United States v. Martinez

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

January 15, 2008
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 07-4040
JORGE MARTINEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.
and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 07-4063 *
ADALBERTO AGUILAR-
BANUELOS,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(D.C. NO. 2:05-CR-148-TS)

Mary C. Corporon, Corporon & Williams, P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah, for
Appellant Martinez.

Ronald J. Yengich, Yengich, Rich & Xaiz, Salt Lake City, Utah, filed a brief for
Appellant Aguilar-Banuelos.

*
Submitted on the briefs by the Court’s Order dated November 16, 2007.
Stephen J. Sorenson, Assistant United States Attorney (Brett L. Tolman, United
States Attorney, with him on the brief), Office of the United States Attorney, Salt
Lake City, Utah, for Appellee.

Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. **

TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.

Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Ashton Jeffery stopped Adalberto Aguilar-

Banuelos and Jorge Martinez for driving a car registered in California without a

front license plate. During his interaction with the occupants, Jeffery became

suspicious of possible drug smuggling, asked Aguilar-Banuelos and Martinez

whether they had any guns or narcotics in the car, and then asked for consent to

search the vehicle. Jeffery searched their car and discovered a bag containing

over two pounds of methamphetamine.

Prior to trial, Defendants moved to suppress the drug evidence, arguing (1)

the initial stop was unlawful, (2) the stop was then unlawfully extended, and (3)

their consent resulted from the prior illegal detention. Relying on a magistrate

judge’s recommendation, the district court denied the motion to suppress.

Preserving their right to appeal the suppression order, both Defendants pleaded

guilty. They now separately appeal the denial of their motion to suppress.

**
The Court on its own motion consolidates the two cases for purposes of
this decision.

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Martinez also challenges the district court’s sentence, arguing he should have

been granted a downward departure as a minor participant.

We consolidate the appeals and conclude (1) the initial stop was lawful, (2)

the resulting discovery of drugs was inevitable since neither Defendant had a

valid driver’s license and the police would have conducted an inventory search

after impounding the car, and (3) the district court did not commit a clear error in

denying Martinez minor participant status.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM both the denial of the motion to suppress and

Martinez’s sentence.

I. Background

Trooper Jeffery testified at the suppression hearing about the circumstances

surrounding the incident. The following facts are undisputed.

The Initial Stop. In the early evening hours of March 1, 2005, Jeffery

spotted a black Toyota 4Runner traveling eastbound on Interstate 80 in northern

Utah. The vehicle had a California license plate on the rear, but no plate on the

front. Jeffery consulted a 1998 license plate chart issued him by the Utah patrol

and noted California requires passenger vehicles to display both front and rear

license plates.

Jeffery briefly followed the 4Runner and turned on his emergency lights.

The 4Runner pulled over. Two people were inside: Aguilar-Banuelos drove and

Martinez sat in the front passenger seat. Jeffery approached the 4Runner and

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asked Aguilar-Banuelos for driver’s license, insurance, and registration. Neither

Defendant could produce a driver’s license; instead, Aguilar-Banuelos gave

Jeffery a resident alien card. Unable to find the 4Runner’s registration card,

Aguilar-Banuelos said the car belonged to his uncle who lived in Salinas,

California, which Jeffery later verified as correct. Jeffery then informed

Defendants he stopped them for not displaying a front license plate, at which

point Aguilar-Banuelos reached into the back seat area and produced the missing

plate. Jeffery decided to issue Aguilar-Banuelos a warning ticket for failing to

properly display a front license plate and for driving without a driver’s license.

The Trooper’s Options Regarding the Vehicle. Jeffery had to decide what

to do about the 4Runner. He could not let either passenger drive it because

neither had a driver’s license. And although Jeffery could have called the

registered owner—Aguilar-Banuelos’s uncle—to pick up the vehicle, that would

have been impractical given the owner resided in the Salinas, California area,

hundreds of miles from the traffic stop. Under the circumstances, the most

sensible approach was to impound the vehicle, conduct an inventory search, and

provide Defendants a ride into the next town so they could arrange for

transportation. The impoundment would have complied with the patrol policies

and procedures. Jeffery did not intend to arrest Aguilar-Banuelos for driving

without a license.

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 Jeffery’s Suspicion, Defendants’ Consent, and the Resultant Search.

