FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 16, 2008
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
PUBLISH Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
B. WILLIS, C.P.A., INC., an
Oklahoma corporation,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
BNSF RAILWAY CORPORATION, a No. 06-5015
foreign corporation; UNION PACIFIC
RAILROAD COMPANY, a foreign
corporation; PUBLIC SERVICE
COMPANY OF OKLAHOMA, an
Oklahoma corporation,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. 04-CV-163-TCK)
William T. Dickson, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant B. Willis, C.P.A.,
Inc.
Stratton Taylor, Taylor, Burrage, Foster, Mallett, Downs & Ramsey, Claremore,
Oklahoma (Hugh D. Rice and William P. Tunnell, Rainey, Ross, Rice & Binns,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Mark H. Ramsey and Clinton D. Russell, Taylor,
Burrage, Foster, Mallett, Downs & Ramsey, Tulsa, Oklahoma; and Robert D.
Hart, Gibbs, Armstrong, Borochoff, Mullican & Hart, Tulsa, Oklahoma, with him
on the briefs), for Defendants-Appellees BNSF Railway Corporation, Union
Pacific Railroad Company and Public Service Company of Oklahoma.
Before TACHA, EBEL and KANE, * Circuit Judges.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
In 1992, Defendant-Appellee Public Service Company of Oklahoma
(“PSO”) used the eminent domain authority granted to it under Oklahoma law to
condemn an easement across property owned by Plaintiff-Appellant B. Willis,
C.P.A., Inc. (“Willis”). Willis, in turn, invoked remedies available under
Oklahoma law, first to challenge, before a state court judge, the necessity for PSO
to condemn this easement for a public use; and second to challenge, in a jury trial,
the amount of compensation awarded Willis for the easement. Pursuant to
Oklahoma law, PSO took possession of the easement while Willis’ challenges to
the condemnation proceedings were ongoing and, since 1995, has operated a rail
line across Willis’ property.
Willis commenced this federal litigation while those state proceedings
remained pending, asserting federal and state law claims in this federal action that
challenged aspects of the state condemnation case. The district court dismissed
these claims, concluding that prior federal proceedings precluded one of Willis’
claims and that Willis’ other claims would not be ripe for adjudication as long as
*
Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior District Judge of the District of
Colorado, sitting by designation.
2
the state court condemnation action remained ongoing. While the district court’s
decision was before this court on appeal, however, the state courts finally
resolved Willis’ challenge to the necessity of PSO’s condemning the easement,
concluding that PSO had established a public necessity sufficient to warrant
condemnation of the easement.
Because this decision conclusively resolved the material issues presented
by most of Willis’ claims asserted in this federal action, Oklahoma issue
preclusion principles preclude Willis from pursuing all but portions of two of its
claims. The two exceptions are 1) aspects of Willis’ due process/equal protection
claim, to the extent that Willis alleges PSO acted in concert with the state trial
judge to deprive Willis of an initial hearing and discovery to challenge the public
necessity of the easement; and 2) Willis’ trespass claim, to the extent that claim
alleges that PSO removed limestone and coal from below the surface of the
easement.
We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of all but these aspects of Willis’
due process/equal protection and trespass claims, but we REMAND those
precluded claims with directions that the district court dismiss them with
prejudice. As to those portions of Willis’ due process/equal protection and
trespass claims that are not precluded, because the state proceedings challenging
the amount of compensation awarded for the easement are still pending, those
claims are not yet ripe for adjudication. We, therefore, AFFIRM the dismissal of
3
those claims, but REMAND them to the district court to clarify that their
dismissal is without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Prior litigation between the parties
Willis 1 owns property in Oolagah, Rogers County, Oklahoma. PSO
operates a power plant nearby. Defendant Union Pacific owns a rail line that runs
adjacent to this power plant.
To fuel its plant, PSO purchases coal from the Powder River Basin in
Wyoming and contracts with Defendant BNSF Railway Corporation (“BNSF”) to
transport the coal to the Oolagah plant. Because BNSF did not own or operate a
rail line adjacent to the plant, however, it had to subcontract with Union Pacific to
complete delivery. PSO believed that it could obtain much better shipping terms
if BNSF also had a rail line running to the power plant, because then the two
railroads would have to compete for PSO’s shipping business. Therefore, PSO
sought to build a rail line, approximately ten miles long, connecting the power
plant to an already-existing BNSF line. That new line ran through Willis’
property.
When Willis refused to grant PSO an easement across its property to build
and operate this rail line, PSO, in October 1992, began proceedings to condemn
1
Willis is “a professional corporation whose sole stockholder is Buck Willis
CPA.” Aplt. Br. at 1. Throughout this opinion, we refer to the corporate entity,
rather than the individual.
4
the easement under Oklahoma’s eminent domain provisions. The Oklahoma
Constitution permits the condemnation of private property for a public use. See
Okla. Const. art. 2, § 24. 3 And Okla. Stat. tit. 27, § 7 expressly gives a power
company, such as PSO, “the right of eminent domain in the same manner and by
like proceedings as provided for railroad corporations” under Oklahoma law. 4
3
The Oklahoma Constitution, art. 2, § 24, provides, in pertinent part:
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without
just compensation. . . . Such compensation shall be ascertained by a
board of commissioners of not less than three freeholders, in such
manner as may be prescribed by law. . . . The commissioners shall not
be appointed by any judge or court without reasonable notice having
been served upon all parties in interest. The commissioners shall be
selected from the regular jury list of names prepared and made as the
Legislature shall provide. Any party aggrieved shall have the right of
appeal, without bond, and trial by jury in a court of record. Until the
compensation shall be paid to the owner, or into court for the owner, the
property shall not be disturbed, or the proprietary rights of the owner
divested. When possession is taken of property condemned for any
public use, the owner shall be entitled to the immediate receipt of the
compensation awarded, without prejudice to the right of either party to
prosecute further proceedings for the judicial determination of the
sufficiency or insufficiency of such compensation. The fee of land
taken by common carriers for right of way, without the consent of the
owner, shall remain in such owner subject only to the use for which it
is taken. In all cases of condemnation of private property for public or
private use, the determination of the use shall be a judicial question.
4
Oklahoma Statutes tit. 27, § 7 provides, in full:
Any person, firm or corporation organized under the laws of this state,
or authorized to do business in this state, to furnish light, heat or power
by electricity or gas, or any other person, association or firm engaged
in furnishing lights, heat or power by electricity or gas shall have and
exercise the right of eminent domain in the same manner and by like
(continued...)
5
Oklahoma law further sets forth specific procedures, see Okla. Stat. tit. 66,
§§ 51-66, by which a railroad or power company can condemn private property
for “a lawful public use.” Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla. v. B. Willis, C.P.A., Inc., 941
P.2d 995, 999 (Okla. 1997) (citing Okla. Const. art. 2, §§ 23, 24).
Acting pursuant to these eminent domain procedures, PSO filed a petition
in a Rogers County state court to condemn the easement across Willis’ property.
The state court then appointed a three-member commission, which determined
“just compensation” PSO should pay Willis for the easement. Okla. Stat. tit. 66,
§ 53(A), (C); 5 see also City of Stigler v. Crumley, 99 P.3d 253, 254 (Okla. Civ.
4
(...continued)
proceedings as provided for railroad corporations by laws of this state.
5
Oklahoma Statutes tit. 66, § 53 provides, in pertinent part:
A. If the owner of any real property or interest therein, over which any
railroad corporation, incorporated under the laws of this state, may
desire to locate its road, shall refuse to grant the right-of-way through
and over his premises, the district judge of the county in which said real
property may be situated shall, upon application or petition of either
party, and after ten (10) days’ notice to the opposite party, direct the
sheriff of said county to summon three disinterested freeholders, to be
selected by said judge as commissioners, and who shall not be
interested in a like question.
....
