F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 24, 2007
PU BL ISH
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES COURT O F APPEALS Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
SHIRLEY A. GRAHAM ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Nos. 06-5054 and 06-5142
H A RTFO RD LIFE A N D A CC IDENT
IN SU RAN CE C OM PA N Y ,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the N orthern District of Oklahom a
(D.C. No. 03-CV-0144-CVE)
Joseph F. Clark Jr., Clark & W arzynski, P.A., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-
Appellant.
Timothy A. Carney, Gable & Gotwals, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before K E LL Y and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and M URG UIA, * District Judge.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
*
Honorable Carlos M urguia, District Court Judge, District of Kansas, sitting
by designation.
Plaintiff-Appellant Shirley A. Graham brought suit after she was denied
long-term disability benefits under a plan administered by Defendant-Appellee
Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Company (“H artford”). The D istrict Court
for the Northern District of Oklahoma concluded that Hartford’s denial of
Graham’s claim violated the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) because Hartford’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. The court did
not aw ard Graham benefits, but instead remanded the claim to Hartford for a “full
and fair redetermination.” Graham appeals both the decision to remand and the
court’s earlier decision that ERISA preempted her state law claim. (No. 06-
5054.) In companion case No. 06-5142, Graham appeals the court’s denial of her
request for attorney’s fees.
W e conclude that the district court’s order to remand G raham’s claim for
benefits to Hartford is not a final decision that gives rise to our jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because Graham w ill have the opportunity later to appeal the
issues before us once a final judgment has been entered, we DISM ISS this appeal
for lack of jurisdiction. W e further hold that Graham’s related action for
attorney’s fees is not ripe, and therefore VACATE the district court’s denial of
her request for fees, and REM AND with directions to dismiss her motion without
prejudice.
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I. Background
Graham was employed by the U nited States Postal Service since 1976 as a
mail carrier. She also was a member of the relevant collective-bargaining union,
the National Rural Letter Carriers’ Association (“NRLCA”). In 1994, while
carrying mail, Graham encountered a small but aggressive dog. In stepping away
from the dog, she backed off the sidew alk and twisted her knee. This injury
required surgery and precipitated more problems in her knees and feet, including
osteoarthritis. Despite her attempt to work in a sedentary position for the Postal
Service from 1997 to 2000, she continued to have health problems.
NRLCA offered its members the opportunity to participate in a long-term
disability insurance plan. Even though the collective bargaining agreement with
the Postal Service did not provide for such a plan, the NRLCA arranged for the
Postal Service to deduct premiums from its participating employees’ paychecks.
Graham applied to participate in the NRLCA’s long-term disability benefits plan,
and became insured on November 22, 1997.
Graham’s last day of work was July 15, 2000. She applied for disability
retirement w ith the Postal Service, which was approved on December 1, 2000.
On October 27, 2000, Graham filed a claim for long-term disability benefits with
Hartford, the administrator of NRLCA’s long-term disability plan. Graham
submitted a statement from her attending physician, Dr. Jeffrey Emel, that
diagnosed ankle osteophytes and an ankle sprain. Hartford considered Graham’s
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claim in early 2001, and sought a clarification from Dr. Emel regarding Graham’s
ankle and knee problems. Hartford then denied Graham’s claim on the basis that
she did not meet the plan’s definition of “totally” disabled, defined as unable to
perform the essential duties of one’s occupation and as a result earn less than 20
percent of one’s pre-disability earnings. Hartford specifically concluded that
Graham’s most recent occupation was classified as sedentary, and that she had not
shown that she could not perform sedentary work. Graham appealed, submitting
additional documentation from Dr. Emel in which he stated that Graham could not
drive or sit for more than an hour at any one time. However, Hartford again
rejected Graham’s claim on the same basis as its previous denial. Graham made a
second and final internal appeal to Hartford, which again denied her claim
because it concluded a job that accommodated her disability was available to her.
