United States v. Brown

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

July 24, 2007

Elisabeth A. Shumaker
PUBLISH Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 05-2319

FR AN K D A VID BR OWN ,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New M exico
(D.C. No. CR-04-2243 W PJ)

Benjamin A. Gonzales, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, New
M exico, for Defendant-Appellant.

David M . W alsh, Assistant U.S. Attorney (David C. Iglesias, United States
Attorney, with him on the brief), Albuquerque, New M exico, for Plaintiff-
Appellee.

Before H E N RY, SE YM OU R, and, TYM KOVICH, Circuit Judges.

SE YM O UR, Circuit Judge.
 Frank David Brown appeals his conviction on one count of being a felon in

possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). M r. Brown pled

guilty but preserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to

suppress evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I

At approximately 9:53 a.m. on October 12, 2004, an unidentified male

called 911 to report that a woman by the name of Shante was being held hostage

by an armed man in apartment 22 at 424 Jefferson Street, Northeast. The caller

stated that he had been visiting Shante when the man entered the apartment with a

handgun in his back pocket. Shante and the man started arguing and Shante asked

him to leave, but he refused. The caller stated that be believed the man w as an

ex-boyfriend Shante had tried to evict earlier in the day. The caller stated that

Shante was afraid of the man and cowered against a wall when the man

brandished his handgun. The caller tried to intervene, but the man told him to

stay out of it. W hen the operator asked his name, the caller immediately replied

“Tyrone,” but shortly thereafter indicated he wished to remain anonymous. Rec.

vol. IV at 14. The caller stated that he had left the apartment “before [he could

get] shot dead.” He insisted repeatedly that Shante needed help. Id. at 16. H e

urged the operator to “please hurry” several times, id. at 15, and at one point

demanded that she “[j]ust get somebody over here before he shoots that girl.” Id.

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at 18. W hen asked whether he thought she would answer if the 911 operator

called her, he replied, “No, I doubt . . . he probably won’t let her answer the

phone.” Id. The 911 operator designated the call a “priority one,” meaning it

involved a direct threat to someone’s life or property. 1 See id. at 8.

W hile the caller was on the phone with the 911 operator, the operator was

communicating with the Albuquerque Police Department (APD) dispatch. It is

unclear from the record whether this communication was w ritten or verbal. 2

1
M ichael Sullivan, an employee of the A lbuquerque Police Department’s
dispatch unit, testified at the suppression hearing that both emergency and non-
emergency calls are routed through the same computer system. Rec., vol. IV at 7,
32-33. He said that in this specific case, the 911 operator initially typed
information into the computer that resulted in a priority designation of “two,” but
she later changed the designation to “priority one” as she continued to gather
information from the caller. Id. at 32-33. M r. Sullivan affirmed that a priority
one call is an emergency call. Id. at 8. See also id. at 39.
2
M r. Sullivan testified that 911 operators take calls from the public and
pass on information to dispatch employees who, in turn, comm unicate with police
officers in the field via radio. See Rec., vol. IV at 6-7. He said that all 911 calls
are recorded, as are radio communications betw een dispatch and police. Id. at 5-
6. On cross-examination, M r. Sullivan seemed to suggest that information
regarding a call is relayed by the 911 operator to dispatch by way of a written
report. See id. at 23-24, 32. The report for the call at issue appears to have been
an exhibit at the suppression hearing, but it is not included in the appellate record.
Accordingly, the record does not reflect what information known to the 911
operator, such as the caller’s first name, for instance, was actually conveyed to
dispatch. On the basis of this record, therefore, we are not prepared to say that
the caller’s first name w as within the “collective knowledge” of the detaining
officers by virtue of the fact that it w as communicated to the 911 operator. See
United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1503-04 (10th Cir. 1996) (explaining
“collective knowledge” doctrine). W e are especially reluctant to do so when it is
clear from the record that dispatch believed the caller w as female and relayed this
erroneous information to the officers. Under the specific facts presented by the
(continued...)

