Jones v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

PU BL ISH
September 13, 2007
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Clerk of Court

TENTH CIRCUIT

KEITH JONES,

Plaintiff - Appellant/
Cross - Appellee,

v. No. 06-3088, 06-3095

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, IN C.,

Defendant - Appellee/
Cross - Appellant.

EQ U A L EM PLO Y ME N T
O PPO RTU N ITY CO M M ISSIO N,

Amicus Curiae.

A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T HE DISTRICT OF. KANSAS
(D . C t. No. 05-CV-2034-KHV)

George A. Barton, Law Offices of G eorge A. Barton, P.C., Kansas C ity, M issouri
(Fredrick D. Deay, II, Law Offices of Fredrick D. Deay, II, Overland Park,
Kansas, with him on the briefs), appearing for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Thom as B. Weaver, A rmstrong Teasdale LLP, St. Louis, M issouri (Daniel K.
O’Toole, Armstrong Teasdale LLP, St. Louis, M issouri; Laurence R. Tucker and
M elody L. Nashan, Armstrong Teasdale LLP, Kansas City, M issouri, on the
briefs), appearing for Defendant-Appellee.

Dori K. Bernstein, Attorney (James L. Lee, Deputy General Counsel, Lorraine C.
Davis, Acting Associate General Counsel, and Carolyn L. W heeler, Assistant
General Counsel, with her on the brief), United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, W ashington, DC, appearing for Amicus Curiae.

Before TA CH A, Chief Circuit Judge, TYM KOVICH, and HO LM ES, Circuit
Judges.

TA CH A, Chief Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Keith Jones appeals the District Court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee United Parcel Service, Inc.

(“UPS”) on his claims of disability discrimination and retaliation under the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.

UPS cross-appeals the District Court’s assertion of subject matter jurisdiction

over the case, arguing that M r. Jones failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

prior to filing suit. W e exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and

AFFIR M .

I. BACKGROUND

Until D ecember 2003, M r. Jones worked at U PS as a package car driver. A

package car driver delivers packages to UPS customers along a prescribed route,

and one of the essential functions of the job is that the driver be able to lift

packages weighing up to 70 pounds overhead. On October 6, 2003, M r. Jones

injured his shoulder at work. He filed a workers’ compensation claim related to

the injury that same day. Dr. Gary Legler, UPS’s company doctor, examined M r.

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Jones and released him to work modified duty on the condition that he limit his

lifting to 20 pounds and that he not lift anything above shoulder level. Dr. Legler

also referred M r. Jones to an orthopedic specialist, Dr. Daniel Stechshulte, for

further evaluation. 1

Dr. Stechshulte examined M r. Jones four times in October and November.

During one of the meetings, Dr. Stechshulte recommended that M r. Jones take a

functional capacity exam (“FCE”), which is designed to test the actual ability of

an employee to perform a desired job. A physical therapist interpreted the results

of the test and concluded that M r. Jones could not lift 70 pounds from his w aist to

his shoulder or overhead. M r. Jones took another FCE on December 4, the results

of w hich w ere similar to the first FCE. Based on the results of this test, Dr.

Stechshulte released M r. Jones to work with permanent lifting restrictions: his

overhead lifting was limited to 20 pounds, and his chest-to-shoulder lifting was

limited to 45 pounds. Because of the lifting restrictions, Don Lewick, a labor

manager for UPS, told M r. Jones that he could no longer work as a package car

driver. According to M r. Jones, M r. Lew ick also told him that he could not work

in any job at UPS with permanent restrictions, and in response, M r. Jones said

that he “need[ed] to work a job.” U PS did not, however, allow him to return to

his job as a package car driver or reassign him to another position.

M r. Jones subsequently contacted his union representative, who suggested

1
In the interim, UPS provided M r. Jones with temporary alternative work.

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that M r. Jones be examined by another doctor. On February 3, 2004, Dr. M ichael

Poppa examined M r. Jones and concluded that, as of that date, M r. Jones w as able

to return to work as a package car driver without restrictions. Pursuant to the

collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between UPS and the union, once M r.

Jones w as cleared to work by his ow n doctor, he had to be examined by UPS’s

company physician, Dr. Legler. Consequently, on February 9, 2004, Dr. Legler

examined M r. Jones. During the examination, M r. Jones provided Dr. Legler with

a copy of his February 3 work release from Dr. Poppa, but did not disclose the

results of the FCEs or the fact that Dr. Stechshulte had imposed permanent lifting

restrictions in December 2003. Dr. Legler had M r. Jones perform a lift test,

which required M r. Jones to demonstrate that he could lift 70 pounds. Following

the examination, Dr. Legler released M r. Jones to w ork w ithout restrictions,

sending the work release to M onica Sloan, a district occupational health manager

for U PS.

According to Dr. Legler’s testimony, later that same day, M s. Sloan

contacted Dr. Legler to inquire about the w ork release. She asked whether Dr.

Legler was aware, when he released M r. Jones to work, that Dr. Stechshulte had

imposed a permanent 20-pound overhead lifting restriction. W hen Dr. Legler

responded that he did not know about Dr. Stechshulte’s recommendation, M s.

Sloan asked, “How do you feel about changing the restriction?” Dr. Legler

indicated that he would change the restriction, which he did, to reflect the

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permanent 20-pound overhead lifting restriction in accordance with Dr.

Stechshulte’s recommendation. UPS subsequently continued to refuse to return

M r. Jones to work.

The following day, February 10, 2004, M r. Jones filed a grievance with the

union regarding UPS’s refusal to return him to work. The panel that heard the

grievance directed UPS and M r. Jones to follow the CBA’s third-doctor

procedure. Under the CBA, if UPS’s doctor and an employee’s doctor disagree,

UPS and the union select a third doctor, “whose decision shall be final and

binding on the Employer, the Union, and the employee.” Following this

procedure, the doctor selected, Dr. Frederick Buck, examined M r. Jones on M ay

21, 2004. Based on his examination, Dr. Buck thought another FCE would help

him better evaluate M r. Jones’s abilities and limitations. Dr. Buck called M s.

