Williams v. WD SPORTS, NM, INC.

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

August 7, 2007
PU BL ISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT O F APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

R OSA N N WILLIA M S, K A TH RYN
HUNTER, M OIRA DALY and
M AR IA M AR QU AR T,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

R OBER T H A D D OC K,

Plaintiff,
No. 05-2127
v.

W .D. SPORTS, N.M ., INC., d/b/a
NEW M EX ICO SCO RPIONS,
W ILLIA M D O U G LA S FR AN K,
PATRICK J. DU NN , and TYLER
BOUCHER,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New M exico
(D.C. No. 03-cv-1195)

M aureen A. Sanders, of Sanders & W estbrook, P.C. (Kathryn Hammel, of The
Hamm el Law Firm, P.C., with her on the briefs), Albuquerque, New M exico, for
Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Alex C. W alker (Lisa M ann and Emil J. Kiehne with him on the briefs), of
M odrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A., Albuquerque, New M exico, for
Defendants-Appellees.
Before KELLY, EBEL, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.

G O R SU CH, Circuit Judge.

Several female former employees of the New M exico Scorpions, a minor

league hockey team, filed suit against the team and various of its managers,

alleging that they engaged in sexual harassment and other conduct proscribed by

Title VII and state law. After a 10-day trial, a jury found for defendants on all

counts. In this appeal, plaintiffs direct us to no fewer than thirty rulings they

argue were mistaken and require reversal. W e find one such argument

meritorious. After the district court’s decision, and during the pendency of this

appeal, the Supreme Court issued Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway

Company v. White, __ U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006), setting forth a new rubric

for analyzing Title VII retaliation cases. In White, the Court held that an

employee subjected to employer conduct, whether inside or outside the

workplace, that well might dissuade an objectively reasonable worker from

making or supporting a charge of discrimination suffers a sufficiently adverse

action to state a claim under Title VII. Because a reasonable jury could find that

the employer in this case took such an action against one of the plaintiffs before

us, Rosann W illiams, we reverse and remand her retaliation claim for trial. On all

remaining scores, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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 I

In a 26-count complaint, plaintiffs – female employees who handled

ticketing, box office, and office manager duties, among others, for the Scorpions

– alleged a pattern of hostile, gender-based activity implicating their rights under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,

and state law. They directed their suit against the team’s ow ner, W .D. Sports,

N.M ., Inc. (“W .D. Sports”); its president W illiam Douglas Frank; Patrick Dunn, a

retired player w ho served as the team’s general manager; and Tyler Boucher,

another retired player who served as assistant to the president. 1 After six months

of discovery, defendants moved for sum mary judgment, which the district court

granted in part and denied in part. R. 911-13, 954-55, 995-97, 1021-04. 2

M ost pertinent among the district court’s rulings for our purposes is the

disposition of M s. W illiams’s claim for unlawful retaliation under Title VII. M s.

1
Under long-standing circuit precedent, supervisors and other employees
may not be held personally liable under Title VII. See Haynes v. W illiams, 88
F.3d 898, 899 (10th Cir. 1996) (“The relief granted under Title VII is against the
employer, not individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of
the Act.” (quoting Sauers v. Salt Lake City, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993))).
Supervisory employees acting in their official capacities, however, may be named
as defendants in a Title VII action as a means to sue the employer under an
agency theory. See id. For these reasons, in the discussion that follows we
regard W .D. Sports as the sole defendant to the plaintiffs’ Title VII claims.
2
All claims against Bruce Levine were dismissed prior to trial. Similarly,
all claims against Dan Burgers were dismissed as a result of a directed verdict
motion at the close of plaintiffs’ evidence. Plaintiffs do not appeal these
dismissals.

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W illiam s began this suit alleging various retaliatory acts. Underlying them all is

the fact that, sometime in early 2002, M s. W illiams complained to her

supervisors, and later to government officials, about gender-related discrimination

at her workplace. Specifically, months prior to her termination, M s. W illiams

voiced discomfort over M r. Boucher’s and the players’ repeated use of gender-

specific profanity when addressing her to M r. Dunn and M r. Frank. R. 2543-44,

2555. Upon her supervisors’ alleged failure to remedy the problem, M s. W illiams

took her grievance to the Human Rights Division of the New M exico Department

of Labor (“NM DOL”) in January 2002. R. 2623-24, 2747. In M arch of the same

year, M s. W illiams filed an official complaint with the Human Rights Division

charging W .D. Sports with gender discrimination and sexual harassment. R.

2596-97, 2624-26, 2747-48.

Shortly after her filing, M s. W illiams testified that she and M r. Frank had

two discussions; that M r. Frank explained that there were rumors circulating

about M s. W illiams being intimately involved with the team coach and some

players, as well as certain season ticket holders; and that he suggested that M s.

W illiams resign, offering her a severance package if she did so. R. 2591-93. M s.

W illiams refused to resign and asked for a written explanation why she was being

fired. M r. Frank allegedly responded that she did not “need” a piece of paper to

know that she was fired and to “[g]et the [expletive] out of [his] office.” R.

2593-94. M s. W illiams’s last day of work was M arch 29, 2002. R. 1734.

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 M s. W illiams contends that, after firing her, M r. Frank then told her not to

“fight” him on “this,” and that if she did fight him, all the rumors about her

sexual activities would be made public, whether or not they were true. R. 2594.

