TMJ Implants, Inc. v. Aetna, Inc.

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
August 21, 2007
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT

TM J IM PLANTS, INC., a Colorado
corporation,

Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 06-1020
No. 06-1146
AETNA, INC., a Pennsylvania
corporation; C IG N A ; C ON N ECTICUT
GENERAL CORPORATIO N, a
Florida corporation; C ON N EC TICUT
GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE
COM PA NY, a Connecticut
corporation; C IG N A D EN TA L
HEALTH, INC., a Florida corporation;
CIG NA HEALTH CORPORATIO N, a
Delaware corporation;
HEALTHSO URCE, INC., a New
H am pshire corporation; C IG N A
D EN TA L H EA LTH O F C OLO RADO,
IN C., a Colorado corporation; CIGNA
H EA LTH CA RE O F C OLO RA DO,
INC., a Colorado corporation,

Defendants - Appellees.

A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T HE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. NO . 05-cv-783 LTB-CBS)

Joseph J. M ellon, Shughart Thomson & Kilroy, P.C., Denver, Colorado (Paul S.
Swedlund, Shughart Thomson & K ilroy, P.C., and W alter L. Gerash, Andrew B.
Reid, Gerash Law Firm, Denver, Colorado, with him on the brief), for Plaintiff -
Appellant

John B. Shely, Andrews, Kurth LLP, Houston, Texas (John M . Palmeri, Franz
Hardy, W hite & Steele, D enver, Colorado, and James C. Crumlish, III, Elliott
Greenleaf & Sieszikowski, PC, Blue B ell, Pennsylvania, with him on the brief),
for D efendant - Appellee Aetna Inc.

Daniel R. Satriana, Jr. (M atthew Y. Biscan with him on the brief), Clisham,
Satriana & Biscan, L.L.C., Denver, Colorado, for Cigna Defendants - Appellees

Before HA RTZ, SE YM OU R, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

HA RTZ, Circuit Judge.

This appeal concerns a suit by plaintiff TM J Implants, Inc. (TM JI) against

defendants Aetna, Inc. and CIGNA 1 for defam ation and related torts. TM JI is a

Colorado corporation that manufactures prosthetic total- and partial-

temporomandibular-joint (TM J) implants for use in patients suffering from TM J

disorders. Aetna and CIGNA provide health and dental insurance under various

benefit plans. Both companies produce bulletins explaining what treatments and

procedures they cover. In its bulletin describing coverage for treatment of TM J

1
The amended complaint filed in the district court named eight CIGNA
defendants: C IG N A Corporation; Connecticut General Corporation; CIGNA
Dental H ealth, Inc.; CIGNA Dental H ealth of Colorado, Inc.; CIGNA Health
Corporation; Healthsource, Inc.; CIGNA Healthcare of Colorado, Inc.; and
Connecticut General Life Insurance Company. The amended complaint refers to
these defendants collectively as CIGNA, and they have filed one brief as the
C IG N A appellees. We also refer to them collectively as CIGNA.

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disorders, Aetna states that it will not cover either the total or partial TM J

implants manufactured by TM JI. In a similar bulletin CIGNA states that it will

not cover TM JI’s partial-joint device. TM JI contends that the coverage bulletins

defamed and disparaged its products, tortiously interfered with prospective

business advantage, and tortiously interfered with existing and prospective

contracts.

TM JI filed suit in D enver County District Court, but Aetna and CIGNA

removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado,

see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (removal statute); id. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction).

Aetna and CIGNA then moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the

complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motions on

the ground that the bulletins were protected statements of opinion. TM JI appeals.

W e have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

I. B ACKGR OU N D

W e summarize the allegations of the amended complaint: Approximately 30

million Americans suffer from TM J disorders, which can cause jaw pain and

inhibit normal jaw function. Dr. Robert Christensen developed prosthetic TM J

implants to replace parts of the mandible that had been surgically removed. After

refining and obtaining patents on his devices, he established TM JI to manufacture

and market them. The total-joint prosthesis is available in three sizes (for both

the right and left sides of the jaw) and can also be custom made; the partial-joint

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prosthesis is available in 44 premade sizes (for both sides of the jaw ). TM JI is

the only manufacturer of a partial-joint prosthesis. Approximately 25,000 of

TM JI’s devices have been implanted in patients, 40% of which have been partial-

joint prostheses. Clinical studies have shown that the partial-joint implants

“reduce the need for further significant surgical intervention of a total joint

replacement in over 95% of the cases.” Aplt. A pp. at 6 (A mended Complaint).

Fewer than 10% of the partial-joint devices implanted in patients have later been

removed.

The total and partial prostheses have “been the subject of various peer

reviews in peer-reviewed journals.” Id. at 7. There have also been “two clinical

studies conducted by [TM JI] that support the safety and effectiveness of the

implants.” Id. The Food and Drug Administration (FD A) approved both the total

and partial implants in 2001. The FDA has approved one other manufacturer,

TM J Concepts, to make custom total-joint prostheses.

Aetna has published, in several editions, Clinical Policy Bulletin (CPB) 28,

which describes the limitations on what it will cover for treatment of TM J

disorders. C IG N A also publishes a bulletin, Coverage Position Number (CPN )

156, regarding the limitations on what it will cover for TM J disorders. Both CPB

28 and CPN 156 are available to the public over the internet. TM JI challenges

several statements in Aetna’s C PB 28 regarding TM JI’s total-joint and partial-

joint prostheses. Some statements refer to the prostheses as “experimental” and

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“investigational.” Others question the adequacy of research supporting their use.

TM JI also challenges similar statements in CIGNA’s CPN 156 regarding TM JI’s

partial-joint prosthesis. The amended complaint alleges that these statements

about TM JI’s products were false and defamatory, disparaged its products by

publication of injurious falsehoods, and tortiously interfered with its business

advantage and existing and prospective contracts.

Aetna and CIGNA moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to

state a claim on several grounds, including that the allegedly defamatory

statements w ere not defamatory as a matter of law and were protected statements

of opinion. Aetna and CIGNA attached copies of their bulletins to their motions

to dismiss, contending that because the bulletins were central to TM JI’s amended

complaint, the district court should consider them in deciding the motions.

TM JI’s response asserted the sufficiency of its claims and argued that the court

should not consider the version of the bulletin proffered by Aetna because it was

an amended version. Three versions of CPB 28 and one version of CPN 156 were

attached to the response.

The district court considered the bulletins and granted the motions to

dismiss. It held that although it could not say as a matter of law that the bulletins

were incapable of defamatory meaning, the statements were not actionable.

Following Colorado Supreme Court opinions, it reasoned that Aetna’s and

CIGNA’s statements that TM JI’s devices were experimental and investigational

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were protected statements of opinion because they were incapable of being proved

false and a reasonable person reading the bulletins would conclude that the

statements were ones of opinion rather than fact. It further held that the

statements were protected under the First Amendment because they were on a

matter of public concern and did not imply the allegation of undisclosed

defamatory facts. As for the remaining tort claims, the court held that Aetna’s

and CIGNA’s protected statements of opinion were not improper; so neither

defendant could be liable for disparagement, tortious interference w ith business

advantage, or tortious interference with contract, each of which requires the

commission of an improper act.

TM JI appeals, contending (1) that the district court resolved several factual

issues against it despite its duty to view the facts in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party; (2) that CPB 28 and CPN 156 are not protected statements of

opinion because the terms experim ental and investigational have sufficiently

definite meanings in the medical comm unity to be proved true or false and an

average reader would understand the bulletins to be asserting fact; and (3) that

Aetna and CIGNA forfeited any privilege accorded their statements of opinion

because they were based on an incomplete and inaccurate evaluation of outdated

facts, were published to avoid payment of claims rather than to convey a coverage

determination, and were published w ith malice. W e reject these arguments,

substantially agreeing with the district court’s analysis.

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II. D ISC USSIO N

W e review de novo a dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for

failure to state a claim, applying the same standard that the district court should

have applied. See County of Santa Fe, N.M . v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M ., 311 F.3d

1031, 1034 (10th Cir. 2002). W e accept as true “all well-pleaded factual

allegations in the amended complaint,” and view those allegations “in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

A lthough w e ordinarily limit our review to the allegations in the complaint, w e

consider documents “incorporated into the complaint by reference.” Tellabs, Inc.

v. M akor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2509 (2007). Our review of the

bulletins shows that the differences between various editions are immaterial to the

following analysis. To give TM JI the benefit of the doubt, however, we have

relied on the editions of CPB 28 and CPN 156 that TM JI references in its opening

brief on appeal.

Because this case arises under the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction, the

law governing TM JI’s causes of action is the law that would be applied if the case

had been brought in Colorado state court. See Butt v. Bank of Am., N.A., 477 F.3d

1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 2007) (“W hen exercising diversity jurisdiction, we apply

state law with the objective of obtaining the result that would be reached in state

court.”). “W here no controlling state decision exists, the federal court must

attempt to predict what the state’s highest court would do.” Wade v. Emcasco

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Ins. Co., 483 F.3d 657, 666 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The parties agree that the applicable substantive law is that of Colorado, although

subject to any restrictions on the alleged torts that may be imposed by the United

States Constitution. W e therefore assume that this case is governed by Colorado

substantive law (and, of course, the federal constitution). See Clark v. State Farm

M ut. Auto. Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1234, 1240 (10th Cir. 2003) (applying substantive

law of state that parties agree controls).