Sloan seeking permission to perform another FCE. M s. Sloan implied that UPS

would not pay for an FCE because M r. Jones already had one the previous

December. She also indicated that Dr. Buck’s evaluation of M r. Jones was

supposed to be based on prior medical records, rather than a current physical

examination of M r. Jones. Dr. Buck thought this w as unusual because generally

his opinions are rendered based on both past medical records and a current

examination of the patient. According to Dr. Buck, M s. Sloan told him that the

union and UPS had mutually agreed that he w as to base his opinion only on M r.

Jones’s medical records. Using only M r. Jones’s medical records, Dr. Buck

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subsequently opined that M r. Jones could not perform the essential functions of

the package-car-driver position.

On June 1, 2004, M r. Jones filed a second grievance with the union

concerning Dr. Buck’s evaluation. After a hearing on the matter, M r. Jones was

instructed to see Dr. Buck again in August 2004. Although M r. Jones went to see

Dr. Buck for an examination, Dr. Buck understood that he was to base his opinion

on the medical records as they existed prior to M ay 2004. In addition, Dr. Buck

testified that, even if he had ordered another FCE, the results would not be

sufficient to alter D r. Stechschulte’s prior lifting restrictions because, given Dr.

Stechschulte’s expertise and credentials, his evaluation would supercede D r.

Buck’s opinion. Dr. Buck ultimately opined that the essential functions of the

package-car-driver position “are beyond the scope of this patient’s permanent

restrictions.” He noted, however, that M r. Jones “appeared to be strong” and that

his opinion was not based on an examination of M r. Jones’s physical condition in

either M ay or August 2004. The union then advised M r. Jones that the opinion of

the third doctor (Dr. Buck) was controlling and would determine his employment

status.

In addition to the two grievances he filed with the union, on February 27,

2004, M r. Jones completed an “Intake Questionnaire” with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging that UPS discriminated against him.

In filling out the questionnaire, M r. Jones checked the “no” box in response to the

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question: “Do you believe that the employer regarded you as disabled?” He also

checked “no” when asked whether he advised his employer that he required an

accommodation. In addition, M r. Jones indicated that he felt UPS discriminated

against him when UPS contacted Dr. Legler and Dr. Legler subsequently changed

his opinion regarding M r. Jones’s lifting restrictions.

The EEOC responded by letter, indicating that it had not filed a charge of

discrimination because the information he provided did not demonstrate that his

condition amounts to a disability within the meaning of the ADA. The agency

also sought additional information from M r. Jones. M r. Jones only partially

responded to the EEOC’s inquiry, providing additional information in response to

one of three questions. The EEOC again advised M r. Jones by letter that his

questionnaire and supplemental materials were not being treated as a charge of

discrimination. But on October 27, 2004, the EEOC sent M r. Jones a dismissal of

his charge and notice of his right to sue. The EEOC also sent UPS a copy of the

dismissal and notice. This correspondence was the first notice UPS received from

the EEOC regarding M r. Jones’s allegations of discrimination.

On January 24, 2005, M r. Jones filed the instant action in federal district

court, alleging disability discrimination (including failure to accommodate) and

retaliation in violation of the ADA and wrongful discharge in violation of Kansas

law . UPS moved for summary judgment on the grounds that M r. Jones failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit, and in the alternative, no

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genuine issues of material fact exist on any of his disability or retaliation claims.

M r. Jones also sought partial summary judgment, contending, in part, that he

exhausted his administrative remedies as a matter of law . The District Court

granted M r. Jones’s motion with respect to exhaustion on all but his theory of

pattern-or-practice discrimination. The court concluded, however, that UPS w as

entitled to summary judgment on the merits of M r. Jones’s ADA claims. It held,

in relevant part, that M r. Jones had failed to raise a factual issue with respect to

whether he was “disabled” and that he had failed to establish a prima facie case of

retaliation under the ADA. Finally, the court denied U PS’s motion for summary

judgment on the question of wrongful discharge under Kansas law, but declined to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim because it had

dismissed all the federal issues. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (providing that a

district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law

claims if it “has dismissed all claims over w hich it has original jurisdiction”).

Both parties appeal the D istrict Court’s rulings with the exception of the court’s

ruling on supplemental jurisdiction.

II. D ISC USSIO N

W e review the District Court’s entry of summary judgment de novo. Plotke

v. White, 405 F.3d 1092, 1093 (10th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is

appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

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genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgm ent as a matter of law .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing the record, we

view the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Plotke, 405 F.3d at 1093–94.

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

1. Filing a charge

Title I of the ADA requires a plaintiff to exhaust her administrative

remedies before filing suit. M acKenzie v. City & County of Denver, 414 F.3d

1266, 1274 (10th Cir. 2005). In the Tenth Circuit, exhaustion of administrative

remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. See id.; Shikles v. Sprint/United

M gmt. Co., 426 F.3d 1304, 1317 (10th Cir. 2005). The first step to exhaustion is

the filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See Jones v. Runyon, 91

F.3d 1398, 1399 n.1 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that, although a timely filing is not

jurisdictional in nature, the filing itself is a jurisdictional requirement under this

Court’s precedent). UPS contends that M r. Jones failed to meet this requirement

because, although he filled out an intake questionnaire, he never filed a formal

charge of discrimination. The D istrict Court concluded that, even though M r.

Jones only submitted an intake questionnaire, he fulfilled the requirement of

filing a charge. W e review the court’s findings of jurisdictional facts for clear

error and its determination of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. M cBride v.

CITG O Petroleum Corp., 281 F.3d 1099, 1104–05 (10th Cir. 2002). As we

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explain below , we conclude that M r. Jones fulfilled the filing requirement because

the questionnaire satisfied the EEOC’s minimum requirements for a charge, the

circumstances of the case indicate that M r. Jones intended to activate the

administrative process, and the EEOC ultimately treated the questionnaire as a

charge.