He also threatened, “I will ruin your marriage. . . . You have kids and you have a

husband to worry about.” Id. M s. W illiams alleges that W .D. Sports proceeded

to carry out M r. Frank’s threats by opposing her application for unemployment

benefits with the NM DOL. Specifically, W .D. Sports submitted a written

statement asserting it had fired M s. W illiams “for cause” because of M s.

W illiams’s supposed “failure to heed warnings or correct behavior regarding,

among other incidents, repeated instances of sexual misconduct w[ith] peers and

subordinates amounting to sexual harassment; drinking [and] alcohol[; and] theft

of company property, proprietary information.” R. 1734. The company’s filing

represented that W .D. Sports could support these allegations through the

testimony of junior employees, peers, and superiors. As it happens, however, the

company never provided any such evidence to the NM DOL, and M s. W illiams

alleges that these allegations were false and retaliatory in design.

B ecause of W.D . Sports’s opposition to her application, the NM DOL

scheduled and held a hearing on M s. W illiams’s unemployment benefits

application. At that hearing, though apparently not on the record, W .D. Sports’s

counsel, John Phillips, allegedly asked M s. W illiams, “W hat do you want to just

shut up and go away?” R. 2600. After M s. W illiams expressed her belief that

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W .D. Sports could not “give [her] back what [it has] taken away,” M r. Phillips

purportedly proposed a quid pro quo: “If you will drop your Human Rights

[discrimination] claim, I won’t fight you on your unemployment.” Id. M s.

W illiams declined the offer, and in spite of the hearing and W .D. Sports’s

opposition, the NM DOL ultimately determined M s. W illiams w as entitled to

unemployment benefits. R. 2601.

Throughout its proceedings, the district court treated W .D. Sports’s

termination of M s. W illiams as a functionally separate claim of retaliation from

M r. Frank’s threats and W .D. Sports’s opposition to her unemployment benefits

application; M s. W illiams did not contest this procedure before the district court

and does not do so before us. W ith respect to the first alleged act of retaliation –

M s. W illiams’s termination – the district court proceeded to grant summary

judgment to W .D. Sports on the ground that, in its view, M s. W illiams had failed

to adduce evidence of a causal link between her firing and her protected Title VII

right to pursue claims of gender discrimination. W hile raising many other

arguments for reversal, M s. W illiams chose not to appeal this decision. The

rem aining acts of alleged retaliation – concerning M r. Frank’s threats and W .D.

Sports’s opposition to her unemployment benefits application – proceeded to trial

along with a variety of other causes of action and forms the crux of this appeal.

At trial, plaintiffs testified to sexually charged comments and behavior by a

number of the defendants and other Scorpions team members and employees.

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They also presented evidence seeking to establish that their work environment

caused them to suffer from post traumatic stress disorder. In contrast, defendants

offered evidence seeking to portray the office as rowdy and informal,

emphasizing the plaintiffs’ own use of foul language. Defendants also elicited

testimony from the plaintiffs regarding other potential causes, besides their work

environment, that might have induced plaintiffs’ claimed emotional distress.

At the close of plaintiffs’ case in chief, defendants moved for judgment as a

matter of law on M s. W illiams’s remaining retaliation claim and various other

counts. The district court granted the motion with respect to M s. W illiams’s

retaliation claim, and in doing so reasoned that

my review of the case law leads me to conclude that one of the
requirements [of a retaliation claim based on the opposition to
unemployment benefits] is that the plaintiff’s benefits, at the very
least, have to have been delayed, suspended, or not paid; and in this
case, that didn’t happen. Therefore, with respect to the
unemployment benefits, I find and conclude that Plaintiff W illiams
suffered no delay or cessation in the benefits and, therefore, did not
suffer an adverse employment action with respect to the opposition
for unemployment.

R. 3969-70.

Plaintiffs’ counsel orally responded to the court’s ruling by representing

that M s. W illiams’s unemployment benefits had been suspended, to which the

district court replied that it was open to reconsidering its ruling, inviting M s.

W illiam s’s counsel to “bring [the evidence in the transcript establishing this] to

[its] attention,” R. 3972, adding that, “if I’m wrong on that, you can ask me to

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reconsider the retaliation claim.” R. 3973. M s. W illiams’s counsel took the

district court up on this offer, asking it to reconsider its ruling and pointing the

district court to four pages of M s. W illiams’s testimony purporting to show that

she had testified as to an interruption in her benefits. R. 4576. The district court

found, however, that none of this testimony established “any cessation,

suspension, or diminution” of M s. W illiams’s benefits and denied the motion to

reconsider. R. 4578-79. 3

Ultimately, after the completion of 10 days of testimony during which 34

witnesses testified, the jury returned a verdict for defendants on all counts

submitted to it.

II

M s. W illiams’s appeal of the disposition of the remaining aspects of her

Title VII retaliation claim – arising from M r. Frank’s threats and W .D. Sports’s

opposition to her application for unemployment benefits – is the most legally

significant issue before us and so we turn to it first. In reviewing a district

court’s grant of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo, we take as our

starting point that

[s]uch a judgment is warranted only if the evidence points but one
way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences supporting the

3
Before the district court, M s. W illiams also pursued a retaliation claim
under New M exico law, R. 87-88, but she did not mention that claim in her
opening brief before this court and thus waived it. See Hill v. Kemp, 478 F.3d
1236, 1250 (10th Cir. 2007).

