Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

June 17, 2008
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

MESHWERKS, INC., a Utah
corporation,

Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.

TOYOTA MOTOR SALES U.S.A.,
INC., a California corporation;
No. 06-4222
GRACE & WILD, a Michigan
corporation doing business as Division
X; 3D RECON, a Utah limited liability
company; SAATCHI & SAATCHI
NORTH AMERICA, a California
corporation,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Utah
(D.C. No. 2:06-CV-97-TC)

Lewis M. Francis (Jerome Romero with him on the briefs) of Jones Waldo
Holbrook & McDonough PC, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Brian D. Wassom of Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn LLP, Detroit, Michigan
(Michael A. Lisi of Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn LLP, Detroit, Michigan
and Arthur B. Berger of Ray Quinney & Nebeker P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah, with
him on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., Grace &
Wild, Inc. and Saatchi & Saatchi North America, Inc.

Stephen Quesenberry and J. Bryan Quesenberry of Hill, Johnson & Schmutz,
Provo, Utah, for Defendant-Appellee 3D Recon, LLC.
Before BRISCOE, GORSUCH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.

GORSUCH, Circuit Judge.

This case calls on us to apply copyright principles to a relatively new

technology: digital modeling. Meshwerks insists that, contrary to the district

court’s summary judgment determination, its digital models of Toyota cars and

trucks are sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection. Meshwerks’

models, which form the base layers of computerized substitutes for product

photographs in advertising, are unadorned, digital wire-frames of Toyota’s

vehicles. While fully appreciating that digital media present new frontiers for

copyrightable creative expression, in this particular case the uncontested facts

reveal that Meshwerks’ models owe their designs and origins to Toyota and

deliberately do not include anything original of their own; accordingly, we hold

that Meshwerks’ models are not protected by copyright and affirm.

I

A

In 2003, and in conjunction with Saatchi & Saatchi, its advertising agency,

Toyota began work on its model-year 2004 advertising campaign. Saatchi and

Toyota agreed that the campaign would involve, among other things, digital

models of Toyota’s vehicles for use on Toyota’s website and in various other

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media. These digital models have substantial advantages over the product

photographs for which they substitute. With a few clicks of a computer mouse,

the advertiser can change the color of the car, its surroundings, and even edit its

physical dimensions to portray changes in vehicle styling; before this innovation,

advertisers had to conduct new photo shoots of whole fleets of vehicles each time

the manufacturer made even a small design change to a car or truck.

To supply these digital models, Saatchi and Toyota hired Grace & Wild,

Inc. (“G&W”). In turn, G&W subcontracted with Meshwerks to assist with two

initial aspects of the project – digitization and modeling. Digitizing involves

collecting physical data points from the object to be portrayed. In the case of

Toyota’s vehicles, Meshwerks took copious measurements of Toyota’s vehicles

by covering each car, truck, and van with a grid of tape and running an articulated

arm tethered to a computer over the vehicle to measure all points of intersection

in the grid. Based on these measurements, modeling software then generated a

digital image resembling a wire-frame model. In other words, the vehicles’ data

points (measurements) were mapped onto a computerized grid and the modeling

software connected the dots to create a “wire frame” of each vehicle.

At this point, however, the on-screen image remained far from perfect and

manual “modeling” was necessary. Meshwerks personnel fine-tuned or, as the

company prefers it, “sculpted,” the lines on screen to resemble each vehicle as

closely as possible. Approximately 90 percent of the data points contained in

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each final model, Meshwerks represents, were the result not of the first-step

measurement process, but of the skill and effort its digital sculptors manually

expended at the second step. For example, some areas of detail, such as wheels,

headlights, door handles, and the Toyota emblem, could not be accurately

measured using current technology; those features had to be added at the second

“sculpting” stage, and Meshwerks had to recreate those features as realistically as

possible by hand, based on photographs. Even for areas that were measured,

Meshwerks faced the challenge of converting measurements taken of a three-

dimensional car into a two-dimensional computer representation; to achieve this,

its modelers had to sculpt, or move, data points to achieve a visually convincing

result. The purpose and product of these processes, after nearly 80 to 100 hours

of effort per vehicle, were two-dimensional wire-frame depictions of Toyota’s

vehicles that appeared three-dimensional on screen, but were utterly unadorned –

lacking color, shading, and other details. Attached to this opinion as Appendix A

are sample screen-prints of one of Meshwerks’ digital wire-frame models.