C. The commissioners shall be sworn to perform their duties
impartially and justly; and they shall inspect said real property and
consider the injury which said owner may sustain by reason of the
condemnation and they shall assess the just compensation to which said
owner is entitled; and they shall forthwith make report in writing to the
(continued...)
6
App. 2004). Willis objected, not only to the amount of compensation the
three-member commission awarded, but to the validity of the condemnation itself,
asserting that PSO was not taking the easement for a public use. 6 See Willis, 941
P.2d at 997.
Notwithstanding Willis’ objection challenging the public need for PSO to
5
(...continued)
clerk of the court, setting forth the quantity, boundaries, and just
compensation for the property taken, and amount of injury done to the
property, either directly or indirectly, which they assess to the owner;
which report must be filed and recorded by the clerk. A certified copy
of the report may be transmitted to the county clerk of the county where
the land lies, to be by him filed and recorded, without further
acknowledgment or proof, in the manner and with like force and effect
as is provided for the recording of deeds. And if said corporation shall,
at any time before it enters upon said real property for the purpose of
constructing said road, pay to said clerk for the use of said owner the
sum so assessed and reported to him as aforesaid, it shall thereby be
authorized to construct and maintain its road over and across said
premises.
6
With this objection, Willis preserved its right to have a court determine
whether or not the easement PSO sought was for a public use. See Bd. of County
Comm’rs v. Casteel, 522 P.2d 608, 611 (Okla. 1974) (noting that only a timely
filed objection to the commissioners’ report will preserve a challenge to the
necessity of the taking); see also Calhoun v. City of Durant, 970 P.2d 608, 610-11
(Okla. Civ. App. 1997). In addition, Willis requested a jury determination of the
adequacy of the compensation the three-member commission awarded Willis for
the easement, see Willis, 941 P.2d at 997, which was provided for by law, see
Okla. Const. art. 2, § 24; Okla. Stat. tit. 66, § 55(A). See generally Casteel, 522
P.2d at 611 (noting that only a jury demand preserves a challenge to the amount
of compensation awarded); Calhoun, 970 P.2d at 610-11 (noting that issue of
damages in a condemnation action is a jury question, while determination of the
character of the use served is a matter for the court); Williams v. State ex rel.
Dep’t of Transp., 998 P.2d 1245, 1252-53 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000) (noting that
only a jury demand preserves a challenge to the amount of compensation
awarded).
7
take an easement across Willis’ property, the state trial court denied Willis
discovery on this issue and, without conducting an evidentiary hearing, held “that
[PSO’s] simple allegation of necessity in the [condemnation] petition was
sufficient to sustain PSO’s case” for condemning the easement; that is, because
PSO had statutory authority to condemn property under Okla. Stat. tit. 27, § 7,
Willis had no right to contest PSO’s taking the easement across Willis’ property.
Willis, 941 P.2d at 997-98. Willis appealed that determination. See id. at 998.
Despite Willis’ pending appeal, Okla. Stat. tit. 66, § 56 permitted PSO to
take possession of the easement by paying the court clerk, on Willis’ behalf, the
amount of compensation the appointed three-member commission had awarded
Willis. 7 See Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla. v. B. Willis, C.P.A., Inc., 155 P.3d 845,
7
Okla. Stat. tit. 66, § 56 provides, in pertinent part, that
[e]ither party aggrieved [in a condemnation proceeding in the state trial
or district court] may appeal from the decision of the district court to
the Supreme Court; but such review or appeal shall not delay the
prosecution of the work on such railroad over the premises in question,
if such corporation shall first have paid to the owner of said real
property, or deposited with the said clerk for said owner, the amount so
assessed by said commissioners or district court . . . .
See also Okla. Const. art. 2, § 24 (“When possession is taken of property condemned
for any public use, the owner shall be entitled to the immediate receipt of the
compensation awarded, without prejudice to the right of either party to prosecute
further proceedings for the judicial determination of the sufficiency or insufficiency
of such compensation.”). See generally Richardson v. State ex rel. Okla. Dep’t of
Transp., 818 P.2d 1257, 1258 (Okla. Civ. App. 1991) (noting “[t]he power of
eminent domain is a special proceeding created as a necessary attribute of
sovereignty to facilitate the emergency acquisition of private property for public
(continued...)
8
848-49 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 66 (2007). PSO then built
a railroad track and bridge across approximately 1,069 feet of Willis’ property.
After completing construction of the track, PSO entered into an “Industrial Track
and Operating Agreement” with BNSF in March 1995. Under that agreement,
BNSF maintains this rail line and runs coal trains across it to PSO’s power plant.
Even though the rail line had already been built, Willis’ state appeal
continued. In March 1995, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held that the
allegation of necessity PSO made in its condemnation petition was sufficient to
state a prima facie case for PSO’s taking the easement across Willis’ property, but
that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying Willis discovery to
support its effort to rebut PSO’s prima facie condemnation case. See Willis, 941
P.2d at 998. Not obtaining all the relief it sought, Willis appealed this decision to
the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
While Willis pursued that appeal, it also returned to the state trial court to
challenge PSO’s and BNSF’s continued use of the easement, asserting that PSO
had no legal right yet to the easement across Willis’ property. Willis, therefore,
demanded that PSO and BNSF immediately abandon the easement and stop
running coal trains across Willis’ land. The state trial court rejected Willis’
7
(...continued)
use,” and further noting that “[b]ecause of the urgent necessity underlying
condemnation proceedings, statutes defining the procedure are subject to fairly short
time constraints”).
9
position and, instead, issued a temporary injunction enjoining Willis from
interfering with PSO’s and BNSF’s continued use of the easement while the
Oklahoma Supreme Court considered Willis’ appeal.
In 1997, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided Willis’ appeal, vacating the
decision of the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals and remanding the
condemnation action to the state trial court for further proceedings. See id. at
997. In doing so, the Oklahoma Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Civil
Appeals and held instead that PSO’s
mere filing of a [condemnation] petition does not establish a prima facie
case [for condemnation]. It is well-settled that the condemnor has the
initial burden of proof on the issues in a condemnation proceeding and
meets that burden to the extent of making a prima facie case of
necessity by introduction into evidence of a resolution of necessity from
the condemning authority [PSO], whereupon the burden of proof shifts
to condemnee [Willis] to show that the taking is not necessary.
Id. at 999. The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that, in this case, because
PSO had “never attempted to have its resolution [of necessity] admitted into
evidence by the trial court,” PSO had never met its “initial burden” in the
condemnation proceeding. Id.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court further held that, on remand, once PSO
meets its initial burden, Oklahoma
law provides a landowner such as Willis with the right and opportunity
to contest the condemnor’s right to take his property. There is a right
to a hearing on all aspects of the plaintiff’s right to condemnation upon
timely and proper exceptions to the report of commissioners which
challenge the condemnor’s right to take the intended particular
10
property. Before an entity having eminent domain authority can
appropriate private land to its use, all the steps legally requisite must
have been taken.
Id. at 999-1000. In light of Willis’ right to a hearing, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court determined that the state trial court had erred by denying Willis “an
opportunity to challenge PSO’s asserted but unproven right to take [Willis’]
property as well as the right to conduct discovery” on that issue. Id. at 1000.
Following the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision remanding the eminent
domain proceeding to the state trial court, Willis again argued to the trial court
that PSO’s and BNSF’s continued use of the easement during the ongoing eminent
domain proceeding was no longer lawful because PSO had never met its initial
burden of showing that its exercise of eminent domain in this case was lawful.
Willis thus again demanded that PSO and BNSF immediately abandon the rail line
running across Willis’ property. Willis also requested that the trial court vacate
the injunction the court had previously entered enjoining Willis from interfering
with the operation of the coal trains across the easement during the state
condemnation proceedings. The state trial court, however, again rejected Willis’
argument and instead left the previously issued injunction “in place pending the
outcome of a hearing on [Willis’] objections” to PSO’s taking Willis’ property.