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 party opposing the motion. W e do not weigh the evidence, pass on
the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute our conclusions for
those of the jury. However, we must enter judgment as a matter of
law in favor of the moving party if there is no legally sufficient
evidentiary basis with respect to a claim or defense under the
controlling law. W e must view the evidence and any inferences to be
drawn therefrom most favorably to the non-moving party.

M cInnis v. Fairfield Cmtys., Inc., 458 F.3d 1129, 1136 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal

quotation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a).

In conducting our review, we are mindful of and must apply the same legal

principles as the district court. In a case for retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff

must establish a prim a facie case of retaliation by demonstrating that “(1) she

engaged in protected opposition to discrimination; (2) she suffered an adverse

action that a reasonable employee would have found material; and (3) there is a

causal nexus between her opposition and the employer’s adverse action.” Antonio

v. Sygma Network, Inc., 458 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2006). 4 If a plaintiff is

unable to make out a prim a facie case, judgment as a matter of law is appropriate.

See Aquilino v. Univ. of Kan., 268 F.3d 930, 936 (10th Cir. 2001) (reversing

4
In successive cases, we have drawn these elements from Title VII’s
language providing that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge . . .
under this subchapter,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), and from the familiar burden-
shifting framew ork set out in M cDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973).

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district court’s denial of a post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law

where court held plaintiff did not suffer from an adverse employment action).

Before us, the first element of the prim a facie case is not in dispute and so we

focus our attention on the latter two elements.

A

The nature of the second element recently was the subject of Supreme

Court review in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company v. White,

__ U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006), a decision issued during the pendency of this

appeal and regarding which we requested supplemental briefing from the parties. 5

Before White, some circuits held that a claim for retaliation lies only when the

employer effects an adverse action within the workplace. White, 126 S. Ct. at

2410 (discussing White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 795

(6th Cir. 2004)). That is, the employee needed not only to suffer a materially

adverse action, but the consequence of that action had to come in the employment

context itself, in the form of a termination, demotion, or the like. By contrast,

other circuits allowed claims to proceed when the employer’s adverse action had

consequences befalling the plaintiff outside the employment environment. Id. at

5
White is properly applied to this case because the Supreme Court
instructs that “[a]n appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time it
renders its decision.” Gulf Offshore Co. v. M obil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 486
n.16 (1981) (internal alteration and quotation omitted); accord M cGowan v. City
of Eufala, 472 F.3d 736, 741 n.1 (10th Cir. 2006) (applying White to case pending
on appeal).

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2410-11 (citing, inter alia, Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (D.C.

Cir. 2006)). Seeking to resolve this circuit split, the Court in White sided with the

latter school of thought, recognizing that “[a]n employer can effectively retaliate

against an employee” for exercising his or her protected rights “by taking actions

not directly related to his [or her] employment or by causing him [or her] harm

outside the workplace.” Id. at 2412.

The Court went further, however, and elucidated the nature of the

retaliatory conduct needed to state a claim. The Court began by cautioning that

Title VII protects individuals “not from all retaliation” but only from retaliation

“that produces an injury or harm.” Id. at 2414. In turn, the Court explained that

for an injury or harm to be actionable, it must also rise to a requisite “level of

seriousness.” Id. at 2415. To qualify under this standard, a plaintiff must show

that “a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially

adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable

worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. (internal

quotations omitted). Requiring this level of adversity, the Court instructed, is

necessary “to separate significant from trivial harms” and inconveniences. Id.

In her briefs to this court, M s. W illiams contends she satisfies this standard

in at least two separate ways. First, she argues that, contrary to the district

court’s holding, her employment benefits were suspended for a period of time.

Second, she submits that, even if her benefits were never suspended, W .D.

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Sports’s threats and its presentation of false accusations to the NM DOL after her

termination were such that a jury could find them sufficient to deter a reasonable

employee from bringing a retaliation claim. W e analyze her arguments in turn.

B

W e do not question that proof suggesting M s. W illiams’s unemployment

benefits were denied or suspended, even for a period of time, would suffice to

state a claim for relief in appropriate cases; indeed, in White itself the plaintiff’s

claim for retaliation rested, in part, on a suspension without pay, and the C ourt

readily acknowledged that the plaintiff suffered a cognizable harm when she and

her family had to live without an income for 37 days. White, 126 S. Ct. at 2417.

As the Court put it, “[m]any reasonable employees w ould find a month without a

paycheck to be a serious hardship.” Id. Unfortunately for M s. W illiams,

however, the record in this case does not support her contention that her

unemployment benefits were ever interrupted.

M s. W illiams points us to one (and only one) portion of trial testimony in

aid of her argument otherwise: “I had started getting [the unemployment

benefits], and then I got a letter, and they told me that I wouldn’t receive [them]

anymore until after the – the hearing, but to go ahead and keep certifying.” R.