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Dispatch in turn contacted several police officers in the field. The

communication from dispatch to the officers was as follow s:

The Zia Plaza Apartments, 424 Jefferson, Northeast, 424 Jefferson.
In apartment 22, there’s going to be a BM A about twenty-six years of
age, refusing to let caller leave. Advising that the subject should
have a gun in his back pocket. Advising [inaudible] approximately
thirty-six year-old BFA. M ale is going to be about six feet tall with
a thin build wearing a black shirt and black pants. Possibly carrying
a 22 or 25. The BFA is going to be a “Shantella” [inaudible]
situation advising that he’s refusing to leave [inaudible] possibly an
ex-boyfriend [inaudible] . . . .

Audio Tape: Gov’t Ex. 2 at Suppression Hr’g (Oct. 12, 2004).

One of the officers asked dispatch to run a license plate check on a vehicle

parked near 424 Jefferson Street, and dispatch responded that the car was

2
(...continued)
record, it does not appear that the officers who detained M r. Brown knew that the
911 call had been placed by a man named “Tyrone.” See id. at 1504 (holding a
presumption of communication between investigating officers is rebuttable by
evidence suggesting communication did not actually occur).
There is also evidence that, in addition to receiving a radio communication,
officers in the field also received, through computers in their patrol cars, the
information typed into dispatch’s computer system by the 911 operator. See Rec.,
vol. IV at 34, 38. It is not clear from the appellate record, however, whether the
information received by the officers in the field through their computers is the
same as that received by dispatch, because the record does not contain any
communication by the 911 operator to either the officers or dispatch. This
ambiguity has hampered our ability to assess precisely what information the
officers had before they detained M r. Brown. Although we conclude that the
evidence in the record, namely, the recording of dispatch’s communication with
the officers, provided the officers w ith the reasonable suspicion necessary to
lawfully detain M r. Brown, we take this opportunity to encourage the government
in the future to clarify exactly what information makes its way from the 911
operator to the officers. It seems clear from this record that information known to
the 911 operator was not relayed by radio from dispatch to the officers, and this
fact has given us some pause.

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registered to Shante Stillman, and the address on the registration was apartment

22, 424 Jefferson Street. After the officer obtained the information on the vehicle

registration, the following exchange took place between dispatch and one of the

officers:

[OFFICER:] W hen you [got] the call from [the] caller, was she
calling back from the home [inaudible] or did she advise you of a
cell, or how w as she able to get on the phone? Did she advise?
[DISPATCH:] Apparently the call . . . the caller w ho is anonymous is
not the actual Shante. Advising that it’s possibly a friend because
she’s advising that she w as w ith this girl earlier, and that the girl
Shante was afraid of the ex-boyfriend coming back. She does have a
[phone number] that’s listed on the call. I don’t know if it’s a cell or
not. But there is a [phone number] listed to Shante.
[O FFICER:] So the caller is not Shante? But it is listed to her?
DISPA TCH: The caller is not Shante. It was an anonymous female,
and [the 911 operator] did advise that this anonymous female called
it in and said she w as with Shante, and that she’s a friend of hers.
[O FFIC ER :] Ten-four. D id she advise that she is still with her? Or
had she left?
[DISPA TCH:] She was no longer with her. The anonymous friend
should not still be w ith her.
[O FFICER:] Ten-four. Can you 21 the caller and see if she’s
anywhere in our area. W e’d like to speak with her.
[DISPATCH:] She’s an anonymous female. Did not leave her name
or 21 back.

Id.

As indicated above, one officer requested that dispatch call Shante’s

number, which the caller had provided to the 911 operator. No one answered the

phone when dispatch rang Shante’s number. An officer then reported they would

attempt to knock on the door of the apartment, but shortly thereafter an officer

exclaimed, “He’s coming out.” Id. at 50.

