FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
October 25, 2007
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
W E Y ER HA EU SER CO M PA N Y,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 06-7096
JIM M IE WY A TT and LA WR ENCE A.
G . JO H NSO N ,
Defendants-Appellees.
A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FO R TH E EASTERN DISTRICT O F O K LAH O M A
(D.C. NO . CIV-06-268-FH S)
W illiam S. Leach (Alison A. Verret, with him on the briefs), Eldridge Cooper
Steichen & Leach, PLLC, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Lawrence A. G. Johnson, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before M cCO NNELL, M cKA Y, and TYM KOVICH, Circuit Judges.
M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judge.
W eyerhaeuser Company appeals the dismissal of its federal suit to enjoin
state court proceedings for breach of contract against it. We conclude that,
because the parties actually litigated and the district court decided the claim for
breach of contract in prior litigation, the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283,
did not deprive the court below of authority to enjoin the state proceedings and
that the court erred in granting the motion to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
W eyerhaeuser Company owns and operates a mill facility in Valliant,
Oklahoma, where Jimmie W yatt served as an at-will employee. In the fall of
2002, W eyerhaeuser became concerned about possible substance abuse problems
among m ill workers and arranged for canine inspections of the facility. W hile a
search of the parking lot was occurring, M r. W yatt attempted to leave the mill.
W eyerhaeuser personnel informed him that he could not depart until his vehicle
was searched, at which point M r. W yatt told them that he had a firearm in the
vehicle. An ensuing search of his vehicle uncovered the firearm, and
W eyerhaeuser subsequently dismissed M r. W yatt for violating a company policy
banning firearm possession on company grounds. The issue in this appeal arises
from a series of lawsuits filed in relation to this dismissal.
A. Case No. 02-627
After his dismissal, M r. W yatt sued W eyerhaeuser in Oklahoma state court,
alleging both state and federal claims. W eyerhaeuser removed the case to the
United States D istrict Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, where it
became Case No. 02-627 and was assigned to a magistrate judge upon consent of
the parties. The original complaint contained a number of claims, but did not
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contain a breach of contract claim. On December 17, 2002, the parties submitted
a “Report on Planning M eeting,” which listed as one of the causes of action in the
case a breach of contract claim based on severance payments W eyerhaeuser
allegedly owed to M r. W yatt. On M arch 3, 2003, M r. W yatt served an amended
complaint, which included the breach of contract claim. 1 On July 3, 2003,
W eyerhaeuser moved for summary judgment, though it did not include the
contract claim in its motion. The district judge ordered the parties to address the
contract claim, as well as other issues, in supplemental briefing. The parties
completed that briefing on December 8, 2003.
On M arch 28, 2004, the magistrate judge issued an order granting summary
judgment for W eyerhaeuser, declaring “that W eyerhaeuser Company’s M otion for
Summary Judgment filed July 3, 2003 . . . is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, all
claims asserted against Defendant in this action are hereby DISM ISSED.”
Appellant’s App. 254. The order explicitly delineated and discussed some of the
claims raised by M r. W yatt, but did not discuss the breach of contract claim. 2 M r.
W yatt appealed the grant of summary judgment to this Court without listing the
1
In its order in this case, the district court noted that the record in Case No.
02-627 does not contain a copy of the amended complaint, nor a docket entry for
M arch 3, 2003. Both parties, however, maintain that the complaint w as filed, see
Appellant’s Br. 5–6; Appellee’s Br. 1, and the record contains W eyerhaeuser’s
answer to the amended complaint, see Appellant’s App. 9 (Docket Entry # 21).
2
Wyatt’s claims for negligence and for invasion of privacy were mentioned once
in the district court’s exposition of the facts of the case, but never discussed again.
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contract issue in his questions presented or discussing it in his brief. W e affirmed
the grant of summary judgment in its entirety, without making reference to any
breach of contract claim. See Bastible v. W eyerhaeuser Co., 437 F.3d 999 (10th
Cir. 2006).
On M arch 23, 2006, M r. W yatt filed a motion to reopen the case on the
breach of contract claim. A few weeks later, on April 13, 2006, he withdrew the
motion and “elect[ed] to proceed in state court.” Appellant’s App. 272.
