F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PU BL ISH
June 25, 2007
UNITED STATES COURT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
U N IFIED SC HO O L D ISTR IC T NO.
259, Sedgwick County, Kansas,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
D ISA BILITY RIG H TS C EN TER OF
KANSAS, (DRC),
No. 06-3057
Defendant-Appellee.
K A N SA S A SSO CIA TIO N O F
SC HO O L B OA RD S A N D N ATIONAL
SC HO O L B OA RD A SSO CIA TION,
Amici Curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of K ansas
(D.C. No. 04-CV-1279-JTM )
Roger M . Theis (Thomas R. Powell and Sarah J. Loquist, with him on the briefs),
Hinkle Elkouri Law Firm, LLC, W ichita, Kansas for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Summer A. Duke, Disability Rights Center of Kansas, Topeka, Kansas (Kirk W .
Lowry, Disability Rights Center, Topeka, Kansas with her on the brief), for
Defendant-Appellee.
Cynthia Lutz Kelly, Kansas Association of School Boards, Topeka, Kansas, filed
an amici curiae brief in support of Unified School District No. 259 on behalf of
amici curiae Kansas Association of School Boards and National School Board Association.
Before TAC HA , Chief Circuit Judge, EBEL, Circuit Judge, and KANE, * District
Judge.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
This case involves a dispute about access to student records between a
school district and a protection and advocacy (“P& A”) agency. A P& A agency is
an entity designated by the state to investigate abuse and neglect among
individuals with disabilities, and through that designation it receives federal
funding to provide protection and advocacy services. The school district asks us
to resolve the tension between federal law that authorizes a P& A agency to have
access to individuals’ records in certain situations and a separate federal statute
that penalizes school districts for unauthorized releases of student records.
However, after the school district filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment to
affirm its authority not to disclose the contested records, the P& A agency
withdrew its request for the records. The district court concluded that, with no
pending records request, the factual basis for the dispute has disappeared and
rendered this case moot. W e agree. Accordingly, we DISM ISS this appeal for
lack of jurisdiction.
*
Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior District Court Judge for the District of
Colorado, sitting by designation.
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I
The mother of a disabled student served by the Plaintiff-Appellant, Unified
School District No. 259 (“USD 259”) in Kansas, contacted Kansas’s designated
P& A agency, the Defendant-Appellee Disability Rights Center (“DRC”), to
complain about USD 259’s services. The student was seventeen years old and
had neurofibromatosis, a condition manifested by tumors on the nerves in the
face, neck and spine. According to DRC, “she had never received a public
education at school. She was homebound, on a doctor’s order, for all of her 17
years.” The mother complained to DRC about the relatively small quantity of
homebound instruction provided by USD 259’s special education program. DRC
began representing this student in a due process action, based on the disparity
between the one to three hours of instruction per w eek in the student’s
homebound placement, and most students’ approximately thirty hours of
instruction in school.
M eanwhile, DRC began investigating whether U SD 259 systemically
denied educational services to disabled students in homebound placements. In a
letter dated M ay 20, 2004, DRC requested information from USD 259 about
students who, pursuant to an individualized education program (“IEP”), did not
attend classes in district facilities. DRC cited its “probable cause” investigative
authority under the federal Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act (“DDA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 15041-15045, and Protection and Advocacy
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for Individuals with M ental Illness Act (“PAIM IA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801 et seq.
How ever, the D RC did not assert that it had probable cause to believe that these
students had been subjected to abuse or neglect.
In the M ay 20, 2004, letter, DRC sought the identities of the students and
the information necessary to contact their parents for their authorization to access
the students’ records. USD 259 replied several days later by providing
cumulative figures about students w ho, pursuant to an IEP, did not attend class in
district facilities during the day and were being “served through homebound
instruction.” U SD 259 then stated that, pursuant to the federal Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA ”), it could not release information
from students’ educational records – including the identity of students receiving
special education services – without the consent of their parents or legal
guardians.
DRC sent another letter to USD 259 on June 17, 2004, withdrawing its
request for the students’ names. Instead, DRC requested other details about each
of the twenty-two students receiving homebound instruction, covering more than
twenty categories of information. The data requested for each student included:
date of birth; grade level; race; disabilities; cognitive level of functioning;
supplemental and related services; physical education provided; transition plan;
transportation services; date of last IEP meeting; date of last comprehensive
evaluation for each student; hours of homebound services received each week;
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qualifications of persons providing services for each student; and percentage of
time spent in core curriculum for each student in math, science, language arts and
social studies. DRC stated that it was “asking these detailed questions because
we want to get a full and more complete understanding of the characteristics of
the students on homebound services in your school district.”