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 At M r. Brown’s suppression hearing, Police Patrol Officer Xavier Lopez 3

testified that, upon receiving notification from dispatch of a “priority one”

domestic dispute involving an armed suspect, he and O fficers Alex M arentes,

John M ontoya and David Jaramillo formulated a plan for approaching the

apartment at 424 Jefferson Street. They planned to approach with their weapons

ready and knock on the apartment door with guns draw n. Before the officers

reached the door, however, M r. Brown exited the apartment onto a breezeway.

The following testimony by Officer Lopez explains w hat happened next:

[OFFICER LOPEZ:] As I got – when we were set up, we were ready
to go in [to the apartment] at that point, I hear Officer M arentes say –
say, “he’s coming out.”
[GOVERNM ENT:] How did you hear that?
[OFFICER LOPEZ:] I heard that over the radio. Apparently,
[Officer M arentes] said it on his handle. He said, “he’s coming
out.”. . .
[GOVERNM ENT:] And then so Officer M arentes said he was
coming out. W hat happened next? . . .
[OFFICER LOPEZ:] That point, myself, Officer M ontoya, [and]
Officer Jaramillo pied out, basically just came out in a circle near the
east stairw ay up near w here the subject was at, at this point where we
could see Officer M arentes begin to give him commands to show him
his hands.
[GOVERNM ENT:] So everyone had their weapons drawn; is that
correct?
[OFFICER LOPEZ:] Everyone has their weapons drawn.
[GOVERNM ENT:] And it might sound kind of obvious, but why?
[O FFICER LOPEZ:] Didn’t want to get shot. Subject possibly has a

3
Officer Lopez testified his duties as a patrol officer involve “responding
to calls that come into our dispatch, from 911 calls to non-emergency calls,
proactive activity . . . basically protection of the community. I’m in a marked
patrol vehicle, and I’m actually driving around in a certain area in Albuquerque.”
Rec., vol. IV at 36.

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 gun. W e’re thinking this is probably the subject that this anonymous
caller is talking about. I guess that’s it . . . .
[GOVERNM ENT:] W hat happened next?
[O FFICER LOPEZ:] At that point, we slow ly walked up the stairs,
continued to have our guns drawn. W e’re giving comm ands: “Show
me your hands. Show me your hands. M ake sure I can see your
hands.” At some point, I had the subject get down on his knees, put
his hands behind his back while O fficer M ontoya covers. A nd what I
mean by that is he’s got his rifle on target to this subject. I went
ahead and holstered, handcuffed the subject . . . .
[GOVERNM ENT:] . . . W hat did you do next? Did you pat him
down?
[O FFICER LOPEZ:] At that point, basically simultaneously, as I
began to pat him down, I asked him, “Do you have any weapons on
you?” He immediately said, “Yes. I have a gun in my left rear
pocket.”
[GOV ERNM ENT:] Okay. And did you remove the firearm?
[OFFICER LOPEZ:] I did.
[GOVERNM ENT:] Okay. And what did you do next?
[OFFICER LOPEZ:] At that point, we detained the subject who
identified himself as Frank Brown, detained him. Obviously, we
took the weapon away. I then continued my investigation and went
to talk to Shante.

Rec., vol. IV at 50-52.

M r. Brown was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm.

Prior to trial, he filed a motion to suppress the handgun and statements made to

police following his detention, claiming the 911 call was anonymous and did not

provide the officers with reasonable suspicion to stop and search him. After

conducting a hearing, the district court, ruling from the bench, denied M r.

Brown’s motion to suppress. In reaching its conclusion, the court found that the

911 call precipitating M r. Brown’s detention was anonymous, but that the

information provided by the anonymous caller had sufficient indicia of reliability

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to provide the officers with reasonable suspicion to detain and frisk M r. Brown.

Id. at 96-97. M r. Brown subsequently pled guilty, preserving the right to

challenge the district court’s ruling on appeal.

