F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
May 25, 2007
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 06-2056
GARY RAYM OND AHID LEY, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New M exico
(D.C. No. CR-05-480-RB)
M arc H. Robert, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Las Cruces, New M exico for
Defendant-Appellant.
David N. W illiams, Assistant United States Attorney (David C. Iglesias, United
States Attorney, with him on the brief), Albuquerque, New M exico, for Plaintiff-
Appellee
Before KELLY, EBEL, and HO LM ES, Circuit Judges.
HO LM ES, Circuit Judge
Gary Raymond Ahidley, Jr., pleaded guilty to assault with a dangerous
weapon (count 1), 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3), and assault resulting in serious bodily
injury (count 2), 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6), charges resulting from a crime he
comm itted in Indian Country, 18 U.S.C. § 1153. M r. Ahidley was sentenced to 41
months’ imprisonment.
M r. Ahidley’s offenses implicated the M andatory Victims Restitution Act
of 1996 (“M VRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. Restitution was ordered in the amount
of $22,537.13, with payment due immediately. M r. Ahidley now appeals the
restitution order. He contends that there was insufficient evidence to justify the
amount of the restitution award and that the district court erred in imposing an
immediate obligation to pay restitution, instead of establishing a reasonable
restitution payment schedule after considering his financial resources and other
legally-required factors.
W e have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. W e AFFIRM the district
court’s order regarding the restitution amount. However, we conclude that the
district court plainly erred in imposing an immediate-payment restitution
obligation on M r. A hidley without consideration of the requisite M VRA factors.
Accordingly, we VAC ATE that aspect of its restitution order and REM AND for
the court to set an appropriate payment schedule.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 13, 2004, Defendant-Appellant Ahidley and his girlfriend Ava
Joyce Pollock, along with two of her children, were staying the night at his
cousin’s home. The couple had been drinking alcohol throughout the day, and
M r. Ahidley admitted he was intoxicated. According to M r. Ahidley, M s. Pollock
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was belittling him and “fussing” about his haircut. R. vol. II, Presentence
Investigation Report (PSR ) ¶ 12. He attempted to hold her to talk, but she pulled
away. This angered M r. Ahidley, and he pulled a pocket knife out and stabbed
M s. Pollock. One of M s. Pollock’s children witnessed the incident. The stabbing
occurred late in the evening, after 9:00 p.m.
M r. Ahidley claims he did not intend to stab M s. Pollock, but she was
“standing too close.” Id. After realizing she was injured, M s. Pollock woke the
defendant’s sister, Tracey Ahidley, who also was staying at the home, and asked
her for a ride to the hospital. M s. Ahidley drove M s. Pollock and her children to
the hospital in Ruidoso, New M exico.
The stab wound resulted in lacerations to M s. Pollock’s liver and kidney,
and a penetrating trauma to her ascending colon. The serious nature of the
wounds necessitated airlifting M s. Pollock to a hospital in Lubbock, Texas for
treatment and surgery. She remained in the hospital for one week. The treating
physician estimated eight weeks for recuperation, but he expected a full recovery.
M r. Ahidley pleaded guilty to the charges on July 11, 2005, and the U.S.
Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR). The PSR
noted that M r. Ahidley was a highschool dropout who apparently had no
specialized skills or training. M r. A hidley reported having no assets or liabilities.
The Probation Office’s examination of a credit report confirmed the latter (i.e.,
the absence of liabilities) and indicated that M r. Ahidley had no credit at all. At
-3-
the time of his arrest, M r. Ahidley was living with, and being supported by,
family members. The PSR concluded that based upon his “financial situation,”
M r. Ahidley “does not have the means to pay a fine.” Id. ¶ 58.
However, the PSR noted that the M VRA was applicable to M r. Ahidley’s
case and required the district court to order restitution for his criminal conduct,
without consideration of M r. Ahidley’s ability to pay. The initial PSR stated that
M r. Ahidley owed restitution to Cardiology Consultants in the amount of $30 and
Lubbock Diagnostic Radiology in the amount of $1,044. The report noted
M edicaid officials would be submitting a request for restitution within 90 days.