Because Jeffery did not have enough information to issue Aguilar-Banuelos a

warning ticket based on a resident alien card, Jeffery asked him to come to the

patrol car and supply the necessary information. Aguilar-Banuelos complied.

Jeffery patted him down for weapons and directed him to the front passenger seat.

As a result of his interaction with the Defendants, Jeffery began suspecting

criminal activity—“[p]ossible illegal immigrants[,] a stolen vehicle and drug

activity,” 70-4063 Aplt. App. 42— based on the totality of the circumstances.

Specifically, from his observations since the stop, Jeffery suspected narcotic

activity “[d]ue to the behavior of both subjects, their travel plans, all the many

indicators, the overwhelming odor, the electrical tape, and the air fresheners in

the glove box, no luggage for their vacation.” Id. at 42–43. While in his police

car with Aguilar-Banuelos, Jeffery asked for consent to search the 4Runner.

Aguilar-Banuelos responded, “yes, yes.” Id. at 123. Jeffery then approached the

4Runner to speak with Martinez, informed Martinez of Aguilar-Banuelos’s

consent to search the 4Runner, and, hearing no objection from Martinez, directed

both Defendants to sit in front of their vehicle during Jeffery’s search. The

search turned up approximately two pounds of crystal methamphetamine.

When Jeffery discovered the drugs, both Defendants fled the scene on foot.

They were apprehended about half an hour later and arrested.

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 II. Analysis

We turn first to the Fourth Amendment claims, which are common to both

Defendants.

A. Fourth Amendment Claims

“When reviewing a district court’s decision on a motion to suppress, we

‘accept the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. The

ultimate determination of reasonableness is a question of law reviewable de

novo.’” United States v. Rice, 483 F.3d 1079, 1082 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting

United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006)).

1. Legality of the Initial Stop

Defendants first challenge the lawfulness of the initial stop. Because a

traffic stop itself represents a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, the stop must

be justified at its inception. United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir.

2001). A traffic stop is justified at its inception “if the officer has either (1)

probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred or (2) a reasonable

articulable suspicion that ‘this particular motorist violated any one of the

multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations of the jurisdiction.’”

United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1197–98 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal

citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th

Cir. 1995) (en banc)); see also United States v. Valenzuela, 494 F.3d 886, 888

(10th Cir. 2007).

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 Trooper Jeffery stopped Defendants for driving a California vehicle without

displaying a front license plate. The district court concluded, “Jeffery’s reliance

on the apparent (as well as actual) violation of California law in failing to display

two license plates was based on reasonable articulable suspicion.” 07-4063 Aplt.

App. 127. We agree. 1

The relevant provision of the California Vehicle Code requires that the

state “issue to the owner two partially or fully reflectorized license plates for a

motor vehicle, other than a motorcycle.” Cal. Veh. Code § 4850(a). And “[w]hen

two license plates are issued by the department for use upon a vehicle, they shall

be attached to the vehicle for which they were issued, one in the front and the

other in the rear.” Id. § 5200(a); see also United States v. Ramstad, 308 F.3d

1139, 1146 (10th Cir. 2002) (“California law appears to require both a front and

rear license plate. . . .”) (citing Section 5200); United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d

1528, 1530, 1533 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding initial stop where a trooper pulled

over a California vehicle “for the stated reason that both California and Utah

require vehicles to have a front license plate”); People v. Saunders, 136 P.3d 859,

1
Defendants do not challenge the authority of a Utah police officer to stop
a vehicle for violation of an out-of-state equipment requirement. They merely
dispute a violation has occurred. We thus have no occasion to decide whether
Utah law permits law enforcement officers to enforce violations of out-of-state
license plate requirements. Cf. United States v. Ramstad, 308 F.3d 1139, 1144
(10th Cir. 2002) (analyzing “whether Kansas law empowered [a state trooper] to
stop Mr. Ramstad for driving his vehicle in Kansas without two California license
plates”).

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863–64 (Cal. 2006) (agreeing with our analysis in Ramstad that California

requires passenger vehicles to display both license plates).