With Meshwerks’ wire-frame products in hand, G&W then manipulated the

computerized models by, first, adding detail, the result of which appeared on

screen as a “tightening” of the wire frames, as though significantly more wires

had been added to the frames, or as though they were made of a finer mesh. Next,

G&W digitally applied color, texture, lighting, and animation for use in Toyota’s

advertisements. An example of G&W’s work product is attached as Appendix B

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to this opinion. G&W’s digital models were then sent to Saatchi to be employed

in a number of advertisements prepared by Saatchi and Toyota in various print,

online, and television media. 1

B

This dispute arose because, according to Meshwerks, it contracted with

G&W for only a single use of its models – as part of one Toyota television

commercial – and neither Toyota nor any other defendant was allowed to use the

digital models created from Meshwerks’ wire-frames in other advertisements.

Thus, Meshwerks contends defendants improperly – in violation of copyright laws

as well as the parties’ agreement – reused and redistributed the models created by

Meshwerks in a host of other media. In support of the allegations that defendants

misappropriated its intellectual property, Meshwerks points to the fact that it

sought and received copyright registration on its wire-frame models. 2

In due course, defendants moved for summary judgment on the theory that

Meshwerks’ wire-frame models lacked sufficient originality to be protected by

copyright. Specifically, defendants argued that any original expression found in

1
G&W also shared one of Meshwerks’ original wire-frames with
defendant 3D Recon, one of Meshwerks’ competitors hired to work on a
subsequent phase of Toyota’s advertising campaign.
2
An initial suit for copyright infringement was dismissed without
prejudice because Meshwerks had not obtained registrations for all of the
copyrights it claimed defendants infringed. Meshwerks subsequently registered
the copyrights at issue and filed this suit.

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Meshwerks’ products was attributable to the Toyota designers who conceived of

the vehicle designs in the first place; accordingly, defendants’ use of the models

could not give rise to a claim for copyright infringement.

The district court agreed. It found that the wire-frame models were merely

copies of Toyota’s products, not sufficiently original to warrant copyright

protection, and stressed that Meshwerks’ “intent was to replicate, as exactly as

possible, the image of certain Toyota vehicles.” D. Ct. Op. at 8. Because there

was no valid copyright, there could be no infringement, and, having granted

summary judgment on the federal copyright claim, the district court declined to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Meshwerks’ state-law contract claim.

Today, Meshwerks asks us to reverse and hold its digital, wire-frame models

sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection. 3

II

To make a case for copyright infringement, Meshwerks must show (1) it

owns a valid copyright, and (2) defendants copied constituent elements of the

work that are original to Meshwerks. Autoskill Inc. v. Nat’l Educ. Support Sys.,

Inc., 994 F.2d 1476, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993). Our inquiry in this case focuses on

the first of these tests – that is, on the question whether Meshwerks held a valid

3
On appeal, we have not been asked to address Meshwerks’ contract
claim, though if the holding on its federal claim were to be reversed, the existence
of supplemental jurisdiction to review the contract claim of course would have to
be reconsidered.

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copyright in its digital wire-frame models. Because Meshwerks obtained

registration certificates for its models from the Copyright Office, we presume that

it holds a valid copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c); Palladium Music, Inc. v.

EatSleepMusic, Inc., 398 F.3d 1193, 1196 (10th Cir. 2005). At the same time,

defendants may overcome this presumption by presenting evidence and legal

argument sufficient to establish that the works in question were not entitled to

copyright protection. Palladium Music, Inc., 398 F.3d at 1196. Because this case

comes to us on summary judgment, we review the question whether Meshwerks

holds a valid copyright de novo and will affirm the district court’s judgment only

if, viewing all of the facts in the light most favorable to Meshwerks, we are able

to conclude that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

[defendants are] entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 4

A

The Constitution authorizes Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science

and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the

exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. Const. art. I,

4
There is some debate over whether the question of copyrightability is a
pure question of law and thus one for the court, or a mixed question of law and
fact and thus one involving potential jury questions in the presence of materially
disputed facts. See Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 648-49 (7th Cir. 2004)
(discussing the dispute). Our court has not spoken on the matter, but neither do
we have need to do so today as this case comes to us on summary judgment, and
we cannot, of course, grant such a motion if we discern any material dispute of
fact in the record before us.