First, we agree with the D istrict Court that M r. Jones’s questionnaire

satisfied the EEOC’s minimum requirements for a charge. Under the relevant

statutory provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), the EEOC has broad discretion to

determine the content and form of a charge. See id. (“Charges shall be in writing

under oath or affirmation and shall contain such information and be in such form

as the [EEOC] requires.”). In addition to requiring that a charge be written,

signed, and verified, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.9, EEOC regulations state that a charge

“should contain” particular information, id. at § 1601.12(a). 2 But even if a charge

2
A charge “should contain” the following information:
(1) The full name, address and telephone number of the person making the
charge . . . ;
(2) The full name and address of the person against whom the charge
is made, if known . . . ;
(3) A clear and concise statement of the facts, including pertinent
dates, constituting the alleged unlaw ful em ployment practices . . . ;
(4) If known, the approximate number of employees of the
respondent employer . . . ; and
(5) A statement disclosing whether proceedings involving the alleged
unlaw ful employment practice have been commenced before a State
or local agency charged with the enforcement of fair employment
practice laws and, if so, the date of such commencement and the
name of the agency.
(continued...)

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fails to contain the specified information, it may still be sufficient, provided it is

“a written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe

generally the action or practices complained of.” Id. at § 1601.12(b). M r. Jones’s

intake questionnaire clearly satisfies these minimum requirements for the content

of a charge, in addition to meeting the EEOC’s formal requirements that a charge

be written, signed, and verified, id. § 1601.9. 3

M oreover, the record supports the District Court’s finding that M r. Jones

intended the questionnaire to serve as a charge. In addition to asking whether a

document meets the EEOC’s requirements for a charge, other circuits ask whether

the charging party manifested an intent to activate the administrative process. See

Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1319–20 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding,

in accordance w ith other circuits, that an intake questionnaire may serve as a

charge of discrimination if the circumstances of the case demonstrate that the

charging party manifested the intent to activate the administrative process); see

also Holowecki v. Fed. Express Corp., 440 F.3d 558, 566–67 (2d Cir. 2006)

(A DEA), cert. granted, – U.S. – , 127 S. Ct. 2914 (2007); Whitmore v. O'Connor

2
(...continued)
29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a).
3
M r. Jones verified his questionnaire when he signed it under penalty of
perjury. A charge is “verified,” as required by 29 C.F.R. § 1601.9, if it is “sw orn
to or affirmed before a notary public, designated representative of the [EEOC], or
other person duly authorized by law to administer oaths and take
acknowledgements, or supported by an unsworn declaration in writing under
penalty of perjury.” Id. § 1601.3(a) (emphasis added).

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M gmt., Inc., 156 F.3d 796, 799 (8th Cir. 1998) (Title VII); Philbin v. Gen. Elec.

Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 929 F.2d 321, 324–25 (7th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)

(Title VII); Bihler v. Singer Co., 710 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1983) (ADEA). As the

District Court noted, the evidence supports the conclusion that M r. Jones

manifested an intent to activate the administrative process. M r. Jones testified

that he wanted the questionnaire to serve as a charge and that the EEOC told him

it would treat it as a charge. The document itself lends credence to M r. Jones’s

assertion that he intended the questionnaire to serve as a charge: the questionnaire

contains an express statement that, if no other written statements are filed, the

EEOC will treat it as a charge. See Wilkerson, 270 F.3d at 1320–21 (considering

questionnaire’s language, which indicated it could serve as a charge, as evidence

supporting the charging party’s intent to activate the administrative process).

Indeed, a senior EEOC investigator testified that the EEOC did, in fact, treat M r.

Jones’s questionnaire as a charge and that the EEOC routinely treats such

questionnaires as charges. See id. (considering EEOC’s treatment of

questionnaire as a factor in determining whether a charging party manifested

intent to activate the administrative process).

UPS contends, however, that the EEOC did not actually treat M r. Jones’s

questionnaire as a charge. It notes that the EEOC twice told M r. Jones that it was

not treating the questionnaire as a charge of discrimination and that it never

notified UPS that a charge had been filed, which it ordinarily must do within ten

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days of the filing of a charge, see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.14(a). But the EEOC later

sent M r. Jones a dismissal and notice of his right to sue, which indicates it

ultimately treated the questionnaire as a formal charge. See Wilkerson, 270 F.3d

at 1321 (holding that “the EEOC’s ultimate response, combined with . . . other

relevant facts, would convince a reasonable person that [plaintiff] manifested her

intent to activate the administrative machinery”).

Even though the EEOC ultimately treated the questionnaire as a charge,

UPS contends that it may not serve as a charge because the purposes of

exhaustion have not been fulfilled. As we have previously recognized, the

purposes of exhaustion are: “1) to give notice of the alleged violation to the

charged party; and 2) to give the EEOC an opportunity to conciliate the claim.”

Ingels v. Thiokol Corp., 42 F.3d 616, 625 (10th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other

grounds, M artinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 2003). Because UPS

did not receive notice that a charge of discrimination had been filed against it

until it received the notice of dismissal and right to sue, it maintains that the

questionnaire is insufficient to constitute a charge of discrimination.

If we were to make notice to the employer a determining factor for

exhaustion, the plaintiff would bear the burden of the EEOC’s failure in handling

a charge. But it is the EEOC’s, not the plaintiff’s, duty to provide the charged

party with notice within ten days after a charge is filed, see 29 C.F.R.

§ 1601.14(a); a plaintiff should not be penalized for the EEOC’s negligence in

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handling a charge. See Wilkerson, 270 F.3d at 1321 (“[A]ny deficiency in the

EEOC’s performance of its duties should not adversely affect a plaintiff’s right to

sue.” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted)); Bihler, 710 F.2d at 99 n.7

(noting that a rule conditioning a court’s jurisdiction on the EEOC’s actions in

response to a charge “would establish a prerequisite to suit beyond a prospective

plaintiff’s control and therefore would be contrary to the spirit and purpose of the

[A DEA]”).