This meant that PSO and BNSF could continue to operate coal trains on the rail
line crossing Willis’ property while the state trial court further considered PSO’s
petition seeking condemnation of the easement.
11
Willis pursued an interlocutory appeal of that decision. But the Oklahoma
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision to leave the injunction in place,
concluding that, although “[a]fter issuance of [the] mandate in the prior appeal
[decided by the Oklahoma Supreme Court], the trial court was required to give
[Willis] a[] meaningful[] evidentiary hearing on the issues of necessity and public
use, . . . [i]t was not require[d] to undo all that had transpired before then.” “The
first appeal resolved only [Willis’] right to an evidentiary hearing, and the
question whether PSO established a prima facie case of necessity by alleging
necessity in its original petition.” The Oklahoma Supreme Court denied Willis’
petition for a writ of certiorari challenging that decision of the Oklahoma Court of
Civil Appeals.
Despite the fact that the state condemnation proceedings remained ongoing,
Willis instituted two actions in the federal district court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma collaterally challenging those state court proceedings. 8 Underlying
the claims Willis asserted in those federal actions was Willis’ continued belief,
already rejected by the state courts, that PSO and BNSF were not entitled to use
the easement over Willis’ property while the state condemnation action remained
unsettled.
8
Willis initiated these federal actions after the first Oklahoma Court of
Civil Appeals’ decision, and while Willis’ appeal from that decision was pending
before the Oklahoma Supreme Court. But the federal courts did not finally
resolve Willis’ federal actions until after the Oklahoma Supreme Court remanded
the eminent domain proceedings to the state trial court for further proceedings.
12
In the first of these federal actions, 9 Willis asserted claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, as well as an Oklahoma state law trespass claim, alleging Willis “was
constitutionally entitled to a final judicial determination on condemnation before
PSO could take possession of the easement over [Willis’] property.” B. Willis,
C.P.A., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla., No. 97-5107, 1999 WL 335207, at *2
(10th Cir. May 27, 1999) (unpublished) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
1003 (1999). The district court denied Willis relief. See id.
On appeal from that decision, this court rejected on the merits Willis’ facial
constitutional challenge to the Oklahoma condemnation scheme, upholding the
aspect of that scheme that permitted the condemnor to take possession of the
property sought to be condemned before the condemnation proceedings were
finally resolved. See id. at *2-*3. This court also rejected Willis’ claim that the
state trial court’s enjoining Willis from interfering with PSO’s and BNSF’s
continued use of the easement violated Willis’ First Amendment freedom of
speech. 10 See id. at *4.
9
This first federal action was actually the product of two separate lawsuits
Willis filed in federal court, which the federal court consolidated into one action.
10
In asserting this First Amendment claim, Willis was “primarily concerned
with a contempt proceeding brought to enforce the injunction” precluding Willis
from interfering with PSO’s and BNSF’s possession of the easement, after Willis
sent a letter to BNSF informing the railroad that, in light of the Oklahoma
Supreme Court’s decision in that state condemnation action, Willis intended to
restore its fence line around the disputed easement and post “No Trespassing”
signs. Willis, 1999 WL 335207, at *4.
13
This court, however, dismissed without prejudice Willis’ claims against
BNSF for trespass and Willis’ constitutional claims alleging the Oklahoma
eminent domain proceedings denied Willis just compensation, due process, and
equal protection of the law. See id. at *2, *4. We concluded those claims would
not be ripe for adjudication until the state condemnation proceeding was
concluded. Id. at *2.
In the second of these federal actions, Willis similarly asserted, among
other claims, that the state trial judge and PSO had violated Willis’ First
Amendment right to free speech when the court, in 1997, held Willis in contempt
for violating the injunction precluding Willis from interfering with PSO’s use of
the easement while the state condemnation proceedings remained ongoing. See B.
Willis, C.P.A., Inc. v. Goodpaster, 183 F.3d 1231, 1233-34 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1046 (1999). The contempt citation resulted when, after the
Oklahoma Supreme Court remanded the condemnation proceedings to the state
trial court, Willis’ attorney wrote PSO and BNSF and demanded that they cease
running trains across Willis’ property until the second condemnation hearing was
completed. See id. at 1233. This court affirmed the district court’s decision
rejecting Willis’ First Amendment claim on the merits. See id. at 1233-35.
Having failed to obtain relief in these two federal actions, Willis next filed
a petition with the federal Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) in February
2001, seeking a declaration that the rail line PSO had already constructed across
14
Willis’ property was subject to the STB’s exclusive jurisdiction. See B. Willis,
C.P.A., Inc., No. 34013, 2001 WL 211240, at *1 (S.T.B. Mar. 5, 2001)
(unpublished). If it was, then it was Willis’ contention that PSO had unlawfully
constructed that line without first obtaining the required certificate of public
convenience and necessity from the STB. See B. Willis, C.P.A., Inc., No. 34013,
2001 WL 1168090, at *1-*2 (S.T.B. Oct. 1, 2001) (unpublished). In that federal
administrative proceeding, however, the STB determined that the rail line running
across Willis’ property was a private rail line, over which the STB did not have
jurisdiction. See id. at *2-*3. The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
affirmed the STB’s determination, see B. Willis, C.P.A., Inc. v. Surface Transp.
Bd., 51 Fed. App’x 321 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 26, 2002) (per curiam) (unpublished), and
the United States Supreme Court denied Willis’ petition for a writ of certiorari,
see 540 U.S. 811 (2003). During all of these federal proceedings, the state
condemnation action remained ongoing.
B. This litigation
The specific federal litigation underlying this appeal stems from two
consolidated cases Willis commenced after failing to obtain any relief in his
previous three federal actions. In the first such case underlying this appeal,
Willis sued BNSF in Oklahoma state court in February 2004, asserting state law
tort and contract claims. Willis based those claims on Willis’ continued belief
that BNSF was wrongfully possessing the easement across Willis’ property, in
15
light of the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s earlier decision to remand the state
eminent domain action to the state trial court for discovery and a hearing. 11
BNSF removed this litigation to federal court pursuant to the federal court’s
diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
In August 2004, Willis commenced another action in federal court, this
time asserting a claim under the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination
Act (“ICCTA”) 12 against BNSF, Union Pacific, and PSO, and claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state law tort and property claims, against PSO and
BNSF, again claiming their continued use of the easement across Willis’ property
was wrongful. 13 The district court consolidated these two actions.
11
In this federal action, Willis specifically alleged that BNSF 1) was
wrongfully possessing and using Willis’ land; 2) had been unjustly enriched as a
result; 3) should be bound, based upon quasi-contract principles, to a licensing
agreement (which BNSF had wrongly rejected) by which Willis would have
agreed to permit BNSF to continue to use the easement while the eminent domain
proceedings continued; and 4) was liable to Willis for punitive damages because
BNSF’s possession of Willis’ property was “done deliberately, wantonly,
intentionally and maliciously with full knowledge that there was no easement or
right of way across Willis’ property.”
12
The ICCTA is “codified generally at Title 49.” Sompo Japan Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 456 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 2006).
13
In this action, Willis alleged that 1) the ICCTA has preempted
Oklahoma’s eminent domain statutes, as those statutes have been applied to
Willis; 2) the condemnation of Willis’ property by PSO and BNSF deprived
Willis of due process because it was not effected for a public purpose; 3) the
condemnation by PSO and BNSF also deprived Willis of equal protection of the
law; 4) PSO was trespassing, under Oklahoma law, by going beyond the surface
easement it had in Willis’ property when PSO removed coal and limestone from
(continued...)
16
In June 2005, the district court dismissed all of Willis’ state law and
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), concluding those claims
would not be ripe for adjudication as long as the state condemnation proceeding
remained pending. Later, in January 2006, the district court granted BNSF, PSO
and Union Pacific summary judgment on the remaining ICCTA claim, concluding
that the earlier federal proceedings before the STB precluded Willis from
reasserting that claim in these proceedings. Willis now appeals both district court
decisions.
