Bialek v. Mukasey

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

June 24, 2008
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
PUBLISH Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

BARRY BIALEK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
No. 07-1284
MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, United
States Attorney General; DAVID M.
MASON, * Federal Election
Commission Chairman, in their
official capacities,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 07-cv-00321-WYD-PAC)

Michael R. Dezsi, Fieger, Fieger, Kenney, Johnson & Giroux, P.C., Southfield,
Michigan, for the Plaintiff-Appellant.

Eric Fleisig-Greene, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United States
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; and Kevin Deeley, Federal Election
Commission, Washington, D.C. (Troy A. Eid, United States Attorney; Peter D.
Keisler, Assistant Attorney General; and Michael S. Raab, Attorney, Appellate
Staff Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. with
them on the brief), for the Defendants-Appellees.

*
David M. Mason is hereby substituted for Michael E. Toner, pursuant to
this Court’s Rule 35.3.
Before LUCERO, EBEL, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.

LUCERO, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Barry Bialek appeals the district court’s dismissal of his

suit against the United States Attorney General and the Chairman of the Federal

Election Commission (“FEC” or “Commission”), pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failing to state a claim. Bialek had sought a

judgment declaring that the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA” or “the

Act”), 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455, bars the Attorney General from investigating or

prosecuting criminal violations of campaign finance law absent a referral from

four FEC commissioners. We find Bialek’s reading of the statute unpersuasive

and affirm the judgment of the district court.

I

Bialek alleges that the Attorney General, acting through the United States

Department of Justice (“DOJ”), targeted him as part of a “politically motivated

investigation” into criminal violations of campaign finance law. Bialek maintains

that the alleged investigation, which began in November 2005, resulted from his

political and financial support of the 2004 presidential campaign of former United

States Senator John Edwards.

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 According to Bialek’s complaint, in April 2006, the Attorney General’s

office summoned Bialek before a federal grand jury to testify and produce

documents. 1 During the grand jury investigation, the government “attempted to

coerce [Bialek] to reveal constitutionally protected activities such as the identi[t]y

of the presidential candidate for whom he voted in the 2004 election.” The

investigation was initiated and conducted entirely by the DOJ; the FEC was not

involved in the matter.

In February 2007, Bialek brought this action against both the Attorney

General and the chairman of the FEC seeking a declaration that the Attorney

General lacks the authority to initiate an investigation into violations of campaign

finance law. Bialek claimed that Congress vested the FEC with exclusive

jurisdiction to initiate both civil and criminal investigations into campaign

finance law violations, and that the Attorney General may therefore pursue such

violations only upon referral by a vote of four FEC commissioners. In their

motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the FEC Chairman and the Attorney

General countered that the Attorney General’s plenary power to prosecute

criminal violations includes violations of campaign finance law.

1
Bialek’s legal memorandum provides a few colorful details regarding the
campaign finance investigation, but of course we recount only those facts present
in the appellate record. In this appeal of a dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of
Procedure 12(b)(6), our factual review begins and ends with the general
allegations within Bialek’s concise complaint. See Lane v. Simon, 495 F.3d
1182, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007).

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 In a written order, the district court concluded that the government had the

better of the two arguments and dismissed Bialek’s complaint with prejudice.

Bialek now appeals. We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s final

judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 2

II

“We review the district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion de novo,

accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and viewing them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Lane, 495 F.3d at 1186. In this case, Bialek’s claim

rests on the proper scope of the Attorney General’s prosecutorial authority.

“Under the authority of Art. II, § 2 [of the United States Constitution], Congress

has vested in the Attorney General the power to conduct the criminal litigation of

the United States Government.” United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694

(1974); see also 28 U.S.C. § 516 (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the

2
At the time this appeal was submitted, Bialek had not been charged with
any campaign finance crimes. In fact, at oral argument, Bialek’s counsel told us
that the statute of limitations had run on any possible charges related to Bialek’s
campaign contributions. Concerned that this concession rendered Bialek’s appeal
moot, we ordered supplemental briefing. See Colo. Off Highway Vehicle Coal. v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 357 F.3d 1130, 1133 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting our duty to
evaluate jurisdiction sua sponte). In response, Bialek informs us that “counsel
. . . was incorrect.” He states that some of the challenged campaign contributions
were made in September 2003, and thus the statute of limitations for these
contributions will not expire until September 2008. See 2 U.S.C. § 455(a)
(establishing a five-year limitations period for FECA violations). Because
nothing within Bialek’s complaint compels the conclusion that his case is moot,
we accept counsel’s representation that he simply misspoke and address the
appeal on its merits.