In a letter dated August 10, 2004, USD 259 declined to provide the
information. USD 259 stated that releasing the data requested would violate
FERPA, because the information in the aggregate w ould make it relatively easy to
identify each student. USD 259 noted that penalties for FERPA violations by
school districts include revocation of all federal funding, and estimated this could
total more than $57 million annually for U SD 259.
USD 259 then filed a declaratory judgment action against DRC, asking that
the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas find that the DDA, PA IM I, and
the Protection and Advocacy for Individual Rights A ct “are not applicable to
public schools” and to find that FERPA and the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (“IDEA”) “prohibit[] the release of the information requested.”
During cross-motions for summary judgment, DRC filed a reply
withdrawing its request for homebound students’ records and guardian
information. 1 DRC argued in its reply that while the “narrow issue of requests for
1
In withdrawing the request, DRC noted that the due process action that
had precipitated the inquiry into homebound instruction had been settled and
(continued...)
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homebound information is moot,” “the broad issue” of P& A agency access to
public school records “is not moot.”
However, the District Court dismissed USD 259’s complaint as moot.
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259 v. Kan. Advocacy & Protective Servs., Inc., No. 04-
1279-JTM (D. Kan. Jan. 11, 2006). Specifically, the court concluded that DRC’s
withdrawal of the record request “effectively deprives the court of the factual
basis for issuing an order” and “any substantive ruling would be considered
advisory.” U SD 259 timely appealed from this order.
II
Although we have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of federal
district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have no subject matter jurisdiction over a
case if it is moot. “Constitutional mootness doctrine is grounded in the Article III
requirement that federal courts may only decide actual ongoing cases or
controversies.” Seneca-Cayuga Tribe v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, 327 F.3d
1019, 1028 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotation, alteration omitted). W e review de novo
the question of whether a case is moot. Prier v. Steed, 456 F.3d 1209, 1212 (10th
Cir. 2006).
Actions seeking a declaratory judgment “must comport with the same
mootness principles as any other suit.” Id. at 1213. “It is well established that
1
(...continued)
subsequently dismissed with prejudice.
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what makes a declaratory judgment action ‘a proper judicial resolution of a “case
or controversy” rather than an advisory opinion is the settling of some dispute
which affects the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff.’” Cox v. Phelps
Dodge Corp., 43 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482
U.S. 755, 761 (1987) (alteration omitted)). “The crucial question is whether
granting a present determination of the issues offered . . . will have some effect in
the real world.” Citizens for Responsible Gov’t State Political Action Comm. v.
Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted).
The issue then is whether DRC’s voluntary withdrawal of the contested
records request moots this dispute, or w hether its contention that it continues to
have a right to such student records creates a case or controversy over which w e
can exercise jurisdiction. “[T]his court has explained that a plaintiff cannot
maintain a declaratory or injunctive action unless he or she can demonstrate a
good chance of being likewise injured by the defendant in the future.” Cox, 43
F.3d at 1348 (quotation, alteration omitted). USD 259 argues that the case is not
moot, because DRC’s position makes it likely that DRC will make similar
requests for student records in the future.
“An exception to the mootness doctrine exists when cases are capable of
repetition, yet evading review.” Disability Law Ctr. v. M illcreek Health Ctr., 428
F.3d 992, 996 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). For a case to dodge dismissal
for mootness under the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception,
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“two prerequisites must be satisfied: (1) the duration of the challenged action
must be too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and (2)
there must be a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be
subjected to the same action again.” H ain v. M ullin, 327 F.3d 1177, 1180 (10th
Cir. 2003) (en banc) (citing United States v. Seminole Nation, 321 F.3d 939, 943
(10th Cir. 2002)).