2749. W hile this testimony indicates that M s. W illiams received a letter,

presumably from the NM DOL, announcing its intention to suspend payments

pending a hearing, as the district court found when confronted with this same

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snippet of testimony at directed verdict, see supra at 7-8, it can bear no more

weight than that. M s. W illiams has pointed neither the district court nor us to any

testimony or evidence that her benefits were actually suspended for any period of

time, a failing we cannot overlook and one which she easily could have avoided

simply by testifying, if she was able to do so, that her benefits were, in fact,

suspended. Neither can her testimony give rise to an inference along these lines

except by resort to impermissible speculation. W e do not know, for example,

when M s. W illiams received the letter, how close it was to the hearing date, or

whether a practically sufficient gap of time existed for administrators to effect a

discontinuation of her benefits. And, significantly on this score, elsewhere in her

testimony, M s. W illiams had this exchange with counsel (though she fails to

direct us to it in her briefs): “Q. Again, my question is, the fact that your

employer challenged your right to unemployment benefits didn’t have any impact

on the amount of benefits you got? A . No. No.” R. 2641-42. On this record, as

developed by M s. W illiams after exhaustive discovery and lengthy trial

proceedings, we simply cannot disagree with the district court’s assessment at

trial that she failed to create an issue for the jury. See Truck Ins. Exchange v.

M agneTek, Inc., 360 F.3d 1206, 1216 (10th Cir. 2004) (affirming the district

court’s grant of summary judgment, in light of the evidence presented, because

“[j]ury verdicts may not be based on speculation”).

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 C

This, however, begins rather than ends our inquiry. Separate and apart

from whether her benefits were actually suspended, M s. W illiams contends that,

under White’s formulation, she need not show any such tangible economic or

psychological harm. Instead, she argues that M r. Frank’s threats and W .D.

Sports’s conduct, consistent with that threat, in opposing her unemployment

benefits claim, would have dissuaded a reasonable person from availing herself of

Title VII remedies. And this, she submits, is sufficient to satisfy White’s

materially adverse action requirement. W .D. Sports responds that, even under

White, a Title VII plaintiff must produce evidence of “actual harm (whether

monetary or otherwise)” to make out a retaliation claim. W e are thus confronted

with the question what sort of adverse action is needed to establish a claim for

retaliation and thus, at bottom, how best to interpret White’s direction.

1

W e approach this interpretive question by acknowledging the Supreme

Court’s focus in White on making actionable only conduct by an employer that

causes “injury or harm.” White, 126 S. Ct. at 2414. The Court expressly stated

that “[n]o one doubts that the term ‘discriminate against’ [as used in the statute]

refers to distinctions or differences in treatment that injure protected individuals.”

Id. at 2410; see also id. at 2412 (“The anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent

harm to individuals based on what they do, i.e. their conduct.”).

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 The Court proceeded to explain, however, that the “standard for judging

harm must be objective,” id. at 2415, and “should be judged from the perspective

of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering all the

circumstances,” id. at 2416 (internal quotation omitted). The Court added that

such an objective standard has the virtue of being “judicially administrable. It

avoids the uncertainties and unfair discrepancies that can plague a judicial effort

to determine a plaintiff’s unusual subjective feelings. W e have emphasized the

need for objective standards in other Title VII contexts, and those same concerns

animate our decision here.” Id. at 2415. Indeed, the C ourt proceeded to point to

its prior decisions in Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004),

and Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993), as similar cases in which

the Court looked to objective standards to determine employer liability. Harris,

in particular, we think affords a helpful analogy for assessing the parties’

competing contentions about the nature of White’s adverse action requirement.

See White, 126 S. Ct. at 2415.

In Harris, the plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment created

by her boss’s repeated gender-based insults and sexual innuendo. 510 U.S. at 19.

The district court ruled that, even though the plaintiff was offended by her boss’s

comm ents and that a reasonable woman likewise would have been offended, the

plaintiff was nevertheless not entitled to relief because the environment was not

“so severe as to be expected to seriously affect [her] psychological well-being”;

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neither did the district court “believe that [she] was subjectively so offended that

she suffered injury.” Id. at 20 (internal quotation omitted). Ultimately, the

Supreme Court rejected this as the appropriate test for hostile work environment

claims, explaining that a plaintiff must prove only that the employer’s conduct

was so severe or pervasive that an objectively reasonable person would find it

abusive or hostile, and that the victim herself perceived the environment to be

abusive. Id. at 21. This standard, according to the Court, “takes the middle path

between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the

conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury.” Id. The Court further

explained that “Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a

nervous breakdown,” and that a

discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not
seriously affect employees’ psychological well-being, can and often
will detract from employees’ job performance, discourage employees
from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their
careers. M orever, even without regard to these tangible effects, the
very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive
that it created a work environment abusive to employees because of
their race, gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VII’s
broad rule of workplace equality.

Id. at 22. In rejecting the district court’s requirement that plaintiff prove a

psychological (or economic) injury, the Court held that “[s]uch an inquiry may

needlessly focus the factfinder’s attention on concrete psychological harm, an

elem ent Title VII does not require. Certainly Title VII bars conduct that would

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seriously affect a reasonable person’s psychological well-being, but the statute is

not limited to such conduct.” Id.

The Court’s reference to Harris suggests the appropriateness of following

an analogous “middle path” in the retaliation arena. The plaintiff in White argued

that any conduct by an employer in retaliation for a protected activity was

actionable; the employer argued that only those actions which affected the terms

and conditions of employment were actionable. W hile rejecting the employer’s

position, 126 S. Ct. at 2411-14, the Court in White also rejected the plaintiff’s

position that an employee was protected from “all retaliation” under Title VII, id.

at 2414, offering instead a path between these extremes focused on whether the

employer’s conduct “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making

or supporting a charge of discrimination,” id. at 2415 (internal quotation omitted).