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§ 8, cl. 8. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the power afforded by this

provision – namely, to give an author exclusive authority over a work – rests in

part on a “presuppos[ition]” that the work contains “a degree of originality.”

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). Congress

has recognized this same point, extending copyright protection only to “original

works of authorship . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 102 (emphasis added). Originality, thus,

is said to be “[t]he sine qua non of copyright.” Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. That is,

not every work of authorship, let alone every aspect of every work of authorship,

is protectable in copyright; only original expressions are protected. This

constitutional and statutory principle seeks to strike a delicate balance –

rewarding (and thus encouraging) those who contribute something new to society,

while also allowing (and thus stimulating) others to build upon, add to, and

develop those creations. The copyright power is said to exist primarily “not to

reward the labor of authors, but to promote the progress of science and the useful

arts. . . . To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original

expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information

conveyed by a work.” Id. at 349-50 (internal quotation and citations omitted).

What exactly does it mean for a work to qualify as “original”? In Feist, the

Supreme Court clarified that the work must be “independently created by the

author (as opposed to copied from other works).” Id. at 345; see also

Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (the work for

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which copyright protection is sought must “owe[] its origin” to the putative

copyright holder) (internal quotation omitted). In addition, the work must

“possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity,” Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; see

also William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright § 3:27 (“both independent creation and

a minimal degree of creativity are required”), though this is not to say that to

count as containing a minimal degree of creativity a work must have aesthetic

merit in the minds of judges (arguably not always the most artistically discerning

lot). As the Court explained through Justice Holmes, even “a very modest grade

of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man’s alone. That something

he may copyright . . . .” Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239,

250 (1903); see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (all that’s needed is some creative

spark, “no matter how crude, humble, or obvious”). 5

The parties focus most of their energy in this case on the question whether

Meshwerks’ models qualify as independent creations, as opposed to copies of

5
The two pertinent concepts – independent creation and minimal creativity
– are intertwined and overlap, at least to some degree: After all, if something
qualifies as an independent creation (that is, it is more than a copy) won’t it also
usually betray some minimal degree of creativity? Still, though the independent
test imputed by the creativity requirement is low, it does exist. Feist, 499 U.S. at
345, 362. It is thus not the case, as some interpreted Judge Learned Hand to say
when he observed that “‘no photograph, however simple, can be unaffected by the
personal influence of the author, and no two will be absolutely alike,’” that
photographs (or any other works, for that matter) are per se protectable. See SHL
Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(quoting Jewelers’ Circular Publ’g Co. v. Key-Stone Publ’g Co., 274 F. 932, 934
(S.D.N.Y. 1921) (Hand, J.)).

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Toyota’s handiwork. But what can be said, at least based on received copyright

doctrine, to distinguish an independent creation from a copy? And how might

that doctrine apply in an age of virtual worlds and digital media that seek to

mimic the “real” world, but often do so in ways that undoubtedly qualify as

(highly) original? While there is little authority explaining how our received

principles of copyright law apply to the relatively new digital medium before us,

some lessons may be discerned from how the law coped in an earlier time with a

previous revolution in technology: photography.

As Judge Pauley admirably recounted in SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan

House, Inc., photography was initially met by critics with a degree of skepticism:

a photograph, some said, “copies everything and explains nothing,” and it was

debated whether a camera could do anything more than merely record the physical

world. 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 307 (S.D.N.Y 2000) (internal quotation omitted).

These largely aesthetic debates migrated into legal territory when Oscar Wilde

toured the United States in the 1880s and sought out Napoleon Sarony for a series

of publicity photographs to promote the event. 6 Burrow-Giles, a lithography firm,

6
The tour brought Wilde within what is now our territorial jurisdiction in
1882, including to the bustling silver mining town of Leadville, Colorado, where
Wilde descended into Horace Tabor’s Matchless Mine and later claimed, “I read
[assembled miners] passages from the autobiography of Benvenuto Cellini and
they seemed much delighted. I was reproved by my hearers for not having
brought him with me. I explained that he had been dead for some little time
which elicited the enquiry ‘Who shot him?’” Oscar Wilde, Impressions of
America 31 (Keystone Press 1906).