W e held that a dispute over the temporary orders of the National Indian
Gaming Commission (“NIGC”) closing certain gaming facilities of the Seminole
Nation of Oklahoma w as not moot, even though those orders had been superceded
by a permanent closure order that was being litigated separately. Seminole
Nation, 321 F.3d at 943. W e observed that the first prerequisite to the mootness
exception was met because “[t]emporary closure orders, by their very nature, are
short in duration,” since federal law “requires the NIGC to quickly review
temporary closure orders and either dissolve them or issue permanent closure
orders.” Id. W e also noted that the second prerequisite was met because “there
[w a]s a reasonable expectation that the Nation w[ould] again challenge the NIG C
Chairman’s authority to issue temporary closure orders that apply to all the
Nation’s gaming facilities.” Id. at 944. W e concluded that the appeal fit “the
exception to mootness for conduct capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Id.
In contrast, we concluded that when the legality of hypothetical future
conduct depends on the “specific context and content” of the disputed action, a
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declaratory judgment action fails to meet the “capable of repetition” prong of the
exception to mootness. O’Connor v. W ashburn Univ., 416 F.3d 1216, 1222 (10th
Cir. 2005). In a First Amendment case contesting the presence on campus of a
particular statue that had been removed during the litigation, we held that the
request for prospective relief was moot. “Although it is conceivable that the
university could bring some other religiously themed statue onto campus as part
of a future sculpture exhibition, this court cannot resolve the constitutionality of a
hypothetical future statue given that Establishment Clause questions are heavily
dependent on the specific context and content of the display.” Id.
In addition, we declared a matter moot when the P& A agency for Utah
withdrew its requests for the records of a patient at a particular health facility
after the patient had been moved out of state, because future records requests
would not necessarily “evade review.” W e concluded that the P& A agency’s
challenge of a facility’s refusal to release the requested records “does not present
an issue with an inherent time limit such that it would necessarily evade review in
future litigation. Unlike a pregnancy or a temporary order, a care facility’s
refusal to release a patient's medical records could last indefinitely.” D isability
Law Ctr., 428 F.3d at 997. M oreover, the P& A agency’s “need for speedy access
to records” was not enough to trigger the “evading review” prong of the exception
to mootness. Id. “If in a future dispute [the P& A agency] is concerned its case
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will become moot because events are moving too quickly, it can request expedited
review.” Id.
In the matter at bar, DRC withdrew its request for records eleven months
after USD 259 filed its action for a declaratory judgment, and waited until fairly
late in the summary judgment stage of litigation to announce its withdrawal.
DRC argues now that the case is moot because DRC withdrew its request, it is
unlikely to reinstate this particular request, and has no records requests pending
before USD 259. DRC suggests that in withdrawing its request it recognized that
“the amount of homebound services offered to students with disabilities could not
be addressed effectively as a systemic issue.” DRC states that “there is no reason
to believe DRC will again assert its access authority under the P& A Acts to
obtain the same information about the same students from the same school
district.” D RC concedes, however, that it “may request student records again in
the future,” although such request w ould “be based on a different set of facts.”
USD 259’s desire for a declaratory judgment establishing its right to
withhold records from DRC in the future is not sufficient to overcome mootness,
even if we were to conclude that DRC is likely to request student records from
USD 259 again. As w e determined in Disability Law Center, the “refusal to
release . . . records could last indefinitely,” 428 F.3d at 997. The fact that USD
259 is seeking a declaratory judgment does not change the conclusion that the
“duration of the challenged action” is not “too short to be fully litigated prior to
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its cessation or expiration,” Hain, 327 F.3d at 1180, because the relevant duration
is measured by USD 259’s refusal to release the student records.
Nor does U SD 259 face an inherent time limit under federal law to
relinquish student records. Although FERPA provides that a school district that
improperly releases student records may lose its federal funding, neither party
points to any possibility of a penalty against USD 259 for improperly withholding
such records. In fact, FERPA gives U SD 259 a safe harbor in that a refusal to
release records on the grounds of student privacy cannot jeopardize a school’s
federal funding. 2 As such, USD 259’s refusal to provide student information
pursuant to a future request for records is the type of matter that can be “fully
litigated” in the normal course of events, and, if unique circumstances demand a
faster resolution, the parties can request expedited review.
Likewise, there is no “reasonable expectation” that USD 259 “will be
subjected to the same action again.” Hain, 327 F.3d at 1180 (emphasis added).