On October 18, 2005, the Probation Office amended the PSR to include a
request for restitution in the amount of $21,463.13 from the New M exico Human
Services Department, M edical Assistance Division (“NM HSD ”). The claim was
submitted on an apparent form letter, 1 stating that the NM HSD M edicaid program
provided assistance to M s. Pollock for treatment “that may be related to the
accident that occurred on or around October 14, 2004.” R. vol. II, PSR
1
The letter directly responded to the question of costs incurred by
NM HSD for M s. Pollock’s treatment by stating a specific figure. However, it
also included considerable boilerplate language that could not have been intended
for the U.S. Probation Office; instead, it was better suited for comm unications
with counsel of injured persons receiving M edicaid-funded medical treatment.
For example, it cautioned the following: “At the mom ent you receive settlement
proceeds or a court award on behalf of your client in this matter, a duty as an
obligor arises on your part to repay [NM ]HSD , after reasonable attorney fees and
costs have been deducted, and prior to distribution of any remaining balance to
your client.” R. vol. II, PSR Addendum, NM HSD Letter at 1 (Oct. 18, 2005)
(emphasis added).
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Addendum, NM HSD Letter at 1 (Oct. 18, 2005).
On January 27, 2006, more than three months after the PSR was initially
amended, M r. Ahidley filed a sentencing memorandum objecting to certain
aspects of the report. See R. vol. I, Doc. 34. M r. Ahidley mentioned the PSR’s
restitution figure in a brief passage of his memorandum. Id. at 12. He devoted
the bulk of his energy, however, to challenging the PSR’s findings (a) that M s.
Pollock suffered “an injury between serious and life-threatening”; and (b) that the
appropriate criminal history category was III. Id. at 4. On February 6, 2006, the
Probation Office filed another addendum. It represented to the court that the
addendum “fairly state[d] any objections that have been made.” Id. vol. II, PSR
Addendum at 1 (Feb. 6, 2006). The addendum addressed M r. Ahidley’s
objections concerning the bodily injury enhancement and his criminal history. It
made no mention, however, of the restitution amount. M ore specifically, it did
not aver that M r. A hidley had raised any objections concerning restitution.
The district court sentenced M r. Ahidley on February 10, 2006. During the
sentencing hearing, when the topic turned to restitution, M r. Ahidley’s counsel
interposed an objection. 2 He stated, “Y our H onor, one thing about
2
The government contends that M r. Ahidley has effectively forfeited
appellate review of this sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue concerning the
restitution award by waiting until the sentencing proceedings to raise the issue.
M r. Ahidley insists, however, that he lodged an earlier objection addressing this
issue in his January 2006 sentencing memorandum. W e need not resolve this
timing dispute. The district court chose to address M r. Ahidley’s objection
(continued...)
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restitution. I assume that there’s evidence supporting that. It was my intention to
object to the restitution, if the Court doesn’t have evidence before it supporting
the restitution award.” R. vol. III, Tr. Sentencing Hearing at 40-41 (Feb. 10,
2006). The court noted the objection, but referred to “numerous claims” listed in
the PSR. Id. at 41. It ordered restitution in the amount cited by the Probation
Office (i.e., $22,537.13), which the government noted was “around [$]21,000.”
Id. 3 The court declined to impose a fine “[b]ased upon M r. Ahidley’s resources.”
2
(...continued)
concerning the restitution amount, which it w as entitled to do. See Fed. R. Crim.
P. 32(i)(1)(D) (providing that a court “may, for good cause, allow a party to make
a new objection at any time before sentence is imposed”); see also United States
v. Chung, 261 F.3d 536, 538-39 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that the district court was
required only “to make findings on timely objections and on objections that it
considers in its discretion”). Therefore, we are content to reach the issue on
appeal and apply the abuse-of-discretion standard of review.
3
The district court’s intentions regarding the amount of restitution that
it was ordering are illuminated by this exchange between the court and the
Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA):
[AUSA ]: M y understanding is that Probation came up with a
figure around the figure that the victim provided, which
is around [$]21,000. I don’t know the exact figure. It’s
around [$]21,000.
[COURT]: And that’s the figure that I saw in the report.
[AUSA ]: Yeah.
[COURT]: And I w ill – I’m going to order that restitution. . . .
R. vol. III, Tr. Sentencing Hearing at 41 (Feb. 10, 2006). The “report” referenced
(continued...)
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Id.
The district court was silent at the sentencing hearing regarding the
schedule of payments – that is, about the timetable that would control M r.
Ahidley’s obligation to pay the restitution. In its written judgment docketed three
days after the sentencing, however, the district court specifically addressed this
issue. It stated: “The restitution will be paid immediately.” Id. Doc. 39, at 5.