A. Issues D isposed of Summarily

W e can briefly dispose of two issues raised by the parties on appeal. TM JI

contends that the district court resolved several issues of fact against it and

ignored issues of disputed material fact. But because our review is de novo, w e

need not concern ourselves with any such alleged misstatements or errors by the

district court. Second, Aetna appears to contend that TM JI has presented no

evidence to support some allegations in its complaint and is not entitled to

discovery to elicit such evidence. It points out that TM JI did not ask the district

court to convert the motions for dismissal into ones for summary judgment and to

delay its decision pending the results of discovery. W e reject Aetna’s apparent

contention because TM JI had no obligation to provide evidentiary support for its

allegations, nor did it have an obligation to request that the court convert the

motions into ones for summary judgment. W hen Aetna moved to dismiss the

complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), it could not contest the truth of the complaint’s

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factual allegations. See County of Santa Fe, N.M ., 311 F.3d at 1034. Of course,

if the allegations are sufficient, so that dismissal is improper, TM JI would then

need to prove those allegations. At that stage of the proceeding, discovery would

be proper. TM JI’s opposition to the Rule 12(b)(6) motion hardly waived or

forfeited its right to conduct discovery at a later stage of the litigation.

B. D efamation C laims

1. Applicable Law

a. Sources of Law

Claims for defamation are deeply rooted in the common law. Since New

York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), however, courts have had to

supplem ent their common-law analysis with a federal constitutional inquiry to

determine whether a claim can survive. M oreover, a number of states, including

Colorado, have invoked state constitutions to restrict defamation claims. See,

e.g., NBC Subsidiary (KCNC-TV), Inc. v. Living Will Ctr., 879 P.2d 6, 9 (Colo.

1994) (“[t]o decide the issues . . . we must first identify the appropriate standard

for evaluating when defamatory statements are constitutionally protected under

the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and article II, section 10 of

the Colorado C onstitution.”). When there are multiple sources of applicable law ,

we must be careful in determining what deference is due to state-court decisions.

A federal court must follow the state’s highest court in pronouncing or construing

the state’s common law, statutory law, or constitutional law. But it owes no

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deference to state-court interpretation of the United States Constitution. See Ace

Cycle World, Inc. v. Am. Honda M otor Co., 788 F.2d 1225, 1228 (7th Cir. 1986).

Thus, if we disagree with the state court’s view that the federal constitution

imposes a particular limitation on defamation claims, we will not impose that

limitation. On the other hand, if state law imposes that limitation, we must

recognize that limitation even if the federal constitution is not so restrictive.

Accordingly, when a state-court decision imposes a limitation on defamation

claims, particularly when we doubt whether that limitation is required by the

federal constitution, it is important that we determine w hether the state court

im posed that limitation as a matter of state law or federal constitutional law.

Unfortunately, the task of determining the source of a limitation in a state-

court decision can be rather difficult. Because the common law of defamation,

federal constitutional law, and the constitutional law of the various states reflect

many of the same underlying principles and adopt similar propositions, it is often

unclear to what extent a court decision relies on each. W e have found this to be

true in some of the leading Colorado opinions on defamation. To assist us in

determ ining the source of C olorado court pronouncements, we rely on two

observations. First, the Colorado Supreme Court has been willing to recognize

limitations on the defamation cause of action that are not required by the federal

constitution. In Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 538 P.2d 450, 457 (Colo.

1975), overruled on other grounds by Diversified M anagement, Inc. v. Denver

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Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103 (Colo. 1982), the court imposed a malice requirement

when the allegedly defamatory statement related to a matter of public concern,

even though the United States Supreme Court requires malice only when the

alleged victim is a public official or public figure. See Gertz v. Robert Welch,

Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342–43 (1974).

Second, the Colorado Supreme Court, both in its opinions 2 and in the

2
See Denver Pub. Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 899 n.9, 900–01 (Colo. 2002)
(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) (Restatement) § 570 for categories
of statements recognized as defamatory as a matter of law and §§ 564 and 652E
cmt. b to compare elements of defamation to elements of false light); In re Green,
11 P.3d 1078, 1084 (2000) (stating that opinions that imply undisclosed false
statements of fact are not protected under the First Amendment and citing
Restatement § 566 for support); Robert C. Ozer, P.C. v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371,
379 (Colo. 1997) (referring to Restatement § 652D cmt. a to distinguish the term
“publication” used in tort of defamation from the term “publicity” used in tort of
invasion of privacy); Living Will Ctr., 879 P.2d at 15 (citing Restatement § 564
for proposition that “allegedly defamatory remark is not actionable if it cannot
reasonably be understood as an assertion of actual fact pertaining to the plaintiff”
(emphasis omitted)); Keohane v. Stewart, 882 P.2d 1293, 1300 n.10 (Colo. 1994)
(quoting Restatement § 564 for support of proposition that defamatory statement
not referring to plaintiff by name is actionable if listeners reasonably understood
statement to be about plaintiff); Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336,
1343–45 (Colo. 1988) (construing Restatement § 577 cmt. k regarding self-
publication); Dominguez v. Babcock, 727 P.2d 362, 364, 365–66 (Colo. 1986)
(discussing qualified privilege in Restatement § 596, and loss of privilege under
§ 600); Burns v. M cGraw-Hill Broad. Co., 659 P.2d 1351, 1357–59 (Colo. 1983)
(adopting Restatement § 559 and its cmt. e regarding when statement may be
defamatory, citing Restatement § 563 regarding determination of defamatory
meaning, and relying on Restatement § 566 and its cmt. b regarding protected
opinions); Bucher v. Roberts, 595 P.2d 239, 241–42 (Colo. 1979) (relying on
Restatement § 566 and its cmts. c and e regarding protected opinion).

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Uniform Jury Instructions it promulgates, see Colorado Jury Instructions, Civil

(4th ed. 2007) (copyrighted by Supreme Court of Colorado) 3 , has displayed great

respect for the formulations of the tort of defamation in the Restatement (Second)

of Torts (1977) (Restatement). 4 W e therefore think it a safe presumption (though

3
See Colorado Jury Instructions, Civil, ch. 22.1 (4th ed. 2007) (citing
Restatement §§ 558–581 as source and authority for instruction on defamation per
se), id. Ch. 22.2 (citing Restatement §§ 566 cmt. c and 614 in discussion of libel-
per-quod instruction); id. Ch. 22.6 (citing Restatement §§ 577 and 578 in
discussion of instruction defining published); id. Ch. 22.7 (basing definition of
defamatory on Restatement § 559); id. Ch. 22.8 (citing Restatement § 564 as
source and authority for instruction on about-the-plaintiff element); id. Ch 22.9
(citing Restatement § 563 for discussion of instruction on meaning of a
statement); id. Ch. 22.10A (citing Restatement § 563 cmt. b in support of
instruction that statement be considered in context); id. Ch. 22.12 (citing
Restatem ent § 575 as source and authority for special-damages instruction); id.
Ch. 22.13 (citing Restatement §§ 621–623 as source and authority for definition
of actual damages); id. Ch. 22.14 (citing Restatement § 581A in support of
instruction on substantial-truth defense); id. Ch. 22.15 (citing Restatement §§
585–592A in discussion of absolute-privilege defenses); id. Ch. 22.16 (citing
Restatement §§ 599–605A for instruction on when qualified privilege may be
lost); id. Ch. 22.17 (citing Restatement § 611 for instruction on privilege for
reports of official proceedings); id. Ch. 22.18 (citing Restatement § 612 for
discussion of privilege for provider of means of publication); id. Ch. 22.20 (citing
Restatement § 583 for instruction on affirmative defense of consent).
4
See also Wilson v. M eyer, 126 P.3d 276, 279 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005) (citing
Restatem ent § 611 regarding privilege for report of official proceeding); Gordon
v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 78 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Restatement § 568A for
statement that “radio broadcast of defamatory matter is defamation by libel”);
Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (discussing slander
per se with reference to Restatement §§ 571–574); Brooks v. Jackson, 813 P.2d
847, 848 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Restatement § 559’s definition of when a
communication is defamatory); Teilhaber M fg. Co. v. Unarco M aterials Storage,
a Div. of Unarco Indus., Inc., 791 P.2d 1164, 1167 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (citing
Restatem ent § 566 regarding when statements of opinion are unprotected in
defamation and product-disparagement actions); Lind v. O’Reilly, 636 P.2d 1319,
(continued...)

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not an irrebuttable one) that the Colorado Supreme Court will adopt as part of its

common law of defamation the various provisions of the Restatement, even if

those provisions may impose restrictions not required by controlling authority

from the United States Supreme Court.

b. Expressions of O pinion

To state a cause of action for defamation under Colorado law, the plaintiff

must allege “(1) a defamatory statement concerning another; (2) published to a

third party; (3) with fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the

publisher; and (4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special

damages or the existence of special damages to the plaintiff caused by the

publication.” Williams v. Dist. Ct., Second Judicial Dist., 866 P.2d 908, 911 n.4

(C olo. 1993). This case turns on the first element.