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quickly copied one of Sarony’s photos and sold 85,000 prints without the

photographer’s permission. Burrow-Giles defended its conduct on the ground that

the photograph was a “mere mechanical reproduction of the physical features” of

Wilde and thus not copyrightable. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59. Recognizing

that Oscar Wilde’s inimitable visage does not belong, or “owe its origins” to any

photographer, the Supreme Court noted that photographs may well sometimes

lack originality and are thus not per se copyrightable. Id. (“the ordinary

production of a photograph” may involve “no protection” in copyright). At the

same time, the Court held, a copyright may be had to the extent a photograph

involves “posing the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and

arranging the costume, draperies, and other various accessories in said

photograph, arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines, arranging and

disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the desired expression . . .

.” Id. at 60. Accordingly, the Court indicated, photographs are copyrightable, if

only to the extent of their original depiction of the subject. Wilde’s image is not

copyrightable; but to the extent a photograph reflects the photographer’s decisions

regarding pose, positioning, background, lighting, shading, and the like, those

elements can be said to “owe their origins” to the photographer, making the

photograph copyrightable, at least to that extent.

As the Court more recently explained in Feist, the operative distinction is

between, on the one hand, ideas or facts in the world, items that cannot be

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copyrighted, and a particular expression of that idea or fact, that can be. “This

principle, known as the idea/expression or fact/expression dichotomy, applies to

all works of authorship. As applied to a factual compilation,” the particular

matter at issue in Feist, “assuming the absence of original written expression,

only the compiler’s selection and arrangement may be protected; the raw facts

may be copied at will. This result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the

means by which copyright advances the progress of science and art.” Feist, 499

U.S. at 350; see also id. at 351 (“In no event may copyright extend to the facts

themselves.”). So, in the case of photographs, for which Meshwerks’ digital

models were designed to serve as practically advantageous substitutes, authors are

entitled to copyright protection only for the “incremental contribution,” SHL

Imaging, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d at 311 (internal quotation omitted), represented by

their interpretation or expression of the objects of their attention.

B

Applying these principles, evolved in the realm of photography, to the new

medium that has come to supplement and even in some ways to supplant it, we

think Meshwerks’ models are not so much independent creations as (very good)

copies of Toyota’s vehicles. In reaching this conclusion we rely on (1) an

objective assessment of the particular models before us and (2) the parties’

purpose in creating them. All the same, we do not doubt for an instant that the

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digital medium before us, like photography before it, can be employed to create

vivid new expressions fully protectable in copyright.

1

Key to our evaluation of this case is the fact that Meshwerks’ digital wire-

frame computer models depict Toyota’s vehicles without any individualizing

features: they are untouched by a digital paintbrush; they are not depicted in

front of a palm tree, whizzing down the open road, or climbing up a

mountainside. Put another way, Meshwerks’ models depict nothing more than

unadorned Toyota vehicles – the car as car. See Appendix A. And the

unequivocal lesson from Feist is that works are not copyrightable to the extent

they do not involve any expression apart from the raw facts in the world. As

Professor Nimmer has commented in connection with the predecessor technology

of photography, “[a]s applied to a photograph of a pre-existing product, that

bedrock principle [of originality] means that the photographer manifestly cannot

claim to have originated the matter depicted therein . . . . The upshot is that the

photographer is entitled to copyright solely based on lighting, angle, perspective,

and the other ingredients that traditionally apply to that art-form.” Nimmer on

Copyright § 3.03[C][3]. It seems to us that exactly the same holds true with the

digital medium now before us: the facts in this case unambiguously show that

Meshwerks did not make any decisions regarding lighting, shading, the

background in front of which a vehicle would be posed, the angle at which to

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pose it, or the like – in short, its models reflect none of the decisions that can

make depictions of things or facts in the world, whether Oscar Wilde or a Toyota

Camry, new expressions subject to copyright protection.