All of this is by way of saying that we do not read White as requiring, as

defendants would have it, that M s. W illiams must prove some tangible, subjective

psychological or monetary injury. Such a requirement would make no sense of

White’s emphasis on the need for an objective test, its concern for judicial

administrability, and its invocation of Harris. Critically, neither would W .D.

Sports’s more rigorous test fully honor Title VII’s purpose of prohibiting

employer actions that not only impose tangible harms but also those that “are

likely to deter victims of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC, the

courts, and their employers.” Id. at 2415 (emphasis added; internal quotation

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omitted). To warrant trial, therefore, we hold that a plaintiff need only show that

a jury could conclude that a reasonable employee in M s. W illiams’s shoes w ould

have found the defendant’s conduct sufficiently adverse that he or she well might

have been dissuaded by such conduct from making or supporting a charge of

discrimination. 6

2

Applying this standard, and viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to M s. W illiams, she has adduced sufficient evidence to warrant trial.

Upon her discharge, M r. Frank allegedly warned M s. W illiams “not to fight” him,

and that if she did so, rumors about her sexual conduct would be made public

without regard to their veracity; that he would seek to ruin her marriage; and that

she should consider the repercussions of her actions on her family. W .D. Sports

then arguably proceeded to make good on these threats, opposing M s. W illiams’s

unemployment benefits in a submission alleging that the firm had fired M s.

6
To be sure, the analogy to Harris is not quite complete. The Court in
Harris teased the standard sufficient to state a hostile work environment claim,
which in part requires that the victim subjectively perceive the employer’s
conduct to have “altered the conditions of the victim’s employment,” from the
statutory language. 510 U.S. at 21-22. The Court in White, meanwhile, made no
mention of a parallel subjective test and underscored the differences between the
statutory language contained in the “core anti-discrimination provision” relied
upon in Harris and that in the anti-retaliation provision at issue here. See White,
126 S. Ct. at 2411-12. As repeatedly emphasized by the Court in White, the
conduct sufficient to state a retaliation claim is that “harmful to the point that [it]
could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.” Id. at 2409.

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W illiams for sexual misconduct amounting to sexual harassment, R. 1734, an

apparent falsity given M r. Frank’s candid admission at trial that he did not fire

M s. W illiams for such behavior, R. 3808-09. W .D. Sports did all this, moreover,

in w hat the jury could find w as an effort to impose yet another plainly adverse

repercussion on M s. W illiams and her family – the loss of income associated with

unemployment benefits. The company then allegedly solicited nothing short of a

quid pro quo – proposing to drop its opposition to M s. W illiams’s unemployment

benefits if M s. W illiams dropped her discrimination claims – thus starkly posing

M s. W illiams w ith the choice whether to seek vindication of her Title VII rights

or risk a former employer’s intentional efforts to damage her reputation and

stymie her receipt of income.

W e do not doubt that a reasonable employee could well find such a

combination of threats and actions taken with the design of imposing both

economic and psychological harm sufficient to dissuade him or her from making

or supporting a charge of discrimination. Indeed, we have found lesser conduct to

suffice under similar legal standards. 7 In sum, W .D. Sports misses the mark in its

7
See Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 1996)
(recognizing that the filing of knowingly false criminal charges against a plaintiff,
because of their impact on future potential employment, can constitute an adverse
employment action for the purposes of a retaliation claim); see also Velikonja v.
Gonzales, 466 F.3d 122, 124 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that the “prospect” of an
investigation resulting from the employer’s false accusations, during the
pendency of which the employee was prevented from receiving promotions, and
which prevented her from obtaining prized assignments, could dissuade a
(continued...)

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argument because material tangible economic or psychological damage is

certainly sufficient but not necessary to satisfy White’s requisites; in the

circumstances here present, the unlawful choice W .D. Sports put to M s. W illiams

by its threats and actions is sufficient to seed her claim. 8

D

Defendants suggest that judgment as a matter of law should be entered on

the alternate ground that M s. W illiams failed to produce evidence of a causal

7
(...continued)
reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of discrimination).
8
W e do not suggest, of course, that every inconvenience an employee is
made to endure can be actionable retaliation. See White, 126 S. Ct. at 2415
(distinguishing “significant . . . harms” from “minor annoyances”); accord
Carmona-Rivera v. Puerto Rico, 464 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2006) (“W hile a delay
in providing the accommodations needed to meet a disability may cause a
significant injury or harm to a disabled person, the record in this case discloses no
such harm. Inconvenience, yes, but no actual harm.”); Higgins v. Gonzales, 481
F.3d 578, 591 (8th Cir. 2007) (purported transfer of plaintiff to new city, “even
given the inconvenience of a move, . . . does not rise to the level of a materially
adverse action”). But M s. W illiams has aggregated evidence well beyond what
any reasonable employee would discard as merely inconvenient. Indeed, even if
defendant’s proffered standard – that M s. W illiams must prove some tangible
psychological or monetary injury – were correct, we would hold that she met that
standard here, given her testimony that she suffered psychological distress from
this episode and the undisputed fact that, but for W .D. Sports’s opposition,
NM DOL would not have scheduled a hearing or otherwise reconsidered its initial
determination of M s. W illiams’s entitlement to unemployment benefits. See, e.g.,
R. 2606 (M s. W illiams recalled that “the unemployment hearing was very hard
. . . because [she] thought . . . [W .D. Sports] had to tell the truth”; and because
W .D. Sports had not told the truth at the hearing or in its opposition statement,
that she “didn’t feel like [she] w as getting a fair chance at [her] unemployment.”);
R. 2607-08 (M s. W illiams “cried a lot” as a result of W .D. Sports’s opposition
and was diagnosed with depression shortly after the hearing).