In sum, because M r. Jones manifested his intent to activate the

administrative process by filing a statement satisfying the EEOC’s minimum

requirements, see 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.9, 1601.12(b), and the EEOC ultimately

treated the statement as a charge, we conclude that he has fulfilled the

administrative filing requirement. 4

2. Scope of the allegations raised in the EEOC charge

The next step in determining whether a plaintiff has exhausted her

administrative remedies is to determine the scope of the allegations raised in the

4
The Supreme Court will soon address the question of when an intake
questionnaire may serve as a charge of discrimination under the ADEA. The
Court recently granted a petition for certiorari on the question of whether an
EEOC intake questionnaire may serve as a charge of discrimination, even when
the EEOC does not treat the questionnaire as a charge and the employee does not
reasonably believe it constitutes a charge. Holowecki v. Fed. Express Corp., 440
F.3d 558 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. granted, – U.S. – , 127 S. Ct. 2914 (2007). W e
note, however, that because the EEOC in Holowecki did not issue a right-to-sue
letter or otherw ise treat the questionnaire as a charge, id. at 563, Holowecki is
notably different from the case before us. In addition, as explained above, M r.
Jones reasonably believed that the questionnaire constituted a charge.

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EEOC charge because “[a] plaintiff’s claim in federal court is generally limited

by the scope of the administrative investigation that can reasonably be expected

to follow the charge of discrimination submitted to the EEOC.” M acKenzie, 414

F.3d at 1274; see also Jones v. Sumser Ret. Vill., 209 F.3d 851, 853 (6th Cir.

2000) (“[T]he facts alleged in the charge must be sufficiently related to the claim

such that those facts w ould prompt an investigation of the claim.”). W e liberally

construe charges filed with the EEOC in determining whether administrative

remedies have been exhausted as to a particular claim. See M acKenzie, 414 F.3d

at 1274 (construing liberally a plaintiff’s charge of discrimination based on the

ADA); Foster v. Ruhrpumpen, Inc., 365 F.3d 1191, 1195 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting

that w e liberally construe charges based on the ADEA).

W e emphasize, however, that our inquiry is limited to the scope of the

administrative investigation that can reasonably be expected to follow from the

discriminatory acts alleged in the administrative charge. In other words, the

charge must contain facts concerning the discriminatory and retaliatory actions

underlying each claim; this follows from the rule that “each discrete incident” of

alleged discrimination or retaliation “constitutes its own ‘unlawful employment

practice’ for which administrative remedies must be exhausted.” M artinez v.

Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.

v. M organ, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002)). Hence, any adverse employment actions

occurring after M r. Jones submitted his administrative charge on February 27,

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2004, would not fall within the scope of his charge. But, as we explain below, his

charge contains facts concerning allegedly retaliatory and discriminatory acts that

occurred before he submitted his charge. Specifically, the charge contains facts

underlying his claims that UPS discriminated and retaliated against him by not

returning him to work after two doctors released him to return to work in

February 2004.

UPS contends, however, that M r. Jones’s charge cannot fairly be read to

raise allegations of discrimination on the basis of disability. As support, UPS

notes that M r. Jones checked boxes on page two of the questionnaire indicating he

was discriminated against on the basis of his race, color, and age, but he did not

check the box for disability. The failure to mark a particular box creates a

presumption that the charging party is not asserting claims represented by that

box. See Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College, 152 F.3d 1253, 1260 (10th Cir.

1998). The presumption may be rebutted, however, if the text of the charge

clearly sets forth the basis of the claim. Id. UPS asserts that the text of M r.

Jones’s charge does not support a disability claim, noting in particular that M r.

Jones did not mention disability in his response to the question: “W hy do you feel

that the personnel action or other discrimination you have experienced was

because of your . . . disability?” Instead, he simply wrote: “Because of the way

everything happened.”

W e disagree with UPS’s reading of the charge. Although M r. Jones did not

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check the box on page two indicating disability as a basis for the alleged

discrimination, he did check the box for disability on page three in response to the

question: “Are you aware of statements made by management officials showing

prejudice toward you for any of the following reasons[?]” In addition, the

instructions at the bottom of page three directed M r. Jones to complete Section C

of the questionnaire if he believed that he was “not hired because of a disability,”

and M r. Jones filled out Section C. Furthermore, in the narrative portion of the

form, M r. Jones described the discriminatory conduct as follows: “Injured on

10/6/03. On 12-4/-3 Dr. Stechschulte placed permanent restriction on me, On 2-

3-04 Dr. M ichael J. Poppa release[d] me to return to full duty, On 2-9-04 Dr.

Legler release[d] me to return to full duty. After UPS contacted Dr. Legler, Dr.

Legler changed restriction on 2/9/04.” The charge therefore contains allegations

that UPS interfered with a medical evaluation in order to ensure M r. Jones was

not released to return to full-duty work. W e agree with the District Court that

these allegations should have triggered an inquiry into w hether UPS viewed M r.

Jones as disabled. In other words, an investigation into whether UPS did not

return M r. Jones to work because it regarded him as disabled “can reasonably be

expected to follow the charge.” M acKenzie, 414 F.3d at 1274. M r. Jones’s claim

of disability discrimination is therefore within the scope of the charge.

Likewise, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that M r. Jones

exhausted his retaliation claim before the EEOC. Although M r. Jones did not

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check the box for retaliation on page two of the questionnaire, he did check the

box for retaliation as a basis for discrimination on page three of the questionnaire.

Furthermore, as noted above, the text of the charge describes the conduct

underlying M r. Jones’s claim that UPS did not return him to work because it

regarded him as disabled. His retaliation claim is based on these facts as well.

He claims that UPS acted with a retaliatory, as well as a discriminatory, motive

when it did not permit him to return to work despite releases from two doctors.

The facts contained in the charge therefore describe the conduct underlying both

his discrimination and his retaliation claims. Thus, given the factual allegations

contained in the charge and the fact that M r. Jones checked a box for retaliation,

an administrative investigation of M r. Jones’s retaliation claim “can reasonably

be expected to follow the charge of discrimination.” Id.

W e do not agree, however, with the D istrict Court’s conclusion that M r.

Jones’s failure-to-accommodate claim is within the scope of his administrative

charge. M r. Jones checked “no” in response to the question: “Did you advise

your employer that you needed an accommodation?” M oreover, the text of the

charge does not contain facts that would prompt an investigation of M r. Jones’s

claim that UPS failed to accommodate him. Indeed, facts related to the alleged

act of discrimination— UPS’s failure to consider accommodating his perceived

disability— are absent from the charge. Because an investigation into whether

UPS failed to accommodate M r. Jones cannot “reasonably be expected to follow

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the charge,” id., he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect

to this claim.