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conduct of litigation in which the United States . . . is interested . . . is reserved to

officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney

General.”). But what Congress giveth, Congress may no doubt taketh away.

Bialek argues that by enacting and amending the FECA, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455,

Congress created an exception to the Attorney General’s authority over criminal

matters. Under this exception, Bialek urges, the Attorney General may only

conduct an investigation of the sort at issue here following a formal referral from

the FEC.

FECA was originally enacted in 1971 and subsequently amended several

times, most relevantly in 1974, 1976, and 1979. The Act, as amended, regulates

campaign finance in a number of ways, such as by capping the amounts of

political contributions, regulating contributions from certain classes of entities

and individuals, and imposing various disclosure and reporting requirements.

See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a-441i, 441k. FECA imposes civil as well as criminal

penalties on those who violate its provisions. § 437g(a)(6), (d)(1). The FEC,

which is composed of six commissioners, three from each political party,

§ 437c(a)(1), has “exclusive jurisdiction with respect to civil enforcement” of

FECA’s provisions, § 437c(b)(1). The FEC has investigatory duties, but may also

provide advisory guidance as to whether planned or present conduct violates

FECA. See 2 U.S.C. § 437f; 11 C.F.R. § 112.1.

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 FECA establishes procedures through which the FEC investigates suspected

campaign finance misdeeds. An FEC inquiry begins when the agency receives a

sworn complaint alleging a violation, or the Commission otherwise ascertains in

its usual course of business that an individual has run afoul of campaign finance

law. § 437g(a)(1), (2). The FEC may then initiate an investigation, issue

subpoenas, and seek judicial enforcement of its orders. § 437d(a), (b). If the

investigation reveals probable cause to believe that a civil violation has occurred,

the FEC must provide the target with notice and an opportunity to respond,

§ 437g(a)(3), and must hold conciliation discussions, § 437g(a)(4)(A)(i). In cases

where no conciliation agreement is reached, it may file a civil enforcement suit.

§ 437g(a)(6)(A).

During the course of an investigation, the FEC may also find probable

cause to believe that the campaign finance violation was “knowing and willful.”

In this event, FECA allows the FEC to refer the case to the Attorney General for

criminal prosecution. § 437g(a)(5)(C). Such a referral requires the votes of four

FEC commissioners. 3 Id.

3
The referral provision provides in full:

If the Commission by an affirmative vote of 4 of its members,
determines that there is probable cause to believe that a
knowing and willful violation of this Act which is subject to
subsection (d) of this section, or a knowing and willful
violation of chapter 95 or chapter 96 of Title 26, has occurred
or is about to occur, it may refer such apparent violation to the
(continued...)

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 It is this last provision which, Bialek claims, places limits on the Attorney

General’s power to independently investigate and prosecute criminal violations of

FECA. Because FECA establishes a mechanism through which the FEC may

refer matters for criminal investigation, he reasons, this must be the only way that

such investigations can commence. Bialek advances several arguments in

support, primarily relying on policy considerations and snippets of the legislative

history. Both the FEC and the Attorney General disagree with his reading,

maintaining that the measure’s plain language addresses only the authority of the

FEC, and leaves undisturbed the Attorney General’s well-established power to

investigate and litigate all federal crimes.

At the outset, we emphasize that we cannot presume that Congress has

divested the Attorney General of his prosecutorial authority absent “a clear and

unambiguous expression of legislative will.” United States v. Morgan, 222 U.S.

274, 281 (1911). “Repeals by implication are not favored,” especially when the

executive’s law-enforcement powers are at issue. Id. Indeed, Bialek’s argument

is an analogue of one rejected by the Supreme Court nearly a century ago. In

Morgan, a defendant was indicted by the federal prosecutor for selling tap water

mislabeled as spring water. Id. at 277. The defendant noted that a federal food

3
(...continued)
Attorney General of the United States without regard to any
limitations set forth in paragraph (4)(A).

§ 437(g)(a)(5)(C).

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and drug statute provided procedures by which the Department of Agriculture

could find a suspected statutory violation, give notice to the violator, and only

then refer the matter for criminal prosecution. Id. at 279-80. Like Bialek, the

defendant argued that the administrative mechanism was the sole means by which

he could be indicted; absent action by the Department of Agriculture, he

maintained, the government had no basis upon which to prosecute.