B. Case No. 06-212
Also on April 13, M r. W yatt filed a second suit against W eyerhaeuser in
Oklahoma state court, asserting only his breach of contract claim (Case No. CJ-
06-212). W eyerhaeuser again removed the case to federal court, and then moved
to consolidate it with Case No. 02-627. The magistrate judge denied the motion
on the grounds that No. 02-627 was already closed. Because M r. W yatt thereafter
stipulated that the amount in controversy was less than $75,000, the district court
found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and remanded the case to state
court.
C. Case No. 06-268
On July 6, 2006, W eyerhaeuser filed the complaint in the present
suit— Case No. 06-268— asking the federal district court to (1) issue a declaratory
judgment stating that the M arch 28, 2005, order disposed of the contract claim,
and (2) use its power to protect and effectuate its judgments to enjoin the pending
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state suit and all future litigation by M r. W yatt arising from his termination. M r.
W yatt responded by filing a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted.
The court noted that under the Anti-Injunction Act (“AIA”) a federal court may
enjoin state court proceedings “to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283. Citing to this Court’s decision in Brooks v. Barbour Energy Corp., 804
F.2d 1144, 1146 (10th Cir. 1986), the district court found that this power extends
only to “state court proceedings involv[ing] issues w hich the federal court ‘fully
adjudicated on the merits.’” Appellant’s App. 323 (quoting Brooks, 804 F.2d at
1146). The court found it “abundantly clear that W yatt’s breach of contract claim
was never adjudicated on its merits.” Id. at 324. Rejecting W eyerhaeuser’s
argument that the magistrate judge’s statement dismissing “all claims asserted
against the Defendant” meant all claims, the court found instead that the
statement referred to all claims that the magistrate judge had “painstakingly set
forth in her detailed order” and could not be said to encompass the breach of
contract claim. Id. The court concluded that the contract claim simply “‘fell
through the cracks.’” Id.
W eyerhaeuser appeals the order of dismissal.
II. D ISC USSIO N
A. The Scope of the Anti-Injunction A ct’s Relitigation Exception
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The Anti-Injunction Act provides that a federal court “may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court” except in three circumstances: “as
expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283. This
case concerns the scope of the third circumstance, commonly known as the
relitigation exception. Specifically, the question presented is whether the
relitigation exception permits a federal court to protect and effectuate the full res
judicata effect of its judgments— that is, to bar state litigation of both claims
actually raised in a prior federal action and those that could have been raised 3 — or
whether it covers only issues that the federal court actually decided.
1.
For enlightenment on this question, we turn to the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140 (1988). The case began when
Leong Chong, a Singapore resident, was accidentally killed in that country while
repairing a ship owned by Exxon. Chick Kam C hoo, Chong’s widow, sued Exxon
in federal district court, asserting claims under the Jones Act, the Death on the
High Seas A ct, general federal maritime law , and the Texas w rongful death
statute. Id. at 142. The district court granted summary judgment in Exxon’s
3
In federal court, “res judicata, or claim preclusion, . . . prevent[s] a party
from relitigating a legal claim that was or could have been the subject of a
previously issued final judgment.” M ACTEC, Inc. v. Gorelick, 427 F.3d 821, 831
(10th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
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favor on the federal statutory claims, finding them inapplicable to M r. Chong. Id.
at 143. The court further concluded that, under federal choice-of-law principles,
Singapore law must control the law suit. Accordingly, the court granted summary
judgment on the general maritime law claim and dismissed the remainder of the
case on forum non conveniens grounds. Id. But instead of refiling the
unadjudicated claims in Singapore, M s. Choo filed suit in Texas state court,
alleging the state law claim and a claim under Singapore law. Id. In response,
Exxon brought a new action in federal court, wherein it procured an injunction
barring M s. Choo from “commencing any . . . claims against [defendant] in the
courts of . . . any . . state . . . arising out of or related to the alleged wrongful
death” of her husband. Id. at 144. M s. Choo appealed, contending that the
injunction ran afoul of the Anti-Injunction Act.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court first explained the purpose of the
AIA. The law “is a necessary concomitant of the Framers’ decision to authorize,
and Congress’ decision to implement, a dual system of federal and state courts.”