C. Determination, in the state condemnation proceeding, that PSO had
established the existence of a public use warranting condemnation of
the easement
The state condemnation proceeding has remained ongoing during all of this
federal litigation. In October 2004, seven years after the Oklahoma Supreme
Court remanded the condemnation case for further proceedings, the state trial
court conducted a hearing, after which the court concluded that PSO had
sufficiently established that its condemnation of Willis’ property was for a public
use or necessity. See Willis, 155 P.3d at 847. On September 19, 2006, the
13
(...continued)
below the surface of Willis’ property; 5) title to the easement should be quieted in
Willis; 6) PSO and BNSF should be ejected from Willis’ property; 7) PSO and
BNSF are liable to Willis for treble damages under Oklahoma law because they
trespassed and wrongfully possessed Willis’ property “by means of a state
eminent domain proceeding that was rife with fraud, bad faith and oppressive
conduct”; and 8) PSO and BNSF are liable to Willis for punitive damages because
they violated Willis’ rights to due process and equal protection “deliberately,
wantonly, intentionally and maliciously.”
17
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. See id. at 852. While the instant
appeal was pending before this court, the Oklahoma Supreme Court denied
Willis’ petition for a writ of certiorari and the United States Supreme Court did
the same. See Willis v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla., 128 S. Ct. 66 (2007). Those
state proceedings finally determined not only that PSO had established a public
necessity justifying its condemnation of an easement across Willis’ property, but
also that PSO’s and BNSF’s possession of the easement during the state
condemnation proceedings was lawful. 14 See Brink v. Bartlett, 294 P. 106, 107
(Okla. 1930) (noting judgment became final after United States Supreme Court
denied a petition for a writ of certiorari); cf. Walker v. Telex Corp., 583 P.2d 482,
484 (Okla. 1978) (noting court of appeals’ decision became final after petitioner
withdrew petition for certiorari filed with Oklahoma Supreme Court).
II. APPELLATE JURISDICTION
As a threshold matter, Defendants have filed with this court a motion to
dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 15 We disagree. This court
14
In January 2008, the state trial court held a jury trial on the issue of
whether the three-member commission awarded Willis adequate compensation for
the easement. In that proceeding, the jury awarded Willis less compensation than
did the three-member commission. Willis has appealed that decision and so the
compensation matter has not been finally resolved.
15
Willis asserts that Defendants filed their motion to dismiss the appeal out
of time. 10th Cir. R. 27.2(A)(3) requires a party, “[i]f possible,” to file a motion
to dismiss an appeal “within 15 days after the notice of appeal is filed.”
Defendants instead filed their motion to dismiss two months after Willis filed its
(continued...)
18
has jurisdiction to consider this appeal from the district court’s final judgment
entered in this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Willis did file its notice of appeal prematurely. The district court
dismissed most of Willis’ claims on June 23, 2005, leaving only Willis’ ICCTA
preemption claim still pending against all three Defendants. BNSF and PSO, but
not Union Pacific, moved for summary judgment on that remaining claim. On
January 3, 2006, the district court granted those two defendants summary
judgment.
On January 17, 2006, Willis filed its notice of appeal. But the district court
had not yet entered a final, appealable order because Willis’ ICCTA claim
remained pending against Union Pacific. See Jackson v. Volvo Trucks N. Am.,
Inc., 462 F.3d 1234, 1238 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that “a judgment . . . that does
not dispose of all claims is not considered a final appealable decision under [28
U.S.C.] § 1291”).
On January 27, 2006, Union Pacific requested summary judgment on that
remaining claim. The district court granted the motion on January 31, 2006, and
on that same day entered judgment “terminating this matter.”
The district court’s final decision, on January 31, 2006, ripened Willis’
15
(...continued)
notice of appeal. Nevertheless, “we may not ignore the jurisdictional issue raised
in the motion [to dismiss]. This court has an independent obligation to determine
its . . . jurisdiction.” Perales-Cumpean v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 977, 981 n.3 (10th
Cir. 2005).
19
prematurely filed notice of appeal. “[A]n otherwise nonfinal decision becomes
final and appealable if the district court adjudicates all remaining claims against
all remaining parties before the appellate court acts to dismiss the appeal on the
merits for lack of jurisdiction.” Harbert v. Healthcare Servs. Group, Inc., 391
F.3d 1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Lewis v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 850 F.2d
641, 645 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc)); see also Jackson, 462 F.3d at 1238; Ashley
Creek Phosphate Co. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 315 F.3d 1245, 1263 (10th Cir.
2003). This court, therefore, has jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the
district court’s January 3, 2006, order, which was the decision named in the
prematurely filed notice of appeal. See Harbert, 391 F.3d at 1144-45, 1146. And,
because the premature notice of appeal referred to both the January 3, 2006
decision, “as well as the prior orders of the Court that did not dispose of all of the
claims brought by Plaintiff,” this court also has jurisdiction to review the district
court’s earlier decision dismissing most of Willis’ claims as unripe. Cf. Breeden
v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 115 F.3d 749, 752 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding premature
notice of appeal that, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4), ripened after trial court
denied Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion, was sufficient to give court of appeals
jurisdiction to consider “any orders specified in the original notice”).
Willis’ prematurely filed notice of appeal, however, was not sufficient to
give this court jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the district court’s final
judgment, dated January 31, 2006. See Nolan v. U. S. Dep’t of Justice, 973 F.2d
20
843, 846 (10th Cir. 1992). To preserve that decision for appeal, Willis needed to
file another notice of appeal. See Ashley Creek Phosphate Co., 315 F.3d at 1263;
EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir. 1999). Willis
failed to do so. Nevertheless, this court can treat Willis’ amended docketing
statement, filed with this court on February 9, 2006, after the district court’s final
decision, as the “functional equivalent” of a second notice of appeal. See Smith
v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 245, 248-49 (1992) (treating a pro se litigant’s appellate
brief as the “functional equivalent” of a timely filed notice of appeal); see also
Haney v. Addison, 175 F.3d 1217, 1219 (10th Cir. 1999) (treating a pro se
litigant’s amended docketing statement as a notice of appeal, although noting that
“we strongly discourage this practice”); Grimsley v. MacKay, 93 F.3d 676, 678
(10th Cir. 1996) (permitting docketing statement filed in counselled case to
correct notice of appeal’s failure to name party appealing, as required by Fed. R.
App. P. 3); cf. Berrey v. Asarco Inc., 439 F.3d 636, 641-42 (10th Cir. 2006)
(deeming counselled litigant’s “motion to certify district court’s order” to be
functional equivalent of timely filed notice of appeal).
This court can do so, however, only if Willis’ amended docketing statement
gives the proper notice required under Fed. R. App. P. 3: “Notices ‘shall specify
the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment, order or part
thereof appealed from; and shall name the court to which the appeal is taken.’”
Smith, 502 U.S. at 248 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 3(c)); see also Berrey, 439 F.3d at
21
642. Willis’ amended docketing statement meets all three of these requirements.
It specifically refers to the district court’s January 31, 2006 decision; identifies
Willis as the appealing party; and names this court as the court to which Willis is
appealing.
Furthermore, Willis filed that document in a timely manner, within thirty
days of the district court’s January 31, 2006 decision. See Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(1)(A); see also Berrey, 439 F.3d at 641. In light of that, Willis’ amended
docketing statement was sufficient to give this court jurisdiction to consider
Willis’ appeal from the district court’s January 31, 2006 decision granting Union
Pacific summary judgment on the ICCTA claim. This court, therefore, has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to consider on appeal all of the district
court’s decisions entered in this case. 16
16
Although the district court dismissed most of Willis’ claims because they
were not yet ripe for adjudication, the district court did not specify whether that
dismissal was with or without prejudice. Presumably, the court dismissed the
claims without prejudice in order to permit Willis to reassert those claims after
the state condemnation proceedings concluded and the claims thereby ripened.