Employing a rationale equally applicable here, the Court rejected this

argument. It found no indication that Congress intended the law to “hamper

district attorneys, curtail the powers of grand juries, or make them, with evidence

in hand, halt in their investigation and await the action of the Department.” Id. at

282. The Court reasoned, “[t]o graft such an exception upon the criminal law

would require a clear and unambiguous expression of the legislative will.” Id.

Following Morgan, our inquiry begins with the plain language of the

statute. See also Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002).

Section 437g(a)(5)(C), like the rest of FECA, speaks only to the power of the

FEC. It requires a vote of four commissioners before the FEC may refer a matter

for criminal prosecution, but this provision, by its clear terms, restricts only the

FEC. Nowhere in FECA do we find a single phrase limiting the Attorney

General’s powers. If Congress wished all campaign finance litigation, both civil

and criminal, to originate with the FEC, only a few lines of statutory text would

have been required. Instead, Congress explicitly granted the FEC only “exclusive

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jurisdiction with respect to civil enforcement” of FECA’s provisions.

§ 437c(b)(1) (emphasis added). The obvious implication, uncontroverted by any

words in the statute, is that the FEC and Attorney General retain concurrent

jurisdiction to investigate criminal matters. 4

One other court of appeals has considered—and rejected—the arguments

that Bialek presents. In United States v. International Union of Operating

Engineers, Local 701, 638 F.2d 1161 (9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit concluded

that the Attorney General can initiate criminal investigations independently of the

FEC. The court opined that “nothing in [FECA] suggests, much less clearly and

ambiguously states, that action by the Department of Justice to prosecute a

violation of the Act is conditioned upon prior consideration of the alleged

violation by the FEC,” and that “it would strain the language to imply such a

condition.” 5 Id. at 1163. Several district courts have reached the same result.

4
Bialek notes that the 1976 amendments consolidated all FECA provisions
in Title 2 of the United States Code, whereas previously some criminal provisions
had been grouped under Title 18. He asks us to infer from this change that
criminal enforcement authority has been shifted to the FEC, but we will not
presume that Congress intended this purely organizational change to affect the
distribution of authority between the DOJ and the FEC. See FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 738 (1978).
5
Bialek points out that in the 1979 amendments, Congress revised FECA to
explicitly require four commissioner votes for referral to the Attorney General,
whereas the Ninth Circuit considered the previous version of the Act that allowed
a majority of the Commission to refer violations without specifying a number of
votes. Compare Pub. L. No. 93-443 at 1282, and Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat.
475, 484 (1976), with Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339, 1360 (1980). But this
(continued...)

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See, e.g., Marcus v. Mukasey, Civ. No. 07-398 (D. Ariz., Mar. 10, 2008); Beam v.

Gonzales, Civ. No. 07-1227, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2008 WL 681020, at *11-12 (D.

Ill. Mar. 7, 2008); Fieger v. Gonzales, No. 07-CV-10533, 2007 WL 2351006, at

*5-7 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2007); United States v. Tonry, 433 F. Supp. 620, 623

(E.D. La. 1977); United States v. Jackson, 433 F. Supp. 239, 241 (W.D.N.Y.

1977).

Bialek asserts that concurrent criminal jurisdiction conflicts with other

provisions in FECA, but we disagree. For example, Bialek contends that the

FEC’s power to render advisory opinions, see 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a)(7), would be

“rendered meaningless” if the Attorney General could pursue criminal sanctions

for conduct that the Commission might, through its own investigation, condone.

Relatedly, he posits that the FEC could issue an advisory opinion endorsing

certain conduct, but that the Attorney General might prosecute this same conduct

as violating the statute. These concerns are misplaced. We have no reason to

believe that courts would not give weight to the FEC’s interpretation of its

governing statute, as reflected in an advisory opinion, even in a criminal case

initiated by the Attorney General. See In re Sealed Case, 223 F.3d 775, 779-80

5
(...continued)
change does not affect the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, and Bialek is without
support when he claims that this portion of the 1979 amendments was intended to
overrule the Ninth Circuit. In fact, the four-vote requirement was reported by the
House committee weeks before the Ninth Circuit’s decision. See Fieger v.
Gonzales, 07-10533, 2007 WL 2351006, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2007).