The primary case on which Meshwerks asks us to rely actually reinforces

this conclusion. In Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2000)

(Skyy I), the Ninth Circuit was faced with a suit brought by a plaintiff

photographer who alleged that the defendant had infringed on his commercial

photographs of a Skyy-brand vodka bottle. The court held that the vodka bottle,

as a “utilitarian object,” a fact in the world, was not itself (at least usually)

copyrightable. Id. at 1080 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101). At the same time, the court

recognized that plaintiff’s photos reflected decisions regarding “lighting, shading,

angle, background, and so forth,” id. at 1078, and to the extent plaintiff’s

photographs reflected such original contributions the court held they could be

copyrighted. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal

of the case and remanded the matter for further proceedings, and Meshwerks

argues this analysis controls the outcome of its case.

But Skyy I tells only half the story. The case soon returned to the court of

appeals, and the court held that the defendant’s photos, which differed in terms of

angle, lighting, shadow, reflection, and background, did not infringe on the

plaintiff’s copyrights. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir.

2003) (Skyy II). Why? The only constant between the plaintiff’s photographs and

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the defendant’s photographs was the bottle itself, id. at 766, and an accurate

portrayal of the unadorned bottle could not be copyrighted. Facts and ideas are

the public’s domain and open to exploitation to ensure the progress of science and

the useful arts. Only original expressions of those facts or ideas are

copyrightable, leaving the plaintiff in the Skyy case with an admittedly “thin”

copyright offering protection perhaps only from exact duplication by others. Id.;

see also SHL Imaging, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d at 311 (“Practically, the plaintiffs

[photos] are only protected from verbatim copying.”).

The teaching of Skyy I and II, then, is that the vodka bottle, because it did

not owe its origins to the photographers, had to be filtered out to determine what

copyrightable expression remained. And, by analogy – though not perhaps the

one Meshwerks had in mind – we hold that the unadorned images of Toyota’s

vehicles cannot be copyrighted by Meshwerks and likewise must be filtered out.

To the extent that Meshwerks’ digital wire-frame models depict only those

unadorned vehicles, having stripped away all lighting, angle, perspective, and

“other ingredients” associated with an original expression, we conclude that they

have left no copyrightable matter. 7

7
The Skyy I panel also faulted the district court for analyzing the
photographs as “derivative works,” requiring (a) non-trivial differences between
the photos and bottle and (b) that copyright in the photo would not interfere with
Skyy’s ability to use its own bottle. See Skyy I, 225 F.3d at 1073. A derivative
work is based on a pre-existing copyrighted work and seeks to recast, transform,
or adapt that original work. 17 U.S.C. § 101. Meshwerks argues that the
(continued...)

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 Confirming this conclusion as well is the peculiar place where Meshwerks

stood in the model-creation pecking order. On the one hand, Meshwerks had

nothing to do with designing the appearance of Toyota’s vehicles, distinguishing

them from any other cars, trucks, or vans in the world. That expressive creation

took place before Meshwerks happened along, and was the result of work done by

Toyota and its designers; indeed, at least six of the eight vehicles at issue are still

covered by design patents belonging to Toyota and protecting the appearances of

the objects for which they are issued. See 35 U.S.C. § 171; Gorham Mfg. Co. v.

White, 81 U.S. 511, 525 (1871) (“It is the appearance itself, no matter by what

agency caused, that constitutes mainly, if not entirely, the contribution to the

public which the law deems worthy of recompense.”). On the other hand, how the

models Meshwerks created were to be deployed in advertising – including the

7
(...continued)
originality requirement is “higher” for derivative works, that the district court
erroneously applied this standard here, and that cases analyzing originality in
derivative works are generally inapposite. In our de novo review, however, we
have simply applied the Supreme Court’s originality directives set out in Feist.
And it appears to us that the courts in derivative works cases, see, e.g., ATC
Distr. Group, Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d
700, 712 (6th Cir. 2005); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490-92
(2d Cir. 1976), just like the court in Skyy II, also had to separate out that which
owed its origin to the putative copyright holder from that which did not, holding
only the former copyrightable. In then examining the elements that are original to
the author, the originality analysis ought to be the same. Patry on Copyright
§ 3:50 (“[T]he standard of originality for derivative works is no different than for
nonderivative works.”); id. § 3:55 (“Under the Supreme Court’s Feist opinion,
there is a single test for originality applicable to all works, derivative and
nonderivative alike.”).