II

In review ing the denial of a motion to suppress, “[w]e view the evidence in

the light most favorable to the government and review the district court’s factual

findings for clear error. W e review the district court’s ultimate determination of

reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment de novo.” United States v. Tucker,

305 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court has said there are three types of police-citizen

encounters:

(1) consensual encounters w hich do not implicate the Fourth
Amendment; (2) investigative detentions w hich are Fourth
Amendment seizures of limited scope and duration and must be
supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; and (3)
arrests, the most intrusive of Fourth Amendment seizures and
reasonable only if supported by probable cause.

United States v. Davis, 94 F.3d 1465, 1467-68 (10th Cir. 1996) (citations

omitted). W e agree with the district court and the parties that the detention here

should be treated as an investigative detention. “To determine whether an

investigative detention was constitutionally permitted, we must ask both ‘whether

the officer[s’] action[s were] justified at [their] inception, and whether [they

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were] reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the

interference in the first place.’” United States v. Soto-Cervantes, 138 F.3d 1319,

1322 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).

Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 30, officers may stop and detain an

individual if they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminality is

afoot. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). The Supreme Court

has instructed that “[t]he concept of reasonable suspicion . . . is not readily, or

even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules . . . . In evaluating the validity

of a [Terry] stop . . . , we must consider the totality of the circumstances – the

whole picture.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted).

At the time the officers detained M r. Brown, they knew the follow ing facts:

(1) a vehicle registered to a “Shante Stillman” was parked near the Zia Apartment

complex at 424 Jefferson Street, and the address on the registration was apartment

22, 424 Jefferson Street; (2) a friend of Shante had called 911, claiming that an

armed man w as holding Shante in apartment 22 and refusing to let her leave; (3)

the friend had been present when the man entered the apartment and had seen the

man’s gun; (4) the caller believed the man might be an ex-boyfriend; (5) the 911

operator designated the call a priority one, meaning a direct threat to someone’s

life or property; (6) a telephone call placed to Shante’s number was not answered;

and (7) a man closely resembling the description provided by Shante’s friend

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exited apartment 22. W e conclude this knowledge was sufficient to give rise to a

reasonable suspicion.

Officer Lopez testified at the suppression hearing that, other than the fact

that there was a car parked outside 424 Jefferson registered to a woman with the

same first name as the alleged victim, all of the information known to the police

was provided by the unidentified individual claiming to be a friend of Shante.

M r. Brown argues this unverified information did not give rise to a reasonable

suspicion justifying his detention. He contends the 911 call precipitating his

detention was an anonymous tip similar to the one held unreliable in Florida v.

J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000). In J.L., the Supreme Court held an anonymous

unrecorded and undocumented telephone call indicating that a “young black male

standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun,” id.

at 268, without more, was unreliable and therefore insufficient to justify a police

officer’s stop and frisk of the defendant. The Court noted that “the officers’

suspicion that J.L. was carrying a weapon arose not from any observations of

their ow n but solely from a call made from an unknown location by an unknown

caller.” Id. at 270.

As we said in United States v. Browning, 252 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2001),

however, “[i]n J. L., ‘[a]ll the police had to go on . . . was the bare report of an

unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the

gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about J. L.’”

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Id. at 1157 (quoting J.L., 529 U.S. at 271). In this case, we have considerably

more information about and from the informant then was the case in J.L.

As the Second Circuit has explained,

[w]here informants are known . . ., a lesser degree of corroboration is
required. C om pare Williams, 407 U.S. at 146-47, 92 S.Ct. 1921
(upholding a Terry stop based on an uncorroborated tip from a known
and previously reliable informant), with White, 496 U.S. at 331-32,
110 S.Ct. 2412 (holding that an anonymous tip justified a Terry stop
because both innocent details and predictive information were
corroborated). A known informant's reputation may be assessed and
he may be held accountable if his allegations turn out to be
fabricated. J.L., 529 U.S. at 270, 120 S.Ct. 1375. W hile a proven
track record of providing reliable tips may serve to bolster an
informant's veracity, past performance is not the only way to show
veracity. See United States v. Canfield, 212 F.3d 713, 719-20 (2d Cir.
2000). The veracity of identified private citizen informants (as
opposed to paid or professional criminal informants) is generally
presumed in the absence of special circumstances suggesting that
they should not be trusted. See Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d
156, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Rollins, 522 F.2d 160,
164 (2d Cir.1975) (noting the “peculiar likelihood of accuracy” of a
citizen informant's report).