II. D ISC USSIO N
W e review the legality of an order of restitution de novo. See United States
v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1278 (10th Cir. 1999). The factual findings supporting
restitution are reviewed for clear error and the amount of restitution for abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Osborne, 332 F.3d 1307, 1314 (10th Cir. 2003).
M r. Ahidley acknowledges that he did not preserve an objection to the restitution
payment schedule; however, w e may review for plain error. See United States v.
Overholt, 307 F.3d 1231, 1253 (10th Cir. 2002); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)
(“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it
was not brought to the court’s attention.”). 4
3
(...continued)
by the court was of course the PSR and the figure in it w as $22,537.13.
4
The elements of the plain-error standard are now familiar. As the
Supreme Court re-stated them in Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997):
Under that test, before an appellate court can correct an error
not raised at trial, there must be (1) “error,” (2) that is “plain,”
(continued...)
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A. Am ount of Restitution
Because M r. Ahidley was convicted of a crime of violence, the M VRA
required the district court to order restitution to the victims of the offense. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 3663A(a)(1), (c)(1)(A)(i) (requiring restitution for crimes of violence);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 16 (defining “crime of violence”). The M VRA calls for
restitution in the “full amount of each victim’s losses as determined by the court
and without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant.” 18
U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A). This amount should include costs for the necessary
medical services for recovery. See id. § 3663A(b)(2)(A).
W e have recognized that “the determination of restitution is not an exact
science and that the calculation of a loss need not be precise.” United States v.
Kravchuk, 335 F.3d 1147, 1157 (10th Cir. 2003). In assessing the reliability of
loss figures, courts are permitted to draw inferences from the totality of the
circumstances through an exercise of “logical and probabilistic reasoning.”
4
(...continued)
and (3) that “affect[s] substantial rights.” If all three
conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its
discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error
“seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.”
520 U.S. at 466-67 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732
(1993); internal quotation marks and citations omitted). An error is plain if
it is “clear” or “obvious.” Id. 467. And the Court in Johnson clarified that
“it is enough that an error be ‘plain’ at the time of appellate consideration.”
Id. at 468.
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United States v. Atencio, 435 F.3d 1222, 1232 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotations omitted; quoting United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 865 (10th Cir.
1995)) (noting that an appellate court will uphold a criminal conviction when the
jury's factual inferences in support of the verdict are based upon logical and
probabilistic reasoning).
M r. Ahidley argues that the NM HSD letter requesting restitution in the
amount of $21,463.13 is insufficient evidence on which to base the restitution
amount because it does not detail the actual medical services rendered to M s.
Pollock. He further asserts that there is nothing to demonstrate that the treatment
M s. Pollock received, for which NM HSD claimed reimbursement, was limited to
injuries caused by his offense. M r. Ahidley hinges his argument on a Seventh
Circuit decision and the equivocal language of the NM HSD letter, which requests
reimbursement for treatment that “may be related to” the incident.
W e are unpersuaded by M r. Ahidley’s arguments. Nothing in the record
would have given the district court a reason to question the loss amount claimed
by NM HSD . Furthermore, its probable accuracy was supported by inferences that
the district court could have reasonably made from the evidence regarding the
severity of M s. Pollock’s injuries and the medical interventions undertaken to
treat her. In other w ords, the amount claimed by NM HSD for M s. Pollock’s
medical care is consistent with the expenditures one might reasonably expect to
be required to medically treat someone under similar circumstances.
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In commenting on the extent of the injuries that M r. Ahidley inflicted upon
her, M s. Pollock stated:
[M r. Ahidley] was the reason why I was in this hospital and
had to have surgery done. I was in the hospital for about one
week. I had surgery on my liver and kidney. M y liver was
stitched, but my kidney was left alone because it was cut in
half. I was suppose [sic] to go for a check-up, but I haven’t
because of the cost. For about two months after I left the
hospital a home health nurse came twice a day to clean my
wounds on my stomach and right side.
R. vol. II, PSR ¶ 23-24. In sum, a hospital incurred costs to treat M s. Pollock,
including performing surgery to repair her vital organs, and providing her with a
bed, and presumably nursing care, for one week. And, after the surgery, M s.
Pollock still needed costly treatment; home healthcare providers treated her for
about two months. In light of these facts, the $21,463.13 figure that NM HSD
claimed as reimbursement for covering the costs of M s. Pollock’s treatment seems
entirely reasonable. And the district court could properly conclude by a
preponderance of the evidence that it w as accurate.