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backgrounds, lighting, angles, and colors – were all matters left to those (G&W,

Saatchi, and 3D Recon) who came after Meshwerks left the scene. See infra

Section II.C. Meshwerks thus played a narrow, if pivotal, role in the process by

simply, if effectively, copying Toyota’s vehicles into a digital medium so they

could be expressively manipulated by others. 8

Were we to afford copyright protection in this case, we would run aground

on one of the bedrock principles of copyright law – namely, that originality, “as

the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created

by the author (as opposed to copied from other works).” Feist, 499 U.S. at 345

(emphasis added). Because our copyright laws protect only “original” expression,

the reason for refusing copyright protection to copies is clear, “since obviously a

copier is not a creator, much less an ‘independent’ creator.” Patry on Copyright

§ 3:28; see also id. (“The key is whether original matter in which protection is

claimed is the result of plaintiff’s ingenuity rather than appropriation of another’s

material.”). As it happens, many other courts before us have denied copyright

protection in analogous cases, involving copies of facts in the world, as well as

copies of prior works of art. So, for example, in Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky,

Skelly, Engineers LLP, 303 F.3d 460, 467 (2d Cir. 2002), our sister circuit,

relying on Feist, denied copyright protection to that portion of an architectural

8
We are not called upon to, and do not, express any view on the
copyrightability of the work products produced by those who employed and
adorned Meshwerks’ models.

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drawing setting forth “the existing physical characteristics of the site, including

its shape and dimensions, the grade contours, and the location of existing

elements, [as] it sets forth facts; copyright does not bar the copying of such

facts.” Much the same might be said here. See also ATC Distr. Group, Inc. v.

Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d 700, 712 (6th Cir. 2005)

(denying copyright protection to catalog illustrations of transmission parts

“copied from photographs cut out of competitors’ catalogs”); Bridgeman Art

Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (denying

copyright protection to photographs that were “‘slavish copies’ of public domain

works of art”); Mary Campbell Wojcik, The Antithesis of Originality: Bridgeman,

Image Licensors, and the Public Domain, 30 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L. J. 257,

267 (2008) (“[T]he law is becoming increasingly clear: one possesses no

copyright interest in reproductions . . . when these reproductions do nothing more

than accurately convey the underlying image.”). 9

9
We are not convinced that the single case to which we are pointed where
copyright was awarded for a “slavish copy” remains good law after Feist. In Alva
Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), the court held that
a miniature reproduction of Rodin’s “Hand of God” was copyrightable because of
the great skill it took accurately to replicate Rodin’s masterpiece. Feist, however,
rejected the notion that skill and hard work suffice for copyright protection, 499
U.S. at 359-60, undermining the very foundation for the holding in Alva Studios.
See Patry on Copyright § 3:56 (“Alva appears to have protected labor—albeit
labor by a skilled artisan—but still only labor, not judgment. Alva is inconsistent
with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Feist.”).

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 It is certainly true that what Meshwerks accomplished was a peculiar kind

of copying. It did not seek to recreate Toyota vehicles outright – steel, rubber,

and all; instead, it sought to depict Toyota’s three-dimensional physical objects in

a two-dimensional digital medium. But we hold, as many before us have already

suggested, that, standing alone, “[t]he fact that a work in one medium has been

copied from a work in another medium does not render it any the less a ‘copy.’”

Nimmer on Copyright § 8.01[B]; see also Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630

F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that “the mere reproduction of the Disney

characters in plastic . . . does not constitute originality as this Court has defined

the term”); Entm’t Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc., 122

F.3d 1211, 1221-24 (9th Cir. 1997) (denying copyright protection to 3-D

costumes based on 2-D cartoon characters). After all, the putative creator who

merely shifts the medium in which another’s creation is expressed has not

necessarily added anything beyond the expression contained in the original. See

Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd., 36 F. Supp. 2d at 199 (noting that “a copy in a new

medium is copyrightable only where, as often but not always is the case, the

copier makes some identifiable original contribution”). 10

10
The single case Meshwerks cites to us as suggesting that a medium shift
alone is sufficient to warrant copyright protection does not alter our conclusion on
this score. There, a series of three-dimensional works of art translated from two-
dimensional sketches were held copyrightable based on the artist’s “creative
effort.” W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik v. Action Indus., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 763, 767
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). This case pre-dated Feist, and it is unclear whether it remains
(continued...)