Having exhausted her internal appeals, Graham filed suit in federal court on
February 27, 2003, invoking the court’s diversity jurisdiction. She alleged that
Hartford had breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing – an Oklahoma state
law claim – by failing to investigate, evaluate and pay Graham’s claims properly.
She further alleged that Hartford’s “malicious” and “intentional” conduct had
caused her extreme emotional distress and financial losses. As a remedy, she
sought actual and punitive damages.
Graham’s complaint did not mention ERISA. ERISA provides a private
right of action to a beneficiary under an ERISA-covered plan, but limits a
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claimant’s remedies to “recover[y of] benefits due to him” and “enforce[ment of]
his rights under the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). ERISA does
not allow consequential or punitive damages. See Allison v. UNUM Life Ins.
Co., 381 F.3d 1015, 1025 (10th Cir. 2004).
The district court first decided that the NRLCA plan was governed by
ERISA , and that ERISA preempted Graham’s state law claim. Specifically, the
court found that the NRLCA plan did not fall under the “governmental plan”
exception to ERISA coverage, because the union-offered insurance lacked an
adequate connection to governmental control, functional responsibilities and
financial support. The district court accordingly dismissed Graham’s state law
claim against Hartford. The court then ordered the parties to submit an
administrative record within 45 days so the court could review the merits of
Graham’s claim for benefits under the NRLCA plan. In so doing, the court
apparently converted Graham’s complaint to an ERISA action. There is no
indication in the record that Graham objected at this time to the court’s decision
to substitute her state law claim with one brought under ERISA.
Eight months later, the district court ruled on the merits of Graham’s claim
for benefits. 1 Employing ERISA , the court concluded that Hartford’s decision
1
Neither the parties nor the court precisely described the procedural
posture of the case at the time the court rendered its decision to remand Graham’s
claim. Graham initially submitted a brief to the district court on her “entitlement
to benefits” by calling it a “motion for judgment as a matter of law .” The clerk
(continued...)
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was arbitrary and capricious, specifically that it failed to prove that its denial of
benefits was supported by substantial evidence under Sandoval v. Aetna Life &
Cas. Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 377, 382 (10th Cir. 1992). The court faulted Hartford for:
relying on the fact that Graham had been able to work in a modified job for the
Postal Service, even though the Postal Service established the accommodation
three years prior to her disability benefits claim; giving undue weight to a single
statement by her treating physician that was not consistent with the other medical
evidence in the record; and not undertaking an independent medical review in the
face of conflicting evidence. The court did not state that Graham was necessarily
eligible for disability benefits, but instead found that, in “[v]iewing the record as
a whole,” Hartford did not meet its evidentiary burden to support the denial of
benefits to Graham.
The district court did not award Graham benefits; instead, the court
remanded her claim to Hartford “for a full and fair redetermination.” The district
1
(...continued)
requested that Graham refile the document as a brief. Hartford responded, also in
the form of a brief. The district court’s resulting decision simply addresses the
merits of Graham’s claim under ERISA without reference to any of the motions
for judgment permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Even though ERISA claims have a distinct standard of review, see
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) and Fought v.
UNUM Life Ins. Co., 379 F.3d 997, 1002, 1006 (10th Cir. 2004), we expect a
district court’s resolution of those claims to comport with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which typically would be to treat them as a motion for sum mary
judgment. See, e.g., Allison, 381 F.3d at 1020; Fought, 379 F.3d at 999, 1002;
Rekstad v. First Bank Sys., 238 F.3d 1259, 1261-62 (10th Cir. 2001); Albright v.
UNUM Life Ins. Co., 59 F.3d 1089, 1091 (10th Cir. 1995).
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court did not state whether or not it w ould retain jurisdiction over the matter.
However, the docket entries administratively entered for this decision indicate
that the court was “dismissing/terminating” the case.
