here. See Nova Health Sys., 416 F.3d at 1155 (“[A]n injury in
fact must be actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”). M r. Smith has
not cited any authority applying Broadrick’s First A mendment standing analysis
in similar circumstances, and we decline to take that step.
M r. Smith also asks us to rely on the principle typically invoked in cases
involving mootness that a dispute “capable of repetition, but evading review” can
be heard despite the lack of a presently justiciable case or controversy. See, e.g.,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973). W hile the state courts’ ongoing practice
certainly satisfies the repetition requirement, there is no reason to think that the
practice must evade review. If the state court of appeals decides a case by
unpublished opinion, the losing party can object by way of rehearing and/or
certiorari review to the state supreme court, whose own practice in this regard
may be reviewed by way of rehearing and/or certiorari review by the United
States Supreme Court.
In sum, the district court correctly concluded that M r. Smith lacked
standing to challenge his mere anticipation of being affected by the state appellate
courts’ practice of issuing unpublished decisions. Indeed, we note that
M r. Smith’s state appeal was eventually heard by the C olorado Supreme Court
and resolved by published decision. Smith v. M ullarkey, 121 P.3d 890 (Colo.
2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1792 (2006). W e affirm the district
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court’s order dismissing M r. Smith’s challenge to Colorado’s non-publication
practice.
III
Challenge to Federal Non-publication Practice
W hen M r. Smith filed suit against the federal defendants, he had no
litigation pending in the Tenth Circuit. The focus of his challenge to this court’s
use of unpublished decisions was the unfavorable disposition, by unpublished
order and judgment, of his prior appeal regarding the constitutionality of the state
bar admission process. The proper means for objecting to the non-publication of
that decision would have been by petition for rehearing in this court and/or
petition for certiorari review by the Supreme Court. 4 Instead, he has sought our
review of this prior action by generating an entirely new stream of litigation.
Although it is possible that this present case could ultimately result in an
unpublished decision, this mere possibility is too speculative to support
jurisdiction under A rticle III. Nova Health Sys., 416 F.3d at 1155; Essence, Inc.
4
In fact, M r. Smith filed a petition for rehearing in which he argued that this
court had deviated from precedent in its decision and then stated, in passing, that
“he ha[d] a right to insist that it do so in a published opinion with precedential
value,” Smith v. M ullarkey, No. 02-1481, Petition for Rehearing, at 1. He also
noted the unpublished nature of this court’s decision in the petition for mandamus
and/or prohibition he filed in the Supreme Court. In neither instance, however,
did he argue that the use of unpublished decisions w as unconstitutional.
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v. City of Fed. Heights, 285 F.3d 1272, 1282 (10th Cir. 2002); Hutchinson v.
Pfeil, 211 F.3d 515, 520-21 (10th Cir. 2000). Thus, we conclude, neither a
collateral challenge relating to M r. Smith’s prior unsuccessful appeal, nor an
anticipatory challenge relating to a potential unpublished disposition in this
litigation suffices to establish an actual injury that would permit review and
redress. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed M r. Smith’s claims for
lack of standing.
W e point out that the alleged injury caused by our circuit publication rules
need not consistently evade review. Other circuits have addressed the validity of
their non-publication rules in cases where the question of the rule’s validity arose
in the context of litigation presently before the court. For example, courts have
considered the constitutionality of publication rules where an unpublished
decision relevant to the merits of an appeal was pressed by a litigant who insisted
it be deemed binding precedent contrary to the circuit rule, see Symbol Techs.,
Inc. v. Lemelson M ed., 277 F.3d 1361, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2002), or was opposed
by a litigant who insisted it be disregarded pursuant to the circuit rule, see
Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot
on reh’g en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). Such rules have also been
scrutinized where an attorney violated a circuit rule prohibiting citation to
non-precedential decisions and sought to avoid proposed disciplinary action by
challenging the validity of the rule. See Hart v. M assanari, 266 F.3d 1155,
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1159-60 (9th Cir. 2001). As demonstrated in these cases, a circuit
non-publication rule may be challenged in the circuit court when application of
the rule in a live proceeding before that court directly implicates the interest of a
party or counsel in that proceeding. Such is not the case here.
IV
M andam us Relief against State Trial Judge
The state trial court held it lacked jurisdiction to consider constitutional
claims stemming from the denial of M r. Smith’s admission to the bar because
jurisdiction to hear such claims was lodged exclusively with the Colorado
Supreme Court. M r. Smith sought mandamus relief from the federal district court
to compel the state trial judge’s consideration of his constitutional claims. The
district court summarily rejected his claim for lack of jurisdiction under Olson v.
Hart, 965 F.2d 940, 942 (10th Cir. 1992), which held that “[f]ederal courts have
no authority to issue a writ of mandamus to a state judge.” Although he
acknowledges this limitation on the authority of federal courts, M r. Smith argues
the district court erred in not construing his mandamus request as a claim for
injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Olson, 965 F.2d at 943 (“W e may
also construe a pro se petition for a writ of mandamus as an action for . . .
declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). W e noted in Olson, however, that
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“section 1983 injunctive relief is available” only if “appellant can show he was
deprived of a federal right.” Id.
In Olson, the plaintiff alleged the state court judge, out of spite, refused to
sign a journal entry necessary to the exercise of his right to appeal. We held, if
the allegation were true, the judge’s arbitrary and capricious action would violate
the plaintiff’s due process rights and present a cognizable § 1983 claim. Id.
Here, M r. Smith has requested mandamus relief claiming that the state trial court
erred by limiting its jurisdiction in accordance with state law precedent, see
People v. Buckles, 453 P.2d 404 (Colo. 1968); Colo. Sup. Ct. Grievance Comm. v.
Dist. Ct., 850 P.2d 150, 154 (Colo. 1993), and failing to consider claims that his
denial of admission to the bar violated his constitutional rights. Although he
contends the state court has refused to entertain his federal claims in violation of
the Supremacy Clause, we note that the state courts have not shut their doors to
federal claims but have simply restricted challenges to individual bar admission
decisions to Colorado Supreme Court jurisdiction. M r. Smith directs us to no
precedent establishing that Colorado violated his federal rights by vesting
exclusive jurisdiction of the regulation of lawyers in its Supreme Court.
Accordingly, we decline to recast his request for mandamus as a § 1983 claim and
we adhere to our general prohibition on issuing a writ of mandamus to a state
court judge.
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Based on the foregoing analysis, we hold that the district court properly
dismissed all of the claims asserted in the actions consolidated in this appeal. 5
Finally, we D EN Y the several motions that remain pending because none of them
affects our analysis of either case or w arrants relief in any collateral respect.
W e A FFIR M the judgments of the district court.
5
There are vague and conclusory references in M r. Smith’s briefing to an
asserted tort liability of defendant Salazar, former Colorado Attorney General.
Neither these references nor the underlying pleadings in the case remotely
establish the existence of a cognizable claim.
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