Id. at 146. By prohibiting “frequent federal court intervention” in state court
proceedings, the AIA “forestalls . . . ‘friction between the state and federal
courts.’” Id. (quoting Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 630–31
(1977)). But given the ultimate need “to ensure the effectiveness and supremacy
of federal law” within this dual system, the AIA contains the above-noted
exceptions. Id. Specifically, “[t]he relitigation exception was designed to permit
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a federal court to prevent state litigation of an issue that previously was presented
to and decided by the federal court. It is founded in the well-recognized concepts
of res judicata and collateral estoppel.” Id. at 147.
The Court turned to its prior decision in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U .S. 281 (1970), as the “best
illustrat[ion]” of the relitigation exception’s “proper scope.” Chick Kam Choo,
486 U.S. at 147. In that case a railroad sought a federal injunction to prevent
union picket activities. Id. The federal court refused, holding that “the unions
were ‘free to engage in self-help.’” Id. (quoting Atlantic Coast Lines, 398 U.S. at
289). The railroad then turned to state court, where it procured the desired
injunction. Two years later, in an unrelated case, the Supreme Court held that
federal statutory law prohibited state court injunctions of the type issued in favor
of A tlantic Coast Lines. Accordingly, the union returned to federal district court
and procured an injunction against enforcement of the original state court
injunction. The federal district court read its earlier order as concluding that
federal law preempted state interference with union self-help. The Supreme Court
reversed, finding that the district court had no authority to issue the injunction.
Id. It rejected the district court’s reading of the earlier order, finding that the
“‘point [was] never argued to the court, [and] there [was] no language in the order
that necessarily implies any decision on that question.’” Id. at 148 (quoting
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Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 290). In light of this holding, the Chick Kam
Choo Court concluded:
an essential prerequisite for applying the relitigation exception is that
the claims or issues which the federal injunction insulates from
litigation in state proceedings actually have been decided by the
federal court. M oreover, Atlantic Coast Lines illustrates this
prerequisite is strict and narrow. The Court assessed the precise state
of the record and what the earlier federal order actually said; it did
not permit the District Court to render a post hoc judgment as to
what the order was intended to say.
Id. (first emphasis added).
Applying this rule to M s. Choo’s case, the Court concluded that because
Texas and federal forum non conveniens law differ, the issue of “whether the
Texas state courts are an appropriate forum for petitioner’s Singapore law claims
ha[d] not yet been litigated, and an injunction to foreclose consideration of that
issue [was] not within the relitigation exception.” Id. at 149. In contrast, because
the district court concluded that Singapore law must apply to the case— “a
decision that necessarily preclude[d] the application of Texas law”— “the validity
of this claim was adjudicated in the original federal action.” Id. at 150.
Accordingly, the relitigation exception permitted a federal injunction on that
issue. Id. at 150–51.
2.
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Since Chick Kam Choo, this Court has dealt with the AIA’s relitigation
exception three times, 4 but we have never squarely addressed its scope. 5 W e do
so now and, like the vast majority of circuits that have explicitly 6 or implicitly 7
considered this issue, conclude that Chick Kam Choo leaves little room for doubt:
the AIA’s third exception does not authorize a federal court to protect the full res
judicata effect of its decisions. Instead, it authorizes injunctions against state
4
See Bailey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 414 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2005);
Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 2001); Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 114
F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1997).
5
The magistrate judge relied on Brooks, 804 F.2d 114, a Tenth Circuit case
decided two years before Chic Kam Choo. W e are not convinced that Brooks
unequivocally endorsed the narrower conception of the relitigation exception, see
id. at 1146 (“Because a dismissal with prejudice by order of the court is a
judgment on the merits, we hold that a federal court can enjoin a state court
proceeding adjudicating an action dealing with the same transaction or occurrence
that w as the subject of the dismissed cause.”), but the question need not detain us.
To the extent Brooks might contradict Chick Kam Choo, it is no longer good law .