The specific issue before us is how to distinguish a defamatory statement

from a protected expression of opinion. W e must consider two sources of law to

resolve the issue. One is the Restatement. The Restatement recognizes two types

of defamatory communication: (1) statements of fact, see Restatement § 565, and

(2) expressions of opinion, see id. § 566. Of the latter, the Restatement states:

“A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an

4
(...continued)
1321 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (quoting Restatement § 575 cmt. b regarding special
damages); Costa v. Smith, 601 P.2d 661 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979) (citing
Restatement § 583 cmt. d illus. 2 regarding consent as a defense).

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opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the

allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.” Id. § 566.

The other source is the United States Supreme Court’s discussion in M ilkovich v.

Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), of the constitutional protection for

expressions of opinion.

In resolving contentions that a statement is a protected expression of

opinion, the Colorado Supreme Court has referred to both the Restatement and

M ilkovich. To the extent that it adopts the Restatement as a matter of state

comm on law, we are bound. To the extent that it relies on M ilkovich, however,

we follow the Colorado court’s interpretation of the United States Supreme

Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence only insofar as we agree with that

interpretation. Accordingly, it is important that we compare M ilkovich’s holding

to the Restatement’s provisions to determine whether the latter provides greater

protection than M ilkovich in the circumstances of this case. If it does, we must

predict whether the Colorado Supreme Court would recognize that additional

restriction on defamation claims. W e begin with an analysis of M ilkovich.

The M ilkovich Court rejected the suggestion that it add to previous doctrine

“a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled ‘opinion.’”

497 U.S. at 18. In its view, use of the term opinion obscures analysis, and the

purposes to be served by such an exemption were already well served by existing

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doctrine. Concerning the first point the Court observed that “expressions of

‘opinion’ may often imply an assertion of objective fact.” Id. It explained:

If a speaker says, “In my opinion John Jones is a liar,” he implies a
knowledge of facts which lead to the conclusion that Jones told an
untruth. Even if the speaker states the facts upon which he bases his
opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or incomplete, or if his
assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still imply a false
assertion of fact. Simply couching such statements in terms of
opinion does not dispel these implications; and the statement, “In my
opinion Jones is a liar,” can cause as much damage to reputation as
the statement, “Jones is a liar.” As Judge Friendly aptly stated: “[It]
would be destructive of the law of libel if a writer could escape
liability for accusations of [defamatory conduct] simply by using,
explicitly or implicitly, the words ‘I think.’” See Cianci [v. New
Times Pub. Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980)]. It is worthy of note
that at common law, even the privilege of fair comment did not
extend to “a false statement of fact, whether it was expressly stated
or implied from an expression of opinion.” Restatement (Second) of
Torts, § 566, Comment a (1977).

M ilkovich at 18–19. The Court then stated that existing doctrine adequately

protected freedom of expression “without the creation of an artificial dichotomy

between ‘opinion’ and fact.” Id. at 19. In particular, it pointed to precedent

providing “that a statement on matters of public concern must be provable as false

before there can be liability under state defamation law, at least in situations . . .

where a media defendant is involved.” Id. at 19–20. Accordingly, it continued,

“a statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not

contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional

protection.” Id. at 20. The Court further observed that “‘rhetorical hyperbole’” is

protected by doctrine requiring that allegedly defamatory statements (such as the

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characterization of a union dissident as a “traitor”) “reasonably be interpreted as

stating actual facts.” Id. (brackets omitted).

W e note four differences between § 566 and the Supreme Court’s

formulation of the constitutional standard in M ilkovich. First, § 566 requires that

the statement (in the form of an opinion) “impl[y] the allegation of undisclosed

defamatory facts.” In other words, an opinion is not actionable if it is based on

defamatory facts that are disclosed. M ilkovich, in contrast, observes that “[e]ven

if the speaker states the facts upon which he bases his opinion, if those facts are

either incorrect or incomplete, or if his assessment of them is erroneous, the

statement may still imply a false assertion of fact,” id. at 18–19, thereby

suggesting that the opinion is not constitutionally protected. The difference

between the two formulations, however, is more apparent than real. As noted in

the comments to § 566, although an opinion based on disclosed defamatory facts

is not itself subject to liability, the disclosure of the defamatory facts on which

the opinion rests may still create liability if the facts themselves are false; it is the

publication of the defamatory facts, however, rather than the expression of

opinion, that is actionable. See § 566 cmt. b (when speaker states facts on which

opinion is based, “[t]he statement of facts and the expression of opinion . . . are

separate matters . . . , and at common law either or both could be defamatory”);

id. cmt. c illus. 5 (“If the defendant bases his expression of a derogatory opinion .

. . on his own statement of false and defamatory facts, he is subject to liability for

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the factual statement but not for the expression of opinion.”); § 578 (liability of

republisher). Thus, Restatement § 566 is no more protective than M ilkovich, and

we need not decide whether the Colorado Supreme Court would impose a

limitation on the defamation tort beyond what M ilkovich requires in this regard.

A second difference between M ilkovich and § 566 is that M ilkovich protects

statements that are not provably false only if they are “on matters of public

concern.” 497 U.S. at 19. Section 566 has no such restriction, see § 566 cmt. c at

173 (“Although it is . . . possible that [the Supreme Court will treat] private

comm unications on private matters . . . differently, the logic of the constitutional

principle would appear to apply to all expressions of opinion of the first, or pure,

type.”). That difference is not material in this case, however, because the

statements by Aetna and CIG NA are undoubtedly on matters of public concern.

In the context of the First Amendment, a matter is of public concern when

it is “a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and

of value and concern to the public at the time of publication.” City of San Diego,

Cal. v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004). “W hether . . . speech addresses a matter

of public concern must be determined by [the expression’s] content, form, and

context . . . as revealed by the whole record.” Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.

Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (brackets and ellipses in

original, internal quotation marks omitted). Although TM JI contends that the

Aetna and CIGNA bulletins w ere not on matters of public concern, we think this

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contention untenable. Indeed, its pleadings below are inconsistent with its

present position. The amended complaint states that “The acts of Aetna and/or

CIGNA [in publishing the bulletins] . . . denied suffering and injured persons the

availability and use of the Christensen partial prosthetic implants and denied the

public a necessary medical device . . . and . . . have, therefore, caused and

continue[d] to cause great distress, pain, and suffering to the many persons who

could benefit from the Christensen partial prosthetic implant.” Aplt. App. at 13

(Amended Complaint). It added that “dentists, oral surgeons, dental and medical

clinics, and hospitals, and their patients, have relied and continue to rely upon the

factual truthfulness and accuracy of the . . . statements made and disseminated by

Aetna and/or CIGNA . . . regarding [TM JI].” Id. at 12. Even on appeal, TM JI’s

opening brief recites that approximately 30 million Americans suffer from TM J

disorders and that at least 100,000 patients had received TM J implants between

1988 and 1998. Twenty-five thousand of its devices have been used by at least

800 hospitals and clinics. Because thousands of people, including those with TM J

disorders, those who have received or are seeking implants, and physicians and

dentists treating TM J-disorder patients, have a legitimate interest in the utility of

TM JI’s devices, the matter is undoubtedly of public concern. Any distinction

between the Restatement and M ilkovich on this issue is therefore inconsequential

here.

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 The third difference between § 566 and the M ilkovich formulation is that

M ilkovich states that the not-provably-false test may apply only “where a media

defendant is involved,” 497 U.S. at 19–20, whereas § 566 contains no such

requirement. W e doubt that Aetna and CIGNA could properly be described as

media defendants. In this respect, then, § 566 may well impose a restriction on

TM JI’s claim not imposed by the federal constitution. Accordingly, we must

decide whether the Colorado Supreme Court would extend this protection even if

not required to do so by federal constitutional law . W e are confident that it

would— that is, that it would not confine the reach of the protection of not-

provably-false statements to those made by media defendants. Indeed, in a pre-

M ilkovich opinion the Colorado Supreme Court applied § 566 to a private

defendant (the plaintiff’s supervisor). See Bucher, 595 P.2d at 241. And more

recently the Colorado Supreme Court discussed M ilkovich’s not-provably-false

standard without a mention of the United States Supreme Court’s possible media-

defendant restriction and affirmed the dismissal of a claim against a defendant

who had written letters to the editor without any discussion of whether the author

of such letters is a media defendant. See Keohane, 882 P.2d 1293.