Graham petitioned the district court for attorney’s fees, which may be
awarded at the court’s discretion under ERISA . See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). The
court applied our five-factor standard from Gordon v. U.S. Steel Corp., 724 F.2d
106, 109 (10th Cir. 1983), and determined that a fee award would be
inappropriate. Specifically, the court said it had made no finding of bad faith on
the part of Hartford, and noted that “the record does not suggest that plaintiff’s
claim for benefits is particularly meritorious.”
On appeal, Graham: (1) seeks to revive her state law claim, contending that
NRLCA ’s disability insurance is a governmental plan exempt from ERISA
because the Postal Service recognizes the NRLCA as a collective-bargaining
union; (2) argues that the court should have awarded her disability benefits rather
than remanding the claim to H artford; and (3) asserts that an aw ard of attorney’s
fees is appropriate, alleging that Hartford engaged in “bad faith” conduct.
Hartford does not appeal the district court’s conclusion that its decision
was arbitrary and capricious. Instead, Hartford argues that we have no
jurisdiction over this appeal, on the theory that a district court’s decision to
remand a claim to a plan administrator is not a final appealable decision under the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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II. Jurisdiction and Finality
W e have jurisdiction “of appeals from all final decisions of the district
courts of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §1291. “It is well settled that we can
only address the underlying merits of a lawsuit if it meets the requirements for
appellate jurisdiction outlined in 28 U .S.C. § 1291.” Albright v. UNUM Life Ins.
Co., 59 F.3d 1089, 1092 (10th Cir. 1995). “A final decision is one that ‘ends the
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment.’” Rekstad v. First Bank Sys., 238 F.3d 1259, 1261 (10th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)). “In considering
whether the judgment constitutes a ‘final decision’ under § 1291, the label used to
describe the judicial demand is not controlling – that is, we must analyze the
substance of the district court’s decision, not its label or form.” Albright, 59 F.3d
at 1092 (quotation, citation omitted).
Thus, we must determine if the district court’s order to remand, which is
the decision giving rise to this appeal, is final. 2 The Tenth Circuit has declined to
adopt a hard-and-fast rule regarding whether a district court’s order remanding a
2
Graham potentially could have immediately appealed from the district
court’s initial decision dismissing her state law claim, which was the only claim
she alleged in her complaint. She has not done so, though, and instead acquiesced
to the district court’s conversion of the suit to one stating an ERISA claim. Her
notice of appeal characterizes that the earlier decision was interlocutory. The
limited statutory exception for permitting interlocutory appeals at 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b) is not met here, because the district court did not certify that the decision
should be immediately appealable, and Graham did not request that the court do
so.
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benefits determination to a plan administrator is final, and therefore appealable,
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “The decision should be made on a case-by-case basis
applying well-settled principles governing ‘final decisions.’” Rekstad, 238 F.3d
at 1263; see also M etzger v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 476 F.3d 1161, 1164 (10th Cir.
2007) (same). In Rekstad, both parties appealed a district court’s order to remand
a benefits determination claim to the plan administrator after the court concluded
that the administrator’s decision to deny benefits was arbitrary and capricious
because it unreasonably relied on one particular doctor’s medical examination.
238 F.3d at 1261. W e held that the decision to remand was not final in that case.
Likening a benefits determination to a computation of damages, we noted
that we had previously held that “a district court’s grant of summary judgment to
the plaintiff on an ERISA claim that left the question of damages unresolved was
not a final appealable order.” Id. at 1262 (citing Albright, 59 F.3d 1089). “[T]he
well-accepted rule [is] that an order determining liability but leaving damages to
be calculated is not final unless the correct amount of damages is self-evident and
not likely to be the subject of future appeal.” Id. And a district court’s remand of
a benefits decision to a plan administrator similarly is indeterminate. Id.
In Rekstad, we also drew a comparison between a district court’s remand to
a plan administrator and a remand to an administrative agency, calling it “perhaps
the best analogue to an ERISA remand.” Id. at 1262. “In the administrative
context, a remand order is ‘generally considered a nonfinal decision . . . not
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subject to immediate review in the court of appeals.’” Id. (quoting Baca-Prieto v.