Consistent with California statutory law and our precedent, Jeffery’s Utah

patrol-issued license plate chart indicated California requires vehicles to display

both front and rear license plates. It is undisputed the 4Runner did not display

the front license plate. And even though Jeffery admittedly did not know whether

his chart, issued in 1998, reflected current law in 2005, his suspicion of a traffic

violation was objectively reasonable and did not represent a mistake of law.

Consequently, Jeffery was justified in stopping Defendants’ vehicle because he

had a reasonable articulable suspicion of a traffic or equipment violation.

Defendants argue Jeffery made a mistake of law in concluding California

required two license plates. A trooper’s “failure to understand the plain and

unambiguous law he is charged with enforcing . . . is not objectively reasonable.”

United States v. DeGasso, 369 F.3d 1139, 1144 (10th Cir. 2004). Defendants

stress California Vehicle Code Section 5200(a) by its terms applies only to

vehicles for which “two license plates are issued.” And “[w]hen only one license

plate is issued for use upon a vehicle, it shall be attached to the rear thereof.”

Cal. Veh. Code § 5200(b). Defendants thus argue Trooper Jeffery could not have

known the 4Runner needed to display two license plates until he stopped the

vehicle and Aguilar-Banuelos produced the front license plate.

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 Defendants’ argument on this score is unpersuasive. They fail to explain

under which circumstances California would issue only one license plate to a

passenger vehicle. Indeed, Sections 4850(a) and 5200(a) obviously mandate all

vehicles except motorcycles receive and display two license plates. In the

absence of contrary California authority, see Saunders, 136 P.3d at 863–64, we

continue to follow our precedent in Ramstad and McRae and construe the

California Vehicle Code as requiring two license plates for passenger cars.

In sum, because Jeffery observed the 4Runner in violation of the California

license plate requirement, he had sufficient justification for the initial stop.2

2. Inevitable Discovery

Defendants next argue Jeffery violated their Fourth Amendment rights by

unreasonably prolonging their detention and searching the 4Runner in reliance on

2
Defendants also claim the stop violated their right to interstate travel.
We see no merit in this argument. “The right to interstate travel protects
individuals from ‘statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or
restrict this movement.’” United States v. Walraven, 892 F.2d 972, 974 (10th Cir.
1989) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969)). Under both
Utah and California traffic laws, a vehicle must display a front license plate. Cal.
Veh. Code §§ 4850(a), 5200(a); Utah Code Ann. § 41-1a-404(1) (“License plates
issued for a vehicle other than a motorcycle, trailer, or semitrailer shall be
attached to the vehicle, one in the front and the other it the rear.”). The front
plate for Defendants’ car was inside the vehicle; all they needed to do was attach
it, as required by California law. A Utahan likewise would have been stopped for
driving in Utah without a front license plate properly attached. Moreover, we
need only glance at the patrol’s license plate chart to recognize the State of Utah
seeks to enforce the front license plate requirement only against those out-of-state
vehicles that are required by their home state to display a front license plate. We
thus see no burden, much less an unreasonable one, on Defendants’ right to
interstate travel.

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an invalid consent (consent tainted by prior illegal stop and detention). Because of

the inevitable discovery doctrine, however, we need not address these arguments.

“The inevitable discovery doctrine provides an exception to the exclusionary

rule and permits evidence to be admitted if an independent, lawful police

investigation inevitably would have discovered it.” United States v. Cunningham,

413 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal citation and quote marks omitted).

The burden rests on the government to prove “by a preponderance of the evidence

that the evidence at issue would have been discovered without the Fourth

Amendment violation.” Id. In regard to roadside car searches, “[i]f evidence

seized unlawfully would have been inevitably discovered in a subsequent

inventory search, such evidence would be admissible.” United States v. Tueller,

349 F.3d 1239, 1243 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Ibarra, 955 F.2d

1405, 1410 (10th Cir. 1992)).

A lawful inventory search promotes three administrative purposes: “the

protection of the owner’s property while it remains in police custody, the

protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property, and

the protection of the police from potential danger.” Id. (quoting South Dakota v.

Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976)). To prove the seized evidence would have

been inevitably discovered, the government can rely on a hypothetical inventory

search, but only if such a search would not have transgressed its administrative

purposes. Id. In other words, “an inventory search must not be a ruse for a

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general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.” Florida v. Wells,

495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990).