In addition, we do not agree w ith the D istrict Court’s decision that M r.

Jones’s theory of pattern-or-practice discrimination is barred by his failure to

raise a pattern-or-practice claim or allege facts supporting such a claim in his

administrative charge. M r. Jones seeks to introduce evidence that UPS routinely

applies a “100%-healed” policy, that is, a policy preventing an injured employee

from returning to work unless the employee fully recovers from the injury. The

District Court assumed that, in offering this evidence, M r. Jones was asserting a

pattern-or-practice claim, a particular kind of discrimination claim alleging an

employer engaged in systemic discrimination against a protected class. See Int’l

Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359–62 (1977)

(discussing method of proof applicable to pattern-or-practice cases brought by the

government or a class of plaintiffs). In concluding that M r. Jones had not

exhausted his administrative remedies for a pattern-or-practice claim, the District

Court noted that M r. Jones did not raise the claim or mention the 100% -healed

policy in his administrative charge.

If M r. Jones were in fact raising such a claim, we might agree that he had

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 5 Pattern-or-practice claims utilize a

5
Because M r. Jones does not assert a pattern-or-practice claim, we do not
decide whether the pattern-or-practice method of proof is available to individual
(continued...)

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different method of proof from the method applied to claims of individualized

discrimination. See Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1106

(10th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he order and allocation of proof, as well as the overall

nature of the trial proceedings, in a pattern-or-practice case differ dramatically

from a case involving only individual claims of discrimination.”). The initial

inquiry in a pattern-or-practice case is whether unlawful discrimination is part of

the employer’s “standard operating procedure,” whereas the focus in a case of

individualized discrimination is on “the reason(s) for the particular employment

decisions at issue.” Id. at 1105–06. Here, however, we need not decide whether

a pattern-or-practice claim is outside the scope of the charge because the record

supports M r. Jones’s contention that he seeks to introduce evidence of U PS’s

allegedly discriminatory policy as proof that UPS was motivated by a

discriminatory and retaliatory intent when it refused to return him to w ork. In

other words, he attempts to prove his claim of individualized disability

discrimination by proving that UPS routinely applies a 100% -healed policy that

5
(...continued)
plaintiffs. W e note, however, that other circuits have held that this method of
proof is not available in a private, non-class suit. See Bacon v. Honda of Am.
M fg., Inc., 370 F.3d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a pattern-or-practice
claim is not available to individual plaintiffs, although “pattern-or-practice
evidence may be relevant to proving an otherwise-viable individual claim for
disparate treatment under the M cDonnell Douglas framework”); Lowery v. Circuit
City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 761 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court has
noted that there is a ‘manifest’ and ‘crucial’ difference between an individual’s
claim of discrimination and a class action alleging a general pattern or practice of
discrimination.”), vacated on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999).

-20-
discriminates against disabled individuals.

Evidence of such a policy is potentially relevant not only to the allegedly

unlaw ful motivation behind UPS’s refusal to return M r. Jones to work, but also to

a determination of whether U PS regarded him as disabled. See Henderson v.

Ardco, Inc., 247 F.3d 645, 653 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that evidence of an

employer’s 100% -healed policy was relevant to the issue of perceived disability at

the summary judgment stage). Although the evidence M r. Jones asserts as proof

of this discriminatory policy is not direct evidence, 6 he may offer circumstantial

evidence to prove his claim under the burden-shifting framew ork comm only used

to analyze individual claims of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804–05 (1973) (noting that evidence of an employer’s

“general policy and practice” may be relevant circumstantial evidence of the

6
A plaintiff may prove discrimination through either direct or
circumstantial evidence. Ramsey v. City & County of Denver, 907 F.2d 1004,
1007–08 (10th Cir. 1990). Proof of “an existing policy which itself constitutes
discrimination” would constitute direct evidence. Id. at 1008. But contrary to
M r. Jones’s argument, the record does not contain direct evidence of a
discriminatory policy. In order to be “direct,” evidence must prove “the existence
of a fact in issue without inference or presumption.” Hall v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor,
476 F.3d 847, 854 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). For example, an
employer’s express adoption of a discriminatory policy constitutes direct
evidence. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)
(holding employer’s admitted policy discriminatory on its face). To prove the
existence of a discriminatory policy, M r. Jones offers evidence in the form of past
litigation concerning this alleged policy and statements of former and current UPS
employees. Because this evidence requires a factfinder to infer the current
existence of a discriminatory policy and motive, it is circumstantial, not direct,
evidence. See Hall, 476 F.3d at 854–55.

-21-
discriminatory intent behind an individual employment decision); see also

M endelsohn v. Sprint/United M gmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223, 1227 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006)

(noting that “we have allowed evidence of a pattern and practice in individual

cases of discrimination as circumstantial evidence of a defendant’s discriminatory

animus”), cert. granted, – U.S. – , 127 S. Ct. 2937 (2007).

W e therefore reverse the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in

UPS’s favor to the extent it excluded from consideration M r. Jones’s theory of

discrimination based on UPS’s allegedly discriminatory policy. Because M r.

Jones’s claim of disability discrimination is w ithin the scope of the charge, his

specific theory of discrimination— that UPS discriminated against him pursuant to

its own employment policy— is also within the scope of the charge. W e

emphasize, however, that, in holding that this theory is within the scope of the

charge, we express no opinion regarding the admissibility of any particular

evidence. 7

B. Discrimination on the Basis of Disability

7
W e acknowledge that the Supreme Court recently granted a petition for
certiorari in order to decide when testimony by nonparties concerning their
treatment by a defendant employer (a form of pattern-or-practice evidence) is
admissible in cases of individualized discrimination. M endelsohn v.
Sprint/United M gmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, – U.S. – ,
127 S. Ct. 2937 (2007). Here, we need not determine whether particular evidence
is admissible. Assuming, without deciding, that M r. Jones’s evidence concerning
UPS’s alleged pattern or practice of discrimination is admissible, it does not
affect our disposition because, as we note below, it does not raise a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether UPS regarded M r. Jones as disabled.