See Graham v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 501 F.3d 1153, 1154, 1161,
1163 (10th Cir. 2007) (directing district court to dismiss without prejudice claim
for attorneys’ fees that was not yet ripe for adjudication), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
1650 (2008).
This circuit has recognized that in some circumstances, a dismissal without
prejudice will not be a final, appealable decision. See Moya v. Schollenbarger,
465 F.3d 444, 448 (10th Cir. 2006). However, the fact that the district court’s
“dismissal was without prejudice does not necessarily make it non-final under
section 1291.” Id. “Rather, in this circuit, whether an order of dismissal is
appealable generally depends on whether the district court dismissed the
(continued...)
22
III. DISCUSSION
Satisfied that this court has jurisdiction, we turn to the merits of Willis’
appeal. The district court dismissed most of Willis’ claims because they were not
16
(...continued)
complaint or the action. A dismissal of the complaint is ordinarily a non-final,
nonappealable order (since amendment would generally be available), while a
dismissal of the entire action is ordinarily final.” Id. at 448-49 (quotation
omitted). In applying this rule, however, this court takes a practical approach and
does not rely upon the precise language that the district court used in its dismissal
order, but instead “look[s] to the substance and objective intent of the district
court’s order.” Id. at 449. This court has recognized that where the district court
dismisses because of a defect that “cannot be cured through an amendment to the
complaint, that dismissal . . . is for practical purposes” a dismissal of the entire
action and is therefore final and appealable. Id. at 450-51. If the district court’s
decision is ambiguous, this court also looks to “whether the district court’s order
evidences an intent to extinguish the plaintiff’s cause of action and whether the
plaintiff has been effectively excluded from federal court under the present
circumstances. If so, then our appellate jurisdiction is proper.” Id. at 450
(quotations, citations, alterations omitted); see also id. at 451.
That is the case here. The district court’s decision clearly indicated that the
district court ultimately intended “to extinguish” Willis’ action, excluding Willis
“from federal court under the present circumstances.” Id. at 450 (quotation
omitted). And Willis could not have saved its claims by merely amending its
complaints. Presuming that the district court dismissed some of Willis’ claims
without prejudice, therefore, this court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to
consider this appeal from the district court’s final judgment. See Signature Props.
Int’l Ltd. P’ship v. City of Edmond, 310 F.3d 1258, 1260-61 & 1261 n.2 (10th
Cir. 2002) (holding, in case where appellate jurisdiction was based upon 28
U.S.C. § 1291, “fact that most of plaintiff’s claims were dismissed without
prejudice does not create a jurisdictional impediment,” citing cases); see also
Bateman v. City of W. Bountiful, 89 F.3d 704, 705-06 (10th Cir. 1996)
(reviewing district court’s dismissal of claims without prejudice because they
were not yet ripe for adjudication).
23
yet ripe for adjudication in light of the ongoing state condemnation proceeding. 17
That state proceeding remains ongoing as to the issue of whether the
compensation awarded Willis is adequate. But the state courts have now finally
determined that PSO established a public use that necessitated its condemning the
easement across Willis’ property and that PSO’s and BNSF’s possession and use
of the easement during the state condemnation proceeding was lawful. The state
courts’ decisions finally resolving these two issues preclude Willis from pursuing
the claims it is asserting in this federal action, with two exceptions. 18 See
Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000) (noting court’s raising res
judicata sua sponte may be appropriate in special circumstances to avoid
unnecessary judicial waste); United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 432
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting court may dismiss, sua sponte, on basis
of res judicata); Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1176 (10th Cir. 2006)
(McConnell, J., concurring in judgment) (noting court can raise preclusion on its
own motion, citing cases), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1132 (2007); 18 Charles Alan
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure
§ 4405 (2d ed. 2002) (noting it is possible that a court may raise preclusion on its
17
The district court addressed the merits of Willis’ ICCTA claim,
concluding earlier litigation precluded Willis from reasserting that claim in this
action.
18
At this court’s request, the parties filed supplemental briefs addressing the
preclusive effect the state court’s final determination of these issues had on
Willis’ claims asserted in this federal case.
24
own motion; further noting that “[p]reclusion even can be raised by an appellate
court for the first time on appeal”); see also Lowell Staats Mining Co. v.
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 878 F.2d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 1989) (noting district
court applied res judicata sua sponte). But see Jicarilla Apache Nation v. Rio
Arriba County, 440 F.3d 1202, 1208 n.3 (10th Cir. 2006) (declining to raise res
judicata sua sponte); cf. Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. McCrady, 176 P.3d 1194,
1199 n.21 (Okla. 2007) (noting that, while “it is uncommon” for appellate court to
apply preclusion principles, it “is not unheard of”). These two exceptions are
1) Willis’ due process/equal protection claim, to the extent that claim is based
upon a theory other than Willis rearguing that PSO unlawfully possessed and used
the easement during the state condemnation proceeding, and 2) Willis’ trespass
claim alleging PSO removed limestone and coal from below the surface easement.
A. Relevant legal principles
In concluding that most of Willis’ claims were not yet ripe for adjudication,
the district court relied upon Williamson County Regional Planning Commission
v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), as well as this court’s decision in Willis’
earlier appeal, Willis, 1999 WL 335207. Williamson County held that a claim
asserting an unconstitutional taking 19 or the deprivation of due process resulting
19
Such takings claims are grounded in the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition
against “‘private property be[ing] taken for public use, without just
compensation,’” which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 175 n.1 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V).
25
from a condemnation proceeding will not be ripe for adjudication until the state or
local condemnation proceedings are final. 20 See
20
In Williamson County, a land developer sued the County’s regional
planning commission, alleging that the commission’s application of zoning laws
and regulations to the developer’s property amounted to a temporary taking of
that property. See 473 U.S. at 175, 185. Without deciding whether such
allegations state a takings or a due process claim, the Supreme Court held that the
developer’s claim was not ripe for adjudication until the developer obtained a
final decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision
regulations and utilized state procedures for obtaining compensation for any
taking. See id. at 185-87, 193-94, 197, 199-200; see also Signature Props., 310
F.3d at 1264-66; SK Fin. SA v. La Plata County, Bd. of County Comm’rs, 126
F.3d 1272, 1276 (10th Cir. 1997); Bateman, 89 F.3d at 706, 708.
This court has applied Williamson County’s reasoning to conclude that, in
addition to takings claims, related constitutional claims challenging the state
condemnation proceedings will also not be ripe for adjudication until the state or
local condemnation proceedings are finally concluded. See Signature Props., 310
F.3d at 1265-68 (addressing substantive due process claim and holding “finality
requirements are the same for due process claims and for takings claims”);
Bateman, 89 F.3d at 709 (holding Williamson County’s ripeness requirement
“applies to due process and equal protection claims that rest upon the same facts
as a concomitant takings claim,” citing cases); see also Willis, 1999 WL 335207,
at *2 (applying Williamson County and concluding that Willis’ claims, which
included due process, equal protection and access-to-courts claims that “derive, in
one way or another, from the eminent domain proceeding prosecuted by PSO,”
were unripe for adjudication until the state eminent domain proceeding was
concluded).
This court has acknowledged the possibility that, “[u]nder certain
circumstances, due process rights may arise which are beyond the more
particularized claim asserted pursuant to the Just Compensation Clause.” J.B.
Ranch, Inc. v. Grand County, 958 F.2d 306, 309 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing
Landmark Land Co. of Okla., Inc. v. Buchanan, 874 F.2d 717, 723 (10th Cir.