Guigni, 95 F.3d 1006, 1008 (10th Cir. 1996)). W e recently reiterated the
administrative agency analogue in M etzger. See 476 F.3d at 1164.
However, we also have held that the “practical finality rule” provides an
important caveat that could result in jurisdiction over an appeal of a remand
decision. Rekstad, 238 F.3d at 1262. The practical finality rule may be invoked
when the lack of immediate review of an order for an administrative remand
“would violate basic judicial principles.” Baca-Prieto, 95 F.3d at 1008 (quoting
Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1984)). “In the context of a
district court order remanding a matter to an administrative agency, jurisdiction
may be appropriate when the issue presented is both urgent and important.” Trout
Unlimited v. U. S. Dep’t of Agric., 441 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing
Bender, 744 F.2d at 1427). “If these two conditions are met, this court will apply
a balancing test and assert jurisdiction if ‘the danger of injustice by delaying
appellate review outweighs the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review.’”
Id. (quoting Bender, 744 F.2d at 1427). Under this rule, w e review orders to
remand a matter to an administrative agency when it is necessary to ensure that
we can review important legal questions w hich a remand may make “effectively
unreviewable,” because administrative agencies “may be barred from seeking
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district court (and thus circuit court) review of their own administrative
decisions.” Rekstad, 238 F.3d at 1262 3 ; see also M etzger, 476 F.3d at 1165.
W e have observed that the practical finality rule has led a “checkered life .
. . in both our court and the United States Supreme Court,” and we have “openly
questioned whether [the] doctrine of practical finality is still viable.”
Baca-Prieto, 95 F.3d at 1009 (quotations omitted). W e have suggested, though,
that the doctrine is more robust in the context of agency review. See id. (noting
that “this court has developed a particular form of practical finality . . . as a
prudential limitation on the administrative-remand rule”); Rekstad, 238 F.3d at
3
Rekstad’s formulation of the practical finality rule borrows some concepts
from the collateral order doctrine, which also provides a limited avenue for
appealing an order that otherw ise might be deemed non-final. The Supreme Court
articulated the standards for appealing collateral orders in Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp. See 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). “To be appealable under
the collateral order doctrine, an order must [1] conclusively determine the
disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate from the
merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment.” Stubblefield v. W indsor Capital Group, 74 F.3d 990, 997 (10th Cir.
1996) (applying Cohen (quotation omitted)); see also Timpanogos Tribe v.
Conway, 286 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2002) (describing applicability of the
collateral order doctrine over “an extremely narrow class of claims raised
interlocutorily,” and noting that the rule “sets a high bar”).
The “practical finality rule,” derived from Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp.,
379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964), provides a somewhat broader opportunity for appeal
than the collateral order doctrine. “[T]he finality requirements of 28 U.S.C. §
1291 . . . need not strictly come w ithin the Cohen [] ‘collateral order’ doctrine if,
in a practical sense, justice may require immediate review.” Cotton Petroleum
Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 870 F.2d 1515, 1522 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing
Bender, 744 F.2d at 1426-27). W e have contrasted the “balancing test” of the
practical finality rule with “the mechanical analysis of the collateral order
doctrine.” Id. (quoting Bender, 744 F.2d at 1427).
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1262 (noting the practical finality rule “exists in the administrative agency
context, if nowhere else”). Still, we have cautioned that the doctrine “must be
narrowly construed to preserve the vitality of § 1291.” Trout Unlimited, 441 F.3d
at 1219 (alteration, quotation omitted).
Pursuant to Rekstad’s rule that we evaluate the finality of an ERISA
remand order on a case-by-case basis, and applying the factors discussed in
Rekstad, the district court’s order here remanding Graham’s claim to Hartford is
not final. The district court did not decide that Graham was eligible for benefits.