The fourth and final difference we note between the § 566 and M ilkovich

formulations is in the expression of the ultimate test for whether a statement is

actionable. The Restatement asks whether a statement “implies the allegation of

[an] undisclosed defamatory fact[].” Restatement § 566. M ilkovich asks whether

-19-
a statement is “provable as false” and is not “rhetorical hyperbole,” M ilkovich,

497 U.S. at 19–20. Again, however, we believe that the tests are essentially

identical in application. If no fact is implied by a statement, then there is no way

to prove it false. And M ilkovich’s rhetorical-hyperbole standard is simply a

recognition that an expression of opinion that appears to imply an allegation of

fact (such as, “X is a traitor”) may, in context, be mere hyperbole that a

reasonable person would not view as a factual assertion. Apparently the Colorado

Supreme Court also views the two formulations as congruent. In two pre-

M ilkovich opinions the court followed § 566 and determined whether an allegedly

defamatory statement implied undisclosed defamatory facts. See Bucher, 595

P.2d at 241; Burns, 659 P.2d at 1358–60. Then in Keohane, 882 P.2d 1293, the

Colorado Supreme Court stated that the standard in its precedents “was

subsequently fortified by M ilkovich,” id. at 1297. As it explained:

M ilkovich and Burns . . . provide the necessary framework to
determine if a statement is protected. This framework involves two
inquiries. The first inquiry is w hether the statement is “sufficiently
factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false.” M ilkovich,
497 U.S. at 21. The second inquiry is w hether reasonable people
would conclude that the assertion is one of fact. Id. The factors
relevant to the second inquiry are: (1) how the assertion is phrased;
(2) the context of the entire statement; and (3) the circumstances
surrounding the assertion, including the medium through which the
information is disseminated and the audience to whom the statement
is directed. Burns, 659 P.2d at 1360.

Keohane, 882 P.2d at 1299 (footnotes omitted). The second inquiry is necessary

only if the first inquiry is answered in the affirmative. See also id. at 1300–03;

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Wilson, 126 P.3d at 280 (citing Keohane for proposition that “[c]ourts determine

whether a statement is protected as opinion by inquiring first whether the

statement is susceptible of being proved true or false. If the answ er is yes, courts

then inquire whether reasonable persons would conclude that the assertion is one

of fact”).

In sum, we find little difference between § 566 and the M ilkovich standard;

and to the extent that the differences are relevant in this case, we are confident

that Colorado would apply the more restrictive § 566 formulation. W e now apply

the above analysis to the parties’ arguments on appeal.

2. TM JI’s Allegations

a. The Terms Experim ental and Investigational

The heart of TM JI’s complaint is that Aetna and CIGNA defamed it by

calling its products experim ental and investigational. In response to Aetna’s and

CIGNA’s defense that they were only expressing opinions, TM JI argues that

within the medical community the terms experim ental and investigational have

definite meanings based on “objective criteria,” and that statements labeling its

devices as experimental and investigational are therefore not mere matters of

opinion but are assertions of fact. Aplt. Br. at 13–14. In support of this

contention TM JI’s appellate briefs discuss three cases and cite several more in a

footnote. They also point to some FDA definitions and a definition retrieved

through an Aetna website. W e are not persuaded.

-21-
 The first case discussed by TM JI is Leonhardt v. Holden Business Forms

Co., 828 F. Supp. 657 (D. M inn. 1993). Plaintiff Penelope Leonhardt had sought

coverage for an autologous bone marrow transplant (ABM T) to treat her cancer.

The administrator of her group health plan denied the treatment on the grounds

that ABM T was “experimental” and “investigational.” Id. at 662. M s. Leonhardt

sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the administrator from denying

coverage because the procedure had to be performed promptly if she was to

benefit fully. See id.

First, the district court found that the administrator’s actions in denying

coverage had violated the terms of the plan. Not only did the plan not include an

exclusion for investigational procedures, but the administrator had failed to

advise M s. Leonhardt of “what deficiencies her application had to overcome to be

successful on appeal,” id. at 668 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted),

and had improperly denied her (1) the right to submit evidence supporting her

position that the treatment was not experimental and (2) the right to challenge the

evidence on which the administrator had relied, see id. at 669.

The district court then considered what the appropriate remedy should be.

Although it acknowledged that it would ordinarily remand to the administrator for

reconsideration, it said that to do so in this case “would be inappropriate” because

time was of the essence and the administrator’s conduct “call[ed] into question its

ability to process [M s.] Leonhardt’s claim impartially,” id. at 670. Therefore, it

-22-
analyzed whether M s. Leonhardt had satisfied the standards for granting a

preliminary injunction. In addressing whether she was likely to succeed on the

merits of her claim, the court “step[ped] into the shoes of the Plan administrator

[and made] a de novo determination of whether [M s.] Leonhardt’s proposed

ABM T treatment [was] experimental under the Plan definition.” Id. The court

did not, as TM JI’s argument would suggest, simply apply the definition of

experimental purportedly recognized throughout the medical community. Rather,

it applied the Plan’s definition of experimental medical procedure as a procedure

that “‘is (a) not proven in an objective manner to have therapeutic value or

benefit, (b) restricted to use at medical facilities capable of carrying out scientific

studies; or (c) of questionable medical effectiveness.’” Id. at 670–71 (quoting the

Plan). The court found that the definition had not been satisfied because the

treatment had achieved partial or complete remission in 80% of patients treated,

the treatment was not restricted to medical facilities capable of carrying out

scientific studies, and the plaintiff was a good candidate for the treatment.

The court rejected the administrator’s proffers intended to show that the

treatment was experimental. An affidavit from a Dr. Altman stated that ABM T

would be considered experimental “until the medical community is presented with

at least two randomized, controlled studies indicating a significant statistical and

practical increase in the disease-free survival and overall survival rate for patients

undergoing [ABM T] as opposed to patients undergoing standard therapy.” Id.

-23-
(internal quotation marks omitted). The other support for the administrator’s

position was a report from a medical research information clearinghouse

concluding that ABM T treatment for M s. Leonhardt’s type of cancer was

experimental. The court did not reject this evidence on the ground that the expert

and the report used a definition of experimental contrary to accepted usage. Its

reason for rejecting the evidence was simply that the Plan used a different

definition. See id. at 671 (“Although this may be Dr. Altman’s understanding of

the term ‘experimental,’ it is not the definition articulated in the Plan.”).

Leonhardt thus does not support TM JI’s contention that the term experim ental has

a single, universal definition.

The other opinion discussed in TM JI’s opening brief is Bucci v. Blue

Cross-Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 728 (D. Conn. 1991). The

defendant insurer had denied plaintiff’s request for coverage of a combination of

high-dose chemotherapy (HDCT) and ABM T treatment for her breast cancer. The

basis for the insurer’s denial was that plaintiff’s policy excluded coverage for

services “‘which are experimental or investigational in nature; meaning any

treatment, procedure . . . drugs, drug usage . . . not recognized as accepted

medical practice,’” id. at 729 (quoting policy, ellipses in original), and that

HDCT/ABM T for breast cancer fell into this category. Although the court noted

the substantial risks of the treatment and the limited data on its effectiveness, see

id. at 730–31, it ordered the insurer to cover the treatment. For our purposes, tw o

-24-
components of the court’s analysis are salient. First, the court did not define

experim ental or investigational, but merely applied the policy’s definition of

these terms. See id. at 729. Second, in construing the term accepted medical

practice in the policy definition, it apparently felt compelled to minimize the plan

administrator’s discretion in determining coverage by selecting an objective

meaning. See id. at 732–33. It appeared to believe that the only possible

definition of accepted medical practice meeting that standard was that

a procedure may be found not to constitute accepted medical practice
only where there is no reasonably substantial, qualified, responsible,
relevant segment of the medical community which accepts the
procedure as properly within the range of appropriate medical
treatment, under the circumstances of the case, as judged by the
standards of the medical community.

Id. at 732. Thus, the court was hardly providing what it thought to be a definition

of experimental or investigational generally accepted in the medical community.

The third case discussed by TM JI, White v. Caterpillar, Inc., 765 F. Supp.

1418 (W .D. M o. 1991), is mentioned only in the reply brief. It, too, provides

TM JI no support. In that case the plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction after

her insurer denied her request for coverage of HDCT/ABM T treatment. The

opinion provides no definition of the term investigational, nor does it quote any

plan provision using the term. Rather, the plan’s standard for coverage appears to

have been whether the procedure was a “generally accepted surgical operation,”

id. at 1420 (internal quotation marks omitted), although the administrator had

-25-
denied coverage on the ground that the procedure did not meet that standard

because the procedure was “investigational,” id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). This case hardly suggests that the term investigational has a universally

understood definition. Likewise, the cases TM JI cites in a footnote in its opening

brief do not support the contention that the terms experim ental and investigational

have definite meanings in the medical community.

TM JI also relies on definitions of investigational device and investigation

in the FDA regulations governing “Investigational Device Exemptions.” 21

C.F.R. pt. 812. Under the regulations the maker of medical devices may obtain

approval to conduct “clinical investigations of devices to determine [their] safety

and effectiveness.” Id. § 812.2(a). An approved device may be shipped for the

purpose of conducting investigations without complying with the usual

performance and marketing standards. Id. Section 812.3 defines investigational

device as “a device . . . that is the object of an investigation.” Id. § 812.3(g).

Investigation is defined as “a clinical investigation or research involving one or

more subjects to determine the safety or effectiveness of a device.” Id.