1989), abrogated on other grounds by Fed. Lands Legal Consortium ex rel. Robart
Estate v. United States, 195 F.3d 1190, 1195-96 (10th Cir. 1999)); see also Rocky
Mountain Materials & Asphalt, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 972 F.2d 309,
310-11 (10th Cir. 1992). Under such circumstances, the due process claim may
(continued...)
26
473 U.S. at 185-86, 194-95, 197, 199-200; see also San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City
& County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 327 (2005). And “whether an
unconstitutionally improper taking occurred cannot be determined until both the
taking and compensation have been legally evaluated.” Wilkinson v. Pitkin
County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 142 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1998) (per
curiam) (emphasis added); see also San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 327 (noting that
Williamson County held that “‘takings claims are not ripe until a State fails to
provide adequate compensation for the taking,’” quoting Williamson County, 473
U.S. at 195); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 733-34
20
(...continued)
be ripe for adjudication before the state condemnation proceedings are complete.
See Rocky Mountain Materials, 195 F.3d at 1195-96; J.B. Ranch, 958 F.2d at 309.
Nevertheless, this court has held that, “where the property interest in which a
plaintiff asserts a right to procedural due process is coextensive with the asserted
takings claim,” Williamson County’s ripeness principle still applies. See Rocky
Mountain Materials, 972 F.2d at 311.
In this case, because all of Willis’ federal and state claims stem from the
Oklahoma eminent domain proceedings, Williamson County’s ripeness rule
applies, requiring Willis to conclude the state condemnation proceedings before
those claims will be ripe for adjudication in federal court. Cf. J.B. Ranch, 958
F.2d at 309-10 (holding that “[t]he facts of this case fall squarely within Fifth
Amendment [takings] analysis. We do not find anything in the record which
dictates a due process analysis above and beyond our consideration of Plaintiff’s
Just Compensation Clause claim”); Miller v. Campbell County, 945 F.2d 348, 352
(10th Cir. 1991) (holding court is “reluctant in the context of a factual situation
that falls squarely within [the Just Compensation Clause] to impose new and
potentially inconsistent obligations upon the parties under the substantive or
procedural components of the Due Process Clause. It is appropriate in this case
to subsume the more generalized Fourteenth Amendment due process protections
within the more particularized protections of the Just Compensation Clause”).
27
(1997). In this case, because the state court has not yet finally resolved the
question of just compensation for the easement, Willis’ claims challenging that
state condemnation proceeding are still not ripe for adjudication.
Even so, Williamson County will not preclude the application of relevant
preclusion principles. 21 See Wilkinson, 142 F.3d at 1323-24 (holding complying
with Williamson County’s ripeness requirement will not negate application of
preclusion principles). And here, because the state court has finally concluded
both that PSO has established a public use warranting its condemnation of an
easement across Willis’ property and that PSO’s and BNSF’s use of that easement
21
We can apply issue preclusion principles, even though Willis’ claims are
otherwise unripe for review. Cf. Wilkinson, 142 F.3d at 1320-21 & 1321 n.2,
1324 (applying res judicata to preclude federal claims stemming from County’s
denial of three land use applications for a real estate development, where
developer had previously filed three state actions challenging those decisions, and
two of those three state actions were finally resolved). “The ripeness doctrine is
drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential
reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v.
Dep’t of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003) (citing Reno v. Catholic Soc.
Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993)); see also Suitum, 520 U.S. at 733 n.7.
Where, as here, Willis asserts a “genuine case or controversy,” ripeness
implicates only prudential concerns. See Suitum, 520 U.S. at 733 n.7. Those
prudential concerns will not preclude us from applying preclusion principles in
this appeal, where the state courts have now finally resolved the legal issues
relevant to Willis’ claims asserted in this federal action. See id. at 739-40
(concluding Williamson County’s ripeness requirement did not preclude
considering takings claim on its merits, where resolution of the relevant legal
issue would not require any further action by the relevant local land use agency);
see also San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 349 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
judgment) (referring to Williamson’s requirement that litigant asserting claim in
federal court must first pursue compensation for that taking in state court “as
merely a prudential requirement,” citing Suitum).
28
during the state condemnation proceedings was lawful, those final determinations
preclude Willis from pursuing all but two of the claims it asserts in this federal
action. 22
“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, the preclusive effect of a state judgment is
governed by the rules of preclusion of that state.” 23 Valley View Angus Ranch,
22
Courts applying Williamson have recognized the anomalous result that,
once the state court proceeding is finally resolved, the litigant may not be able to
challenge the result entered in that state proceeding in federal court because of
preclusion principles. See San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 341-46 (rejecting
argument that “federal courts simply should not apply ordinary preclusion rules to
state-court judgments when a case is forced into state court by the ripeness rule of
Williamson County”); see also Wilkinson, 142 F.3d at 1323-25 (concluding,
pre-San Remo Hotel, that “the Williamson ripeness requirement is insufficient to
preclude application of res judicata and collateral estoppel principles,” citing
cases). The Supreme Court has rejected the argument “that plaintiffs have a right
to vindicate their federal claims in a federal forum.” San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S.
at 342.
[T]o the contrary, . . . issues actually decided in valid state-court
judgments may well deprive plaintiffs of the “right” to have their
federal claims relitigated in federal court. This is so even when the
plaintiff would have preferred not to litigate in state court, but was
required to do so by statute or prudential rules. The relevant question
in such cases is not whether the plaintiff has been afforded access to a
federal forum; rather, the question is whether the state court actually
decided an issue of fact or law that was necessary to its judgment.
Id. (citations omitted).
23
28 U.S.C. § 1738 provides, in pertinent part:
The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such
State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof, shall be proved or
admitted in other courts within the United States and its Territories and
Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed,
(continued...)
29
Inc. v. Duke Energy Field Servs., Inc., 497 F.3d 1096, 1100 (10th Cir. 2007)
(footnote omitted); see also Wilkinson, 142 F.3d at 1322. “As a general rule”
under Oklahoma law, “the doctrine of preclusion operates to enjoin successive
attempts to relitigate the same issue in different forums.” 24 State ex rel. Dep’t of
Transp. v. Little, 100 P.3d 707, 719 (Okla. 2004). Further, Oklahoma law
recognizes the “well established rule that where two actions involving the same
issues, between the same parties, are pending at the same time in different courts,
23
(...continued)
if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court that
the said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so
authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court
within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have
by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from
which they are taken.
24
Under Oklahoma law,
[p]reclusion doctrine consists of two precepts. Claim preclusion,
formerly known at common law as res judicata, teaches that a final
judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties from
re-litigating not only the adjudicated claim, but also any theories or
issues that were actually decided, or could have been decided, in that
action. The other preclusion doctrine, formerly known at common law
as collateral estoppel, is issue preclusion. Under this doctrine, once a
court decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, the same
parties or their privies may not relitigate that issue in a suit brought
upon a different claim. Issue preclusion prevents relitigation of facts
and issues actually litigated and necessarily determined in an earlier
proceeding between the same parties or their privies.
State ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. v. Little, 100 P.3d 707, 719 n.47 (Okla. 2004)
(citations omitted).
30
a final judgment in one will be res judicata, or a bar in the other.” Hixson v.
Cook, 379 P.2d 677, 684 (Okla. 1962). Oklahoma law specifically affords
preclusive effect to condemnation proceedings. See Okla. City v. Cooper, 420
P.2d 508, 511-12 (Okla. 1966); see also Elliott v. City of Guthrie, 725 P.2d 861,
862-63 & 863 n.7 (Okla. 1986); Graham v. City of Duncan, 354 P.2d 458, 464
(Okla. 1960); Fischer v. Okla. City, 174 P.2d 244, 246-47 (Okla. 1946).
Although “[t]he issue (collateral estoppel) and claim (res judicata)
preclusion doctrines are often used interchangeably because they are closely
related and both promote the same general public policy concerns,” Tibbetts v.