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 To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, M r. Jones

must show: (1) he is “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is

qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential

functions of the job he holds or desires; and (3) UPS discriminated against him

because of his disability. See M acKenzie, 414 F.3d at 1274. The D istrict Court

held that M r. Jones failed to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material

fact as to the first element, so it did not address the second and third elements.

W e agree that M r. Jones failed to introduce evidence creating a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether he is disabled.

The A DA defines “disability . . . with respect to an individual” as “(A ) a

physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major

life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being

regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). In the present

case, M r. Jones does not argue that he is actually disabled or that he has a record

of a disability. Rather, he contends that UPS regarded him as disabled. To

prevail on a regarded-as claim, a plaintiff must show that an employer has

mistaken beliefs about the plaintiff’s abilities: the employer “must believe either

that one has a substantially limiting impairment that one does not have or that one

has a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so

limiting.” Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999). M oreover,

the employer must mistakenly believe that the impairment substantially limits the

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employee in one or more major life activities. See id. (stating that the “regarded

as” standard is met when an employer “mistakenly believes that a person has a

physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities” or

when an employer “mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment

substantially limits one or more major life activities”).

M r. Jones contends that UPS discriminated against him based on a mistaken

belief that his shoulder injury substantially limits him in the major life activity of

working. 8 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (identifying “working” as a major life

activity). He maintains that UPS’s belief regarding the extent of his impairment

is mistaken because Dr. Poppa and Dr. Legler (at least initially) cleared him to

work as a package car driver w ithout any lifting restrictions. The D istrict Court

held that UPS did not regard him as disabled because it relied on doctors’

evaluations to determine w hether M r. Jones could return to w ork. The court

reasoned that, because UPS relied on these evaluations, it did not mistakenly

perceive M r. Jones as substantially limited in the major life activity of working.

Although we agree with the District Court’s conclusion, we do not entirely agree

with its reasoning.

Reasonable reliance on a medical opinion may demonstrate that an

8
Although M r. Jones makes a passing reference to “lifting” as a major life
activity, see Lusk v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, 238 F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir.
2001) (identifying “lifting” as a major life activity), he does not argue in his
opening brief that he is regarded as substantially limited in that activity.
Consequently, we do not address that issue.

-24-
employer did not act on the myths, fears, and stereotypes associated with

disability that the “regarded as” definition of disability was designed to redress.

See Rakity v. Dillon Cos., 302 F.3d 1152, 1162–63 (10th Cir. 2002); Lusk v.

Ryder Integrated Logistics, 238 F.3d 1237, 1241–42 (10th Cir. 2001); see also

Brunko v. M ercy Hosp., 260 F.3d 939, 942 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting that employer’s

perception was not based on “myths or archaic attitudes about the disabled”

because it was based on the treating physician’s recommendations regarding the

plaintiff’s ability to lift). In addition, an employer’s disregard for or disinterest in

medical judgments regarding an employee’s condition may support the opposite

inference— that an employment action was impermissibly based on myths or

stereotypes associated with disabilities. See Doebele v. Sprint/United M gmt. Co.,

342 F.3d 1117, 1134 (10th Cir. 2003); M cKenzie v. Dovala, 242 F.3d 967, 971

(10th Cir. 2001); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(l) (indicating that an

employer regards an employee as disabled if it makes an employment decision

“because of a perception of disability based on ‘myth, fear or stereotype’”). 9

9
W e have previously indicated that an employee must show that the
employer’s mistaken belief was “based on myth, fear, or stereotype” to sustain a
regarded-as claim. Doebele, 342 F.3d at 1133 (quotation omitted). Conversely,
at least one circuit has held that an employer may be liable under the ADA even if
its mistaken belief regarding an employee’s limitations is not based on myth, fear,
or stereotype. See Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 191 (3d Cir.
1999) (“T]he law in this circuit is that a ‘regarded as’ plaintiff can make out a
case if the employer is innocently wrong about the extent of his or her
impairment.”). In any event, as we explain below, the basis for U PS’s belief is
not determinative here because M r. Jones has failed to show that UPS mistakenly
(continued...)

-25-
 In the case before us, the record contains evidence that UPS not only

deliberately ignored medical evidence related to M r. Jones’s current ability to

perform the essential functions of his position, but also actively interfered with

the process by which he was evaluated. But although this evidence undercuts the

District Court’s conclusion that UPS’s perception was based on medical judgment

(and therefore not mistaken), a genuine issue of material fact concerning the basis

for UPS’s perception of M r. Jones’s abilities is not enough to survive summary

judgment. Even if UPS mistakenly believed that M r. Jones could not perform the

essential functions of his particular job, it did not regard him as disabled unless it

also mistakenly believed that his impairment substantially limited him in a major

life activity (in this case, the major life activity of working). See Sutton, 527 U.S.

at 489; see also Doebele, 342 F.3d at 1133 (noting that an employee must show

both that the employer regarded her as substantially limited in the major life

activity of working and that the mistaken belief regarding her limitations was

based on myth, fear, or stereotype). Unless UPS mistakenly believed M r. Jones

was substantially limited in a major life activity, it was free to decide that his

lifting restrictions (real or perceived) prevented him from returning to his job as a

package car driver. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490–91 (“[A]n employer . . . is free to

decide that some limiting, but not substantially limiting, impairments make

9
(...continued)
believed (innocently or not) that he was substantially limited in a major life
activity.

-26-
individuals less than ideally suited for a job.”).

Consequently, we w ill not reverse the D istrict Court’s grant of summary

judgment unless the record contains evidence that UPS viewed M r. Jones as

substantially limited in the major life activity of working. According to the

EEOC regulations, in the context of the major life activity of w orking, the “term

substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a

class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the

average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.” 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (emphasis added); see also Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492 (“If jobs

utilizing an individual’s skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are

available, one is not precluded from a substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a

host of different types of jobs are available, one is not precluded from a broad

range of jobs.”). M r. Jones must therefore present evidence that UPS mistakenly

believed his shoulder injury significantly restricted his “ability to perform either a

class of jobs or a broad range of jobs as compared to similarly trained

persons.” EEOC v. Heartway Corp., 466 F.3d 1156, 1162 (10th Cir. 2006)

(quotation omitted).