It concluded only that Hartford’s denial of her benefits violated ERISA because
Hartford’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. Graham articulates no argument
that a remand of her benefits claim to Hartford falls within the practical finality
exception employed by this circuit. 4 W e discern nothing on appeal that is
“urgent” or presents a “danger of injustice” if not immediately appealable. Trout
Unlimited, 441 F.3d at 1218.
Hartford’s redetermination of Graham’s claim – which, Hartford assured
the court at oral argument, would be de novo – may lead to an award of benefits
for Graham. If Hartford again determines that Graham is ineligible for benefits,
4
Although Graham filed a supplemental brief devoted solely to the
question of jurisdiction and finality, her main argument was that the district court
erred in ordering a remand to Hartford rather than directing an award of benefits.
This line of argument conflates the merits of her appeal with the question of
jurisdiction, since even if the district court’s decision to remand was patently
wrong, it would not necessarily be final within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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she m ay return to district court to argue that Hartford’s decision violates ERISA . 5
W e observe that Hartford has conceded that if its benefits determination on
remand “is unfavorable to [Graham], she may simply move to reopen the case, or
file an amended complaint to address any dissatisfaction with Hartford’s decision
on remand.”
Graham argues that the district court’s decision to remand is final in her
case because it is based on the earlier decision to dismiss her state law claim that
sought punitive damages, a type of relief that is not available from either a plan
administrator on remand or a court reviewing the decision under ERISA . 6 But
this argument does not change the availability of appellate review after Hartford
redetermines Graham’s claim for benefits. After the remand to Hartford, Graham
still can appeal the district court’s decision that ERISA preempts her state law
claim, and if successful, she will be able to pursue punitive damages. In other
words, this is not a situation in which remand may make either the district court’s
5
Our conclusion interprets the district court’s ERISA remand order as
permitting either party to challenge the plan administrator’s new eligibility
determination. See Bowers v. Sheet M etal W orkers’ Nat’l Pension Fund, 365
F.3d 535, 537 (6th Cir. 2004).
6
Oklahoma law provides that “[t]ort liability for breach of th[e] duty [of
good faith and fear dealing] arises where there is a clear showing that the
insurance company unreasonably and in bad faith withheld payment of the claim
of the insured.” Hale v. A.G. Ins. Co., 138 P.3d 567, 572 (Okla. Ct. Civ. App.
2006) (citing Christian v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 901 (Okla.
1977), which holds that breach of the duty of good faith permits the insured to
“recover consequential and, in a proper case, punitive, damages”).
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earlier decision that ERISA preempted Graham’s state law claim or the merits of
Hartford’s decision on Graham’s claim for benefits “effectively unreviewable.”
Rekstad, 238 F.3d at 1262.
Graham also contends that the order is a final judgment, because to hold
otherwise allows a plan administrator to delay awarding benefits with impunity,
since the administrator is not penalized for improperly denying benefits in the
first instance. But the mere fact that ERISA does not expressly penalize a plan
administrator for its initial arbitrary and capricious denial – an issue of statutory
design that rests in the hands of Congress – does not warrant a change in our
jurisprudence surrounding finality. 7
W e note that although circuits vary on how they approach the issue of
finality in cases involving ERISA remand orders, see M etzger, 476 F.3d at 1165
n.1 (describing the circuit split), Graham would fare no better under most of those
approaches. The majority of circuits have relied on one of the analogues invoked
in Rekstad or the collateral order doctrine in deciding whether a decision to
remand a benefits decision to a plan administrator is final. See Borntrager v.
Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 425 F.3d 1087, 1090, 1092 (8th Cir.
2005) (following the First, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits in holding
7
In any event, ERISA authorizes a district court to aw ard attorney’s fees,
see 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), which likely provides a disincentive for a plan
administrator to engage in dilatory tactics purely for the sake of delaying benefits.
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that “an order remanding to an ERISA plan administrator for further proceedings
is interlocutory in nature and therefore not immediately appealable, particularly
when the district court retained jurisdiction or otherwise deferred considering the
merits of the administrator's decision being reviewed”). The Sixth Circuit has
found that an order to remand w as not final, in part because the “assessment of
damages or awarding of other relief remains to be resolved.” Bowers v. Sheet
M etal W orkers’ Nat’l Pension Fund, 365 F.3d 535, 536 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Liberty M ut. Ins. Co. v. W etzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 (1976)).