United States v. Elmore, 482 F.3d 172, 180 (2d Cir. 2007). See also Easton v.

City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1449 (10th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he skepticism and

careful scrutiny usually found in cases involving informants . . . from the criminal

milieu, is appropriately relaxed if the informant is an identified victim or ordinary

citizen w itness.”). Under the totality of circumstances, therefore, we assess

whether the information received from the informant “bore sufficient indicia of

reliability.” United States v. Jenkins, 313 F.3d 549, 554 (10th Cir. 2002).

The officers in this case knew the caller w as a friend of the alleged victim

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and was present when the armed man entered her apartment. The fact that the

officers did not know the caller’s name is not dispositive on the question of

anonymity. An unnamed individual who divulges enough distinguishing

characteristics to limit his possible identity to only a handful of people may be

nameless, but he is capable of being identified and thus is not anonymous. For

example, if a tipster says “I wish to be anonymous, but I live at the apartment

building on a certain street corner” or “I wish to remain anonymous, but I have a

blue truck and work at the Burger King on a particular avenue,” the person may

have provided sufficient clues for an intrepid officer to find and identify him.

In the present case, it was reasonable for the officers to believe a limited

number of people were both Shante’s friend and present in her apartment on the

morning of October 12, 2004. 4 The caller in this case belonged to a relatively

small population, and therefore is not analogous to the anonymous caller in J.L.

who did not distinguish him or herself from the more than two million people who

lived in M iami-Dade County. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring)

(“a tip might be anonymous in some sense yet have certain other features, either

supporting reliability or narrowing the likely class of inform ants, so that the tip

4
The recording of the 911 call indicates the caller knew Shante fairly well.
He knew her telephone number, the age of her child, and the child’s whereabouts.
He also knew that she had an appointment that morning. W hile it is true that he
did not know her last name, see Rec., vol. IV at 16, we do not regard that as
conclusive evidence that he was not a friend of Shante in light of the other things
he knew about her that only a friend or close acquaintance would know.

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does provide the lawful basis for some police action.” (emphasis added)).

Although the police did not know the caller’s name here, they knew enough about

him to reasonably believe they could locate him had his call been simply intended

to harass M r. Brown. The caller was not free to “lie with impunity,” because by

making his identity readily knowable he risked criminal liability for reporting a

false claim. J.L., 529 U.S. at 276 (K ennedy, J., concurring). See N.M . S TAT . §

30-39-1 (criminalizing the making of a false report to police). W hen a caller

refuses to provide his name but nonetheless provides sufficient details regarding

his identity to render him readily identifiable by police, we are persuaded that the

caller is not anonymous in the same sense as the caller in J.L. was anonymous,

and information furnished by such a caller therefore bears an indicium of

reliability not present in J.L. 5 See United States v. Terry-Crespo, 356 F.3d 1170,

1174 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding where 911 call was recorded and transcribed and

defendant gave his name but not his phone number, the calls “narrowed the likely

class of informants,” thus rendering the officers’ reliance on it more reasonable

than the officers’ reliance on the anonymous tip in J.L.) (citing J.L., 529 U.S. at

275 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).

W e consider it another important indicium of reliability that the caller

5
W e caution that our ultimate conclusion regarding the reliability of the
call should not be read as being based exclusively on the incomplete anonymity of
the caller. This attribute is simply one among several meaningful indicia of
reliability that, when review ing the totality of circumstances in this case, led us to
our present disposition.