-20-
connection between her protected activity and the challenge to her unemployment

benefits. W e are unable to agree.

“[A] causal connection is established where the plaintiff presents evidence

of circumstances that justify an inference of retaliatory motive, such as protected

conduct closely followed by adverse action.” M acKenzie v. City and County of

Denver, 414 F.3d 1266, 1279 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). M s.

W illiams filed her discrimination charge before she was fired on M arch 29, 2002.

W .D. Sports’s written statement opposing her unemployment benefits was dated

A pril 15, 2002, although it does not appear to have been received by the NM DO L

until M ay 20, 2002. R . 1734. This temporal nexus is sufficient to infer that W.D .

Sports’s opposition to her claim was caused by M s. W illiams’s filing her

discrimination charge. See Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d

1164, 1171-72 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding evidence that termination occurred no

more than six weeks after employer knew employee intended to engage in

protected activity was “very closely connected in time” and thus sufficient to

establish causation (internal quotation omitted)). Equally important, during the

NM DOL hearing on her entitlement to benefits, M r. Phillips allegedly said to M s.

W illiams, “If you will drop your Human Rights claim, I won’t fight you on your

unemployment.” R. 2600. A reasonable jury could quite reasonably infer from

this a direct causal link between W .D. Sports’s decision to impede M s. W illiams’s

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benefits application and her decision to pursue discrimination charges with the

NM DOL Human Rights Division.

W .D. Sports responds that there is no evidence that W .D. Sports knew

about M s. W illiams’s discrimination charge before it filed its written statement

opposing her benefits. Appellee’s Answer Br. at 39-40. But M s. W illiams

produced evidence at trial that, sometime in April, one of M s. W illiams’s former

co-workers, Chancy W ilson, called M s. W illiams to tell her that W .D. Sports was

making allegations against M s. W illiams and, later, that W .D. Sports’s attorney,

M r. Phillips, had been in the office interviewing at least two other employees

about M s. W illiams’s discrimination charge. R. 2597-99, 2747; see also R. 2850-

52, 3108-09. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to M s. W illiams,

as we are obliged to do, this is enough evidence from which a jury could infer

that W .D. Sports knew about her discrimination charge when it opposed her

benefits.

E

Having concluded that M s. W illiams has made a prim a facie case of

retaliation, two questions remain under the M cDonnell Douglas burden shifting

analysis – whether defendants might show a legitimate non-discriminatory reason

for their adverse actions against M s. W illiams and, if so, whether M s. W illiams

can demonstrate that defendants’ proffered reasons were pretext for retaliation.

See Y oung v. Dillon Cos., 468 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir. 2006). At the

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completion of M s. W illiams’s case in chief, the district court granted judgment as

a matter of law to W .D. Sports on her retaliation claim because, in its view, she

failed to prove a prim a facie case. As a result, W .D. Sports had no occasion to

present evidence (or develop argument) that non-discriminatory reasons fueled its

threats and opposition to M s. W illiams’s unemployment benefits. The briefing on

appeal similarly focuses on whether M s. W illiams has established a prim a facie

case of retaliation. But even assuming (without deciding) that W .D. Sports could

m eet its burden of establishing some legitimate reasons for its conduct, we

nonetheless remand the matter for trial because M s. W illiams has produced

sufficient evidence of pretext to warrant it.

Our precedent instructs that to show pretext, M s. W illiams must show that a

reasonable fact finder could conclude that W .D. Sports threatened her and

opposed her unemployment benefits on account of her decision to invoke her Title

VII privileges rather than in furtherance of some legitimate business interest:

“the relevant ‘falsity’ inquiry is w hether the employer’s stated reasons w ere held

in good faith at the time [the adverse action was taken], even if they later prove to

be untrue, or whether plaintiff can show that the employer’s explanation was so

weak, implausible, inconsistent or incoherent that a reasonable fact finder could

conclude that it was not an honestly held belief but rather was subterfuge for

[retaliation].” Id. at 1250. Of course, the “nature and quantum of plaintiff’s

proof is key, for the Supreme Court has also explained that evidence about the

-23-
falsity of an employer’s proffered [legitimate business] explanation . . . will not

always be adequate to sustain liability.” Id. (internal quotation and citation

omitted).