As we have previously explained, the determination of whether an

employee is regarded as disabled in the major life activity of w orking has a

“strong subjective component.” Id. at 1163. To show UPS regarded him as

substantially limited in the major life activity of w orking, M r. Jones must

-27-
therefore show that UPS “subjectively believed [him] to be significantly restricted

as to a class of jobs or broad range of jobs in various classes.” Id. The

determination of w hat constitutes a class or broad range of jobs requires,

however, an objective inquiry. Id. Thus, we first determine whether UPS

subjectively believed M r. Jones to be substantially limited in his ability to

perform other jobs (in addition to his job as a package car driver). See id. at

1166. If UPS treated M r. Jones as significantly restricted in jobs other than the

one he held at UPS, we then determine whether the jobs from which M r. Jones

was regarded as restricted constitute a “class of jobs” or a “broad range of jobs.”

Id. at 1166–67. A class of jobs includes “‘the number and types of jobs utilizing

similar training, know ledge, skills or abilities, within [the employee’s]

geographical area,’” id. at 1164 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B)), whereas

a broad range of jobs includes “‘the number and types of other jobs not utilizing

similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities within that geographical area,’” id.

(quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(C)).

As evidence that UPS regarded him as substantially restricted in a class or

broad range of jobs, M r. Jones emphasizes that UPS did not consider him for any

other position at the James Street facility where he worked or another nearby

facility. In other words, he argues that UPS’s failure to offer him reassignment

within the company is evidence of its subjective belief that he is substantially

limited in performing other jobs. W e find this argument unavailing for a number

-28-
of reasons.

First, we note that M r. Jones does not argue that UPS viewed him as

substantially limited in his ability to perform a class of jobs because UPS

believed he could not perform other jobs with similar lifting requirements (e.g.,

jobs loading and unloading trucks). Instead, he argues that, because UPS is a

large company with numerous job openings for a variety of positions, its failure

to offer him a position without similar lifting requirements is evidence that UPS

viewed him as unable to perform a broad range of jobs. To reach this conclusion,

he argues that the objective determination of what constitutes a “broad range of

jobs” depends on the range of jobs offered by UPS, rather than the range of jobs

available to him within his geographical area. But, as noted above, we look at the

range of jobs within the geographical area. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492 (noting

that, when determining whether an individual is substantially limited in the major

life activity of working, courts should consider, among other things, “the

geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access”). W e

acknowledge, of course, that, when an employer is hiring for a broad range of

jobs in the relevant geographical area, its decision not to offer an employee one of

a broad range of company jobs may be relevant evidence of its perception of that

employee’s abilities. See Doebele, 342 F.3d at 1134 (considering employer’s

failure to offer plaintiff a job, when it was hiring 200–300 people each week, as

evidence employer regarded plaintiff as disabled).

-29-
 Here, however, the record demonstrates that UPS believed M r. Jones was

ineligible for jobs without similar lifting requirements under the collective

bargaining agreement. 10 Thus, even if UPS had open positions without similar

lifting requirements, it could not consider M r. Jones for these positions without

disregarding its understanding of the collective bargaining agreement. 11 See

EEOC v. Schneider Nat’l, Inc., 481 F.3d 507, 512 (7th Cir. 2007) (reasoning that

employer did not regard plaintiff as disabled when all available truck-driving jobs

at company were subject to safety standard that plaintiff could not meet).

M oreover, because U PS did not believe he w as eligible for other jobs, M r. Jones’s

allegations that UPS applied a 100% -healed policy are of no consequence; even if

UPS applied such a policy in refusing to return M r. Jones to w ork, it did not use

the policy to exclude him from a broad range of company jobs. See Henderson,

247 F.3d at 653 (“W here the 100% rule is applied to mildly impaired persons to

exclude them from a broad class of jobs, it may be treating them as disabled even

if they are not . . . .”); see also id. at 653 n.6 (explaining that the “variability and

10
M r. Jones does not dispute that this was UPS’s understanding of the
collective bargaining agreement. Because U PS’s understanding of the agreement
is the relevant factual issue, we express no opinion as to whether UPS’s
understanding is a correct interpretation of the agreement as a matter of law.
11
In this respect, the present case is unlike Doebele, 342 F.3d 1117, where
we noted that the employer’s failure to consider the plaintiff for one of many
open positions w ith the company was evidence supporting the inference that it
viewed the plaintiff as substantially limited in her ability to perform a broad
range of jobs. See id. at 1134 (noting that the employer “was hiring 200–300
people a w eek at the time”).

-30-
type of jobs available” are relevant in determining whether an employer applying

a 100% -healed policy regards an employee as disabled).

Furthermore, M r. Jones offers no evidence that UPS did not consider him

for particular jobs because it view ed him as substantially restricted in his ability

to do these other jobs. Cf. Heartway Corp., 466 F.3d at 1166 (noting that a jury

could infer from the evidence that employer believed the plaintiff was restricted

in ability to do “any kitchen job” and “any other job where there is a chance of

bleeding and thereby transmitting hepatitis”); M cKenzie, 242 F.3d at 971–72

(noting employer’s statements, including statement that plaintiff “‘would be better

off in some other field,’” w ere evidence that plaintiff was regarded as disabled in

class of jobs). For example, he has not presented any evidence indicating that

UPS w ould refuse to consider him for another job if it had an opening for a job he

could perform with his lifting restrictions without violating the terms of the

collective bargaining agreement. See Schneider Nat’l, Inc., 481 F.3d at 512

(reasoning that “given the absence of [job] openings, a mistaken belief that

[plaintiff] was disqualified from all driving jobs cannot be inferred from the fact

that the company didn’t offer him a driving job”). In short, because M r. Jones

has not identified a broad range of jobs that UPS mistakenly believed he was

substantially limited in performing, his regarded-as claim may not survive

summary judgment.

C. Retaliation

-31-
 To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, M r. Jones

must show: “‘(1) that he engaged in protected [activity] . . . , (2) that a reasonable

employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, and (3) that

a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the materially

adverse action.’” Haynes v. Level 3 Commc’ns, LLC, 456 F.3d 1215, 1228 (10th

Cir. 2006) (quoting Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 452 F.3d

1193, 1198 (10th Cir. 2006)) .