The Probation Office made a specific request to NM HSD for information
related to costs that it incurred for the medical treatment of M s. Pollock’s
injuries, which M r. Ahidley caused on October 13, 2004. One cannot reasonably
conclude that, in responding to this federal governmental entity, NM HSD would
have elected to include costs associated with any other treatment. Nor has there
been any credible suggestion that M s. Pollock suffered injuries around October
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13 th that were unrelated to M r. Ahidley’s criminal conduct. The fact that NM HSD
could have employed more unqualified language in its letter – something more
direct than the phrase “may be related to” – is of little significance. Although
directly addressing the question of costs incurred in connection with M s.
Pollock’s treatment, NM HSD’s correspondence was basically a generic form
letter. See supra note 1. The district court properly relied upon the NM HSD
letter in setting the amount of restitution.
M r. Ahidley’s contrary argument relies on United States v. M enza, 137 F.3d
533 (7th Cir. 1998). There, the Seventh Circuit vacated a restitution award and
remanded for an evidentiary hearing because it concluded that the sentencing
court had not developed an adequate record to permit appellate review. M enza,
137 F.3d at 538-40. In particular, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the
sentencing court had given “an inadequate explanation and insufficient reasoning”
regarding its acceptance “on their face” of invoices of the Drug Enforcement
Administration and defendant’s landlord and that it needed to determine “whether
the losses incurred by the DEA and M eriter [the landlord] are specifically
attributed to and directly related to” the criminal conduct that formed the basis for
defendant’s convictions. Id. at 538, 540.
M enza is readily distinguishable. The two invoices at issue in M enza raised
more questions than they answered. It was undisputed that the reimbursement
amount claimed in the DEA’s invoice included costs for the disposal of “non-
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criminal” items that were not related to defendant’s offense. Id. at 536. In that
circumstance, the failure of the invoice to itemize costs – thereby identifying
clean-up costs related to the offense conduct – w as a major deficiency. Further,
the landlord’s invoice raised a significant possibility of double-counting, in that it
showed that the landlord was seeking reimbursement for environmental
assessment and clean-up work that appeared to be similar to the kind of activities
for w hich the DEA was separately seeking reimbursement. Id. at 539. Given the
problem atic nature of these invoices, it is hardly surprising that the Seventh
Circuit questioned why the sentencing court would accept them on their face.
In contrast to M enza, the documentation at issue here – on its face –
established with reasonable certainty the losses recoverable through a restitution
order. In particular, it did not raise concerns about the inclusion of non-
recoverable costs. This documentation related to one thing and one thing only –
the costs incurred by NM HSD for care provided to M s. Pollack for injuries she
suffered on O ctober 13, 2004 at M r. Ahidley’s hands. Given this singular focus,
unlike the situation in M enza, the district court would not have been impeded in
arriving at a proper restitution amount by the absence of a specific itemization of
costs. Accordingly, M r. Ahidley’s reliance on M enza is misplaced. W e conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in setting the restitution amount.
B. Paym ent Schedule
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The M VRA outlines the procedure for issuing and enforcing restitution
orders and provides that the district court “shall . . . specify in the restitution
order the manner in which, and the schedule according to which, the restitution is
to be paid.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2). “The court is granted considerable
discretion in structuring a payment schedule.” Overholt, 307 F.3d at 1255. The
statute provides:
A restitution order may direct the defendant to make a single,
lump-sum payment, partial payments at specified intervals, in-
kind payments, or a combination of payments at specified
intervals and in-kind payments.
18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(3)(A). Furthermore, when the court finds from the evidence
that the defendant’s “economic circumstances” do not permit him (a) to pay
currently any amount of a restitution order, and (b) to pay “the full amount of a
restitution order in the foreseeable future under any reasonable schedule of
payments,” it may enter an order “direct[ing] the defendant to make nominal
periodic payments.” Id. § 3664(f)(3)(B).
In determining a payment schedule, the statute expressly instructs the court
to consider certain factors regarding an individual defendant, including the
defendant’s financial resources, his other assets (including whether jointly or
individually controlled), his projected earnings and other income, and his
financial obligations. See id. § 3664(f)(2)(A)-(C). Although extensive remarks
are not necessary, we must be able to discern from the record that this
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consideration has taken place. See United States v. Coates, 178 F.3d 681, 684 (3d
Cir. 1999) (Alito, J.) (rejecting the government’s argument that the district court
may “satisfy its duties under section 3664 through its silence”). W e “decline to
enter the zone of appellate speculation” as to whether a district court has
considered § 3664(f)(2) factors. Kravchuk, 335 F.3d at 1159 (internal quotation
marks omitted; quoting United States v. Zanghi, 209 F.3d 1201, 1205 (10th Cir.