§ 812.3(h). These definitions may be suggestive of general usage, but they do not

purport to be universally applicable. For regulations to provide adequate

guidance they must use terms with precision. Often, however, no common word

has such a precise meaning, so the regulation must use an imprecise word and

give it a precise definition. This process is a common one. For example, this

-26-
circuit uses the adjective unpublished to refer to opinions with no precedential

force even though such opinions are widely “published” in the usual meaning of

the term. Accordingly, we view the FDA definitions as authoritative only in the

special context of the regulations in which they are used.

Finally, TM JI relies on a definition that it obtained through Aetna’s w ebsite

for health-care information, http://www.intelihealth.com. To the extent that TM JI

is suggesting that Aetna has adopted that definition for its coverage policy

bulletins, we are not persuaded. First, all the website does is provide a link to the

M erriam W ebster M edical Dictionary; the definitions are not ones provided by

Aetna itself. Second, the definition referenced is not a definition of experimental

or investigational. Rather, it is the following definition of investigational new

drug: “a drug that has not been approved for general use by the Food and Drug

Administration but is under investigation in clinical trials regarding its safety and

efficacy first by clinical investigators and then by practicing physicians using

subjects who have given informed consent to participate— abbreviation IND; also

called investigational drug.” A plt. App. at 322. Again, the definition is an effort

to explain the meaning of a technical term used by the FDA for regulatory

purposes. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.3 (defining IND and investigational new drug). It

does not purport to be, and should not be read as, a universal definition of the

term investigational, or even as providing the sole meaning in a medical context.

-27-
 Contrary to TM JI’s assertion, several courts have expressly stated the view

that the terms experimental and investigational do not have a settled meaning in

the insurance-coverage context. See Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d

1249, 1260 (3d Cir. 1993) (in insurance context, term experimental is “resistant to

precise definition”); Dahl-Eimers v. M ut. of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 1379,

1383 (11th Cir. 1993) (“[i]n the context of a major medical insurance policy, the

term ‘experimental,’ . . . is ambiguous w hen it is undefined.”); Johnson v. Dist. 2

M arine Eng’rs Beneficial Ass’n, 857 F.2d 514, 516 (9th Cir. 1988) (“In the

context of modern medicine, the term ‘experimental’ seems clearly ambiguous on

its face.”); Reed v. Wal-M art Stores, Inc., 197 F.Supp.2d 883, 888–89 (E.D. M ich.

2002) (terms experimental and investigational used in insurance plan are

ambiguous); Steil v. Humana Kansas City, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 660, 665 (D.

Kan. 2000) (experimental is ambiguous in medical context); Nichols v. Trustmark

Ins. Co., 1 F. Supp. 2d 689, 699 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (terms investigational and

experimental used in insurance plan were ambiguous).

M ore importantly, it is apparent from the cases that the terms are not

applied, as TM JI would have us believe, only to medical procedures and devices

that are undergoing research. In particular, perhaps as the result of growing

concern that new, expensive treatments are no better than old standbys, it is

apparently unremarkable for plan definitions and independent experts to consider

a treatment to be experimental or investigational until it has established its

-28-
superiority to current treatment. See M artin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va.,

Inc., 115 F.3d 1201, 1208 (4th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff’s expert agreed with

administrator that whether treatment was experimental or investigative depended

on whether it produced better outcomes than standard alternatives); Hendricks v.

Cent. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 39 F.3d 507, 513 (4th Cir. 1994) (professor of

medicine testified that because cancer treatment had no demonstrated “survival

advantage” over conventional therapy, it was investigational); Pinckney v. Blue

Cross Blue Shield of Tenn., Inc., No. 3:05-00962, 2007 W L 108886, at *3 (M .D.

Tenn. Jan. 9, 2007) (plan defines services as experimental or investigational if

“further research is necessary in order to define safety, toxicity, efficacy, or

effectiveness of that Service compared with conventional alternatives”); Reed,

197 F. Supp. 2d at 889 (one of defendant’s experts defined terms investigational

and experim ental as “whether a sufficient number of clinical trials had been

performed to demonstrate that the therapy is either inferior, equivalent, or

superior to standard treatment”); Nichols, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 698 (plaintiff’s expert

stated that treatment was not experimental or investigational because its

“effectiveness had previously been established to be superior to any other known

therapy”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Leonhardt, 828 F. Supp. at 671

(defendant’s expert stated that “procedure will be considered experimental until

the medical community is presented with at least two randomized, controlled

studies indicating a significant statistical and practical increase in the disease-free

-29-
survival and overall survival rate for patients undergoing this therapy as opposed

to patients undergoing standard therapy”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In short, neither the authority cited by TM JI, nor any we have found,

supports its contention that experimental and investigational have definite

meanings in the medical community. Because there is no universally accepted

definition for these terms, we must discern their meanings from the context in

which the defendants use them. W e begin with the Aetna bulletin.

b. Aetna C PB 28

i. Description of the Bulletin

CPB 28 addresses Aetna’s coverage determinations for treatment of TM J

syndrome and TM J disorders. It contains several statements about TM JI’s

products that TM JI alleges are defamatory. W e proceed to put these statements in

context to determine whether they are actionable. In our quotations from CPB 28,

we have italicized the allegedly defamatory statements.

The bulletin begins with an “Important Note” stating the sources on which

Aetna has relied in reaching the conclusions the bulletin sets forth. The note

reads, in part:

This Clinical Policy Bulletin expresses Aetna’s determination of
whether certain services or supplies are medically necessary. Aetna
has reached these conclusions based upon a review of currently
available clinical information (including clinical outcome studies in
the peer-reviewed published medical literature, regulatory status of
the technology, evidence-based guidelines of public health and health
research agencies, evidence-based guidelines and positions of leading

-30-
 national health professional organizations, views of physicians
practicing in relevant clinical areas, and other relevant factors).

Aplt. App. at 177. The bulletin then cautions readers that a conclusion in CPB 28

that Aetna considers a procedure to be medically necessary does not mean that the

procedure is covered for a specific policy holder— rather, individual coverage

determinations can be made only with reference to the individual’s benefit plan,

as the individual benefit plan controls over any determination made in the

bulletin. Although not stated expressly, the implication of this statement is that a

treatment determined in the bulletin not to be medically necessary will never be

covered, but the specific circumstances determine w hether there is coverage for a

treatment that can be medically necessary.

The next section, entitled “Policy,” sets forth Aetna’s m edical-necessity

determinations. Following that section is the “Background” section, which

explains the bases for those determinations. W e now explore these sections in

some detail.

The Policy section lists several nonsurgical treatments that Aetna considers

medically necessary. For example, the use of intra-oral devices such as bite

guards is considered medically necessary when the patient has documented

evidence of difficulty chewing because of TM J pain or limited joint functionality.

Physical therapy is considered medically necessary without the need to

demonstrate pain or lack of functionality, but documentation of need is required

-31-
before coverage will be provided for more than a six-w eek course of 14 sessions.

Various categories of drugs are also considered medically necessary to treat

different types of TM J-related pain, as are relaxation and behavior-modification

therapies. Treatment in specialized pain centers, however, is considered

medically necessary only for “those few individuals who have been unresponsive

to less comprehensive interventions.” Id. at 179. Other medically necessary

pain-management techniques include acupuncture, injecting pain medication into

the joint, and dry needling (sticking a needle into TM J-related muscles without

injecting any substance).

Surgical management options are much more restricted. The bulletin

reminds readers that any request for surgical intervention must be reviewed by the

Oral and M axillofacial Unit and will be granted only when the patient has been

unresponsive to nonsurgical treatments and surgery is the only remaining option.

Acceptable surgical interventions include arthrocentesis (surgically flushing fluid

from the TM J joint and stretching it), arthroscopy (using an instrument to

diagnose and repair the joint), and joint-reconstruction surgery.

The bulletin describes TM J implants as the most invasive surgical option.

Regarding such surgery, CPB 28 states:

Aetna considers the TM J Concepts prosthesis medically necessary
when used as a salvage device for treatment of end-stage TM J
disease, when no other viable therapeutic alternatives are available.
The use of the Christensen TM J Fossa-Eminence Prosthesis System
(partial TM J prosthesis) and the Christensen TM J Fossa-

-32-
 Eminence/Condylar Prosthesis System (Christensen total joint
prosthesis) are considered experim ental and investigational.

Id. (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, use of

the TM J Concepts device is strictly circumscribed, whereas TM JI’s devices are

not considered medically necessary under any circumstances because Aetna has

determined that they are experimental and investigational.

TM JI’s devices are not unique in this regard. The list of treatments that

Aetna will not cover because it has determined them to be experimental and

investigational includes 10 diagnostic procedures and 16 nonsurgical management

treatments. Four surgical treatments are considered “experimental and

investigational for diagnosis and treatment of TM J disorders”:

...
• Christensen total TM J prosthesis
• M odified condylotomy [(surgical division of the
condyle)] or intraoral vertical ramus osteotomy [(cutting
of the ramus)]. . . when submitted with a diagnosis of
internal derangement of the temporomandibular joint
• Treatment of alveolar cavitational osteopathosis . . .
• Partial temporomandibular joint prostheses.