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 In reaching this conclusion, we do not for a moment seek to downplay the

considerable amount of time, effort, and skill that went into making Meshwerks’

digital wire-frame models. But, in assessing the originality of a work for which

copyright protection is sought, we look only at the final product, not the process,

and the fact that intensive, skillful, and even creative labor is invested in the

process of creating a product does not guarantee its copyrightability. See Feist,

499 U.S. at 359-60; Howard B. Abrams, Law of Copyright § 2:8 (“Even if the

process is both expensive and intricate, an exact or near-exact duplicate of an

original should not qualify for copyright.”) (emphasis added); Wojcik, supra, 30

Hastings Comm. & Ent. L. J. at 267 (“This is not to say that [accurately

reproducing an underlying image] requires no skill or effort; it simply means that

such skill and effort does not suffice to invoke the highly advantageous legal

monopoly granted under the Copyright Act.”). In the case before us, there is no

doubt that transposing the physical appearances of Toyota’s vehicles from three

dimensions to two, such that computer-screen images accurately reflect Toyota’s

products, was labor intensive and required a great amount of skill. But because

10
(...continued)
good law. In Feist, the Supreme Court specifically eschewed the notion that
effort alone was enough to make the resultant work “original” and therefore the
proper subject of copyright protection. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 359-60; see also
supra note 9. Moreover, and as discussed in greater detail below, creative
decision-making in the process is insufficient to render the product original. Cf.
Nimmer on Copyright § 3.03[C][2] (stating that a district court erred in another
case “in holding that the mere act of converting a public domain Santa Claus
figure into a three-dimensional plastic form constituted sufficient originality”).

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the end-results were unadorned images of Toyota’s vehicles, the appearances of

which do not owe their origins to Meshwerks, we are unable to reward that skill,

effort, and labor with copyright protection.

2

Meshwerks’ intent in making its wire-frame models provides additional

support for our conclusion. “In theory, the originality requirement tests the

putative author’s state of mind: Did he have an earlier work in mind when he

created his own?” Paul Goldstein, Goldstein on Copyright § 2.2.1.1. If an artist

affirmatively sets out to be unoriginal – to make a copy of someone else’s

creation, rather than to create an original work – it is far more likely that the

resultant product will, in fact, be unoriginal. See Russ VerSteeg, Intent,

Originality, Creativity and Joint Authorship, 68 Brook. L. Rev. 123, 133 (2002)

(“[A] person’s intent to copy . . . should be considered strong evidence that what

that person has produced is not copyrightable.”). Of course, this is not to say that

the accidental or spontaneous artist will be denied copyright protection for not

intending to produce art; it is only to say that authorial intent sometimes can shed

light on the question of whether a particular work qualifies as an independent

creation or only a copy.

In this case, the undisputed evidence before us leaves no question that

Meshwerks set out to copy Toyota’s vehicles, rather than to create, or even to

add, any original expression. The purchase order signed by G&W asked

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Meshwerks to “digitize and model” Toyota’s vehicles, and Meshwerks’ invoice

submitted to G&W for payment reflects that this is exactly the service Meshwerks

performed. Aplt’s App. at 113, 115. Meshwerks itself has consistently described

digitization and modeling as an attempt accurately to depict real-world, three-

dimensional objects as digital images viewable on a computer screen. See, e.g.,

id. at 369 (“the graphic sculptor is not intending to ‘redesign’ the product, he or

she is attempting to depict that object in the most realistic way”); id. at 370 (goal

is “to create a realistic depiction on the computer screen”); id. at 378

(“Meshwerks’ graphic sculptors [] create realistic-looking depictions of

complicated real-world objects on a two dimensional screen . . . a digital

representation of the real object”); id. at 455 (Meshwerks “basically draws a three

dimensional rendering of that object in the computer . . . it closely resembles the

original”). The parties thus intended to have Meshwerks create base-layer digital

models to which the original and creative elements viewers would see in actual

advertisements could be added by others in subsequent processes.