2000)).
In United States v. Zunie, 444 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2006), we recently
addressed the requirement that a district court set a restitution payment schedule
“in light of the statutory factors.” 444 F.3d at 1238. There, the defendant alleged
that the district court erred by (1) imposing restitution “without regard” to his
“indigence”; and (2) ordering to be due immediately the total amount of
restitution. Id. W e deemed it unnecessary to go beyond the first contention of
error. W e confirmed that under the M VRA a district court must consider a
defendant’s financial resources and the other § 3664(f)(2) factors in setting “an
appropriate restitution payment schedule.” Id. W e remanded for such
consideration.
In the language of § 3664(f)(2), the district court’s restitution payment
schedule in this case required M r. Ahidley to pay a “single, lump-sum payment.”
The court’s w ritten judgment provided: “The restitution will be paid
immediately.” R. vol. I, Doc. 39 at 5. Nothing in the record, however, indicates
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that the district court engaged in the requisite consideration of the statutory
factors, including M r. Ahidley’s financial resources. Indeed, at the sentencing
hearing, the district court was completely silent about the subject of a restitution
payment schedule. Therefore, the court would not have had any occasion to
engage in the mandated statutory analysis.
In failing to consider on the record the § 3664(f)(2) factors in imposing a
restitution payment schedule on M r. Ahidley, it is beyond peradventure that the
district court erred. See Zunie, 444 F.3d at 1238 (“remand[ing] for the district
court to set an appropriate payment schedule in light of the statutory factors”).
As the government correctly suggests, however, the real question is w hether it
comm itted plain error. The government “concedes that if Zunie was decided
under a plain error standard, this Court must remand this case and instruct the
district court to set a payment schedule.” A ple. Br. at 13. It contends, however,
that Zunie’s text leaves the reader in doubt regarding the standard of review that
the court used in concluding that the district court erred. That lack of clarity, the
government reasons, allows for the possibility that Zunie was decided under a less
demanding standard of review than plain error, such that its holding of error
should not dictate the result here.
It is true the text of Zunie is not clear regarding its guiding standard of
review. For the reasons noted below, however, we do not believe that clearing
the murky waters on this point has any controlling effect on the outcome of this
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case. Nonetheless, reliable information concerning the standard of review at work
in Zunie could be directly relevant to our assessment of the weight to give to its
holding. Consequently, we have reviewed certain publicly-filed records in Zunie. 5
They strongly suggest that Zunie was not decided under a plain-error standard of
review. Regarding the restitution challenge, in Zunie the government did not
argue for application of the plain-error standard, and the defendant was silent
about it. See Aple. Br. at 27; Aplt. Op. Br. at 23, 25; Aplt. Reply Br. at 6-8. The
defendant did express concerns about the restitution award at the sentencing
hearing. See Tr. Sentencing Hearing at 23-24 (D. N.M ., Case No. 03-1453,
August 31, 2004). The parties apparently deemed defendant’s sentencing
arguments to be sufficient to preserve the issue of the restitution payment
schedule for appellate review.
Therefore, Zunie is probably not on all fours with this case; unquestionably,
5
Although we are not obliged to do so, we may exercise our discretion
to take judicial notice of publicly-filed records in our court and certain other
courts concerning matters that bear directly upon the disposition of the case at
hand. See St. Louis Baptist Temple v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 605 F.2d 1169,
1172 (10th Cir. 1979) (“[I]t has been held that federal courts, in appropriate
circumstances, may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and
without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to
matters at issue.”); see also Van Woudenberg v. Gibson, 211 F.3d 560, 568 (10th
Cir. 2000) (“W e note, however, that the court is permitted to take judicial notice
of its own files and records, as w ell as facts w hich are a matter of public
record.”), abrogated on other grounds by M cGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946
(10th Cir. 2000). Here, we have elected to examine publicly-filed records in the
Zunie litigation, including the appellate briefs, the criminal judgment, and the
transcript of the sentencing proceeding.