Id. at 179–180 (emphasis added).

The “Background” section contains a comprehensive explanation of

Aetna’s Policy decisions. The thrust of the discussion is that caution should be

used in treating TM J dysfunction, and surgery of any kind is an option of last

resort. The bulletin explains that the causes of TM J dysfunction are generally

unknow n, but that it is thought to be the result of trauma to the joint. The cause

-33-
of some TM J trauma is obvious, such as extreme force applied to the joint (as

may occur in an accident), whereas other causes, such as stress, anxiety, and sleep

disorders, create the damage over time. According to the bulletin, because of “a

paucity of evidence-based outcome research and lack of consensus on the

appropriate management of [TM J dysfunction],” id. at 180–81, there is wide

variation in how clinicians treat TM J dysfunction. It states that there is a lack of

“[s]cientifically valid clinical trials” for most TM J therapies and there is no

“objective, generally accepted” diagnostic approach for identifying TM J

dysfunction. Id. at 181. As general support for its limitations on coverage, the

bulletin quotes the National Institutes of Health’s (NIH) recommendation that

TM J therapies be “CO NSERVATIVE & REVERSIBLE.” Id.

The Background section then proceeds to discuss specific surgical

treatments. A number of surgical techniques are considered experimental and

investigational because of a lack of evidence supporting their efficacy. For

example, it states:

Aetna considers modified condylotomy to be experimental and
investigational. There are no controlled studies of modified
condylotomy. Controlled studies are important because, according to
an NIH Consensus Conference, up to 90 percent of TM J patients[’]
symptoms resolve spontaneously. In addition, the literature on
modified condylotomy comes almost exclusively from a single group,
raising questions about the generalizability of findings. Furthermore,
disc displacement is extremely common, and there is no direct
evidence that disc displacement is a cause of TM J symptoms.

Id.

-34-
The discussion of the partial- and total-joint devices is lengthy:

A partial TM J prosthesis consists of a meniscectomy and placement
of a metallic glenoid fossa metal prosthesis (Christensen fossa-
eminence prosthesis, TM J, [sic] Inc., Golden, CO) in place of the
meniscus, such that a natural condyle articulates with a metal fossa
prosthesis. There is inadequate evidence from published clinical
outcome studies of the safety and effectiveness of partial joint
prostheses in the treatment of [temporomandibular disorders] . The
U.S. Food and Drug Administration Dental Products Advisory Panel
reviewed clinical studies of the Christensen fossa prosthesis, and
advised the FDA to approve the total prosthesis, but to not approve
the partial joint prosthesis because of a lack of clinical data on its
safety and effectiveness. The information submitted to the FD A on
the safety and effectiveness of the partial TM J prosthesis is limited
and has not been published in a peer-reviewed journal. In an
editorial, Laskin (2001), former editor-in-chief of the Journal of Oral
and M axillofacial Surgery, the official journal of the American
Association of Oral and M axillofacial Surgeons, commented on the
data on the partial TM J prosthesis presented to the FDA Dental
Products A dvisory Panel:

At that meeting [of the FDA Dental Products Advisory Panel
w here the partial TM J prosthesis was considered] the FDA
staff presentation expressed concern regarding the lack of data
on the effect of the natural condyle articulating against a metal
fossa, the limited number of patients with long term follow-up,
and the broad diagnosis of internal derangement as an
indication for its use. The panel expressed similar concerns
about these issues, as w ell as the fact that the registry data
provided in support of the product did not include all the
patients treated and the sample size was insufficient for each
of the individual indications. They recommended clarification
of the patient inclusion criteria in the clinical study, evaluation
of failures and additional patient follow-up, more clearly
defined indications for use of the device, and that a power
analysis of the clinical data be done to place the PM A in an
approvable form. However, despite these criticisms, and the
panel’s opinion that adequate safety and effectiveness data for
the given surgical indications were lacking, the device was
approved by the FDA for distribution in February 2001.

-35-
 Laskin (2001) concluded that “there are insufficient data” to
answer questions about the safety and effectiveness of the partial
TM J prosthesis. “For example, how reliable are clinical data based
on a registry that did not include all patients treated with the device,
in which there was a very small number of total patients with serial
data and even smaller numbers in each diagnostic subcategory, and
where in 1 group of 97 patients with a diagnosis of internal
derangement and/or inflammatory arthritis, only 30% (12 subjects)
had a follow-up of 3 or more years and 70% were either lost to
follow-up, withdrawn, or potentially lost to follow-up. How can one
make an informed decision with such information?”

Aetna considers the Christensen total joint prosthesis
experimental and investigational because it has not been shown to be
as effective as the TM J Concepts total joint prosthesis. An
evaluation study has reported significantly better post-surgical
outcomes with the TM J Concepts total joint prosthesis than the
Christensen total joint prosthesis. W olford, et al. (2003) reported the
results of a study comparing the Christensen total joint prosthesis
(TM J, Inc., Golden, CO) with the TM J Concepts total joint prosthesis
(TM J Concepts Inc., Camarillo, CA) in 45 patients, 23 of w hom were
treated with the Christensen prosthesis, and 22 of whom were treated
with the TM J Concepts Prosthesis. The investigators reported that,
although subjects treated with either total joint prosthesis showed
good skeletal and occlusal stability, the subjects treated with the TM J
Concepts Prosthesis had statistically significant improved outcomes
compared to subjects treated with the Christensen prosthesis with
respect to [various indicators]. The investigators concluded “[a]s a
result of our study, it appears that [TM J Concepts Prosthesis]
provides a more biologically accepted and functional prosthesis than
the [Christensen prosthesis] for the complex TM J patient.”

Id. at 181–82 (emphasis added). Finally, the bulletin concludes with a list of 57

references on w hich Aetna based its TM J treatment-coverage determinations.

ii. Liability

Aetna is subject to liability only for those statements in CPB 28 that are

false statements of fact or expressions of opinion that imply the existence of

-36-
undisclosed defamatory facts. See Restatement §§ 565, 566. TM JI challenges as

defamatory three statements in CPB 28 regarding TM JI’s total-joint prosthesis

and five regarding its partial-joint prosthesis: (1) “[t]he use of the . . .

Christensen TM J Fossa-Eminence/Condylar Prosthesis System (Christensen total

joint prosthesis) [is] considered experimental and investigational,” Aplt. App. at

179; (2) “Aetna considers the [Christensen total TM J prosthesis] experimental and

investigational for diagnosis and treatment of TM J disorders,” id.; (3) “Aetna

considers the Christensen total joint prosthesis experimental and investigational

because it has not been shown to be as effective as the TM J Concepts total joint

prosthesis,” id. at 182; (4) “[t]he use of the Christensen TM J Fossa-Eminence

Prosthesis System (partial TM J Prosthesis) . . . [is] considered experimental and

investigational,” id. at 179; (5) “Aetna considers [partial TM J prostheses]

experimental and investigational for diagnosis and treatment of TM J disorders,”

id.; (6) “[t]here is inadequate evidence from published clinical outcome studies of

the safety and effectiveness of partial joint prostheses in the treatment of

[temporomandibular disorders],” id. at 181; (7) there is “a lack of clinical data on

[the partial-joint prosthesis’s] safety and effectiveness,” id.; and (8) “[t]he

information submitted to the FDA on the safety and effectiveness of the partial

TM J prosthesis is limited and has not been published in a peer-reviewed journal,”

id. Statements 1, 2, and 3 are formulations of A etna’s determination that TM JI’s

total-joint device is experimental and investigational, while statements 4 and 5

-37-
express its determination that the partial-joint device is also experimental and

investigational. Statements 6, 7, and 8 provide support for its determination

regarding the partial-joint device.

CPB 28 nowhere provides an explicit definition of the terms experimental

and investigational. Thus, its explanation in the Background section of why it has

determined that certain treatments are experim ental and investigational amounts

to its definition of those terms as they are used in the bulletin. For example, the

bulletin states that “A etna considers the Christensen total joint prosthesis

experimental and investigational because it has not been shown to be as effective

as the TM J Concepts total joint prosthesis.” Id. at 182. In other words, when

Aetna says that the total joint prosthesis is experim ental and investigational, it is

saying that the total-joint prosthesis “has not been show n to be as effective as”

the TM J Concepts prosthesis. The statement that the prosthesis is “experimental

and investigational” therefore is defamatory only if it is defamatory to say that

the prosthesis “has not been shown to be as effective as” the TM J Concepts

prosthesis. In our view, this latter statement is not defamatory because it is not

provably false. Different people will make different judgments on whether a

product “has been shown to be as effective as” another. Some may require only

one study; others may require the gold standard of a double-blind study, or even

multiple such studies.

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 M oreover, TM JI does not even contend that it was false to say that its

product has not been shown to be as effective as the TM J Concepts product.