DRC has suggested that it would not seek again information about all homebound
students because it determined that addressing homebound services on an
aggregate basis would not be effective. M oreover, DRC’s authority to access
2
FERPA provides that “refusal of a . . . local educational agency . . . to
provide personally identifiable data on students or their families . . . to any . . .
third party, on the grounds that it constitutes a violation of the right to privacy
and confidentiality of students or their parents, shall not constitute sufficient
grounds for the suspension or termination of Federal assistance.” 20 U.S.C. §
1232i(a).
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student records – and U SD 259’s obligation to release requested records –
depends on the specific facts underlying the request for records, so separate
requests for different types of student information in different contexts cannot be
considered the “same action.” For example, a P& A agency’s authority under the
federal DDA to access records depends on the status of the individual’s legal
guardianship, whether a complaint has been received, or whether “as a result of
monitoring or other activities, there is probable cause to believe that such
individual has been subject to abuse or neglect.” 42 U.S.C. § 15043(a)(2)(I).
State law provides certain authority to the designated P& A agency as well. See
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 74-5515 (setting forth records access provisions for alleged
incidents of abuse and neglect). Therefore, the legitimacy of a hypothetical
request for records will be “heavily dependent on the specific context and
content” of the facts asserted in the request. O’Connor, 416 F.3d at 1222.
USD 259 argues that DRC’s withdrawal of its record request is merely the
“voluntary cessation” of wrongful conduct that should not necessarily defeat
jurisdiction. The rule that “voluntary cessation of a challenged practice rarely
moots a federal case . . . traces to the principle that a party should not be able to
evade judicial review, or to defeat a judgment, by temporarily altering
questionable behavior.” City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of W aukesha, 531
U.S. 278, 284 n.1 (2001) (citations omitted). “A request for prospective relief
can be mooted by a defendant’s voluntary compliance if the defendant meets the
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‘formidable burden’ of demonstrating that it is ‘absolutely clear the allegedly
wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.’” Tandy v. City of
W ichita, 380 F.3d 1277, 1291 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc.
v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000)). “Such a burden
will typically be met only by changes that are permanent in nature and that
foreclose a reasonable chance of recurrence of the challenged conduct.” Id.
(citing Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 190).
Because D RC continues to assert that it has authority to request and access
student information from USD 259, USD 259 contends that DRC has not met its
burden of demonstrating that future records requests are unlikely to recur. W e
can envision circumstances in which a P&A agency’s repeated and similar
requests for student records would fall within the voluntary cessation doctrine,
particularly if accompanied by legal threats seeking to compel release of the
records. W e have held that a declaratory judgment is not mooted simply by the
defendant’s stated rescission of a compelling action when the defendant retains
the ability to reinstitute that action against the plaintiff. See, e.g., ARW
Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 947 F.2d 450, 453 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding a
declaratory judgment action remained live where the defendants had neither
dismissed with prejudice their arbitration claims against the plaintiff nor filed an
amended complaint to eliminate the disputed claims). But in this case, DRC
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currently wields no weapon against USD 259, making the “possibility of
recurrence” merely “theoretical.” O’Connor, 416 F.3d at 1222.
M ore importantly, we already have observed that the “allegedly wrongful
behavior” in this case is highly fact- and context-specific, rather than conduct that
is likely to “recur” on similar facts and in the same context. In such a case, the
“voluntary cessation” doctrine is inapplicable, because our review of future
instances of “wrongful behavior” may be quite different than the complained-of
example that already has ceased.
“The hallmark of a moot case or controversy is that the relief sought can no
longer be given or is no longer needed.” N.M . Env’t Dep’t v. Foulston (In re L.F.
Jennings O il Co.), 4 F.3d 887, 889 (10th Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted). It would
have no “effect in the real world,” Citizens for Responsible Gov’t, 236 F.3d at
1182, and essentially be “an advisory opinion,” Cox, 43 F.3d at 1348, were we to
adopt USD 259’s position that FERPA and IDEA prevent the type of disclosure
requested by DRC, because USD 259 does not need any relief. DRC currently
does not burden USD 259 with any requests for student information, nor is USD
259 threatened with any adverse action based on its denials of such requests.
DRC’s future requests for information will not “evad[e] review,” because “[w ]e
expect that [USD 259] will have ample opportunity to contest this issue in each
case where it arises.” N.M . Env’t Dep’t, 4 F.3d at 889.
This appeal is DISM ISSED as moot.
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