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claimed firsthand knowledge of the alleged conduct. See Jenkins, 313 F.3d at

554-55; Browning, 252 F.3d at 1157. The caller in this case specifically told the

911 operator that he was present when an armed man entered Shante’s apartment

and that he saw the man’s gun. Furthermore, the caller remained on the phone

with the 911 operator beyond the time of the police officers’ arrival. It was not

until the 911 operator terminated the call that the caller hung up. The presence of

the tipster outside the apartment during his conversation with the 911 operator

bolsters the credibility of the caller’s claim that he was present at the apartment

immediately prior. See Rec., vol. IV at 18-21 (relaying to the operator over the

phone the movements of the police officers outside the apartment). So,

importantly, the officers knew that the caller’s information was based on firsthand

knowledge and that it was contemporaneous. They were reasonable, therefore, in

taking the caller’s information more seriously than information obtained, for

instance, through the report of a third party or reported sometime later than the

described events. See Terry Crespo, 356 F.3d at 1177 (affording additional

reliability to the tip because the caller “sought immediate police assistance within

minutes of being threatened and described the suspect and the threat.”).

M oreover, we consider it important that the caller’s primary motive in

contacting 911 – as is apparent from listening to the tape of the 911 call – was not

to implicate the armed man but to obtain aid and protection for his friend. In

United States v. Hauk, 412 F.3d 1179, 1188 (10th Cir. 2005), we stated in the

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context of a non-emergency residential search that “[i]f anonymous,

uncorroborated tips w ere deemed a sufficient basis . . . , malicious informants

could use the device of a phoney tip to wreak injury (indignity, invasion of

privacy, suspicion, and sheer annoyance) on their enemies, rivals or acquaintances

without fear of being held responsible.” 6 Here, the caller’s only apparent

motivation for calling 911 was fear for Shante’s safety, an urgency that is clearly

detectable in the tenor of the 911 call. Thus, his call is more analogous to a plea

for help from a victim than to an informant’s tip. In making this analogy, we are

not saying callers will never falsely claim to be victims to “wreak injury . . . on

their enemies,” but rather that in such instances police can afford the caller

6
W e also pointed out in United States v. Hauk, 412 F.3d 1179, 1188 (10th
Cir. 2005), that
[e]ven if the informant is well-meaning, reliance on anonymous
uncorroborated tips could result in searches based on far less than an
objective reasonable basis. If in M rs. Grundy’ fertile imagination,
the innocent doings of her neighbors assume the aspect of dire
criminality, her report of her conclusions to the police does not mean
that a reasonable basis for suspicion exists. Information is only as
good as its source, and if police do not know the source and have no
other means for verifying the information, the mere fact that an
anonymous tipster thinks there is mischief afoot is not a sufficient
basis for police action.
W e do not believe the outcome in the present case is adverse to this eminently
reasonable proposition. First, the “doings” alleged in the present case were not
innocent on their face. A man entering a residence uninvited with a gun in his
back pocket and causing the occupants fear and alarm is not analogous to the
observation of a neighbor digging in his backyard at odd hours. Second, it is
reasonable to assume that a source who is concerned about the welfare of an
identifiable third party is inherently more reliable than a source harboring
general, non-particularized concerns.

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greater credibility. Accordingly, we conclude it was reasonable for the police to

further credit the information provided in an emergency 911 call because the

caller was apparently seeking protection and aid for a friend.

W e also note that some relevant details provided by the caller w ere

corroborated by the police. 7 The information relayed by the caller indicated that

the police would find a woman by the name of Shante and a tall, thin black male

wearing dark pants and a dark shirt in apartment 22 at 424 Jefferson Street.