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(D.C. Cir. 2000). And regardless of whether a case is civil or criminal, there is

only one final arbiter of the interpretation of FECA: the federal courts. As a

result, even if interpretive disagreements between the Attorney General and the

FEC were to arise, they would be resolved in the normal course of litigation.

No more compelling are Bialek’s arguments that concurrent jurisdiction

undermines the purposes of FECA. For example, he theorizes that individuals

will assert their Fifth Amendment privilege in FEC proceedings more frequently

because they fear independent DOJ prosecutions. This, he warns, will thwart the

FEC’s efforts to resolve campaign finance disputes through voluntary agreements.

The privilege against self-incrimination, of course, “can be asserted in any

proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or

adjudicatory.” Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972). We have

some difficulty understanding why an individual’s decision to invoke the

privilege in a civil FEC proceeding would turn on whether the threat of eventual

criminal prosecution comes from the DOJ rather than the FEC itself. An

individual’s decision to invoke the privilege is always one of personal choice no

matter which agency takes the investigatory lead, and the effect of concurrent

jurisdiction on that decision would be speculative and likely inconsequential.

In support of his argument that the FEC cannot share concurrent criminal

jurisdiction with the DOJ, Bialek cites United States v. LaSalle National Bank,

437 U.S. 298 (1978). That case, however, does not speak to the issue at hand.

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LaSalle addressed 26 U.S.C. § 7602, which authorizes the Internal Revenue

Service (“IRS”) to issue investigative summonses but explicitly prohibits it from

doing so after a tax case has been referred to the Attorney General for criminal

prosecution. Id. at 311. Specifically, the Court interpreted that statute’s

additional requirement that such prereferral summonses be issued in good faith, a

condition which bars the IRS from pursuing an investigation solely for the

purpose of criminal prosecution. Id. at 313-14. FECA’s language, however,

places no analogous limitations on the FEC’s investigative powers. Nor do we

have any occasion to entertain analogous policy concerns about the concurrent

investigatory powers of the FEC and the DOJ, as the FEC does not assert the

authority to pursue an investigation into a purely criminal campaign-finance

violation concurrent with an independent DOJ prosecution. If such circumstances

were to arise, we would address them at that time. In the meantime, Bialek does

not allege that the FEC has taken any action in his case, let alone action in excess

of its broad authority.

Bialek next urges that we consider the legislative history of FECA.

Because “it is a well established law of statutory construction that, absent

ambiguity or irrational result, the literal language of a statute controls,” we

arguably have no reason to delve into the legislative history. Edwards v. Valdez,

789 F.2d 1477, 1481 (10th Cir. 1986). But even if we do consider it, that history

only serves to bolster the government’s position. For example, a House

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committee report stated that the 1976 amendments would “channel[] to the [FEC]

complaints . . . other than complaints directed to the Attorney General and

seeking the institution of a criminal proceeding.” H.R. Rep No. 94-917, at 4

(1976) (emphasis added). Likewise, Senator Cannon, who sponsored those

amendments, stated that they would “grant exclusive civil enforcement of the act

to the Commission . . . but at the same time, retain the jurisdiction of the [DOJ]

for the criminal prosecution of any violations of this act.” 94 Cong. Rec. S3860-

61 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1976) (statement of Sen. Cannon).

Bialek has plucked one contrary specimen of evidence from FECA’s long

legislative history: The 1976 floor statement of Senator Brock, an opponent of

the 1976 amendments. Brock stated that passage of the amendment would mean

that

the Justice Department is no longer able to prosecute on its
own. If an aggressive district attorney finds a clear violation
of the law, he cannot take the person into court. He must refer
the case to the [FEC]. . . . The Justice Department can take no
further action—even if it violently disagrees with the [FEC’s]
decision.

94 Cong. Rec. S6480 (daily ed. May 4, 1976) (statement of Sen. Brock).

Isolated statements such as these merit little weight. They are the

slenderest of reeds because opponents of legislation, “[i]n their zeal to defeat a

bill, . . . understandably tend to overstate its reach.” NLRB v. Fruit Vegetable

Packers Warehousemen, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964). Senator Brock’s opposition is

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the lone suggestion in thirty years of legislative debate, federal court decisions,

and federal regulations that the 1976 amendments are susceptible to the drastic

reading that Bialek urges. This statement cannot overwhelm the plain language of

the statute, let alone the other evidence of legislative intent already discussed.