A number of other circuits apply the comparatively strict collateral order
doctrine as a means for appealing a remand to a plan administrator, and in cases
similar to the one at bar, hold that a district court remand order is not final. See
Borntrager, 425 F.3d at 1092 (reiterating Supreme Court precedent that the
doctrine is a “narrow exception” and noting that “[w]hile there may be factors
unique to the world of administrative law that justify a somewhat broader final
order exception for orders remanding to federal agencies, in our view no such
factors apply to orders remanding to private ERISA plan administrators”);
Petralia v. AT& T Global Info. Solutions, Co., 114 F.3d 352, 354 (1st Cir. 1997)
(holding a remand order was not final under the collateral order doctrine, since
the issue remanded to the plan was the plaintiff’s “continued eligibility for
benefits,” w hich w as “the very heart of th[e] case”); Shannon v. Jack Eckerd
Corp., 55 F.3d 561, 563 (11th Cir. 1995) (similarly holding that the decision to
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remand is not “completely separate” from the merits, but rather is “inextricably
intertwined with the merits of [the claimant’s] eligibility for benefits”). 8
The Seventh Circuit has taken a minority approach that often concludes that
ERISA remand orders are final and appealable. That court observed that
“[r]emands to plan administrators serve the same functions as remands to the
Commissioner [of Social Security], which implies the same jurisdictional
treatment for purposes of § 1291.” Perlman v. Sw iss Bank Corp. Comprehensive
Disability Prot. Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 978-79 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) and Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 625 (1990)). The Perlman
court also drew support from an analogy to arbitration, since the Federal
Arbitration Act permits appeals of district court orders vacating arbitration
awards, 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(E), and a court order to remand to a plan
8
The Ninth Circuit has applied to ERISA decisions a hybrid of the practical
finality and collateral order doctrines in assessing whether a district court’s
rem and to a plan administrator is final and appealable. Hensley v. Nw.
Permanente P.C. Ret. Plan & Trust, 258 F.3d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 2001) (defining
three factors as “(1) the district court order conclusively resolved a separable
legal issue, (2) the remand order forces the agency to apply a potentially
erroneous rule which may result in a wasted proceeding, and (3) review would, as
a practical matter, be foreclosed if an immediate appeal were unavailable”).
The Hensley court found that its remand order w as a final and appealable
decision, because it met all three factors. Central to the dispute was whether the
plaintiffs w ere “employees” under the plan – a severable legal issue necessary to
deciding whether the plaintiffs were eligible for plan benefits – and because the
plan had determined they were not employees, the plan had never addressed the
merits of their claims. Id. at 990-91. Our matter differs in that Hartford does not
dispute that Graham is a plan participant, has addressed the merits of her claim
for benefits, and will do so again on remand.
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administrator for redetermination is comparable to vacating the plan’s denial
decision. Perlman, 195 F.3d at 980. However, this minority approach has not
been adopted by this circuit, and has not attracted support from other circuits
either. Specifically, the Sixth Circuit has criticized the argument comparing
ERISA to Social Security remands, noting:
. . . 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) specifically grants courts of appeals jurisdiction
over orders remanding social security claims to the Commissioner [of
Social Security]. N o statutory language permits similar appeals under
ERISA . The existence of language authorizing appeals from remand
orders under the social security laws implies that those orders would not
constitute final decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In the absence of a
statutory grant of jurisdiction, this court declines to expand its
jurisdiction by analogy.
Bowers, 365 F.3d at 537-38. W e reject the minority approach here as well.