W hen dispatch confirmed that a vehicle parked nearby was registered to Shante

Stillman and that her address was apartment 22 at 424 Jefferson Street, a detail

provided by the caller was meaningfully corroborated. M oreover, when a man

meeting the description provided by the caller emerged from apartment 22,

another crucial detail was corroborated. 8 The police also attempted to

7
As noted earlier, the call was not anonymous as that term was used in J.L.,
and thus police corroboration is not as prominent in our evaluation of reasonable
suspicion here as it w ould be in anonymous tipster case. See United States v.
Elmore, 482 F.3d 172, 181 (2d. Cir. 2007) (“when the informant is only partially
known . . . a lesser degree of corroboration may be sufficient.”). Furthermore,
we recognize that the information corroborated by the police here is of limited
predictiveness and would not independently provide reasonable suspicion.
Nevertheless, the corroboration lends some additional support, albeit more limited
than if it were confirmed predictive information, to the caller’s perceived
reliability. See J.L., 529 U.S. 272; Elmore, 482 F.3d at 183 (“Although [police]
were not able to corroborate . . . predictive information . . . the police did
corroborate a significant portion of the information in [the informant’s] tip,”
including the accused’s address “and that his car w as parked outside.”).
8
W e do not regard the relatively slight discrepancies between the caller’s
description of the armed man’s attire and M r. Brown’s attire as an indication that
(continued...)

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independently investigate the situation when they directed dispatch to call Shante.

Shante’s failure to answer the phone, while not proof that she was either injured

or being held hostage, also did nothing to negate that possibility.

In reaching our conclusion, we do not ignore the fact that the caller

specifically requested anonymity and expressly refused to meet with the officers

face to face. In Jenkins, 313 F.3d at 554, we determined that an informant’s

allegations “bore sufficient indicia of reliability” partially on the ground that,

although the informant had refused to provide his name, he agreed to face to face

meetings with police. W e stated that “[a] reasonable person in such

circumstances w ould realize that in all likelihood the police could, if they so

chose, determine the person’s identity, and could hold him responsible if his

allegations turned out to be fabricated.” Id. Although the caller here refused a

face-to-face meeting with the police, the police likely could have discerned his

identity from the detailed statements he made to the 911 operator. A reasonable

person in this caller’s shoes would realize that in all likelihood the police could,

if they so chose, determine his identity. W hile w e do not say that refusing to

meet with police face to face will never undermine a source’s reliability, the

8
(...continued)
the caller’s information was unreliable. The caller said “[h]e’s wearing, I think, a
black shirt, if I’m correct . . . [and] black pants.” Rec., vol. IV at 15. Officer
Lopez testified that M r. Brown was wearing dark blue pants and “a blue patterned
shirt, just different patterns on the shirt, blue.” Id. at 54. This minor discrepancy
does not undermine the caller’s reliability.

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record in this case suggests the caller refused to do so not because he was lying,

but because he was afraid of the armed man he was implicating. See Elmore, 42

F.3d at 182 (“[w]hile [the caller] was unwilling to meet with [the officer]

face-to-face, she had a good reason for her reluctance-she was afraid the

defendant would retaliate against her.”). Rather than undermining his reliability,

the caller’s evident concern actually supports the coherence of his story, namely,

that the police are likely dealing with an armed, dangerous, and frightening

individual.

In sum, we hold the information provided by the 911 caller here bore

sufficient indicia of reliability to generate a reasonable suspicion justifying the

officers’ detention of M r. Brown. 9 Those indicia were: (1) the caller’s lack of

true anonymity; (2) his reported contemporaneous, firsthand knowledge; (3) his

stated motivation for seeking police intervention; and (4) limited police

corroboration of facts provided by the caller. W e stress that the outcome in this

case is the result of a totality of the circumstances analysis, and although “[n]o

single factor here is conclusive, . . . the informant’s story and the surrounding

facts possessed an internal coherence that gave weight to the whole.” Jenkins,

9
M r. Brown argues that when he emerged from apartment 22, the situation
ceased to be an emergency and the officers’ role as community caretakers could
therefore no longer factor into their decision to detain him. This might be a
persuasive argument but for our conclusion that the officers already had
reasonable suspicion to detain M r. Brown before he vacated the apartment. That
reasonable suspicion did not dissipate w hen M r. Brown vacated the apartment.

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313 F.3d at 556 (quotation marks omitted).

For the aforementioned reasons, we AFFIRM .

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