Before the District Court, M r. Jones argued that he engaged in protected

activity by filing grievances with the union and by repeatedly requesting that UPS

return him to work. 12 The District Court held that M r. Jones’s union grievances

were not protected activity because they did not contain allegations of

discrimination and that, even if the grievances constituted protected activity, he

had failed to establish a causal link between the grievances and UPS’s refusal to

return him to work.

On appeal, M r. Jones does not argue that the District Court erred in holding

that his grievances w ere not protected activity. Instead, he argues that his

requests to return to work are protected activity because they were actually

requests for an accommodation (namely, reassignment to a different position).

12
M r. Jones does not contend that UPS retaliated against him for filing a
charge with the EEOC. Although M r. Jones filed his intake questionnaire with
the EEOC in February 2004, UPS had no knowledge of his allegations until
October 2004, well after the allegedly discriminatory conduct occurred.

-32-
Although M r. Jones claims he made multiple requests to return to work, he

describes only one of these requests in any detail. W hen a UPS labor manager

told him to go home after learning that Dr. Stechshulte had imposed permanent

lifting restrictions, M r. Jones responded: “I can’t just go home. I need to work a

job.” M r. Jones argues that this response was a request to be reassigned to

another job, which triggered UPS’s duty to engage in the interactive process for

determining whether he is entitled to a reasonable accommodation under the

ADA. See Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1132 n.8 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that,

once an employee notifies an employer of a disability and requests reassignment,

both parties should “interact in good faith to determine how to reasonably

accommodate the employee”).

W e begin by recognizing that a request for reassignment may constitute

protected activity under the ADA. W e have treated requests for reasonable

accommodation as protected activity under the ADA. See Selenke v. M ed.

Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d 1249, 1265 (10th Cir. 2001); Butler v. City of Prairie

Vill., 172 F.3d 736, 752 (10th Cir. 1999). And a request for reassignment to a

vacant position is a request for a reasonable accommodation. 13 42 U.S.C. § 12111

13
To communicate a desire for reassignment, an employee “need not use
magic words,” but “must convey to the employer a desire to remain with the
company despite his or her disability and limitations.” Smith v. M idland Brake,
Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1172 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc); see also Davoll, 194 F.3d at
1133 (“[T]he burden is typically on the employee to initiate the interactive
process.”).

-33-
(9)(B); see also Smith v. M idland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1167 (10th Cir.

1999) (en banc) (holding that employers must, when appropriate, accommodate a

disabled employee by reassignment to a vacant position if employee cannot be

accommodated in existing job). Hence, if M r. Jones had a reasonable, good faith

belief that he was entitled to an accommodation, a request for reassignment to

another position would constitute protected activity. See Selenke, 248 F.3d at

1264 (“[I]n order to prosecute an ADA retaliation claim, plaintiff need not show

that she suffers from an actual disability. Instead, a reasonable, good faith belief

that the statute has been violated suffices.”). To show he engaged in protected

activity, M r. Jones must therefore show that he reasonably believed he was

entitled to an accommodation under the ADA. Id.; see also Standard v. A.B.E.L.

Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1328–29 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that employee’s

requests for accommodation were not protected activity because the evidence did

not show that he had a reasonable, good faith belief that he was disabled or

perceived as disabled).

W e need not determine, however, whether M r. Jones reasonably believed

that he was entitled to an accommodation because the record contains no evidence

that UPS w as aware of any such belief. W ithout knowledge of M r. Jones’s belief

that he is entitled to an accommodation for a perceived disability, UPS could not

interpret his requests to return to work as requests for an accommodation. See

Petersen v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 301 F.3d 1182, 1188–89 (10th Cir. 2002)

-34-
(explaining that employer must know of employee’s protected activity in order to

engage in unlaw ful retaliation). Unless an employer knows that an employee is

engaging in protected activity, it cannot retaliate against that employee because of

the protected conduct, as required by statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (“No

person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has

opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such

individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.” (emphasis added));

Petersen, 301 F.3d at 1188 (“An employer’s action against an employee cannot be

because of that employee’s protected opposition unless the employer knows the

employee has engaged in protected opposition.”).

In other words, M r. Jones cannot establish a causal link between his

allegedly protected activity and UPS’s refusal to return him to work unless he can

show that U PS knew he was engaging in protected activity. See Williams v. Rice,

983 F.2d 177, 181 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that “to establish a ‘causal

connection,’ plaintiff must show that the individual who took adverse action

against him knew of the employee’s protected activity”). To establish causation,

M r. Jones must therefore present evidence showing that his supervisors knew of

his belief that he w as entitled to a reasonable accommodation under the ADA

based on a perceived disability. Cf. Petersen, 301 F.3d at 1188 (reasoning that

employee’s supervisors could not know that employee was engaging in protected

-35-
conduct “unless they knew that her opposition was based (at least in part)” on

supervisor’s discriminatory motives).

M r. Jones does not explain how his supervisors could have known that he

believed he w as regarded as disabled and entitled to an accommodation. As

evidence that he requested reassignment, he offers only his remarks in response to

UPS’s labor manager (“I can’t just go home. I need to work a job.”). In the

absence of other evidence, these remarks could not have put UPS on notice that

M r. Jones was requesting reassignment based, at least in part, on his belief that

UPS regarded him as disabled. Because M r. Jones has failed to produce any

evidence that UPS knew he was engaging in protected activity, he has failed to

establish the requisite causal connection between this activity and any adverse

employment actions. W e therefore affirm the D istrict Court’s grant of summary

judgment in UPS’s favor on M r. Jones’s retaliation claim.

III. C ON CLU SIO N

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the District Court’s decision that

M r. Jones exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his claims that

UPS discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of the ADA when it

refused to return him to w ork. W e REVERSE the court’s decision that M r.

Jones’s failure-to-accommodate claim is within the scope of his administrative

charge, as well as its decision excluding M r. Jones’s theory of pattern-or-practice

discrim ination as outside the scope of his administrative charge. In addition, w e

-36-
AFFIRM the District Court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of UPS on the

merits of M r. Jones’s ADA claims.

-37-