Sight ‘n Sound Appliance Ctrs., Inc., 77 P.3d 1042, 1060 n.31 (Okla. 2003)
(Opala, C.J., dissenting in part), in this case issue preclusion is the most relevant
preclusion doctrine. “In accordance with the doctrine of issue preclusion
(previously known as collateral estoppel), once a court has decided an issue of
fact or law necessary to its judgment, the same parties or their privies may not
relitigate that issue in a suit brought upon a different claim.” McCrady, 176 P.3d
at 1199 (footnote omitted). To invoke issue preclusion, “there need not be a prior
adjudication on the merits (as is often the case with res judicata) but only a final
determination of a material issue common to both cases.” 25 Id. Further, the
25
There is no question that the issues of whether PSO established a public
need for the easement across Willis’ property and whether PSO and BNSF were
unlawfully possessing that easement, while the state condemnation proceedings
remained pending, have now been finally determined in the state condemnation
(continued...)
31
doctrine of issue preclusion “may not be invoked if the party against whom the
earlier decision is interposed did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the critical issue in the previous case.” Id. (quotation omitted).
B. Applying these legal principles to Willis’ claims asserted in this
federal action
1. Willis’ state law claims alleging that PSO and BNSF
wrongfully possessed and used the easement across Willis’
property during the state condemnation proceeding
Willis asserts state law claims against both PSO and BNSF premised on
Willis’ belief that PSO and BNSF wrongfully possessed and used the easement
across Willis’ property during the state condemnation proceedings. 26 The state
25
(...continued)
action. “A final judgment is one in which no appeal has been perfected within the
time allotted by law or one in which an appeal has been properly perfected and
acted upon by the highest court whose review has been sought.” Nealis v. Baird,
996 P.2d 438, 459 (Okla. 1999). While the entire eminent domain proceeding is
not yet final, because the state courts are still considering the amount of
compensation to which Willis is entitled for the easement, see Willis, 155 P.3d at
849 n.7 (noting “that Oklahoma’s eminent domain procedures are not ‘complete’
until (1) the condemnor’s right to take is finally resolved and (2) the amount of
the condemnation award is determined”), that fact is of no moment because the
claims that Willis asserts in this federal action do not implicate the adequacy of
the compensation award. See 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller &
Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4434 (2d ed. 2002) (noting
“[r]ecent decisions have relaxed traditional views of the finality requirement by
applying issue preclusion to matters resolved by preliminary rulings or to
determinations of liability that have not yet been completed by an award of
damages or other relief,” particularly when the issue has been resolved “by appeal
prior to final judgment”); cf. Cities Serv. Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 980 P.2d 116,
127 (Okla. 1999) (applying federal preclusive principles).
26
Willis specifically alleged the following: 1) “From March 16, 1995 until it
(continued...)
32
courts’ final determination that PSO established a public use sufficient to warrant
its condemning an easement across Willis’ property and the Oklahoma courts’
determination that PSO and BNSF did not wrongfully possess the easement
during the state condemnation proceedings now preclude these claims.
PSO, of course, is the same party that initiated the state condemnation
action. And BNSF is in privity with PSO. “Privity is usually defined as mutual
or successive relationships to the same rights of property.” Sautbine v. Keller,
423 P.2d 447, 457 (Okla. 1966) (quotation omitted). However, “[t]here are no
26
(...continued)
abandoned possession of Willis’ property, BNSF was in wrongful possession of
Willis’ property.” 2) BNSF was unjustly enriched “[b]y virtue of [its] wrongful
possession and use of Willis’ property.” 3) After the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s
decision remanding the state condemnation proceeding to the state trial court, see
941 P.2d at 995, “Willis made a written demand that BNSF cease its wrongful
possession and use of Willis’ property.” BNSF rejected that demand and yet
continued to run trains across Willis’ property. Thus, “justice and equity require
that a [quasi-]contractual obligation be imposed on BNSF to compensate Willis
for the use of Willis’ property at the rate Willis was prepared to negotiate with”
BNSF. 4) BNSF was liable to Willis for punitive damages because BNSF’s
actions “in wrongfully possessing and using Willis’ property were done
deliberately, wantonly, intentionally and maliciously with full knowledge that
there was no easement or right of way across Willis’ property.” 5) PSO, acting in
concert with BNSF, trespassed on Willis’ property by possessing and using the
easement across Willis’ property. 6) PSO and BNSF are liable to Willis for
treble damages resulting from PSO’s trespass onto Willis’ property because PSO
and BNSF were able to gain possession of the easement across Willis’ property
“by means of a state eminent domain proceeding rife with fraud, bad faith and
oppressive conduct.” 7) Because PSO’s and BNSF’s possession of the easement
across Willis’ property was “void,” title to the easement should be quieted in
Willis. 8) Because PSO’s and BNSF’s possession and use of the easement across
Willis’ property was wrongful, they should be ejected and possession restored to
Willis.
33
hard and fast rules; the existence of privity depends upon the circumstances and
requires a person so identified in interest with another that he represents the same
legal right.” Wilson v. City of Tulsa, 91 P.3d 673, 677 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004)
(quotation omitted); see also Hildebrand v. Gray, 866 P.2d 447, 450-51 (Okla.
Civ. App. 1993). In this case, BNSF’s use of the easement running across Willis’
property, and BNSF’s right to use that easement, both stem from its contract with
PSO. And PSO’s right to access the easement across Willis’ property stems from
its ability to condemn and use that easement. Under these circumstances, then,
BNSF and PSO are in privity. Cf. State ex rel. Trimble v. Kindrick, 852 P.2d
758, 760-61 (Okla. Civ. App. 1992) (concluding corporate entity which received
the deed to a hospital sold to a second corporate entity stood in privity with the
second corporate entity in actions challenging sale of hospital).
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals determined, in the state
condemnation proceeding, that PSO was entitled to take possession of the
easement across Willis’ property after PSO paid the amount of compensation the
three-member commission awarded Willis, after the state trial court entered its
initial decision in that case. See Willis, 155 P.3d at 848-50. In reaching this
conclusion, the state appellate court specifically rejected Willis’ contention that
PSO was a trespasser at the time PSO built the railroad track across Willis’
property and began operating trains across it. See id.
The state condemnation proceedings, therefore, resolved the issue at the
34
heart of all of the state law claims that Willis asserts in this federal action, save
one. As part of the trespass claim Willis asserted against PSO, Willis alleged
that, although “PSO sought only to condemn a surface easement and explicitly
disclaimed any interest in the subsurface minerals,” PSO nevertheless “sever[ed]
and remove[d] coal and limestone from below the surface of the property.” See
generally Kirby-Smith Mach., Inc. v. City of Okla. City, 19 P.3d 331, 333 (Okla.
Civ. App. 2000) (noting “[e]asements are limited to the particular purpose for
which they are created”) (quotation omitted). The state eminent domain
proceedings, so far as we can tell, did not specifically address that issue.
The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals’ decision is now final, after both the
Oklahoma Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court denied Willis’
petition for a writ of certiorari, see Willis v. Pub. Serv. Co., 128 S. Ct. 66 (2007).
Lastly, Willis does not specifically assert, in its supplemental brief, that it
did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of whether PSO, and
BNSF through its contractual relationship with PSO, wrongfully possessed and
used the easement across Willis’ property during the state condemnation
proceedings. For these reasons, then, the state condemnation proceedings
preclude Willis from further pursuing his state law claims premised on allegations
that PSO and BNSF wrongfully possessed the easement across Willis’ property.
The state condemnation proceedings do not, however, preclude Willis from
pursuing its trespass claim to the extent that it alleges that PSO wrongfully
35
removed limestone and coal from underneath PSO’s surface easement across
Willis’ property.