Finally, Graham contends that the district court’s remand order is final
because the court intended its decision to be final, pointing to the docket entries
for the January 20, 2006, order and judgment remanding her claim to Hartford, at
which the clerk states under each entry, “terminates case.” Furthermore, a
separate entry was made in the docket for January 20, 2006, stating “Civil Case
Terminated.” H owever, when we question the finality of a district court’s
decision to remand a benefits determination to the plan administrator, we
“analyze the substance of the district court’s decision, not its label or form.”
Albright, 59 F.3d at 1092. For example, in M etzger, we drew no legal
conclusions from the fact that the district court had earlier determined that its
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2004 remand order was final, because the court effectively amended that order by
reversing itself in 2006. M etzger, 476 F.3d at 1164-65. Instead, we held that this
series of events rendered the first order interlocutory. Other courts similarly have
disregarded the administrative entries regarding the status of an ERISA case when
it is clear that the last district court decision was not a final judgment. See, e.g.,
Petralia, 114 F.3d at 355; B orntrager, 425 F.3d at 1090-91; W illiamson v. UNUM
Life Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 1998). W e follow the same path here
in holding that regardless of the notations in the docket entries for the district
court’s remand decision, that decision is non-final in substance for the reasons
given above.
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
III. Attorney’s Fees
Graham requests that we reverse the district court’s decision not to aw ard
attorney’s fees that are authorized in ERISA actions. 9 However, we conclude that
the motion for fees w as not ripe before the district court, and therefore we vacate
the district court’s decision and remand w ith instructions to dismiss the motion
without prejudice.
9
See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (“In any action under this title . . . by a
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its discretion may allow a
reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to either party.”).
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“The ripeness doctrine stems from the ‘cases and controversies’
requirement in Article III, and it also reflects important prudential limitations on
a court's exercise of jurisdiction.” Salt Lake Tribune Publ’g Co. v. M gmt.
Planning, Inc., 454 F.3d 1128, 1140 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation, alterations
omitted). “[R]ipeness is a justiciability doctrine designed to prevent the courts,
through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in
abstract disagreements.” M organ v. M cCotter, 365 F.3d 882, 890 (10th Cir.
2004) (quoting Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803,
807 (2003)). A question of ripeness focuses on “whether the harm asserted has
matured sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention.” Id. (quoting W arth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 n.10 (1975)). “Determining whether the issues
presented by this case are ripe for review requires us to evaluate both the fitness
of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding
court consideration.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Courts vacate attorney’s fees decisions when the presence of ongoing
litigation precludes an informed determination of whether the moving party is in
fact entitled to attorney’s fees under the relevant law. See, e.g.,
Bennett v. Coors Brewing Co., 189 F.3d 1221, 1238, 1239 (10th Cir. 1999); see
also Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 394 F.3d 665, 674 (9th Cir. 2004); Star
Phoenix M ining Co. v. W est One Bank, 147 F.3d 1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 1998).
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Courts considering whether to award attorney’s fees in ERISA actions
consider five factors: a party’s culpability or bad faith; its ability to satisfy an
award of fees; the deterrence value of an award; the number of plan participants
affected by the case or the significance of the impact of the legal question
involved; and “the relative merits of the parties’ positions.” Gordon, 724 F.2d at
109. W e also afford certain w eight to prevailing party status, even though we
acknowledge that the ERISA attorney’s fees provision is not expressly directed at
prevailing parties. See, e.g., Deboard v. Sunshine M ining & Ref. Co., 208 F.3d
1228, 1245 (10th Cir. 2000) (reversing and remanding an attorney’s fee award
because appellate decision “alter[ed] the relative merits of the parties’
positions”); M organ v. Indep. Drivers Ass’n Pension Plan, 975 F.2d 1467, 1471
(10th Cir. 1992) (“Although the statute does not expressly require that a party
prevail as a condition to receiving an award of attorneys' fees . . . we have
remanded cases for denial of fees w ithout explanation only when the party
seeking fees had prevailed at least partially.” (citations omitted)); Arfsten v.