View ing the evidence in the light most favorable to M s. W illiams, there is

no question that a jury could find that W .D. Sports’s stated reasons for opposing

M s. W illiams’s unemployment benefits – that M s. W illiams was terminated for

cause because of, among other things, sexual misconduct – w ere pretextual. In

support of its summary judgment motion, W .D. Sports argued that M s. W illiams’s

“termination” was the “result of her insubordination,” omitting any mention of

her alleged sexual misconduct. See R. 522-23. At trial, M r. Frank testified that

he did not actually fire M s. W illiams, and that her employment did not cease on

account of any sexual misconduct. See R. 3808-09. As the decision-maker who

terminated M s. W illiams, M r. Frank’s testimony that she w as not terminated, and

that any alleged sexual misconduct did not precipitate M s. W illiams’s discharge,

strongly suggests that W .D. Sports’s contrary statements to the N M DOL were

“post hoc fabrication[s] or otherw ise did not actually motivate” W .D. Sports’s

opposition to her unemployment benefits. Plotke v. White, 405 F.3d 1092, 1102-

03 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). Neither can these contradictions

be readily explained as simple mistakes. Nearly seven months after W .D. Sports

submitted its opposition to the NM DOL, W .D. Sports again employed the same

justifications of its decision to terminate M s. W illiams – including that M s.

-24-
W illiams had engaged in sexual misconduct – to the EEOC in its response to her

charges of discrimination. R. 1736-37. Finally, the quid pro quo allegedly

proposed by M r. Phillips on behalf of W.D. Sports also leads to a ready inference

that W .D. Sports opposed M s. W illiams’s receipt of unemployment benefits

because she filed a discrimination claim and sought to oppose her benefits in the

hope of dissuading her from pursuing a discrimination claim.

Presented with these seemingly inconsistent and contradictory explanations

undergirding W .D. Sports’s opposition to M s. W illiams’s unemployment benefits

claim, we conclude that a jury could reasonably find that W .D. Sports’s stated

reasons for opposing M s. W illiam’s unemployment benefits were false and that it

“is dissembling to cover up a [retaliatory] purpose.” Reeves v. Sanderson

Plum bing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000). 9

III

9
Of course, we do not mean to suggest that the jury is obliged to credit
M s. W illiams’s version of events and find liability; we hold simply that, in light
of the facts presented to us, judgment as a matter of law is inappropriate and M s.
W illiams is entitled to take her claim to a jury. Having resolved that sufficient
evidence to show injury exists to merit a jury’s resolution, M s. W illiams will of
course be required to show at trial what damages she is entitled to recover, a
question on which we likewise express no views at this time. See Barber v. T.D .
Williamson, Inc., 254 F.3d 1223, 1226-28 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding no plain error
where jury aw arded damages of $1 for hostile work environment claim where jury
was instructed that it may award nominal damages if it finds that “the law was
violated but that Plaintiff suffered no damages”); see also Azimi v. Jordan’s
M eats, Inc., 456 F.3d 228, 235 & n.3 (1st Cir. 2006).

-25-
 Beyond M s. W illiams’s retaliation argument, plaintiffs collectively submit

that a great many of the district court’s jury instructions w ere in error and merit a

new trial. In assessing their challenge on this score, we are obliged to review the

instructions as a whole and we will reverse only when “(1) we have substantial

doubt whether the instructions, considered as a whole, properly guided the jury in

its deliberations; and (2) when a deficient jury instruction is prejudicial.”

M cInnis, 458 F.3d at 1141 (internal quotation omitted).

Further, when a party does not object to an instruction before the district

court (the case here with respect to several instructions), we can review the

district court’s decision to administer the instruction only for plain error. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 51(d)(2); Johnson ex rel. Estate of Cano v. Holmes, 455 F.3d 1133, 1141

(10th Cir. 2006). “Under that standard, we will affirm unless the instructions

were patently, plainly erroneous and prejudicial.” Johnson, 455 F.3d at 1141

(internal quotations omitted); accord Abuan v. Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc., 353 F.3d

1158, 1173 (10th Cir. 2003) (“W e may only reverse [for plain error] in an

exceptional circumstance, where the error was patently erroneous and prejudicial

and where fundamental injustice would otherw ise occur.”).

Plaintiffs submit that Instructions 6, 8, and 10, to which they did object

before the district court, obscured the jury’s ability to consider the totality of the

circumstances by stating that evidence offered to prove an abusive workplace

does not necessarily prove a hostile w ork environment. But Instruction 8 simply

-26-
states that “[c]rude language alone does not necessarily amount to sexual

harassment.” R. 1641 (emphases added). The instruction thus implies that such

crude language can constitute sexual harassment. And what Instruction 8 left

implicit, Instruction 11 made explicit, clearly informing the jury that, weighing

whether a Title VII violation occurred, it could consider the totality of the facts

about the plaintiffs’ workplace environment, including acts which are not

necessarily sexual in nature:

In connection with the claims for sexually hostile w ork environment, it is
not necessary that the acts at issue have clear sexual overtones; rather, any
harassment or abuse directed at an employee that would not occur but for
her gender may constitute sexual harassment or a hostile work environment
if it is so severe and pervasive that it has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with the employee’s work performance and
altering the conditions of her employment, causing her to sustain damages.

R. 1644. Instruction 6 likew ise correctly informed the jury that “[w]hether a

work environment is hostile or abusive based on gender can only be determined

by looking at the totality of all the circumstances.” R. 1639. Thus, looking at the

instructions as a whole, we cannot say the jury was misled.

Plaintiffs next challenge Instructions 18 through 22 as being “ludicrously

slanted” and inaccurately describing M s. W illiams’s discrimination claim.

Plaintiffs offer no explanation as to why these instructions were so pernicious

other than that they purportedly failed to instruct the jury as to liability based on

“mixed motive cases.” Appellants’ O pening Br. at 35. But the trial court did

advise the jury on exactly this score. Instruction 17, immediately preceding those

-27-
plaintiffs identify and complain of, expressly states that “Plaintiff W illiams must

show that her gender was, more likely than not, a motivating factor behind the

defendant’s actions. It need not be the only factor,” R. 1651; only by

disregarding Instruction 17 can one suggest that mixed motive went unaddressed.