6
In re G.S.F. Corp., 938 F.2d 1467, 1478 (1st Cir. 1991), abrogated on other
grounds by Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992); Farias v. Bexar
County Bd. of Trustees, 925 F.2d 866, 879–80 (5th Cir. 1991); LCS Servs., Inc. v.
Hamrick, 925 F.2d 745, 749 (4th Cir. 1991); Am. Town Ctr. v. Hall 83 Assocs.,
912 F.2d 104, 112 n.2 (6th Cir. 1990); Staffer v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 878 F.2d
638, 643 (2d Cir. 1989).
7
See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig., 261 F.3d 355,
364 (3d Cir. 2001); In re Deist Forest Prods., Inc., 850 F.2d 340, 341 (7th Cir.
1988); Derrickson v. City of Danville, 845 F.2d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 1988); Thom as
v. Powell, 247 F.3d 260, 263 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The Eighth Circuit does not appear
to have a clear position on the issue. See Canady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 282 F.3d
1005, 1015 (8th Cir. 2002); In re SDSS, 97 F.3d 1030, 1038–40 (8th Cir. 1996).
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adjudication of issues that “actually have been decided by the federal court.”
Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 148.
The Ninth Circuit appears to be the only circuit that has rejected the
majority reading of Chick Kam Choo and continues to apply the broader
conception of the relitigation exception. See W. Sys., Inc. v. Ulloa, 958 F.2d 864,
868–71 (9th Cir. 1992). Some commentators have also taken issue with the
majority view. See, e.g., 17A Charles Alan W right, Arthur R. M iller, Edward H .
Cooper & Vikram D avid Amar, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4226, at 120
n.22 (3d ed. 2007) (“The Chick Kam Choo opinion is ambiguous and does not
show that a distinction between claim preclusion and issue preclusion was really
considered or intended.”); George A. M artinez, The Anti-Injunction Act: Fending
Off the New Attack on the Relitigation Exception, 72 Neb. L. Rev. 643 (1993)
(criticizing the majority view of Chick Kam Choo and suggesting an alternative
reading of the case and the AIA). Admittedly, the Chick Kam Choo opinion
contains language pointing both ways. The Court broadly stated that the
relitigation exception is rooted “in the well-recognized concepts of res judicata
and collateral estoppel.” 486 U.S. at 147. Given that res judicata extends beyond
claims actually decided and includes those that could have been raised, M ACTEC,
427 F.3d at 831, this statement might be seen to conflict with the opinion’s later
statement that the exception applies only to “claims or issues . . . actually . . .
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decided by the federal court.” Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 148. As the Ninth
Circuit explained:
To read Choo as the other Circuits have . . . would in essence be to read res
judicata entirely out of section 2283. Any issue which was “actually
litigated” by the parties in a prior proceeding will be barred by collateral
estoppel (“issue preclusion”), without any need to rely on res judicata
(“claim preclusion”).
Ulloa, 958 F.2d at 870. Be that as it may, we think Chick Kam Choo’s specific
explication of the scope of the relitigation exception, along with the case’s actual
outcome (and that of Atlantic Coast Lines), leads to the conclusion that the
relitigation exception does not encompass all aspects of claim preclusion.
W hether or not this is the best interpretation of the statute, and whether or not this
limitation undermines the rights that are supposed to attach to a federal judgment,
see M artinez, supra, at 662–79, Chick Kam Choo says what it says, and we must
follow it.
In any event, we believe this interpretation is consistent with the dual
purposes of the A IA: to respect comity while also “ensur[ing] the effectiveness
and supremacy of federal law.” Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 146. W hen a
federal court affirmatively decides an issue, that decision is entitled to respect and
finality. But when a federal court has not passed on a specific claim, the main
concern raised by subsequent state litigation is harassment of the opposing party.
That concern is not to be taken lightly, but it is the province of res judicata, a
defense that a party is free to raise in the subsequent state-court suit, see Staffer,
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878 F.2d at 643 (“Here, the proper forum for a complete investigation of the res
judicata effects of the district court’s judgment is the state court . . . .”)— and that
the state courts “are presumed competent to resolve,” Chick Kam Choo, 468 U.S.
at 150.