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plain-error review is appropriate here. However, this fact is of little moment. W e
have no difficulty concluding that a district court’s failure to follow the
unambiguous mandate of § 3664(f)(2) to consider a defendant’s financial
resources and related factors is error that is clear and obvious, and, under the
particular circumstances of this case, it is an error that should be recognized. See
Coates, 178 F.3d at 681; cf. United States v. Thingpen, 456 F.3d 766, 771 (7th
Cir. 2006) (holding that district court plainly erred when it effectively failed to
set a statutorily-required restitution payment schedule by “rul[ing] that the entire
amount of the restitution was due and payable in sixty days after sentencing”). 6
The M VRA was on the books for almost ten years at the time of M r.
Ahidley’s sentencing hearing and § 3664(f)(2)’s command is unambiguous. A
district court must set the restitution payment schedule “in consideration of”
certain characteristics of a defendant, including the defendant’s financial
resources. The failure to do so is obvious error. Only a few years after the
6
In an unpublished opinion of our court, on similar facts, we applied
the plain error standard and determined that the district court plainly erred in
ordering the defendant, jointly and severally with his co-defendants, to pay
$76,594.73 in restitution immediately, without giving consideration to
defendant’s financial condition. See United States v. Garcia-Castillo, 127 Fed.
App’x. 385, 386, 393 (10th Cir. 2005). There, according to the PSR, defendant
“had no income or assets and only a grade-school education.” Id. W e “vacat[ed]
the portion of the restitution order that directs immediate full payment and
remand[ed] to the district court to consider an appropriate manner of payment.”
Id. at 394. Although Garcia-Castillo is not binding precedent, its analysis is
persuasive on these facts.
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passage of the M VRA, the Third Circuit recognized this in Coates. It succinctly
stated: “Since the M VRA mandates that district courts schedule restitution
payments after taking into account the defendant’s financial resources, the
District Court’s failure to do so here constitutes plain error.” 178 F.3d at 684.
Despite the presence of contrary authority in other circuits, 7 we reached a
similar result in Overholt, focusing on the unambiguous language of the statute
and its structure. W e stated: “In light of this statutory scheme, we see no room
for delegation by the district court with respect to payment schedules for
restitution.” 307 F.3d at 1256. Accordingly, under a plain-error standard, we
reversed the district court’s restitution order that was “essentially delegating the
preparation of a payment schedule to the Bureau of Prison and the probation
office” and remanded “for the sole purpose of establishing a schedule.” Id. 1255,
1256. Accordingly, the district court’s failure here to consider on the record the §
3664(f)(2) factors is error of an obvious nature.
Further, it is an error that affects M r. Ahidley’s substantial rights and
seriously impacts the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings. M ost
7
In at least one circuit, a district court need not consider on the record
the § 3664(f)(2) factors in establishing a restitution payment schedule. In United
States v. Nucci, 364 F.3d 419, 422 (2d Cir. 2004), the Second Circuit rejected the
notion that the district court “committed error, plain or otherwise, by failing to
consider 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2)’s mandatory factors in setting his restitution
amount.” 364 F.3d at 421. As in Overholt, however, we do not believe the
presence of contrary circuit authority should control our determination of whether
the district court’s error was plain.
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importantly, under an appropriate and reasonable consideration of the §
3664(f)(2) factors, it seems virtually certain that the district court would not have
settled on the option of imposing an immediate-payment obligation on M r.
Ahidley.
The PSR indicated that M r. Ahidley, a highschool dropout with no
specialized skills, had no financial assets and was being supported by his family
when he was arrested. It further concluded that M r. Ahidley did not have the
financial w herewithal to pay a fine. Indeed, the district court appeared to
acknowledge M r. A hidley’s impecunious state by waiving imposition of the fine.
On these facts, it would appear almost beyond question that M r. Ahidley could
not make an immediate, single lump-sum payment of over $22,500. See United
States v. M yers, 198 F.3d 160, 168-69 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding as to $40,000
restitution award that the district “plainly erred in requiring immediate payment
of the restitution” when defendant had a negative net worth and no income); see
also supra note 6 (discussing our unpublished decision in Garcia-Castillo,
reversing under a plain error standard an immediate-payment restitution order in
the amount of $76,594.73, where defendant had no income and “only a grade-
school education”).
Having concluded that the district court plainly erred, we vacate the
schedule-of-payments portion of M r. Ahidley’s sentence and remand for the
district court to determine an appropriate payment schedule with reference to the
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§ 3664(f)(2) factors.
III. C ON CLU SIO N
The district court’s order regarding the restitution amount is AFFIRM ED.
However, we VAC ATE that portion of its restitution order establishing the
schedule of payments and R EM AND for the district court to impose an
appropriate payment schedule consistent w ith this opinion.
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