Other courts before us have examined and relied on a putative copyright

holder’s intent in holding that the resultant work was not original and thus subject

to copyright protection. The Sixth Circuit, for example, held that a series of

catalog illustrations depicting auto transmission parts were not independently

copyrightable. ATC Distrib. Group, Inc, 402 F.3d at 712. The drawings had been

copied by hand from photographs in a competitor’s catalog. Id. In denying

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copyright protection, the court emphasized that “[t]he illustrations were intended

to be as accurate as possible in reproducing the parts shown in the photographs on

which they were based, a form of slavish copying that is the antithesis of

originality.” Id. (emphasis added). In Bridgeman Art Library, the court

examined whether color transparencies of public domain works of art were

sufficiently original for copyright protection, ultimately holding that, as “exact

photographic copies of public domain works of art,” they were not. 36 F. Supp.

2d at 195. In support of its holding, the court looked to the plaintiff’s intent in

creating the transparencies: where “the point of the exercise was to reproduce the

underlying works with absolute fidelity,” the “spark of originality” necessary for

copyright protection was absent. Id. at 197 (emphasis added). Precisely the same

holds true here, where, by design, all that was left in Meshwerks’ digital wire-

frame models were the designs of Toyota’s vehicles.

C

Although we hold that Meshwerks’ digital, wire-frame models are

insufficiently original to warrant copyright protection, we do not turn a blind eye

to the fact that digital imaging is a relatively new and evolving technology and

that Congress extended copyright protection to “original works of authorship

fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed.” 17

U.S.C. § 102(a) (emphasis added). A Luddite might make the mistake of

suggesting that digital modeling, as was once said of photography, allows for

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nothing more than “mechanical reproduction of the physical features or outlines

of some object . . . and involves no originality of thought or any novelty in the

intellectual operation connected with its visible reproduction in [the] shape of a

picture.” Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59. Clearly, this is not so.

Digital modeling can be, surely is being, and no doubt increasingly will be

used to create copyrightable expressions. Yet, just as photographs can be, but are

not per se, copyrightable, the same holds true for digital models. There’s little

question that digital models can be devised of Toyota cars with copyrightable

features, whether by virtue of unique shading, lighting, angle, background scene,

or other choices. The problem for Meshwerks in this particular case is simply

that the uncontested facts reveal that it wasn’t involved in any such process, and

indeed contracted to provide completely unadorned digital replicas of Toyota

vehicles in a two-dimensional space. For this reason, we do not envision any

“chilling effect” on creative expression based on our holding today, and instead

see it as applying to digital modeling the same legal principles that have come, in

the fullness of time and with an enlightened eye, to apply to photographs and

other media. 11

11
Defendants’ request for the costs and attorneys fees associated with this
appeal is denied. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (allowing reasonable fees and costs at the
court’s discretion). Non-exclusive factors that may guide a court’s exercise of its
discretion include the “frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness
(both in the factual and in the legal components of the case) and the need in
particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and
(continued...)

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 ***

Originality is the sine qua non of copyright. If the basic design reflected in

a work of art does not owe its origin to the putative copyright holder, then that

person must add something original to that design, and then only the original

addition may be copyrighted. In this case, Meshwerks copied Toyota’s designs in

creating digital, wire-frame models of Toyota’s vehicles. But the models reflect,

that is, “express,” no more than the depiction of the vehicles as vehicles. The

designs of the vehicles, however, owe their origins to Toyota, not to Meshwerks,

and so we are unable to reward Meshwerks’ digital wire-frame models, no doubt

the product of significant labor, skill, and judgment, with copyright protection.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed, and defendants’ request for

attorneys’ fees is denied.

So ordered .

11
(...continued)
deterrence.” Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994). Far from
being frivolous, this suit presents a novel and consequential question focused on
the copyrightability of images in a relatively new technological medium. Neither
are we presented with evidence suggesting that Meshwerks’ motivation in filing
this suit was anything other than sincere.

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 APPENDIX A

06-4222, Meshwerks v. Toyota

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 APPENDIX B

06-4222, Meshwerks v. Toyota

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