Plaintiffs argue that Instruction 12 erroneously stated that the harassment of

which a plaintiff was not aware during her employment cannot contribute to the

hostile work environment. 10 But plaintiffs have pointed to no contemporaneous

objection made to this instruction, so our review here is for plain error alone –

and we find none. In Creamer v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., we held that “the plaintiff

may only rely on evidence relating to harassment of which she was aware during

the time she was allegedly subject to a hostile work environment.” 86 F.3d 167,

171 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation omitted). W hile Creamer involved

evidence of acts that took place after the plaintiff had left her employment, the

rationale holds equally true for events which took place during plaintiffs’

employment of which they were not aw are and suggests that the district court did

not err. Further, even if such evidence could have been used to show

discriminatory intent on the part of defendants for M s. W illiams’s disparate

10
Instruction 12 stated: “H arassment, hostility or abuse not directed at a
plaintiff herself, but directed at her co-workers, or at customers, or at others
around her, may also constitute evidence of a sexually hostile work environment.
However, harassment of which a Plaintiff was unaware during her employment
cannot, as a matter of law , contribute to that Plaintiff’s alleged hostile work
environment.” R. 1645. Plaintiffs challenge the last sentence of this instruction.

-28-
treatment claim, plaintiffs suggest no way in which this instruction was

prejudicial to M s. W illiams or resulted in fundamental injustice sufficient to

satisfy our plain error standard of review.

Plaintiffs summarily argue that Instruction 14 failed to instruct the jury

regarding (what they argue are) different standards under state and federal law for

the availability of vicarious liability against employers for the actions of their

employees. But plaintiffs’ argument is precluded because the very language that

they claim was impermissibly absent from Instruction 14 – that an “employer”

can include “any person acting for an employer,” Appellants’ Reply Br. at 18 –

plainly appears in Instruction 5. R. 1638. Once again, we find no error. 11

IV

11
Plaintiffs also argue that Instruction 15 was not justified by the evidence
at trial. This instruction addressed the affirmative defense available to companies
that have policies regarding the handling of harassment claims that the employee
does not follow or pursue. See generally Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
Plaintiffs’ summary assertion, however, is supported by no legal authority or
reason why such an instruction was improper. In such circumstances, we cannot
meaningfully review the argument or provide the relief plaintiff seeks. See
United States v. Banks, 451 F.3d 721, 728 (10th Cir. 2006); Phillips v. Hillcrest
M ed. Ctr., 244 F.3d 790, 800 n.10 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Because appellants have
failed to support this [argument] with any authority, legal or otherwise, we need
not consider it.”). Similarly, plaintiffs describe Instruction 24 as an “inaccurate
gloss” on Instruction 23 regarding outrageous conduct under New M exico law but
offer no argument or authority as to why this instruction is inaccurate or
prejudicial, Appellants’ Opening Br. at 35, precluding us again from affording
them the review they seek.

-29-
 Finally, plaintiffs seek reversal on the basis of some 28 allegedly erroneous

evidentiary and discovery rulings. But only some of plaintiffs’ current objections

to these rulings were ever presented to the district court in the first instance and,

of the remaining few issues, few er still were adequately briefed before us. As a

court dependent on the testing of ideas in the crucible of the adversary process,

we are reluctant to issue rulings the consequences of which we may not be able to

foresee and the soundness of which we cannot assess without a meaningful

joinder of issues by the parties. See, e.g., Hill, 478 F.3d at 1250-51; Headrick v.

Rockwell Int’l Corp., 24 F.3d 1272, 1278 (10th Cir. 1994). And we have

repeatedly warned that attempts to raise issues w ithout sufficient briefing will

result in their summary disposition. See supra p. 29 n.11. W e can report,

however, that we have reviewed each of plaintiffs’ allegations with care and

found none that rises to the level of an abuse of the discretion invested in the

district court. 12

12
Plaintiffs also appeal the district court’s dismissal of the claims for
constructive discharge brought by Plaintiffs Kathryn Hunter, M aria M arquart and
M oira Daly, and the subsequent dismissal of their claims for lost wages.
However, “the equitable remedy of backpay is only available . . . when the
plaintiff has demonstrated that she was constructively discharged.” M allinson-
M ontague v. Pocrnick, 224 F.3d 1224, 1237 (10th Cir. 2000). Because the same
allegations underlying their claims for constructive discharge (e.g., gender
discrimination, sexual harassment, and hostile work environment) failed before
the jury and are not reversed in this appeal, any error in dismissing the plaintiffs’
constructive discharge claims, as well as the claims for lost wages, was harmless
under our precedents. Jones v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 1260, 1270 (10th Cir. 2003)
(citing Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Schs., 164 F.3d 527, 534 (10th Cir. 1998)).

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 t t t

The judgment as a matter of law on M s. W illiams’s retaliation claim is

reversed and that claim is remanded for trial. The judgment of the district court

is affirmed in all other respects and, because of our disposition of those claims,

defendants’ self-styled “M otion to Strike N ewly-Raised Issues in A ppellants’

Reply Brief” is denied as moot.

So ordered.

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