2. Willis’ ICCTA claim
Willis asserts a claim seeking a declaratory judgment, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201, that the ICCTA preempts Oklahoma’s eminent domain statutes, as applied
to PSO’s condemnation of an easement across Willis’ property, because in
obtaining this easement, PSO is attempting to regulate interstate rail
transportation. Willis asserted this claim against all three defendants, PSO, BNSF
and Union Pacific. The final determinations made by the Oklahoma courts in the
state condemnation proceeding preclude Willis from further pursuing this claim.
PSO is the same party that initiated the state condemnation proceeding.
And, as discussed above, BNSF is in privity with PSO under the circumstances of
this case. Union Pacific owned the already existing track adjacent to PSO’s
power plant but is not otherwise involved in PSO’s condemnation action. Willis,
nevertheless, named Union Pacific as an “interested party” to its declaratory
judgment claim based upon the ICCTA. Willis apparently did so because the
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), provides, in pertinent part, that
“[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the
United States . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested
party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be
sought.” (Emphasis added.) Willis believed that the Declaratory Judgment Act
36
required Willis to name all parties “interested” in its claim and further believed
that Union Pacific was an interested party because PSO’s new track across Willis’
property had diverted business from Union Pacific. Under these circumstances,
we will deem Union Pacific to be in privity with PSO for purposes of this claim.
In the state condemnation action, Willis argued that the state trial court
“was without jurisdiction to enter its November 2004 Order because federal
regulation of railroads preempts any assertion of State authority over the rail spur
constructed by PSO.” Willis, 155 P.3d at 850. The Oklahoma Court of Civil
Appeals determined that Willis’ earlier federal action before the STB precluded
Willis from relitigating this issue. See id. In reaching this conclusion, the
Oklahoma appellate court noted that the STB, in the earlier federal administrative
proceedings, had determined that it did not have jurisdiction over PSO and its rail
line running across Willis’ property because PSO was not a rail carrier and
because PSO’s rail spur was a private track. See id. In light of that earlier
administrative determination, the Oklahoma appellate court held that, “[a]bsent
federal jurisdiction over PSO in its construction and operation of this rail spur,
there is no basis for federal preemption of the proceedings in the [state] Trial
Court.” Id. at 851.
The state appellate court’s determination is final. And Willis does not
specifically assert, in its appellate brief, that it did not have a full and fair
37
opportunity to litigate this issue before the Oklahoma appellate court. 27
Therefore, the state appellate court’s determination precludes Willis’ ICCTA
preemption claim asserted here.
3. Willis’ state and federal law claims challenging the
conduct of the state condemnation proceedings
Willis asserts several claims against PSO and BNSF challenging the general
manner in which the Oklahoma courts conducted the state condemnation
proceedings.
a. Willis’ due process/equal protection claim against
BNSF
Willis alleged, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that BNSF deprived Willis of both
due process and equal protection because, no later than the Oklahoma Supreme
Court’s decision in Willis, 941 P.2d 995, “BNSF was aware that its possession
and use of Willis’ property was wrongful and in violation of Willis’ constitutional
rights.” In addition, Willis alleged that BNSF is liable for punitive damages
because BNSF violated Willis’ due process and equal protection rights
“deliberately, wantonly, intentionally and maliciously.”
As previously discussed, BNSF is in privity with PSO, and PSO was a party
to the state condemnation action. In that condemnation action, the Oklahoma
27
Willis does assert, in its supplemental brief, that it did not have a full and
fair opportunity to litigate this issue in the STB proceeding. That is an issue that
Willis could have argued to the Oklahoma appellate court. But Willis does not
assert that it lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate the preclusive effect to
be given those STB proceedings before the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals.
38
Court of Civil Appeals finally determined that PSO, and thus BNSF through its
contractual relationship with PSO, was entitled to possess the easement after PSO
paid the determined amount of compensation to the court clerk on Willis’ behalf.
See Willis, 155 P.3d at 848-50. Willis does not specifically assert, in its
supplemental brief, that it did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate this
issue. Thus, the Oklahoma courts’ determination precludes Willis’ due
process/equal protection claim against BNSF.
b. Willis’ due process/equal protection claim against
PSO
Willis alleges, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that PSO, acting under color of
state law, seized the easement across Willis’ property in violation of Willis’
federal due process and equal protection rights. Specifically, Willis asserted that
PSO accomplished this seizure “by knowingly and deliberately prevailing on the
state district court to [exercise] its jurisdiction corruptly and issue an order that
contradicted what the state district court admitted it knew the law to be and
permit PSO to seize Willis’ property without giving Willis the process due in
violation of Willis’ rights under the Oklahoma Constitution.” Further, Willis
contends that PSO is liable for punitive damages because PSO violated Willis’
due process and equal protection rights “deliberately, wantonly, intentionally and
maliciously.”
Willis’ due process and equal protection claims are difficult to pin down.
39
In its opening brief, Willis asserted that “neither PSO nor BNSF had any right to
be on or had any rights in Willis’ property until” the state trial court’s November
15, 2004, order, following the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s remand. “Until that
date, they were trespassing on the property as state actors under color of state law
in violation of both Willis’ state law property rights under the Oklahoma
Constitution and Willis’ federally protected rights to due process and equal
protection of the law.” To the extent that this is the basis for Willis’ due process
and equal protection claims, the state courts finally resolved those issues against
Willis when the state court held that PSO and BNSF did not wrongfully possess
and use the easement during the state condemnation proceedings.
In its supplemental brief, however, Willis also asserts that its due process
and equal protection claims asserted against PSO are based instead upon the state
trial court initially depriving Willis of discovery and a hearing, the reasons for
which the Oklahoma Supreme Court remanded the state condemnation action to
the state trial court. In addition, in what appears to be an effort to allege that
PSO acted under color of state law, as is required for liability under § 1983,
Willis further alleged that PSO acted in concert with the state trial judge to
deprive Willis of due process and equal protection. 28 The state condemnation
28
“In order to state a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must ‘allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under
color of state law.’” Bruner v. Baker, 506 F.3d 1021, 1025-26 (10th Cir. 2007)
(continued...)
40
proceedings, as far as we can tell, did not specifically address and resolve such a
claim. To the extent that this is the basis for Willis’ due process and equal
protection claim, the already resolved state court matters do not preclude it. The
same is true for Willis’ claim for punitive damages stemming from these alleged
constitutional violations. Nevertheless, because those claims stem from the
ongoing state condemnation proceedings, they are not yet ripe for adjudication.
We, therefore, affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss these due
process/equal protection claims without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, final determinations that Oklahoma courts have
made in the state condemnation proceedings preclude Willis from pursuing all of
the state and federal claims Willis asserts in this action, with only two limited
exceptions. Final determinations made in the state proceedings do not preclude
1) Willis’ state law trespass claim to the extent it alleges that PSO wrongfully
removed coal and limestone from beneath the surface easement; and 2) Willis’
28
(...continued)
(quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). At different times, Willis
appears to have asserted, in a contradictory manner, that PSO was acting under
color of state law simply by exercising the eminent domain authority Oklahoma
law gave PSO and, alternatively, that PSO was acting under color of state law
instead by acting in concert with the state trial judge to deprive Willis of due
process and equal protection of the law, relying upon Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S.
24, 27-29 (1980) (holding private parties might act under color of state law if they
act in concert with state actor). We need not decide here whether PSO was, in
fact, acting under color of state law.
41
due process/equal protection claim asserted against PSO, to the extent that claim
is based upon allegations other than that PSO wrongfully possessed and used the
easement across Willis’ property during the state condemnation proceedings.
These two viable claims are, nevertheless, not yet ripe for adjudication. We,
therefore, AFFIRM the district court’s decision to dismiss them and REMAND
for the district court to dismiss these two claims without prejudice.
The rest of Willis’ claims are precluded. We, therefore, AFFIRM the
district court’s decision to dismiss those claims, but REMAND for the district
court to dismiss those claims with prejudice. See MACTEC, Inc. v. Gorelick, 427
F.3d 821, 827, 830-33 (10th Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal of precluded claim
with prejudice).
42