Frontier Airlines, Inc. Ret. Plan for Pilots, 967 F.2d 438, 442 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992)
(“Because we reverse the district court's decision on the merits, plaintiff is not a
prevailing party, and his arguments on attorney's fees are moot.”).
In this case, the district court denied G raham’s motion for attorney’s fees,
concluding that its determination that Hartford acted arbitrarily and capriciously
did not equate to a finding of bad faith under the first Gordon factor. The court
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found two other Gordon factors similarly were not satisfied here, because (1)
Graham pursued benefits for only herself and her action did not involve a
significant legal question and (2) the record did not suggest that her claim for
benefits was “particularly meritorious.” Ordinarily, we review district courts’
attorney’s fees decisions for abuse of discretion. Gordon, 724 F.2d at 108. At
this point in the litigation, however, a decision regarding attorney’s fees is
premature. The district court cannot properly apply the five-factor G ordon test,
particularly with respect to the merits of the parties’ positions and the impact of
the litigation on other beneficiaries, when it remains to be seen whether Graham
is entitled to benefits under the plan. Hartford will make a new determination of
Graham’s eligibility for benefits, and if eligibility is denied again, Graham will
have the opportunity to re-argue before the district court that Hartford’s new
decision violates ERISA. The issues presented in Graham’s motion for attorney’s
fees are not “fit” for judicial decision at this time. M organ, 365 F.3d at 890. 10
In dismissing the current fee motion on grounds of ripeness, we do not
intend to create a per se rule that attorney’s fees are inappropriate w henever a
district court decides to remand a claim to the plan administrator rather than
10
Graham argues that courts need to award attorney’s fees in ERISA cases
even at the remand stage in light of the realities of ERISA litigation, which often
feature a plaintiff suffering from health problems who can afford to hire a lawyer
only on a contingency fee arrangement. However, initiating this type of policy
decision in authorizing attorney’s fees properly lies with Congress.
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ordering benefits directly. 11 ERISA provides procedural protections to plan
participants by statute and in its implementing regulations, which require plan
administrators to provide certain notices and appeals procedures in making
benefits determinations. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (setting forth
minimum requirements for claims procedures in employee benefit plans). It is
theoretically possible for a claimant to bring suit for egregious violations of
ERISA’s procedural protections and, upon remand to the plan administrator, still
not succeed in obtaining benefits. The judicial discretion provided by 29 U.S.C. §
1132(g)(1) and our five-factor Gordon test permit a court, in the right case, to
reward plaintiffs for holding plans accountable under ERISA . However, Graham
does not argue that Hartford systemically is violating ERISA procedures – and
indeed, does not cite to any specific regulatory or procedural violation by
Hartford – that would have made the issue of attorney’s fees ripe in this case.
Because the district court decided the issue of attorney’s fees before it was
ripe, we vacate that decision and remand w ith instructions to dismiss without
prejudice G raham’s claim for fees.
11
Hartford argues that we have no jurisdiction over the appeal of the denial
of attorney’s fees because the underlying order to remand to the plan
administrator is not a final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
However, a petition for attorney’s fees is considered “collateral to and separate
from” the decision on the case’s merits. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,
486 U.S. 196, 200 (1988) (quotation omitted). Because our guidance on awarding
attorney’s fees under ERISA does not necessarily preclude an award when the
district court remands a claim to the plan administrator, the district court’s
decision regarding fees in such a case is not inherently interlocutory.
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IV. Conclusion
W e hold that the district court’s decision remanding Graham’s claim to
Hartford for a full and fair redetermination of her eligibility for long-term
disability benefits is not a final decision under the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and therefore we DISM ISS appeal No. 06-5054 for lack of jurisdiction. W e
conclude that, under the facts of this case, the related action for attorney’s fees,
No. 06-5142, is not ripe, because several of the factors we assess for the
appropriateness of fees cannot be ascertained until Hartford redetermines
Graham’s entitlement to benefits. Therefore, we V ACATE the district court’s
denial of Graham’s motion for attorney’s fees and REM AND with instructions to
dismiss her motion without prejudice.
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