Even the FEC and the DOJ themselves have long agreed that the Attorney

General maintains independent authority to investigate and prosecute campaign

finance crimes. A 1978 Memorandum of Understanding (“Memorandum”)

between the two agencies unambiguously contemplates that the DOJ will

investigate criminal campaign finance violations independently. 43 Fed. Reg.

5441 (1978). The Memorandum provides for information sharing with the FEC

where “information comes to the attention of the [DOJ] indicating a probable

violation [of FECA].” Id. In such cases, the DOJ will “continue its investigation

to prosecution” but share information with the FEC as appropriate and, if criminal

charges do not result, refer the matter to the FEC for civil investigation. Id. The

Memorandum also demonstrates that both the FEC and the DOJ have long

assumed that investigations may originate with either entity and that referrals may

be made in either direction. We need not afford formal deference to the

Memorandum to observe that the very bodies whose authority is implicated have

consistently understood that FECA means what it says, and nothing more. See CF

Indust., Inc. v. FERC, 925 F.2d 476, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

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 Bialek’s remaining arguments, based in policy, are easily dismissed. First,

he argues that our construction of the statute would allow a dissenting

commissioner, upon failing to garner the four votes necessary for formal referral

to the Attorney General, to take matters into his own hands by simply “walk[ing]

across the street” to the DOJ. 6 Yet, it is doubtful that Congress would implicitly

divest the DOJ of its authority based on a hypothetical fear of insistent FEC

commissioners. We expect that FEC commissioners, like any other government

officials, follow the law.

Bialek also maintains that Congress intended FECA’s referral provision to

be the exclusive mechanism for initiating criminal investigations because it

wished to depoliticize campaign finance investigations. We agree that it is “fair

to infer that Congress was concerned that complainants and the FEC might launch

unfounded, partisan accusations that could injure a candidate merely because they

were published.” Operating Engineers, 638 F.2d at 1164. But nothing in the

statutory history suggests, even in passing, that Congress had similar concerns

about theoretical abuses by the Attorney General. Moreover, as the Court

observed in Morgan, additional protections, both constitutional and procedural,

are available to criminal defendants but not to the targets of civil complaints.

Indeed, Morgan explicitly rejected the argument—renewed by Bialek—that

6
We take judicial notice of the fact that the FEC is actually a full block
away from the main DOJ building. See United States v. Rio Grande Dam &
Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 698 (1899).

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Congress intended the referral mechanism to prevent malicious prosecution. 222

U.S. at 282. In a criminal prosecution for statutory violations by the Attorney

General, defendants retain the “chosen instruments of the law to protect the

citizen against unfounded prosecutions,” such as the requirement that witnesses

testify under oath before a grand jury. Id. As in Morgan, nothing in the nature of

the offense, “or in the language of the statute, . . . indicates that Congress

intended . . . to confer upon [violators of the act] a privilege not given every other

person charged with a crime.” Id. If Congress thought that the usual protections

would be insufficient in criminal campaign finance cases, it easily could have

drafted statutory language to that effect. 7 Finding no such language in the Act or

its amendments, we conclude that Bialek’s interpretation of the statute is

meritless. 8

7
Instead, Congress rejected explicit language to that effect: A Senate draft
version of the 1974 Amendments would have given the FEC the exclusive
criminal referral powers that Bialek attempts to read into the present statute. The
draft provided that FECA violations would be prosecuted by the Attorney General
only with the consent of the FEC. S. 3044, 93d Cong. § 207(a) (1974). In
conference, however, this language was removed, and the Conference Report
specifically noted that “[t]he primary jurisdiction of the [FEC] to enforce the
provisions of the Act is not intended to interfere with the activities of the
Attorney General or [DOJ] personnel in performing their duties . . . .” H.R. Rep.
No. 93-1438, at 22 (1974). It is clear from these changes that Congress
considered and rejected giving exclusive criminal jurisdiction to the FEC. See
also Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263, 1280 (1974) (enacted amendments,
excluding the proposed § 309(d)).
8
Because we affirm the district court for the reasons stated, we do not
address the FEC’s alternate argument that Bialek has failed to state a claim
(continued...)

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 III

For the reasons explained, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

8
(...continued)
against the Chairman, or the Attorney General’s alternate argument that equitable
principles prohibit Bialek from collaterally attacking a criminal investigation.

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