Instead, TM JI complains that comparing its prosthesis to TM J Concepts’ custom

prosthesis is “like saying a M ercedes-B enz is not as good as a Rolls Royce; one is

assembly-line produced and the other custom built but both are superior

machines.” Aplt. Br. at 29. But whether the comparison is an appropriate one is

beside the point. It is not defamatory to say that a M ercedes rides less smoothly

than a Rolls Royce just because a better comparison would be between a

M ercedes and a Jaguar. Thus, statements 1, 2, and 3, expressing Aetna’s

determination that TM JI’s total-joint device is experimental and investigational

because it has not been shown to be as effective as the TM J Concepts product, are

not actionable because they are not provably false.

Similarly, neither statements 4 and 5, that Aetna considers TM JI’s partial-

joint prosthesis experimental and investigational, nor statement 6, that there is

inadequate evidence of the device’s safety and effectiveness, are actionable.

Statement 6 amounts to Aetna’s explanation of why it has reached the

determination it makes in statements 4 and 5: “There is inadequate evidence from

published clinical outcome studies of the safety and effectiveness of partial joint

prostheses in the treatment of [TM J disorders].” Aplt. App. at 181. To say that

the partial-joint prosthesis is experim ental and investigational is thus to say that

there is “inadequate evidence” supporting the device’s safety and effectiveness.

-39-
A gain, such a statement is not defamatory because it is not provably false. As

noted above, whether one considers evidence to be adequate is a matter of

individual taste. See Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 281 F.3d

1220, 1228 (11th Cir. 2002) (statement that company was fired because its

performance was inadequate was one of opinion not capable of being proved

false).

Statement 7, that there is “a lack of clinical data on [the partial-joint

device’s] safety and effectiveness,” Aplt. App. at 181, is a paraphrase of the FD A

Dental Products Advisory Panel’s recommendation that the FDA not approve the

partial-joint prosthesis. To the extent that Aetna may be arguing on appeal that it

cannot be liable for this statement because it was merely repeating a

determination made by others, it is incorrect. Comment b to Restatement § 578

makes clear that one who republishes a defamatory statement may be liable to the

same extent as the original speaker because each publication causes a new harm

to the plaintiff’s reputation. But a republisher is liable only if the original

statement is defamatory, and in this instance the statement is not. To say that

there is a “lack of clinical data” in this context is not provably false. Like the

statement that there is inadequate evidence supporting the device’s safety and

effectiveness, whether there is a “lack of clinical data” is a statement of opinion.

Reasonable people may differ on how much data from clinical studies they

require before they are satisfied that such data are no longer wanting or deficient.

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 W e recognize that in some circumstances to say that there is a lack of data

is to imply that any such data are absent, and that whether such data were in fact

absent could then be proved true or false. But that implication could not follow

from the context in which Aetna’s statement appears. The sentence containing

the allegedly defamatory statement also states that the FDA panel “reviewed

clinical studies” of the prosthesis. Id. A few lines after the sentence are (1) a

quotation from Laskin explaining the panel’s recommendation “that a power

analysis of the clinical data be done,” id. (emphasis added), and then (2) Laskin’s

conclusion that the data on the partial prosthesis were insufficient because “how

reliable are clinical data based on a registry that did not include all patients . . . ?”

Id. at 182 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this context no reasonable reader

could infer that “lack of clinical data” means absence as opposed to insufficiency.

Because Aetna’s statement that there is a lack of clinical data cannot be proved

false, it is not actionable.

The last statement in CPB 28 of w hich TM JI complains is Aetna’s

statement that “[t]he information submitted to the FDA on the safety and

effectiveness of the partial TM J prosthesis is limited and has not been published

in a peer-reviewed journal.” Id. at 181. The first part of this sentence, that the

“information submitted to the FDA on the safety and effectiveness of the partial

TM J prosthesis is limited,” is not defamatory because it is not capable of being

proved false. To say that information is limited is simply another way of saying

-41-
that information is “inadequate” or “lack[ing].” But the statement that the

“information submitted to the FDA on the safety and effectiveness of the partial

TM J prosthesis . . . has not been published in a peer-reviewed journal” is

susceptible of being proved false. To make that determination, one would need

only to look at the information submitted to the FDA and investigate whether that

same information had been published in a peer-reviewed journal. Nevertheless,

TM JI has no claim based on this statement because it does not allege that this

statement is false. W hat it does allege is that “[t]he bulletins state that there are

no published peer-review ed studies” of its prostheses, Aplt. Br. at 28 (emphasis

added), and that this statement is inaccurate because such studies do exist. But

this allegation distorts the record. CPB 28 does not state that there are no peer-

review ed studies of the prostheses; it states only that “[t] he information submitted

to the FD A on . . . safety and effectiveness,” id. (emphasis added), was not

published in a peer-reviewed journal. TM JI has not challenged the accuracy of

that statement.

TM JI may be arguing that Aetna’s statement, even if literally true, is

nonetheless defamatory because it omits a relevant material fact (namely, that

peer reviews of its devices exist), and therefore carries a defamatory implication.

The Restatement does not address this situation, but a leading treatise notes that

liability can be found if the publication gets the facts right but the “gist” wrong:

-42-
 [I]f the defendant juxtaposes a series of facts so as to imply a
defamatory connection between them, or creates a defamatory
implication by omitting facts, he may be held responsible for the
defamatory implication, unless it qualifies as an opinion, even though
the particular facts are correct. On the other hand, the defendant who
states all the particular facts correctly, does not omit facts necessary
to put them in context, and does not juxtapose the facts in a far-
fetched way to create libelous implications, is not liable.

W . Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 116A, Supp. at

117 (W . Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984, Supp. 1988) (footnotes omitted); see

M emphis Publ’g Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W .2d 412 (Tenn. 1978) (news article that

plaintiff was shot when assailant found her husband with plaintiff at plaintiff’s

house improperly implied adulterous relationship because plaintiff’s husband and

other guests were also present).

W e believe that Colorado would tightly cabin liability in this context. In

Living Will Center, 879 P.2d 6, the Colorado Supreme Court stated that the

omission of what the plaintiff considered to be relevant information would not

convert an otherwise nonactionable statement into a defamatory one. The

defendant had broadcast a report stating that the plaintiff’s product was not worth

its purchase price. The plaintiff argued, among other things, that because the

broadcast in which the statement appeared had failed to describe its product fully,

the statement was defamatory. The court disagreed, stating, “[W]e . . . fail to see

how providing limited, though accurate, information about the [product] can be

regarded as a defamation of [plaintiff] under the facts of this case.” Id. at 15.

-43-
 In this case the context of the allegedly libelous statement was a discussion

explaining why the FDA advisory committee recommended against approval of

the TM JI partial-joint prosthesis. The omitted facts would not affect the gist of

this discussion. The bulletin hardly “juxtapose[d] the facts in a far-fetched way

to create libelous implications.” Keeton et al., supra, Supp. at 117. As the court

said in Living Will Center, “we fail to see how [the omission] can be regarded as

a defamation of [TM JI].” Living Will Ctr., 879 P.2d at 15.

c. CIG NA CPN 156

Having disposed of the statements in CPB 28, we turn to TM JI’s allegations

that CIGNA published defamatory statements about TM JI products in its TM J-

surgery bulletin, CPN 156. That bulletin states that “CIGNA HealthCare does not

cover partial joint replacement with the Christensen Fossa Eminence Prosthesis™

(TM J Implants, Inc.) Partial TM J Replacement System because it is considered

experimental, investigational, or unproven,” Aplt. App. at 194, and that “[t]here is

insufficient evidence in the published medical literature to establish the clinical

efficacy or long-term outcome of implantation of partial TM J prostheses,” id. at

197. TM JI complains that saying that its partial-joint devices are “considered

experimental, investigational, or unproven,” id. at 194, is defamatory. The

bulletin does not otherwise define the terms experimental, investigational, or

unproven; we must therefore discern their meanings from the context in which

-44-
they are used. Once again we italicize the allegedly defamatory statements in our

quotations from the bulletin.

The bulletin begins with a paragraph instructing the reader on how to use

the bulletin. Like Aetna’s bulletin, it tells readers that their individual benefit

plans always control in the event of a conflict between a statement of coverage in

CPN 156 and one in the individual plan. It informs readers that some benefit

plans exclude TM J treatment altogether. It then states that CIGNA covers

arthrocentesis, arthroscopy, and arthrotomy (open-joint surgery) w hen certain

listed medical-necessity criteria are met. For such a procedure to be covered,

pain must have persisted despite at least six months of “scientifically recognized

non-invasive therapies,” including pain medication, intra-oral devices, and

physical therapy. Id. at 193. In addition, clinical examinations must document

specific joint conditions for each treatment. The bulletin then states:

CIGNA . . . covers arthrotomy with total prosthetic joint replacement
using The TM J Concepts Patient-Fitted TM J Reconstruction
Prosthesis for temporomandibular disorder when ALL the following
medical necessity criteria are met and indication for surgery is
confirmed by M RI, CT or corrected tomogram:

• inflammatory arthritis involving the TM J not responsive to
other modalities of treatment
• recurrent fibrosis and/or bony ankylosis not responsive to other
modalities of treatment
• failed tissue graft
• failed alloplastic joint reconstruction
• loss of vertical mandibular condylar height due to bone resorption,
trauma, developmental abnormality or pathologic lesion

-45-
 CIGNA . . . does not cover partial joint replacement with the
Christensen Fossa Eminence Prosthesis™ (TM J Im plants, Inc.)
Partial TM J Replacement System because it is considered
experimental, investigational, or unproven.