In this case, Defendants do not dispute Jeffery would have impounded the

4Runner and conducted an inventory search because neither Defendant could

produce a driver’s license. Instead, they argue the evidence does not support the

conclusion that a standard inventory search would have revealed the drug

evidence. We disagree.

After opening the hatch in the rear of the 4Runner, Trooper Jeffery removed

a blanket, a spare tire, and an unconnected speaker box. He then spotted “a

compartment that had a crack with some duct tape coming out of the compartment

with just this little opener things [sic].” 07-4063 Aplt. App. 85. After Jeffery

opened the compartment, he “noticed there was a ziplock bag with foil bags inside

of it.” Id. The foil bags contained the seized drugs.

An inventory search aimed at documenting all of Defendants’ property left

in the 4Runner would have reasonably encompassed checking a compartment with

the attached openers. We thus agree with the magistrate judge, “the government

has proved by a preponderance of the evidence the illegal narcotics would have

been inevitably found in the car through the [Utah patrol] inventory search.” Id. at

139.

Defendants’ reliance on our opinion in United States v. Lugo, 978 F.2d 631

(10th Cir. 1992), does not lead to a contrary result. There, we held “searching

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behind the door panel of a vehicle does not qualify as ‘standard police

procedure.’” Id. at 637. We need not belabor the point that opening a visible

storage compartment is different from prying open car door panels not meant to be

opened.

In sum, the inevitable discovery doctrine makes our resolution of the

remaining Fourth Amendment arguments unnecessary. The district court properly

denied the motion to suppress the drug evidence.

B. Martinez's Sentencing Claim

Martinez also argues the district court erred by denying him minor

participant status, which would have reduced his offense level by two points. We

find no clear error in the district court’s decision.

1. Background

On November 2, 2006, Martinez pleaded guilty to possessing with intent to

distribute 872.3 grams of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)

and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The government prepared a Presentence Report (PSR), which

related the following: Martinez accepted full responsibility by admitting he and

Aguilar-Banuelos possessed methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Martinez

stated he and Aguilar-Banuelos were going to receive a total payment of $2,000

for delivering the drugs. Martinez knew the drugs were inside the 4Runner.

The PSR calculated a base offense level of 36 and, after a downward

adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, arrived at a total offense level of 34.

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Martinez, with no prior convictions, had a criminal history score of zero. A

criminal history score of zero (category I) and a total offense level of 34 yielded a

guidelines imprisonment range of 151–188 months. Under the applicable statute,

21 U.S.C. § 841, the maximum term of imprisonment for Martinez’s offense is

life.

Martinez filed two objections to the PSR. Martinez first argued he should

receive the safety valve adjustment under the United States Sentencing Guidelines

(USSG) §§ 5C1.2 and 2D1.1(b)(7), reducing his offense level by two points. The

district court granted the adjustment and recalculated the advisory range as

121–151 months. Second, Martinez argued he should receive a minor participant

adjustment under USSG § 3B1.2(b)—a reduction of two points in Martinez’s

offense level—because of his minor role “as compared to [Aguilar-Banuelos] and

as compared to the whole chain of the transaction.” 07-4040 R., Vol. III at 8. The

district court denied the minor participant adjustment, but granted Martinez’s

request for a downward variance and sentenced him to 119 months incarceration,

two months below the advisory guidelines range.

On appeal, Martinez challenges the district court’s denial of a downward

departure based on his asserted minor participation in the crime. A minor

participant adjustment under USSG § 3B1.2(b) applies only to “a defendant who

plays a part in committing the offense that makes him substantially less culpable

than the average participant.” USSG § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(A) (emphasis added). The

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determination is “heavily dependent upon the facts of the particular case,” and the

district court, “in weighing the totality of the circumstances, is not required to

find, based solely on the defendant’s bare assertion, that such a role adjustment is

warranted.” Id. at n.3(C).

Martinez challenges only the procedural reasonableness of the district

court’s application of the Guidelines. United States v. Fonseca, 473 F.3d 1109,

1112 (10th Cir. 2007) (“A direct challenge to the district court’s denial of a

downward departure is . . . treated as a [procedural] challenge. . . .”). As the

Supreme Court has directed us in reviewing challenges to procedural

reasonableness, we must ensure

the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as
failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range,
treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the
§ 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous
facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including
an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.

Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). We defer to the district court’s

application of the Guidelines to the facts “under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”

Id.

“[T]he abuse of discretion standard consists of component parts, affording

greater deference to findings of fact (clearly erroneous) than to conclusions of law

(erroneous).” United States v. McComb, No. 07-5003, 2007 WL 4393142, at *3

n.4 (10th Cir. Dec. 18, 2007). We have previously explained a defendant bears the

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burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence whether an adjustment

under USSG § 3B1.2 is warranted. United States v. Virgen-Chavarin, 350 F.3d

1122, 1131 (10th Cir. 2003). Because denial of a minor participant status

represents a finding of fact, we review the district court’s decision for clear error.

Id.

2. Application to Martinez

The district court committed no error in concluding Martinez did not qualify

as a minor participant.

Martinez claims he was a minor participant for two reasons: (1) he was less

culpable than Aguilar-Banuelos, and (2) both Defendants were mere mules in the

larger drug operation. Neither argument is persuasive.

The district court disposed of the first argument by reasoning Martinez and

Aguilar-Banuelos “were fairly equal participants in the transportation of drugs in

this case. Both defendants were present and agreed to transport the

methamphetamine for $2,000, and both were entrusted with a large quantity of

drugs. Both defendants fled the scene after they were stopped by law enforcement

to avoid apprehension.” 70-4040 R., Vol. III at 12. The district court thus found

“no evidence to suggest [Martinez] is substantially less culpable than his co-

defendant.” Id. In order for us to disturb the district court’s factual finding as

clearly erroneous, we would have to conclude the finding lacks “factual support in

the record,” or, “after reviewing all the evidence,” we would need “the definite

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and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” United States v. Phelps, 17

F.3d 1334, 1337 (10th Cir. 1994) (internal quote marks omitted). Under this

standard, we have little difficulty in concluding the district court’s culpability

explanation was not clearly erroneous.

Regarding Martinez’s second argument, we have consistently “refused to

adopt a per se rule allowing a downward adjustment based solely on a defendant’s

status as a drug courier.” United States v. Rangel-Arreola, 991 F.2d 1519, 1524

(10th Cir. 1993). We explained, “[d]rug couriers are an indispensable component

of drug dealing networks.” Id. To debate whether couriers as a group are less

culpable would not be productive, “akin to the old argument over which leg of a

three-legged stool is the most important leg.” United States v. Carter, 971 F.2d

597, 600 (10th Cir. 1992). The district court’s decision whether to grant an

adjustment under § 3B1.2 must therefore “turn[] on the defendant’s culpability

relative to other participants in the crime.” Rangel-Arreola, 991 F.2d at 1524

(emphasis added). The district court did so.

In further support of the district court’s determination, Martinez was

indicted and sentenced only for the amount of drugs he personally transported. In

other words, the court did not assess the total amount of narcotics involved in a

larger conspiracy to traffic drugs. Martinez thus received a lower sentence than he

would have as part of an overall distribution network. Accordingly, to grant

Martinez an additional adjustment simply because he was a mule in a larger drug

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distribution enterprise “would cede [Martinez] an undeserved windfall.” United

States v. James, 157 F.3d 1218, 1220 (10th Cir. 1998) (denying a § 3B1.2

adjustment when the defendant’s “sentence was based not on the collective amount

of drugs distributed by all members of the conspiracy, but only on the amount of

drugs distributed by” the defendant himself). 3

In sum, the district court did not commit clear error in concluding that

Martinez was not entitled to a minor participant adjustment. 4 As between the two

Defendants, Martinez was not substantially less culpable. And both were

important links in an overall drug trafficking chain.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the motion to

suppress the drug evidence. We also AFFIRM Martinez’s sentence.

3
Charged only with the amount of drugs he personally transported,
Martinez of course was not categorically precluded from receiving a minor
participant adjustment. See USSG § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(A). Our holding merely
reaffirms that a defendant does not deserve an adjustment based solely on his
status as a drug courier.
4
To the extent Martinez faults the district court for not sufficiently
explaining the denial of a downward adjustment, we also find the argument
without merit. The district court’s extensive explanation, addressing all
Martinez’s arguments, went above and beyond the minimum standard prescribed
in Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007) (“The sentencing judge
should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the
parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal
decisionmaking authority.”).

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