B. W as the Breach of Contract Issue “Actually Litigated and D ecided”?
In this case, then, the question becomes whether the parties litigated and
the district court actually decided the breach of contract issue. “Assessing the
precise state of the record and what the earlier federal order actually said,” Chick
Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 148, we conclude that it did.
W yatt included a breach of contract claim in his amended complaint. W hen
W eyerhaeuser moved for partial summary judgment on some of W yatt’s claims,
the district court ordered W eyerhaeuser to file an “additional summary judgment
motion encompassing the issues of breach of contract [and several other issues]”
App. 49. W eyerhaeuser filed a supplemental brief, expanding its motion for
summary judgment to include “Plaintiff’s contract claim, Plaintiff’s alleged
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claims.” App.
51. W yatt responded, arguing that factual issues precluded summary judgment.
Thus, the parties actually litigated the contract claim.
W hether the district court actually decided the contract claim presents a
closer question. Although the district court’s order stated that it was dismissing
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“all claims asserted against Defendant in this action,” App. 254, the order
explicitly discussed only some of the claims brought against W eyerhaeuser while
conspicuously failing to mention the breach of contract claim, and mentioning
once but then failing to discuss the negligence claim or the invasion of privacy
claim. In our view, this creates sufficient ambiguity regarding the reach of the
decision that we must consult the surrounding context for clarification.
W e note first that the district court specifically requested briefing on the
contract issue, stating that this briefing would enable it to “render[]a decision on
all pending motions.” App. 49. This makes it more likely that the court meant
precisely what it said – that it was dismissing “all claims” asserted by W yatt.
This conclusion is strengthened by the conduct of the parties. If there had
been any doubt that all of the litigated claims were included by the court’s
dismissal of “all claims,” W yatt could have asked the district court to reconsider
the scope of its order dismissing “all claims” to exclude the contract claim. But
W yatt does not appear to have regarded the order as ambiguous. Instead, he
appealed, representing to this court that “[t]he Circuit’s jurisdiction is an appeal
from final order entered M arch 28, 2005 disposing of all parties’ claims.” Aplt.
Br. at 6, Bastible v. Weyerhaeuser Co., No. 05-7037 (10th Cir. June 21, 2005).
He thus construed the district court’s order as a final “judgment” under Rule
54(a), which necessarily means the district court’s order resolved all the claims
before it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (directing that an order is not final and
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appealable if it “adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities
of fewer than all the parties”). If the district court’s order had left one of W yatt’s
claims undecided, W yatt could not have appealed that order without first seeking
certification under Rule 54(b). Because W yatt took the position that the district
court’s order resolved all claims and successfully invoked the jurisdiction of the
appellate court on the basis of that interpretation of the order, we are inclined to
resolve any ambiguity against his new and contradictory interpretation.
W yatt claims that he treated the previous order as final because the court
had declined pendent jurisdiction and thus dismissed the state law claims without
prejudice. This is not the best reading of the record. Our duty is to examine
“what the earlier federal order actually said,” Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 148,
and it does not give any reason to suspect that the court declined pendent
jurisdiction over the contract claim. After all, the court decided other state law
claims by W yatt, such as his claim for false imprisonment. W yatt also appealed
to us (and therefore treated as decided) his state law claim for invasion of privacy
even though that claim was in a similar procedural posture: both claims arose
under state law, both were added to the expanded motion for summary judgment,
and both were dismissed by the court’s order to dismiss “all claims,” even though
the court did not discuss either claim separately in the order. 8
8
The district court did mention the existence of the false imprisonment claim
once, in describing the facts of the case, but the court never analyzed or discussed the
(continued...)
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On the basis of the text of the district court’s order, the conduct of the
parties, and an examination of the record, we conclude that the parties litigated,
and the court decided, W yatt’s claim for breach of contract. It follows that the
Anti-Injunction Act permits the district court to enjoin the relitigation of that
claim in state court.
III. C ON CLU SIO N
W e REV ER SE the order of the district court and REM AND for it to
decide whether to grant W eyerhaeuser’s request for an injunction.
8
(...continued)
claim in its order.
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