Id. at 194 (emphasis added). The bulletin does not discuss TM JI’s total-joint

prosthesis.

CPN 156 then provides a “General Background” that describes the anatomy

of the TM J and sets forth several symptoms that may indicate the presence of

TM J disorders, including pain in the face or jaw, headaches, dizziness, limited

mouth opening, and clicking or popping sounds. It discusses the prevalence of

TM J disorders, noting that “[a] majority of the general population have at least

one sign of TM [J disorders].” Id. The bulletin states that “[t]here is no widely

accepted standard test to diagnose TM [J disorder],” id. at 195, but that physical

examination combined with reported symptoms generally provides sufficient

information for a diagnosis. Regarding treatment options the bulletin states that

“[n]on-invasive, reversible therapies are used in the initial treatment of [TM J

disorders].” Id. These include pain-control drug therapies, physical therapy, and

intra-oral appliances. W hen these conservative therapies are unsuccessful,

surgical options may be considered.

In discussing surgical treatment, the bulletin states that “the most invasive

surgical technique to treat” TM J disorders is arthrotomy, id. at 196, which can

involve total- or partial-joint reconstruction with prosthetic implants. Because

-46-
“[t]here is inadequate guidance in the published medical literature regarding

patient-selection criteria for these procedures,” this surgical option should be

considered only when “all appropriate conservative treatment has failed and

minimally invasive surgery . . . is not indicated.” Id. CPN 156 explains that

there are two FD A-approved prosthetic systems, the TM J Concepts system and

TM JI’s devices. The TM J Concepts device is approved for total-joint

reconstruction in certain patients but “should only be considered for end-stage

[TM J disorders] when no other medical or surgical options are available.” Id. A s

to TM JI’s partial-joint prosthesis, the bulletin acknowledges that the FDA

approved it in 2001 for use in patients w ith any of five indications and that a

retrospective study reported that patients who had received the implant

experienced significant pain relief. But it notes that the study also advised that

“rigorously controlled prospective studies” were needed to investigate the

procedure. Id. at 197. CIGNA thus concludes that “[t] here is insufficient

evidence in the published medical literature to establish the clinical efficacy or

long-term outcome of implantation of partial TM J prostheses.” Id. (emphasis

added). The bulletin ends with a list of 20 references relied on for the

information and determinations in the bulletin.

As with the Aetna bulletin, the terms experimental, investigational, or

unproven take on meaning only as the CIGNA bulletin explains why a procedure

or device merits those adjectives. The bulletin’s statement that there is

-47-
“insufficient evidence in the published medical literature to establish the clinical

efficacy or long-term outcome of implantation of partial TM J prosthesis” amounts

to its definition of those terms as they are used in CPN 156. In other words, in

the context of the bulletin, to say that the partial-joint prosthesis is experimental,

investigational, or unproven is to say that there is insufficient evidence supporting

its efficacy. The statement that evidence is “insufficient,” however, is not

defamatory because it is not provably false. As we said in the discussion of the

Aetna bulletin, people may differ on the quantity or quality of information that

they require before they deem it sufficient. The challenged statements in CPN

156 are therefore not defamatory.

3. Q ualified or Conditional Privilege

TM JI argues that even if the statements in the bulletins are not provably

false, they are afforded only a qualified privilege. It contends that Aetna and

CIGNA lost the privilege because their opinions were based on an incomplete and

inaccurate evaluation of outdated facts, were published to avoid payment of

claims rather than to convey a coverage determination, and were published with

malice. But TM JI offers no support for its assertion that under Colorado law not-

provably-false statements (opinions) are entitled to only a qualified privilege; and

we have found none.

TM JI has confused the concepts of (1) nondefamatory statements and (2)

defamatory statements that are privileged. W e have already concluded that the

-48-
statements by Aetna and CIGNA were not defamatory. Accordingly, neither

defendant needed a privilege to escape liability. A brief discussion of qualified

(or conditional) privilege in the defamation context may help clarify the matter.

Restatement § 593 states: “One who publishes a defamatory matter

concerning another is not liable for the publication if (a) the matter is published

upon an occasion that makes it conditionally privileged and (b) the privilege is

not abused.” Conditional privileges protect, for example, information that

“affects a sufficiently important interest of the publisher, [if] . . . the recipient’s

knowledge of the defamatory matter will be of service in the lawful protection of

the interest,” id. § 594, and similar information that affects the interests of third

persons, see id. § 595, or family members, see id. § 597. The Restatement sets

forth several circumstances in w hich these conditional privileges are lost because

of abuse. For example, if the speaker makes the statement with knowledge of or

reckless disregard for its truth or falsity, see id. § 600, or for a purpose other than

that for w hich the privilege was extended, see id. § 603, there is no longer a

privilege. W hen there has been no defamatory statement, however, the publisher

does not need the protection of a privilege and therefore abuse of the privilege is

irrelevant. If the publisher levels a charge for the most evil of motives and

without any interest in the charge’s truth, the publisher is not liable if the charge

turns out to be true. The publisher’s motive may have precluded a claim of

conditional privilege, but the publisher can prevail without invoking a privilege.

-49-
 W hat we decided above is that the challenged statements by Aetna and

CIGNA are simply not defamatory statements. A statement in the form of an

opinion that does not imply the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts is not

actionable and a publisher of such a statement has no need for a privilege.

Accordingly, we reject TM JI’s contention that Aetna and CIGNA are liable for

abuse of a privilege.

C. Product Disparagement

TM JI claims that the same statements by Aetna and CIGNA that are alleged

to be defamatory also constitute product disparagement. The Colorado Court of

Appeals has adopted the elements of a product-disparagement claim set forth in

Restatement § 623A, stating that a plaintiff making such a claim must show “(1) a

false statement; (2) published to a third party; (3) derogatory to the plaintiff’s

business in general, to the title to his property, or its quality; (4) through which

the defendant intended to cause harm to the plaintiff’s pecuniary interest, or

either recognized or should have recognized that it was likely to do so; (5) w ith

malice; (6) thus, causing special damages.” Teilhaber, 791 P.2d at 1166. Citing

Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984), the

court in Teilhaber added that “[t]he constitutional protections afforded a

defendant in a defamation action are applicable to a defendant in a product

disparagement action.” 791 P.2d at 1167. Accordingly, “a statement of opinion

[about a product] will be protected expression” unless “the language is

-50-
defamatory and the underlying defamatory facts which provide a basis for the

opinion are false and are not disclosed in context.” Id. W e believe that the

Colorado Supreme Court would not recognize a product-disparagement claim

relying entirely on expressions that could not support a defamation claim. See

also Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1057–58 (9th Cir. 1990) (subjecting

product-disparagement claim to same First Amendment requirements as

defamation claims); Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publ’g Co., Inc., 516 A.2d 220,

226 (N.J. 1986) (extending common-law privileges available in defamation claims

to product-disparagement claims); Restatement § 646A (same). Therefore,

TM JI’s product-disparagement claim fails.

D. Interference Torts

Finally, TM JI claims that the statements in the bulletins constituted

intentional interference with prospective business relations and contracts.

Colorado follows the Restatement with respect to the elements of both intentional

interference with prospective business relations and intentional interference with

contract:

“One who intentionally and improperly interferes w ith another’s
prospective contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is
subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary harm resulting from
loss of the benefits of the relation, whether the interference consists
of
(a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter
into or continue the prospective relation or
(b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the
prospective relation.”

-51-
Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493, 500–01 (Colo. 1995) (quoting Restatement

§ 766B) (emphasis added). And

“[o]ne who intentionally and improperly interferes with the
performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between
another and a third person by inducing or otherw ise causing the third
person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other
for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the
third person to perform the contract.”

M em’l Gardens, Inc. v. Olympian Sales & Mgmt. Consultants, Inc., 690 P.2d 207,

210 (Colo. 1984) (quoting Restatement § 766) (emphasis added). Thus, for either

claim to proceed, the interference must have been improper.

If the alleged impropriety, however, is an allegedly defamatory statement,

then the interference claim must fail if the statement is not an actionable

defamation. W e have addressed this issue in a diversity case governed by

Colorado law. In Jefferson County School District No. R-1 v. M oody’s Investor’s

Services, 175 F.3d 848, 856–58 (10th Cir. 1999), the plaintiff based its claims for

intentional interference with contractual and business relations on allegedly

defamatory statements made by the defendant. We held that law ful speech could

not form the basis of the interference claims because such activity was not

improper. See id. at 858. Although the speech in that case was constitutionally

protected, we see no reason to distinguish speech protected from a defamation

claim under the common law. The interests served by that protection would be

-52-
undermined if the common law recognized a different tort based on the same

speech. W e are aware of no authority to the contrary.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of TM JI’s tortious-

interference claims.

III. C ON CLU SIO N

W e AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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